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Abstract 
 
Cyberstalking is a cyber-enabled crime which can be difficult to investigate and 
prosecute because offenders engage in the conduct in cyber space. The purpose of 
this study is to highlight the difficulties which police officers and prosecutors perceive 
hinder them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The study identifies 
solutions to the perceived difficulties and makes recommendations. 
  
The research participants consisted of 50 London prosecutors and 25 police officers. 
Participants provided data on the topic under investigation in their roles as the primary 
law enforcement officials who investigate and prosecute cyberstalkers. A Member of 
Parliament, probation official and Northern Ireland government policy adviser were 
also interviewed because they provided data from the perspectives of government and 
probation officials. 
 
The qualitative research method of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis was 
considered most appropriate because the study investigated the lived human 
experiences of the participants and their perceptions of the topic under investigation. 
Emergent themes were identified from the numerous interview transcripts and 
analysed to explore the experiences of the participants in relation to the research 
questions.  
 
The research identified various perceived thresholds for distinguishing rudeness, 
abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking. Additionally, the 
study 6 perceived law enforcement issues which frustrate police officers and 
prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers were identified. The 
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research further revealed that lack of resources, lack of knowledge and evidential 
difficulties are perceived to impede the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
Importantly, the study found that factors such as shortage of manpower, heavy 
caseloads, anonymity of cyberstalkers and victim behaviour can prevent police officers 
from risk assessing victims.  
 
The thesis therefore makes recommendations for the recruitment of additional staff, 
the regular training of police officers and prosecutors on cyberstalking and the 
education of victims by police officers of the risks posed by cyberstalkers and the 
implications of not supporting the prosecution of offenders. Importantly, the thesis 
recommends that police officers should be trained on how to identify, monitor and 
manage the risks posed by anonymous and mentally ill cyberstalkers.  
 
The recommendation for the CPS  is based on the researcher’s personal view of the 
research.  The researcher concedes that the research was conducted at a specific 
time and that a limited number of prosecutors were interviewed for the research. The 
researcher acknowledges that  there has been a lot of training of prosecutors by both 
the prosecution college and the central training team subsequent to the conclusion of 
this research. The researcher also recognises that the department is in the process 
of actively recruiting more prosecutors. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
 
 
Cyberstalking connotes the continuous targeting by repeated threats, intimidating 
messages, harassment, or sexual messages that are unwanted, persistent, and 
potentially intrusive via electronic and computer-based communication.1 It is an 
emerging phenomenon of the twenty first century which poses investigative difficulties 
for law enforcement officials. From a legislative perspective, Basu suggests that there 
should be a continuous debate on the regulation of cyber space given that a unique 
characteristic of cyber space is that it enables behaviours to be engaged in 
anonymously and devoid of any geographical barriers.2 Basu’s observation implicitly 
relates to the behaviour of cyberstalking which occurs in cyber space.  
 
Vasiu and Vasiu contend that there could be a correlation between the commission of 
violent crimes and cyberstalking.3 Against this background, the fatal risk associated 
with cyberstalking was manifested in the death of Lorna Smith who was murdered in 
the UK by a cyberstalker.4  From an international perspective, the fatal risk associated 
with cyberstalking was equally highlighted in the death of Amy Boyer who was 
murdered by a cyberstalker in the US.5 Further, in Ireland, the legal advisory body of 
the country has highlighted that online abuse has been connected to the psychological 
harm suffered by victims and has also, in some cases led to victims committing 
                                                          
1 Michelle Wright, ‘Cyberstalking Victimization, Depression, and Academic Performance: The Role of Perceived Social Support from 
Parents’ (2018) 2 CyberPschology, Behaviour and Social Networking 2 
2 Subhajit Basu and Richard Jones, ‘Regulating Cyberstalking’ (2007) 2 Journal of Information Law  and Technology  
3 Vasiu and Vasiu suggest that cyberstalking interferes with the victim’s rights to life, liberty, security and privacy. They make this 
observation from a human rights perspective 
4 ‘Stalker Clifford Mills Jailed for Killing Ex-Girlfriend’ (BBC, 6 February 2012) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-1613667>  
   accessed 21 September 2017 
5 Paul Bocji, Mark  Griffiths and Leroy McFarlane ‘Cyberstalking A New Challenge for Criminal Law’ (2002) 122  The Criminal  Lawyer  
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suicide.6 These cases demonstrate that cyberstalking akin to physical stalking, can 
lead to the deaths of victims.  
 
From an academic perspective, researchers have found that cyberstalking can have 
widespread consequences by affecting the psychological, social, interpersonal and 
economic aspects of life.7 The findings are based on recent research which has been 
conducted on the emotional impact of cyberstalking in the UK.8 The findings support 
the assertion of Vasiu and Vasiu that cyberstalking can have psychological, economic 
and physical effects on victims.9 From a victimisation perspective, a concern is that 
victims of cyberstalking who do not receive relevant support may wrongly blame 
themselves for being targeted by cyberstalkers. Consequently, in 2019, researchers 
in the UK conducted a study on how the volume and source of cyber abuse influences 
victim perceptions of online abuse.10 The study found that there was a co-relation 
between attractiveness and direct victim blame. The significance of this recent study 
is that it reveals that there is a perception that victims of cyber abuse such as 
cyberstalking and cyberbullying are attributed blame for the acts perpetrated against 
them.  
 
An additional study which was based on 35 victims of stalking and harassment found 
that stalking, harassment and cyberstalking implicitly can affect victims emotionally, 
                                                          
6  Cormac O’ Keffee,, ‘New Laws to Combat Online Abuse such as  Bullying and Revenge Porn’ (Irish Examiner, 27 September 2016 ) 
<www.irishexamminer.com/ireland.com/ireland/news-laws-to-combat-online-abuse-such-as-cyb’> accessed 21 June 2017 
7 Joanne Worsley, Jacqueline Wheatcroft  Emma Short and Rhiannon Corcoran,  ‘Victims’ Voices: Understanding the Emotional  Impact of 
Cyberstalking and Individuals’ Coping Responses’ (2017)  7 Sage Open 2  
8 Worsley, Wheatcroft, Short and Corcoran found that the emotional impacts of cyberstalking are anxiety and depression. The research 
sample consisted of 100 victims of cyberstalking who took part in an online survey 
9 Ioana Vasiu and Lucian Vasiu, ‘Cyberstalking: Nature and Response Recommendations’ (2013) 2 (9) Academic Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies <http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/download > accessed 1 May 2015 
10 Graham Scott, Stacey Wiencerz and Christopher Hand, ‘The volume and source of cyberabuse influences victim blame and perceptions of 
attractiveness’  (2019)  92 Computers in Human Behaviour  
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psychologically and physically.11 The study found that the behaviours had an impact 
on every aspect of a person’s life ranging from home to work.12 The study is significant 
because it revealed that victims of stalking, harassment and cyberstalking implicitly 
include individuals who have disabilities, care for someone with a disability and/or 
have a substance misuse problem. Additionally, the study found that victims include 
individuals who have mental health issues such as depression, anxiety and physical 
health problems such as angina, cancer, diabetes and arthritis.13  The researcher 
concurs with the academics who conducted this study because victimisation of 
vulnerable, mentally and physically ill individuals can worsen the impact of being 
stalked, harassed and cyberstalked implicitly14. 
 
Given the severe impacts of cyberstalking on victims, the challenge for the current 
research was to establish the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors in London 
on cyberstalking and the threshold of what constitutes acceptable behaviour on the 
internet. In doing so, the researcher examined the issues of the risk assessment of 
victims and the factors which frustrate the attempts of both police officers and 
prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
 
The researcher interviewed 63 UK law enforcement officials comprising of 25 police 
officers, 30 prosecutors, 1 probation officer, 1 Member of Parliament and 1 Northern 
Ireland government adviser.  
                                                          
11  ‘The Victim’s Journey  participatory research project seeking the views and experiences of victims of stalking and harassment’ (Justice 
inspectorate, July 2017) <A participatory research project seeking the views and experiences of victims of stalking and harassment> 
accessed 6 May 2019 
12  Out of the 35 participants, 14 completed an online survey, 5  were interviewed face to face and 16 were interviewed over the telephone 
13  ‘The Victim’s Journey  participatory research project seeking the views and experiences of victims of stalking and harassment’ (Justice 
inspectorate, July 2017) <A participatory research project seeking the views and experiences of victims of stalking and harassment> 
accessed 6 May 2019 
14 The implicit cyberstalking behaviours experienced by the participants include stalking via social media, phone calls, text messages and 
recording/taking pictures with a mobile phone 
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The factors listed below have been identified as posing a potential hindrance to the 
investigation of cyberstalkers. 
 
  1.1 Jurisdictional difficulties 
 
Jurisdictional difficulties constitute an obstacle for law enforcement officials because 
the unlimited reach of the internet enables cyberstalkers to harass victims 
instantaneously, cheaply and globally even when the cyberstalkers and the victims are 
in different geographical locations.15 From the perspective of victims, it has therefore 
been acknowledged that the fact that cyberstalkers can contact the victims from any 
jurisdiction can lead to victims living in a state of fear, terror, stress, anxiety or 
intimidation.16  
 
From a geographical perspective, there are two jurisdictional dimensions to 
Cyberstalking which could determine the extent to which international cooperation is 
required to bring a cyberstalker to justice. The first jurisdictional dimension entails 
cyberstalking which occurs when the cyberstalker and the victim reside in the same 
country. The second jurisdictional dimension encompasses cyberstalking which 
occurs cross-jurisdictionally where the cyberstalker and the victim reside in different 
countries.  
 
                                                          
15 Naomi Goodno, ‘Cyberstalking A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws’ (2007) 72 (1)    
   Missouri Law Review <http://www.file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/SSRN-id1674176%20(1).pdf > accessed 28 July 2018 
16 Steven Hazelwood and Sarah Koon-Magnin, ‘Cyberstalking and Cyber Harassment Legislation in the United States: A Qualitative  
   Analysis’ (2013) 17 (2) International Journal of Cyber Criminology 
   <http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/hazelwoodkoonmagninijcc2013vol7issue2.pdf >  accessed  9 August 2018 
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From a law enforcement perspective, the first dimension to cyberstalking may pose 
little or no jurisdictional difficulties given that the victim and the perpetrator reside in 
the same geographical location. The second jurisdictional dimension on the other hand 
is more problematic for UK law enforcement officials given that there will be an onus 
on the other countries to cooperate with UK police officers and prosecutors during the 
investigation process. The second dimension is problematic because it is questionable 
whether the law enforcement officials in the other countries will cooperate with the UK 
police officers during the investigation process.  
 
From a jurisdictional perspective, prior to investigating a case, UK police officers will 
have to establish that an offence has been committed and ascertain which criminal 
law will be applicable. Against this background in relation to the investigation of 
cybercrime, Brown highlights that several factors such as ascertaining where a crime 
was committed and dealing with conflicting laws can create problems for police 
officers, prosecutors and judges.17 Brown argues that the difficulties can make it 
challenging to issue warrants, draft subpoenas and conduct trials.18  
 
From an extradition perspective, when investigating a case where a cyberstalker and 
the victim reside in different jurisdictions, UK police officers and prosecutors face the 
related difficulty of identifying which jurisdictional law will be applicable to a given case.  
This is because the law enforcement authorities in a cyberstalker’s country of 
residence could refuse to extradite a suspect on the grounds that they do not extradite 
nationals. Consequently, Shearer argues that some international extradition treaties 
                                                          
17 Cameron  Brown, ‘Investigating and Prosecuting Cybercrime: Forensic Dependencies and Barriers to Justice’ (2015) 9 International 
Journal of Cyber Criminology 1  
18 Applying Brown’s line of reasoning to the conduct of cyberstalking which is an aspect of cybercrime, UK police officers and prosecutors 
may encounter similar difficulties in the investigation of cyberstalkers given the jurisdictional and legislative implications of prosecuting 
 cyberstalkers 
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may contain either mandatory or discretionary bars to the extradition of nationals 
exempting countries from extraditing citizens.19 Shearer suggests that there is no 
moral duty on countries to extradite a fugitive in the absence of an extradition treaty.20  
 
Another aspect of the jurisdictional problem is that sometimes, cyberstalkers 
perpetrate the offence from several jurisdictions when the victim and the cyberstalker 
reside in different countries.21 Therefore, Ogilvie stresses that confirmation has to be 
sought regarding which jurisdiction has the responsibility of regulating cyberstalking 
where for example, a suspect harasses a victim from four different jurisdictions.22 
Ogilvie notes that the borderless feature of cyberstalking and challenges of legislative 
control make it difficult to establish which jurisdiction has the responsibility prosecuting 
a cross-jurisdictional cyberstalker.23  
 
Against the above background, previously conducted research has indicated that the 
investigation of cyberstalkers can be hindered by certain difficulties. In particular, a 
study was conducted on the number of cases that were handled by the New York 
Police Department’s Computer and Investigation unit.24 The study examined the 
number of cases that were handled by the New York City department between January 
1996 and 2000 involving the use of the computer or the internet by criminals to 
perpetrate the offence of aggravated harassment which is synonymous to  
                                                          
19 Ivan Shearer, ‘Non-Extradition of  Nationals: A Review and a Proposal’ (1966)   2 Adelaide Law Review Association 3 
20 Applying Shearer’s line of reasoning to the study, it is debatable whether foreign countries will honour the requests of UK police officers 
to extradite cyberstalkers if there are no extradition treaties. This area of uncertainty therefore casts a doubt on the effectiveness of extradition 
as a law enforcement method of international cooperation in this regard 
21 The ability of cyberstalkers to perpetrate the offence from various geographical locations could undermine the efforts of UK police 
officers to seek the prompt extradition of suspects 
22 Emma Ogilvie, ‘Cyberstalking Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice’ (2005) 166 Australian Institute of Criminology  
23 It is therefore questionable whether police officers in the UK can successfully investigate a cross-jurisdictional cyberstalker where the 
perpetrator sends offensive and threatening messages to a victim resident in the UK for example and then flees to Ireland and subsequently, 
the US from where he sends further messages 
24Robert D’Ovidio and James  Doyle, ‘A study of Cyber stalking Understanding Investigative Hurdles’ (2003)  72 FBI Law Enforcement  
   Bulletin 3 
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cyberstalking.25  The study found that 192 out of 201 cyberstalking cases were closed 
without any action having been taken against the perpetrators even after evidence 
was found to support a victim’s allegation  
 
In summary, UK police officers will encounter jurisdictional difficulties in seeking to 
prosecute cyberstalkers given that there are no geographical barriers to the behaviour. 
Considering the above observations, it is arguable that UK police officers may 
successfully prosecute cyberstalkers who are resident in other countries subject to the 
jurisdictional challenges identified above being overcome, however the focus of this 
thesis is the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers in the UK. 
. 
1.2 Legislative difficulties  
 
There is generally no accepted definition of cyberstalking.26 This lack of a universal 
definition has arguably placed an onus on countries including the UK to enact 
adequate legislation regulating the criminal behaviour of cyberstalking. Consequently, 
Van der Aa notes that as is the case with traditional stalking, it is a challenge to define 
cyberstalking.27 Van der Aa highlights that an aggravating factor is deciphering 
whether cyberstalking should be viewed as a new type of criminal behaviour or simply 
an aspect of stalking in the physical realm.28  
 
                                                          
25 The significance of the research findings is twofold. First, it established that jurisdictional difficulties could hinder the investigation of 
cybestalking cases. Second, the research highlighted that the police could be reluctant to investigate such cases if cyberstalkers and victims 
reside in different locations.  
26  Ioana Vasiu and Lucian Vasiu, ‘Cyberstalking: Nature and Response Recommendations’ (2013) 2 Academic Journal of  
    Interdisciplinary Studies 9  
27  Suzanne Van der Aa, ‘International (Cyber) stalking, Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution’ (Pure, 1 January 2011)  
    <www.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1310512/Aa_International_cyberstalking_110216_posprint_embargo_1_y.pdf  >  accessed 9 August 2018 
28 This area of uncertainty can create legislative difficulties insofar as it results in countries either adopting different legislative approaches to 
criminalising cyberstalking in the absence of a universally accepted definition for the behaviour or choosing not to regulate the conduct 
22 
 
Given that cyberstalking needs to be a proscribed conduct for perpetrators to be 
brought to justice, relevant legislation needs to be enacted to criminalize and regulate 
the conduct. This is more so because the legal system is not structured to tackle 
offences committed by cybercriminals in the cyberworld.29 Basu implies that there is a 
perception that legislation will only be an effective means of control if the cyberstalker 
can be identified. Against this backdrop, Geach and Haralambous suggests that to 
ensure that the law is definite, the legislation should provide a clear and precise 
definition of cyberstalking.30 Geach and Haralambous emphasise that in the 
information and technology sector, criminalising a conduct that is specific to online 
acts may be problematic if due to technological advancement, a particular technology 
becomes so outdated that it no longer matches the technology as specified in an 
offence.31 
 
Two aspects of legislative difficulties could hinder the efforts of UK police officers and 
prosecutors to prosecute cyberstalkers. The first aspect is that existing legislation may 
not specifically prohibit cyberstalking thereby placing an onus on UK police officers to 
establish that an offence has been committed. The second aspect of the legislative 
difficulty is that perpetrators could threaten victims from countries where no laws on 
cyberstalking exist.  In the jurisdiction of Ireland for example, no legislation has been 
enacted to criminalize either offline stalking or cyberstalking. Consequently, O’Keeffe, 
highlights that the law reform commission in Ireland has recommended the creation of 
                                                          
29 Subhajit Basu and Richard Jones, ‘Regulating Cyberstalking’ (2007) 2 Journal of  Information  Law and Technology  
30 Neal Geach and Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating Online Harassment: Is the Law fit for the Social Networking Age?’ (2009) 73 Journal 
of Criminal Law 3 
31  Geach and Haralambous highlight that in such situations, the technology develops into something which no longer matches, what is  
    defined in the offence 
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new offences to tackle online abuse in respect of cyberbullying and revenge 
pornography.32  
 
In consideration of the above, this research will focus on the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalking in the UK as a specific cyber enabled aspect of 
cybercrime.  
 
1.2.1   Regulation of cyberstalking in the United Kingdom  
 
In the UK following public concern, the coalition government attempted to regulate 
cyberstalking on 25 November 2012 via the amendment of the Protection from 
Harassment Act (PHA).33 The PHA was consequently expanded via sections 2A (1), 
4A (i) (b) (i)) and 4A (i) (b) (ii) respectively to create the statutory offences of “stalking”, 
“stalking involving fear of violence”  and “stalking involving serious alarm or distress”. 
 
From a law enforcement perspective, although cyberstalking is not specifically defined 
as an offence, the newly created laws have been drafted broadly to incorporate 
elements of cyberstalking.34 The researcher therefore anticipates that the legislative 
amendments will assist UK police officers and prosecutors to an extent in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
 
                                                          
32 Cormac O’Keeffe, ‘New Laws to Combat  Online Abuse Such as Cyber Bullying and Revenge Porn’ (Irish Examiner ,27 September 
2016) <www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/new-laws-to-combat-online-abuse-such-as-cyber bullying-and-revenge-porn-422963.html> 
accessed 9August 2018 
33 Section 111 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 came into force on 25 November 2012 thereby creating the new offences of stalking 
    and stalking involving serious alarm or distress  
34 Section 2A (3) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 gives seven examples of acts or omission which amount to stalking. Five of  
   the examples under ss 2A (3) (b) (c) (d) (f) and (g) highlight activities carried out by cyberstalkers 
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In Northern Ireland which is part of the UK, there is no specific legislation on stalking 
and cyberstalking. This has led to the committee of justice embarking on a review of 
the need to for stalking legislation in Northern Ireland. To this effect, in making a 
submission to the committee, academics at the Queen’s University of Belfast, School 
of Law, concluded that the current law in Northern Ireland is not effectively tackling 
stalking.35 The academics suggested that a specific legislation on stalking would 
ensure that stalking is effectively tackled. This implies that it is vital for legislation on 
cyberstalking to be enacted with a view to regulating the behaviour and holding 
perpetrators accountable for their actions.36 Against this backdrop, Holt, Bossler and  
Seigfried-Spellar highlight that certain factors such as the cheap prices of 
technological gadgets, the easy access of technology, the minimal technical 
knowledge required to commit some offences and the ability to instantaneously 
victimise on a large scale globally, collectively make cybercrime and cyberdeviance 
attractive to offenders.37 Holt, Bossler and Seigfried-Spellar’s observations implicitly 
relate to cyberstalkers who as cyberdeviants, are a specific breed of cybercriminals.38  
 
In summary, it can therefore be argued that the legislative measures which have been 
taken by the UK parliament in 2012 to create the 2 new offences of stalking and 
stalking involving serious alarm or distress, is a step in the right direction given that 
police officers and prosecutors in the UK can utilise the legislation as a tool to bring 
cyberstalkers to justice. Further from a civil law perspective, the recently enacted 
Stalking Protection Act 2019 has provided police officers with an additional tool to 
                                                          
35 Rachel Kilean, John Stannard, Gillian Mcnaul, Shaghayegh Belgi, Alexandra Born, Stephanie Johnston and  Jaclyn Watters ‘Review of  
   the Need for Stalking Legislation in Ireland’ (Pure, 2016) <www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/justice/stalking- 
    inquiry/qub-law-school.pdf > accessed 28 July 2018 
36 This is more so because if cybercrime is not regulated via legislation, it could lead to perpetrators avoiding extradition and prosecution 
due to lack of legislation 
37Thomas Holt, Adam Bossler and Kathryn Seigfried-Spellar, Cybercrime and Digital Forensics (2nd edn, Routledge 2018) 1 
38 Holt, Bossler and Siegfried-Spellar point out that the risk of detection from law enforcement is lower in the cyber realm than in the physical 
realm 
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protect victims.39 The Stalking Protection Act 2019 creates a new civil stalking 
protection order to protect members of the public from risks associated with stalking 
and empowers police officers to make applications for a new order to a magistrates’ 
court.40 Therefore the Home Office explanatory note emphasises that the intention of 
the Act is to provide the police with an extra weapon with which to protect victims of 
stalking and to fill a gap within the existing protective system.41 The significance of the 
new stalking order is that it enables Police officers to utilize the order as a tool for 
protecting victims in five different cases as discussed in the Home Office explanatory 
note.42  
 
1.2.2 Regulation of cyberstalking in Ireland 
 
In comparison to the UK government, Ireland has not taken legislative steps to 
criminalize cyberstalking. Hence, Gleenson highlights that there is a call for 
cyberstalking laws to be updated.43 McCarthy echoes Gleeson’s view and emphasises 
that to regulate cyberstalking in Ireland, the current legislation banning harassment 
and threats will be extended to criminalize online activity and social media activities 
especially. 44 
 
The implication is that Irish law enforcement officials still utilise existing legislation on 
harassment to prosecute perpetrators in the absence of a specific cyberstalking 
                                                          
39 ‘Royal Assent: Stalking Protection Bill Signed into Law’ (Parliament, 15 March 2019) 
<https://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2019/march/royal-assent-stalking-protection-bill-signed-into-law/> accessed 18 January 2020 
40 ‘Stalking Protection Act 2019 Explanatory Notes’ (Home Office,2019 ) 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2019/9/pdfs/ukpgaen_20190009_en.pdf> accessed 18 January 2020 
41 ibid 
42 The cases are when the does not occur in a domestic abuse situation, context, or offenders are strangers who are not the current or 
previous partners of victims; the criminal threshold has not, or has not yet, been met or the victim does not support a prosecution 
43  Colin Gleeson,  ‘Call for cyber-stalking laws to be updated’ (The Irish Times, 25 November 2015) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/call-for-cyber-stalking-laws-to-be-updated-1.2443829>accessed> 18 December 2019 
44 Kieran McCarty ‘Ireland to make Revenge porn, Cyberstalking Criminal Acts’ (Register, 16 May 2017)  
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/16/ireland_cyberstalking_criminal/> accessed  18 December 2019 
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legislation.45 The inadequate legislative situation in Ireland highlights the second of 
the legislative difficulties identified above which is that some countries are yet to 
criminalize cyberstalking.  
 
The fact that cyberstalking is yet to be criminalised in Ireland has led to public concern 
among certain sectors in Ireland. Consequently, on 12 February 2014, the Women’s 
Aid Domestic Violence charity in Ireland launched an awareness campaign requesting 
a legislative change to tackle digitally assisted stalking or cyberstalking.46 The 
outcome of the campaign was that there was a heightened public awareness on the 
effects of cyberstalking on victims in so far as it relates to domestic violence. Further, 
the independent Law Reform Commission in Ireland conducted a public consultation 
on whether the harassment offence in section 10 of the Non-Fatal Offences against 
the Person Act 1997 should be amended to incorporate a specific reference to cyber 
harassment.47 Baker notes that in seeking legal opinion on whether a specific 
legislation was required for cyber harassment, the Irish Law Reform Commission 
requested that members of the public comment on issues such as the creation of 
harmful websites and fake profile pages on social networking sites in order to 
impersonate the victim and post harmful or private messages in the victim’s name.  
 
On 6 October 2014, the findings of the Law Reform Commission in Ireland were 
published. The commission recommended among other things that a specific 
reference to cyber harassment in section 10 of the Non-Fatal Offences against the 
                                                          
45  The primary legislation is section 10 of the Non -Fatal offences against the Persons Act 1997.  The statute creates the offence of  
     harassment and prohibits the harassment of a person by any means without lawful authority or reasonable excuse 
46‘Women’s Aid Urges Government Action on Stalking and Abuse Among Young Women’ (Women’s Aid, 13 February 2014)  
    <www.womensaid.i.e/newsevents> accessed 17 April 2016 
47 Jennifer Baker, ‘Ladies and Trolls: Should We Make Cyber bullying a Crime?’ (The register,5 January 2015) 
<www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/05/speak_your_brains_should_we_criminalise_cyber bullys_asks_ireland/  >  accessed 9 August 2018   
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Person Act 1997 should be incorporated into the legislation as it would clarify the 
scope of the section and might increase the reporting and the prosecution of cyber 
harassment cases.48 The researcher anticipates that if the recommendation is 
implemented, the UK police officers investigating a cyberstalker in Ireland could argue 
that the amended legislation which expressly prohibits cyber harassment via any 
means, implicitly prohibits cyberstalking too. 
 
The Law Reform Commission in Ireland has also recommended the creation of new 
offences to tackle online abuse in respect of cyberbullying and revenge pornography.49  
Notably, Bardon highlights that the Irish government will draft the Non-Fatal Offences 
(Amendment) Bill to address loopholes in current legislation in order to criminalize 
stalking, including cyberstalking, and revenge porn criminal offences.50 It is anticipated 
that the legislative change will extend the offence of harassment to ensure it includes 
activity online and on social media. 
 
1.2.3. Response of the ISPs 
 
 
Given the global and technologically reliant features of cyberstalking, there is a public 
expectation that the internet companies such as Google and Facebook should have 
responsibility to introduce specific measures to tackle the use of the internet to 
disseminate offensive messages in addition to addressing online harassment in 
                                                          
48‘ Issues on Paper Crime Affecting Personal Safety, Privacy and Reputation Including Cyber bullying’ (Law Reform Commission, 2014)   
    <www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/Issues%20Papers/ip6Cybercrime.pdf> accessed  10 August 2018 
49  Cormac O’Keeffe, ‘New Laws to Combat Online Abuse such As Cyber Bullying and Revenge Porn’ (Irish Examiner ,27 September 
2016) <www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/new-laws-to-combat-online-abuse-such-as-cyber bullying-and-revenge-porn-422963.html>  
accessed 9 August 2018 
50 Sarah Bardon, ‘Stalking and Revenge Porn to become criminal offences’ (Irish Times, 31 December 2016) 
<www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/stalking-and-revenge-porn-to-become-criminal-offences-1.2921564> accessed 13 November 
2019 
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general and cyberstalking specifically. Such public expectation is understandable 
given that cybercriminals are utilising the internet to commit further offences in addition 
to cyberstalking. To this effect, on 18 January 2018, Wilkinson and Kelly reported that 
drug dealers are using Facebook, Instagram and Twitter as platforms to sell drugs to 
children on social media websites.51 
 
From a law enforcement perspective on 7 February 2017, it was further reported that 
Twitter had announced new measures to tackle abuse and online harassment.52  It 
was envisaged that the highlighted measures would protect customers from abuse 
and harassment, stop banned users from creating new accounts and introduce a 
feature which will enable the company to remove sensitive tweets.53  Specifically, it 
was highlighted that Twitter had previously banned prominent individuals for either 
engaging in or instigating the targeted abuse of individuals and had additionally 
suspended the accounts of 360,000 customers for violating its policies against the 
promotion of terrorism and violent extremism.  
 
In addition to the above, Wilkinson and Kelly emphasise that Facebook employed an 
extra three thousand people to review the videos of crimes and suicides in light of 
murders that have been broadcasted live on the network.54 Further, it has been 
stressed that Google has recently introduced a new measure to identify and remove 
offensive materials on YouTube.55 The observation was made from two standpoints. 
                                                          
51 Ben Wilkinson and Tom Kelly ‘The Facebook Drug Dealers Exposed: Cannabis Peddled to Children on Social Media’ Daily Mail  
 (London, 18 January 2018) 1 
52  ‘Twitter Announces New Measures to Target Abuse and Harassment’ (The Guardian, 7 February 2017) 
     <www.the guardian.com/technology2017/feb07 > accessed 17 January 2017 
53 ibid  
54 ‘Facebook to Hire Another 3,000 People to Review Videos of Crime and Suicides’  (Belfast Telegraph, 3 May 2017)  
    <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/bisiness/technology/facebook> accessed 17 January 2018 
55 ‘Google Bows to Pressure to Tackle Extremists’  (The Week, June 20 2017)  
     <www.week.co.uk/85809-google-bows-to-pressure-to> accessed 19 January 2018 
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The first standpoint suggests that Google will recruit independent experts to assist the 
company while adopting a strict approach to the removal of videos that violate the 
policies of the company. The second standpoint demonstrates that Google will expand 
the role of YouTube in combating the radicalization of individuals online by terrorists. 
 
It is evident from this that Twitter, Facebook and Google respectively are taking some 
measures to tackle the dissemination of offensive messages via the internet albeit 
without making specific reference to cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime.56 
However, in light of the current international political climate and the constant global 
threat of terrorist attacks, the researcher is of the view that there may be a danger of 
the government and the ISPs focusing principally on the constant threat of cyber 
terrorist attacks and the related problem of the radicalization of individuals on the 
internet by extremists as opposed to the activities of cyberstalkers.57  
 
Against the above backdrop, MacAskill highlights that Ciaran Martin the head of the 
National Cybersecurity Centre has warned that a major cyber-attack in the UK which 
could disrupt British elections and infrastructures is inevitable.58 The observation was 
made from a perspective which suggests that such an attack is anticipated to happen 
in the next two years and measures have to be implemented to address the threat.  
The implication is that cyberstalking may not be considered a priority for the UK 
government in comparison to certain topical cybercrimes.  
 
                                                          
56 The measures range from the removal of offensive materials on the internet to suspending the accounts of cybercriminals 
57 The researcher recognizes that in light of the regular media reporting of terrorist attacks and the radicalization of youths, there is a danger 
of the government and the ISPs justifying their envisaged decision to focus primarily on cyber security on the grounds that cyber terrorists 
and extremists pose a real and serious threat to national security 
58 Ewen MacAskill, ‘Destructive Attack on UK A Matter of ‘When Not If’, Warns Cyber Chief’ The Guardian (London, 22 January 2018)  
    1 
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Despite the various measures discussed above which have been implemented by 
Twitter, Facebook and Google on 17 January 2020, a report prepared by the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists on technology and the mental health of children and young 
people was published which identified  several measures that social medial companies 
and ISPs arguably should implement to protect children and young people.59 The 
measures are for social media companies to highlight communication with risky 
content, offer assistance to vulnerable people, liaise with mental health charities and 
fund media literacy awareness campaigns.60 The report is crucial because it 
demonstrates that the debate on the onus of the social media companies and ISPs to 
protect victims is ongoing.  
 
1.2.4   Evidential challenges 
 
The ability of UK police officers and prosecutors to gather incriminating electronic 
evidence is a pre-requisite for the successful prosecution of cyberstalkers.61  Without 
the required evidence, Prosecutors will be unable to build strong cases against 
perpetrators.62 This is more so because, as the primary prosecuting authority in the 
UK, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is required to apply the full code test which 
is set in the CPS code for crown prosecutors. The test comprises of the evidential and 
the public interest tests.63 
 
                                                          
59 ‘Technology Use and the Mental Health of Children’ (Royal College of Psychiatrists, 18 January 2020) 
<https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/docs/default-source/improving-care/better-mh-policy/college-reports/college-report-cr225.pdf> accessed 18 
January 2020 
60 ibid 
61 The Incriminating evidence will be crucial for the prosecution of cross- jurisdictional cyberstalkers 
62 The electronic evidence includes emails, phone data and electronic printouts from the various social networking sites such as Twitter and  
    Facebook  
63 ‘The Code  for Crown Prosecutors’ (CPS, 20 October 2018)  <www.cps.gov.uk/publications-code-for-crown-Prosecutors> accessed  25 
March 2019 
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Based on the Evidential Test, UK prosecutors will have to decide whether the evidence 
presented is sufficient and credible to charge a cyberstalker and whether there is a 
realistic prospect of convicting them. Additionally, if there is sufficient evidence to 
warrant a prosecution or settlement out of court, prosecutors will also be required to 
apply the public interest test to decide whether it is in the public interest to prosecute 
a cyberstalker.64  
 
The significance of the public interest questions is that the questions which are not 
exhaustive, enable prosecutors to ascertain the relevant public interest factors tending 
for and against prosecution. Crucially, the public interest test requires prosecutors to 
consider seven questions. The first, second and third questions consider the 
seriousness of the offence, the level of culpability and the circumstances of and the 
harm caused to the victim. The fourth, and fifth public interest questions to be 
considered by prosecutors are the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence 
and the impact on the community. The sixth and seventh questions require 
prosecutors to consider if prosecution is an appropriate response and if sources of 
information require protecting.65 
 
There is an onus on UK police officers to ensure that during the investigation of 
 cyberstalkers, the electronic evidence is retrieved legally, stored appropriately and 
analysed by a computer forensic expert if required. This is more so given that the 
electronic evidence could be lost or rendered inadmissible in court if they are not 
preserved properly or obtained after following proper procedures.66   
                                                          
64 ibid 
65 ibid 
66 ‘Practice Advice on Investigating  Stalking and Harassment’ (ACPO, 2009) <www.library.college.police.uk/docs/acpo/practice-advice-
stalking-harrasment-2009>  accessed 9 August 2017 
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From a legal perspective, if police officers believe that a cyberstalker has committed 
an indictable offence and that evidence of that offence is in the cyberstalker’s 
premises, they will be legally required to obtain a search warrant.67 The significance 
of the warrant is that it may also authorize persons accompanying the police officers 
conducting the search such as computer experts. Consequently, there is an onus on 
UK police officers to ensure that they obtain search warrants and comply with 
applicable jurisdictional legislation prior to searching, confiscating and storing the 
computer devices of perpetrators. Where the onus is not discharged, there is a risk 
that any evidence obtained from such searches will be rendered inadmissible at trial. 
The difficulty for UK police officers is ensuring that they adhere to jurisdictional laws 
when investigating cyberstalkers given that the laws may be divergent.68 
 
Marion highlights that it is not always easy to obtain and preserve the evidence 
required to prove a cyberstalker’s criminal identity or to acquire and preserve 
electronic evidence.69 Therefore, Burmester, Henry and Kermes emphasise that digital 
evidence presents a new challenge for law enforcement officials seeking to prosecute 
cyberstalkers due to its easily corruptible features70.  Burmester, Henry and Kermes 
have further argued that accessing the digital evidence stored in foreign jurisdictions 
could significantly complicate the investigation process, more especially where an 
offender resides in a given country and the required digital evidence is in a different 
country.  
                                                          
67 ‘ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence’ (CPO, 2012) < www.digital-detective.net/digital-forensics-
documents/ACPO_Good_Practice_Guide_for_Digital_Evidence_v5.pdf> accessed 2 December 2018 
68 Nancy Marion, ‘The Council of Europe: An Exercise in Symbolic Legislation’ (2010) 4 International Journal of Cyber Criminology 2 
69 ibid 
70 Mike Burmester, Peter Henry and Leo Kermes, ‘Tracking Cyberstalkers: A cryptographic  Approach’ (ACM, 2005) <www.cs.fs.edu-
burmeste/cyberstalking/pdf> accessed 19 August 2014 
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Cyberstalking contains a lot of digital evidence given that cyberstalkers tend to leave 
a trail of digital evidence when disseminating malicious messages.71 From an 
evidential perspective, UK police officers will be required to send a preservation order 
to an ISP in a bid to prevent any change or deletion of a cyberstalker’s data until a 
court order or a search warrant has been obtained. Sammon argues that a 
preservation order will prevent an ISP from deleting existing data pertaining to an 
internet subscriber, which indirectly includes a cyberstalker.72 There is therefore an 
obligation on UK police officers and prosecutors to obtain, secure and preserve the 
required digital evidence to enable them to build robust cases against cyberstalkers.73  
 
On obtaining a preservation order, UK police officers are expected to submit the 
search warrant, court order or subpoena to the social media provider and the ISP with 
a view to obtaining the relevant data. The preservation order must be in relation to a 
specific account and time frame.74  The researcher however envisages that the criteria 
might create evidential difficulties where the identity of the cyberstalker is anonymous. 
In such a scenario, an ISP may be unable to store and save the existing data that is 
specific to an anonymous cyberstalker.75 
 
A further dimension to the evidential challenge faced by UK law enforcement officials 
is that where electronic data is publicly accessible on the internet, there is an onus on 
UK police officers to ensure that subsequent investigations do not infringe on a 
                                                          
71 The digital evidence consists of internet history records, emails, instant messaging, blogs, text messages and videos among others 
72 John Sammon, (2015), Digital Forensics: Threatscapes and Best Practice (first published, 2015) 62 
73 To fulfil this obligation, UK police officers will be required to overcome the evidential hurdle of obtaining a judicial warrant to either seize 
the digital evidence or to request for it to be produced  
74 John Sammon, (2015), Digital Forensics: Threatscapes and Best Practice (first published, 2015) 62 
75 This is because, in theory, prior to obtaining a search warrant or production order, UK police officers are required to obtain a preservation 
order for the retention of a cyberstalker’s computer data. In reality however, it might be a challenge for the UK police officers to obtain the 
preservation order if a cyberstalker is anonymous 
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cyberstalker’s right to privacy which is guaranteed under Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights 1953. The right governs the processing of data relating 
to the private lives of individuals which implicitly includes the likes of cyberstalkers and 
other criminal deviants.76 Given that cyberstalkers can argue that they have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the information stored on their 
electronic devices which should not be subject to police investigations, there is a 
further onus on UK police officers to ensure that there is a legal basis for obtaining 
publicly accessible data on the internet which pertains to a cyberstalker.77 
 
In addition to the above, a further evidential difficulty which could be encountered by 
UK police officers is that it may be difficult for them to establish the computer that was 
used by a cyberstalker to disseminate offensive messages or to prove the identity of 
the perpetrator. This is because, the relevant computer may be in a public library or 
an internet cafe.78  Geach and Haralambous therefore argue that there is no guarantee 
that the identification of a computer which was used by a cyberstalker to perpetrate a 
cyberstalking act will provide an evidential link to the cyberstalker.  
 
In summary, UK police officers and prosecutors will face various evidential and 
procedural issues in seeking to obtain, preserve and analyse the digital evidence 
required to prosecute cyberstalkers. The challenge for UK police officers and 
prosecutors is to overcome the highlighted difficulties with a view to building robust 
cases against cyberstalkers and bringing them to justice.  
 
                                                          
76 Bert-Jaap.Koops, ‘Police Investigations in Open Internet Sources: Procedural Law Issues’  (2013)  29 Computer Law & Security Review  
6    
77 ibid 
78 Neal Geach and Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating Harassment: Is the Law Fit for the Social Networking Age?’ (2009) 72 Journal of 
Criminal Law 3l  
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1.2.5 Financial challenges 
 
The prosecution of cyberstalkers will involve the analysis of electronic intangible 
evidence. Consequently, the investigating police officers may be required to instruct 
forensic experts in an attempt to recover and analyse electronic data from the 
electronic gadgets of cyberstalkers.79 The forensic experts play a significant role in the 
investigation process because they assist in the analysis of coded materials which 
could connect a cybercriminal to an offence.80 To this effect, Casey suggests that 
encryption can constitute a strong obstacle in the forensic examination of digital 
evidence.81 Casey highlights that the computer forensic examiners will assist in the 
recovery of encrypted data which have been used by criminals to conceal incriminating 
evidence. 
 
The difficulty for UK police officers is establishing that it is justifiable to instruct forensic 
experts who will be tasked with analysing, recovering and interpreting encrypted digital 
data which have been used by cyberstalkers to conceal incriminating evidence given 
the financial implications. A further financial difficulty which UK police officers could 
encounter is establishing who will pay the fees of the forensic computer expert. The 
Metropolitan Police Service acknowledges that the process of obtaining computer 
evidence could be expensive but nevertheless, contends that if handled effectively, it 
could provide compelling evidence.82 It is however, questionable whether 
                                                          
79 In doing so, the police officers will face the financial challenge of instructing computer forensic experts thereby incurring expenses 
80 Eoghan Casey, ‘Practical Approaches to Recovering Encrypted Digital Evidence’ (2002) 1 International Journal of Digital Evidence 3 
81 ibid 
82 ‘Good Practice Guide For Computer Based Electronic Evidence’, (ACPO) 
<www.whereismydata.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/acpo20guide20v30.pdf> accessed 12 August 2018 
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cyberstalking would be prioritised as a serious offence justifying the very high costs 
that will be incurred in obtaining crucial computer evidence.83 
 
In addition to the above, financial expenses will be incurred when the UK law 
enforcement officials commence extradition proceedings against a cyberstalker. In 
effect, the extradition of a cyberstalker will involve public funding. Crucially, critics may 
argue that it is not justifiable for police officers to spend significant amounts of public 
funds on the extradition of cyberstalkers if the public view is that the cyberstalkers 
probably do not pose the same level of threats to society in comparison to other 
criminals such as murders, rapists, paedophiles and terrorists. However, given that 
some perpetrators have ended up killing victims, it could be counter argued that it is 
in the interest of both the victims and society for cyberstalkers to be brought to justice 
by extraditing, prosecuting and sentencing them accordingly.84  
 
1.2.6   Anonymity of cyberstalkers on the internet  
 
Anonymity connotes the ability of individuals to utilise the internet without disclosing 
personal information that might enable other internet users to identify them.85 The 
internet affords cyberstalkers the opportunity to harass, intimidate and threaten victims 
under the cloak of anonymity. Against this backdrop, Roberts highlights the anonymity 
of the internet as an investigative problem for law enforcement officials given that the 
perpetrators, within it, can hide their identities by sending forged and anonymous 
                                                          
83  Whether cyberstalking is classified as a serious offending behaviour justifying exorbitant law enforcement expenditure is contingent on  
     cultural trends and the perceptions of recipients 
84 From a domestic perspective as previously mentioned, this is evident in the case of Lorna Smith who was murdered by a cyberstalker in 
the UK. From an international perspective, the fact that cyberstalking can result in the death of a victim was equally highlighted in the case 
85 Yair Amichai-Hamburger ‘The Social Net understanding Our Online Behaviour’ (2nd edn, OUP 2013)  
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communications.86 Roberts argues that cyberstalkers are able to communicate in 
cyber space without revealing their identities by utilising anonymous re-mailing 
services. Marion therefore suggests that law enforcement officials have been unable 
to respond effectively to the threats which are posed by individuals who utilise 
computers to commit crimes.87 
 
The problem of cyberstalkers being anonymous has been compounded by the fact 
that certain business establishments offer services which enable customers to 
communicate anonymously. In particular, such organisations have developed 
technological devices which are used by customers to threaten individuals and public 
organisations in the cyber-world.88 Against this background, Patrick highlights that by 
using the anonymous re-emailer service, a cyberstalker can interact with a victim via 
email without the cyberstalker revealing his true identity.89 Patrick emphasises that a 
re-emailer, removes the original header of an email and then forwards the message 
on to a victim with a new email header.90  Further, Harvey suggests that the re-emailer 
service provides anonymity by removing all identifying information from an email and 
attaching a random replacement header.91 In light of Patrick and Harvey’s 
observations, the implications for UK law enforcement officials is that where 
cyberstalkers use the anonymous messaging apps to disseminate communications, 
they can potentially evade detection, arrest, prosecution and punishment. 
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Another dimension of the investigative hurdle is that anonymous cyberstalkers make 
things more difficult by either utilising technological encryption techniques or assuming 
the identity of another person. In doing so, they can hinder the investigation process 
by disseminating messages to victims via computers in more than one country which 
are inaccessible to law enforcement officials.92 
 
If the identity of an alleged cyberstalker is known and the offensive messages have 
been traced to the internet portal address of a suspect, there will be a further onus on 
UK prosecutors to prove that the offensive messages were personally disseminated 
by the suspect. As previously highlighted, this might be problematic where a computer 
is located in a publicly accessible area given that the cyberstalker may argue that a 
third party accessed his computer to send the messages.93  
  
From a legal perspective the anonymity of cyberstalkers could make it difficult for 
prosecutors to satisfy the Evidential Test of establishing that there is a realistic 
prospect of conviction due to the fact that a robust case cannot be built against an 
anonymous cyberstalker whose real identity cannot be established.94 The anonymity 
of cyberstalkers may also prevent UK police officers from being able to obtain an arrest 
warrant or to seek the extradition of an unidentified cyberstalker.  
 
                                                          
92 For the purposes of this research  study, the investigative problem can arise for UK law enforcement officials where cyberstalkers resident 
in Ireland or the US for example, utilize encryption techniques, different ISP addresses or fake online screen names to hide their identities 
when communicating with victims in the UK 
93 This scenario may arise where a cyberstalker is sharing his accommodation with other tenants or where the relevant computer is located in 
a public library, community centre, or internet shop 
94  Crown prosecutors are required to apply the full code test which comprises of evidential and public interest tests prior to charging a 
suspect 
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To avoid cyberstalkers escaping justice, UK law enforcement officials can attempt to 
unmask the identity of a cyberstalker by liaising with the relevant ISPs with a view to 
obtaining the internet portal addresses of suspects and tracing the origins of the 
offensive email correspondence.95  
 
Given that Google, Yahoo and Facebook all have their headquarters in the US, there 
is a procedural requirement for UK police officers to obtain a court order for information 
about cyberstalkers to be disclosed in the country of the headquarters. To this effect, 
Goodno highlights that the US Federal Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 
stipulates that the records of a subscriber will not be disclosed to law enforcement 
officials without a court order.96 Goodno therefore argues that the protection of an 
internet subscriber’s details by the ISPs can constitute a barrier to combating 
cyberstalking.  
 
In addition to the above, the ISPs may be reluctant to disclose the data held on 
cyberstalkers without their prior consent to avoid potential breaches of privacy 
arguments. Suffice it to say that the evidential data may be inaccessible to UK police 
officers if the ISPs refuse to provide the communication data of customers for privacy 
reasons. 
 
In summary, the collective investigative difficulties identified above coupled with the 
fact that ISPs may be reluctant to provide the evidence required to prosecute 
                                                          
95 The internet portal address is a unique address which is given to each customer who subscribes to services rendered by the ISPs. The internet 
portal address is significant because it can establish the origin of an email correspondence and identify the actual email account from which 
the message has been disseminated  
96 Naomi Goodno, ‘Cyberstalking A New Crime: ‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws’ (2007) 72  Missouri Law 
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 cyberstalkers demonstrates that UK police officers face a daunting task in the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. Suffice it to say that factors such as the anonymity on 
the internet, jurisdictional limitations, statutory limitations, evidential limitations and 
resource limitations are five investigative impediments which can hinder the efforts of 
UK police officers and prosecutors to bring cyberstalkers to justice.  
 
1.3. Response of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is a government department which is 
completely independent of the police and prosecutes criminals in England and 
Wales.97 In advising the police on possible prosecutions, the CPS carries out various 
functions ranging from applying the CPS code for crown prosecutors when reviewing 
cases to preparing the cases for trial.98 When arriving at decisions on whether or not 
to charge a suspect or proceed with a prosecution, the CPS applies the Threshold 
Test which consists of two stages. The tests are discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (Sub-
section2.3.8).  
 
As the primary organisation, responsible for prosecuting criminal cases in the UK, the 
CPS has implemented measures to assist prosecutors reviewing cyberstalking cases. 
To this effect on 29 September 2010 the CPS published revised guidance for 
prosecutors on stalking.99 
 
                                                          
97 Code for Crown Prosecutors’, (CPS,2013) < www.cps.gov.uk/publications/doc/code_for_crown_prosecutord accessible> accessed 18 
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Given that the emerging criminal behaviour of cyberstalking has led to legislative 
changes in the UK (comprehensively discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.3), the CPS 
has taken steps to enlighten prosecutors and members of staff on the relevant 
changes. Specifically, on 22 January 2013, the CPS notified staff members via the 
internal communications gateway system that the organisation had amended the legal 
guidance on the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA) to incorporate the new 
offences of stalking and stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress. 
The offences were created under the newly inserted s2A and s4A of the PHA. In doing 
so, the CPS has ensured that the prosecutors are equipped to charge perpetrators 
accordingly given that some elements of the newly inserted stalking offences also 
apply to the activities of cyberstalkers as highlighted in the statutory examples listed 
under s2A (3) b, c, d f and g of the PHA. These aspects of the legislation govern the 
criminal activities of a cyberstalker ranging from the publishing of statements by any 
means in the name of another person to the monitoring of an individual’s internet 
usage. 
 
Furthermore, on 20 June 2013 Sir Keir Starmer the former Director for Public 
Prosecutions, published guidance on the prosecution of social media cases following 
a public consultation which commenced in December 2012. The purpose of the 
guidance was to ensure a consistent approach in the handling of such cases across 
the CPS. The guidance identified how the threshold will be applied to social media 
cases.100 The CPS guidelines on the prosecution of cases involving social media 
highlighted the steps that prosecutors are required to take when making decisions that 
have a social media element. The strengths of the document are that first, it 
                                                          
100  ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving Communication Sent Via Social Media’ (CPS, 2013]  < www.cps.gov.uk/legal> 
        accessed 15 June 2017 
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establishes the grounds for charging defendants and second, it constitutes a point of 
reference for prosecutors to review and build robust cases against perpetrators.  
 
On 6 October 2014, the CPS updated the legal guidance regarding the prosecution of 
communication sent via social media. The updated legal guidance explains how 
current legislation can be used to prosecute offences involving malicious intimate 
media sometimes referred to revenge pornography.101 The guidance was updated 
further in 2016 to include a section on stalking and was further revised on 21 August 
2018.102 
 
In addition to introducing relevant policies to tackle cyber enabled crimes such as 
cyberstalking, the CPS has taken steps to liaise with other agencies to tackle the issue 
of stalking and cyberstalking implicitly. Consequently, in September 2016 the former 
Director for Public Prosecutions confirmed that in July 2015, a stakeholder meeting 
was held following which, a working group was set up. The working group which 
consisted of cross government criminal justice specialists and third sector agency 
representatives explored improvements to the training of prosecutors on stalking.103   
 
In addition to the above, on 23 May 2018 to be precise, the CPS published the updated 
guidance on stalking and harassment which includes a web-link to the updated 
protocol on stalking and harassment.104  The recent publication demonstrates that the 
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CPS is still taking steps to tackle the criminal behaviour of stalking albeit from a public 
enlightenment perspective. 
 
1.3.1   Increase in prosecution of stalking cases 
 
On 11 September 2014, the CPS further confirmed that after the first full year of 
operation, the new legislation resulted in 743 cases being brought to court which would 
never have been charged under the previous law. Additionally, the CPS confirmed that 
prosecutions from all stalking and harassment offences using both the new and older 
legislation, have increased by more than 20 per cent in 2013-14 (from 8,648 in 2012 -
13 to 10,525 in 2013).105 
 
The data in Table 10 of Appendix 6 indicates that in 2012-2013, the CPS commenced 
prosecutions in relation to: 
 
 7,159 offences under S2 PHA 1997 for harassment 
 1,398 offences charged under S4 PHA 1997 for putting people in fear of 
violence 
 
 91 prosecutions charged under the new stalking offences:   
 72 without fear/alarm/distress and 119 involving fear of violence/alarm or 
distress, since the new offence was introduced in November 2012. 
 
                                                          
105 ‘New Stalking Legislation Helps to Bring More Prosecution as CPS and ACPO Launch Protocol  to Improve Services to Stalking’ 
(CPS, 2014) <www.cps/gov/uk/news/stalkingrotocol> accessed 17 May 2017 
44 
 
Given that the recently created stalking offences include elements of cyberstalking, 
the data in Table 10 implicitly encompasses cyberstalking.106 The data confirms that 
London prosecutors are utilising the old and new legislation on stalking to prosecute 
stalkers in absence of a specific legislation on cyberstalking.107 
 
In September 2016, the CPS confirmed that prosecutions were commenced for 12,986 
cases involving harassment and stalking offences. The CPS highlighted that this was 
an increase of 864 offences (7.1%) from 2014-2015 when 12,122 prosecutions were 
commenced. The CPS confirmed that this was the highest volume ever recorded.108 
The CPS additionally confirmed that 1,102 prosecutions were commenced under the 
new stalking offences (similar to 2014-15 when 1,103 prosecutions commenced).109 
However in November 2017, the former Director for Public Prosecutions confirmed 
that in general, there was a decrease in stalking and harassment prosecutions and a 
rise in prosecution of breaches of restraining orders.110 
 
Despite the above measures which have been implemented by the CPS to promote a 
consistent approach to the prosecution of stalking and harassment which implicitly 
includes cyberstalking, on 5 July 2017, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary and 
Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate published critical findings of 
their joint inspection into how the MET and the CPS tackle the offences of harassment 
                                                          
106  On 25 November 2012, the PHA was amended via ss.111 and 112 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The amendment added two 
  New offences of stalking to the PHA. The first new criminal conduct is the offence of “stalking” as enacted under (s.2A (1). The second  
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and stalking offences. The summary of the findings indicate that the CPS and the MET 
are required to implement additional measures with a view to protecting victims of 
stalking and harassment and to ensuring that perpetrators are charged with the correct 
offences.111 
 
The subsequent response of the CPS on 5 July 2017 to Her Majesty’s Joint 
Inspectorate report is significant. This is due to the fact that the response 
acknowledged that the CPS needs to implement more measures to improve the 
services it offers to victims.112 Additionally, the response of the CPS identified the 
measures that the stakeholder will introduce with a view to implementing three of the 
twelve recommendations which were solely addressed to the CPS and four of the 
recommendations which were collectively addressed to the CPS and colleagues in the 
policing sector.113  The prompt response of the CPS demonstrates that the stakeholder 
is keen to act on the recommendations in an attempt to improve the services offered 
to victims of stalking and harassment which implicitly includes cyberstalking.  
 
From a positive perspective, in September 2018, former Director for Public 
Prosecutions Alison Saunders revealed that in 2017–18, there was an increase of two 
thirds in prosecutions commencing under the newer stalking offences.114  Additionally, 
it was confirmed that three quarters of the prosecutions were domestic abuse-related. 
Also, it was highlighted that more breaches of restraining orders were prosecuted. 
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On 12 September 2019, while discussing the latest figures on prosecutions involving 
Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG), the current Director for Public 
Prosecutions Max Hill revealed that in 2018-2019, stalking prosecutions increased 
from 1,616 to 2,209 which was an increase of 36.7% and the highest volume ever 
recorded.115  Additionally, the Director for Public Prosecutions confirmed that the CPS 
has taken various actions to improve prosecution performance. Notably, it was 
highlighted that the CPS worked with the National Police Chief Council (NPCC) and 
College of Policing to provide guidance on harassment and stalking to its police 
responders.116  Additionally, it was also confirmed that a workshop was held by the 
police and prosecutors to facilitate best practice. Further, it was revealed that the CPS 
worked with the Home Office and police to develop statutory guidance to support the 
implementation of the Stalking Protection Act 2019 Act, including a new civil Stalking 
Protection Order.117 
 
1.4   Response of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
 
While the CPS introduced relevant policies on stalking and harassment with a view to 
assisting prosecutors build robust cases against the perpetrators inclusive of 
cyberstalkers, the MPS took a parallel approach of embarking on an awareness 
campaign. To this effect, on 18 April 2013 on the National Stalking awareness day, 
Gary Shewan the UK Lead on stalking and harassment confirmed the following: 
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(a)  That 20,000 police officers have completed specialist training in stalking 
developed by the college of policing 
(b) That the Metropolitan Police Force had liaised with the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission and its Continuing Professional Development events 
to ensure that any lessons on stalking cases are learned 
(c) That steps are being made to look at how police forces can be held to account 
on stalking issues 
(d)  That the Metropolitan police forces are looking at proposals to develop the 
national crime recording standards for stalking.118 
 
In addition to the above, on 11 September 2014, the CPS and the Association of Chief 
Police Officers introduced a protocol to ensure a consistent approach to tackling 
stalking offences.119 The protocol is an indication that the CPS and the MPS are 
committed to taking a consistent approach to tackling stalking and cyberstalking 
implicitly.  
 
Further, to raise public awareness on the issue of stalking and cyberstalking implicitly, 
on 20 October 2016 the Hampshire Constabulary organised a multi-agency stalking 
conference.120 The aim of the one-day conference was to enlighten delegates on the 
work that is carried out by law enforcement officials at the Hampshire Stalking Clinic 
who work with offenders with a view to providing rehabilitative treatment. The 
conference was attended by several representatives of the law enforcement agencies, 
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academics and victim support groups. The significance of the conference which was 
attended by the researcher, is that it afforded officials in the psychiatry, police, 
probation, academic and victim advocacy sectors the opportunity to enlighten 
delegates on how the clinic works as a multi-agency unit.  
 
The Hampshire Stalking Clinic is a multi-agency forum that meets monthly to review 
the 4 stalking cases which have generated the highest concern in the county. The 
three pronged goals of the clinic are to analyse the risks that are created by the stalker, 
proffer advice to the relevant professionals and offer support to the victims of 
stalking.121 The clinic which received government funding has been described as the 
first of its kind globally given that it has the dual fold goals of enhancing responses to 
stalking across the criminal justice system in addition to the health sector via the 
rehabilitative treatment for stalkers.122  To this effect, on 5 July 2017, it was reported 
that the Hampshire Stalking Clinic had been recognised as best practice in the national 
inspection of stalking and harassment.123  The stalking and harassment service which 
covers the region of Hampshire was commended by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate.  
 
In addition to the above on 5 July 2017, David Tucker, the crime and criminal justice 
lead for the college of policing provided a response to the joint government inspectors 
on how the organisation tackles the offences of stalking and harassment. In his 
response, David Tucker acknowledged that stalking and harassment can have a 
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detrimental impact on an individual’s life and confirmed that training will be introduced 
for all new police recruits and existing officers.124  This suggests that as a stakeholder, 
the MPS like the CPS is willing to implement the recommendations of Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate 
in a bid to tackle the offences of stalking and harassment with a view to improving the 
services offered to victims of stalking and harassment. 
 
As previously highlighted to improve prosecution performance, the CPS worked with 
NPCC and College of Policing to provide guidance on harassment and stalking to 
police officers.125  Also, a workshop was held by the police to cascade best practice.126 
 
In summary, various challenges can hinder police officers and prosecutors from 
investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers. The above discussion indicates that the   
CPS and the MPS are willing to implement recommended measures to enhance the 
prospects of law enforcement officials successfully bringing offenders to justice.  
 
1.5. Purpose of the current research  
 
The recent cyber-attacks in the UK which affected organisations in at least 100 
countries and 48 National Health Service organisations in the UK highlight the 
Global and instantaneous nature of cybercrime.127 Since cyberstalking specifically has 
emerged as an aspect of cybercrime, certain areas of research have been undertaken. 
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The research areas covered include the effects of cyberstalking on victims, the 
regulation of cyberstalkers, the typology of cyberstalkers and cyberstalking 
victimisation amongst others. However, limited research investigations have been 
carried out into the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors in London on 
cyberstalking victimisation and the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. 
Further, it has been highlighted that in comparison to offline stalking, cyberstalking has 
received a lesser attention from the research world.128  
  
Against the above background, there is a research requirement in this area given the 
recent public concern in the UK over the regulation of cyberstalking. This concern led 
to a campaign involving the charities Protection against Stalking (PAS) and the 
National Probation Officers Organisation (NAPO) which resulted in a subsequent 
consultation with the Home Office. The officials in these organisations, questioned the 
effectiveness of the PHA legislation as a tool for regulating stalking and implicitly 
cyberstalking. The public concern reached a climax in February 2012 when the Hon 
Elfyn Llywd published his findings after being commissioned by the coalition 
government to chair an independent parliamentary enquiry into stalking law reform.  
 
The primary finding of Elfyn Llywd’s inquiry reiterated the public concern that a specific 
offence of stalking should be introduced into the legislation of England and Wales.129 
The question as to whether the public outcry was justified is evident in the subsequent 
reaction of the coalition government which amended the PHA on 25 November 2012. 
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The amendment resulted in the addition of two new specific statutory criminal offences 
under the PHA. The offences are: 
 
(1)  “stalking” under s.2A (1) PHA 1997 which is harassment and a conduct that 
amounts to stalking  
 
(2)  “stalking” under s.4a (1) PHA 1997 which can be committed in two ways.  
 The first way is “stalking involving fear of violence s.4A (1) (b) (i) 
 The second way is “stalking involving serious alarm or distress”, s.4A (1) (b) 
(ii).130 
 
The two new offences were added via s111 and s112 of the Protection from Freedoms 
Act 2012. Although the amendment did not create a specific statutory offence of 
cyberstalking, the newly created offences encompass behaviours which may be 
construed as cyberstalking. The CPS has since confirmed that the new legislation has 
resulted in more prosecutions in comparison to the old legislation.131 To this effect, it 
has launched a new protocol with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) with 
a view to ensuring a consistent approach when tackling stalking.132  
 
Following the amendment of the PHA, some academics questioned whether it 
provides an effective protection from cyberstalking.133 MacEwan contends that the 
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amended PHA legislation in this era of the internet may not be suitable to regulate 
cyberstalking. MacEwan suggests that there are five primary means of cyberstalking 
which could indicate that cyberstalking is different from offline stalking even though 
cyberstalking is sometimes accompanied by offline stalking or results in offline 
stalking. MacEwan concludes by asserting that although the new offences can 
regulate certain aspects of cyberstalking, they will not be effective for all aspects of 
cyberstalking especially if the offences relate to covert activities. 
 
In response to MacEwan’s assertion, Gillespie has counter argued that the amended 
PHA legislation is effective in protecting victims of cyberstalking.134 Gillespie argues 
that although there are uncertainties to be addressed regarding the creation of two 
new offences which are solely based on the initial offence of harassment, the PHA has 
nevertheless, demonstrated that it is flexible especially after the various statutory 
amendments which have been made to it.  
 
From a different perspective, it has been argued that the new offence of stalking 
involving alarm or distress created under s.4A (1) b (ii) which has been added to the 
PHA, is an extra protection for victims given that it looks at the cumulative effects of 
stalking on a victim as opposed to the effect and characteristics of each individual 
offence. Addison and Perry contend that the new offence could be a crucial change 
given that it carries a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment.135 
 
In consideration of the above and given that the debate on cyberstalking seems to 
focus on the regulation of cyberstalking, the impact of cyberstalking on victims and the 
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public perception of cyberstalking, there is an additional research requirement into the 
perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on cyberstalking. The research 
requirement is justified because the findings will enlighten the stakeholders of the 
policy changes that are required to enable police officers and prosecutors to bring 
cyberstalkers specifically and cyber criminals in general to justice.  
 
Furthermore, a major interest of the current research was to analyse the responses of 
the research participants with a view to identifying their perceptions on cyberstalking. 
Accordingly, the researcher identified the opinions of the participants on the threshold 
for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking. 
  
Against the above background, this thesis highlights six difficulties which the 
participants perceive that they will likely encounter in the investigation and the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers and identifies solutions to the highlighted problems. The 
research will conclude with recommendations addressing the perceived difficulties 
highlighted.  
 
1.5.1. Structure of the Thesis: 
 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters.  
 
Chapter One Introduces the research and its current context. To this end it presents 
and discusses the data from both national and international academic literature on the 
challenges faced by law enforcement officials in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
Additionally, the jurisdictional, legislative, evidential and financial investigative 
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impediments to the prosecution of cyberstalkers are examined. Further, the structure 
and the purpose of the research are identified.  
 
Chapter Two offers a Review of the literature, wherein the academic literature is 
discussed. Specifically, this chapter provides a review of the existing literature in 
relation to certain key areas, the distinction between cyber-dependent and cyber-
enabled crimes, the distinction between cyberstalking and cyberbullying and the 
regulation of cyberstalking. Additionally, this chapter examines risk assessment of 
stalking victims, cyberstalking victimisation and police perceptions and the theoretical 
framework of cyberstalking.  
 
Chapter Three presents the methodology. 
 
Chapter Four presents the results of the analysis of the interview data.  
 
Chapter Five presents the discussion of the findings in relation to both the academic 
literature and legal theory. Furthermore, it makes recommendations for policy and 
practice based upon the findings of the thesis.  
 
The next chapter will provide a review of the literature in relation to cyberstalking. 
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Chapter Two Review of the literature  
 
This chapter offers a review of the existing literature in relation to cyberstalking, the 
legislation that exists to regulate and counteract it and the mechanisms in place in the 
UK to prosecute such crimes. The primary purpose of the literature review was to 
acquire knowledge on the topic with a view to identifying the materials that are relevant 
to the research questions. The secondary purpose of the literature review was to 
identify gaps in previous research and to open questions left from other research to 
ensure the thesis further develops knowledge in the field.  
2.1 Literature Review Strategy 
 
The researcher adopted a comprehensive search strategy to carry out the literature 
review which informs this chapter of the dissertation. The researcher first reviewed 
and analysed relevant academic literature which were available within the University 
of West London library.  The researcher additionally analysed academic materials then 
supplemented the research by accessing the SCONUL facility which entitles university 
members students to access or borrow books from other UK university libraries. The 
researcher specifically analysed academic materials in the British library and the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. 
 
In addition, the researcher accessed online search engines such as Google and 
Yahoo and electronic databases (Lexis Web, All England Law Reports, Justia, Lexis-
Nexis, Westlaw and Crime library) with a view to obtaining further relevant literature. 
The search terms used on the electronic databases comprised a wide variety ranging 
from independent to combined terms. Some of the terms included ‘cyberstalking and 
prosecution’, ‘cyberstalking and risk assessment’, ‘cyberstalking and investigation’, 
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‘cyberstalking and police perceptions’,  ’cyberstalking and prosecutors perceptions’, 
cyberstalking victimisation,’ ‘cyberstalking and anonymity’, ‘cyberstalking UK 
legislation’, ‘regulation of cyberstalkers’, ‘internet service providers and cyberstalking’, 
‘origin of cyberstalking’, ‘criminological theories and cyberstalking’, ‘psychological 
theories and cyberstalking’, ‘hate speech and cyberstalking,’ ‘privacy rights and 
cyberstalking’, ‘victimisation and cyberstalking’, ‘cybercrime and the law’, ‘cyber- 
enabled crimes and prosecution’ and ‘cyber- dependent crimes and definition’. 
 
In addition to the above, the relevant policies of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
were reviewed. A general search of all relevant websites in the UK was carried out 
along with English language searches for information about cyberstalking in the UK. 
Some of the websites include but are not limited to the National Stalking Helpline, 
Paladin National Stalking Helpline, Paladin National Stalking Advocacy, Protection 
against Stalking, and Network for Surviving Stalking. The literature review was also 
compiled by searching relevant textbooks, online newspapers and online journals.  
 
2.2     Definition of cyberstalking  
 
From an academic perspective given that there is no universal definition of 
cyberstalking, this thesis suggests that an acceptable definition of cyberstalking should 
contain five elements which would: 
 
1    Identify the deviant behaviours that constitute cyberstalking 
2    Identify the means by which cyberstalkers target victims 
3    Highlight the effects of cyberstalking on victims 
4     Establish a standard test for gauging whether the conduct of a cyberstalker  
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    is as an acceptable behaviour 
5     Identify the potential culprits 
 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher has therefore chosen to apply the 
definition postulated by Bocji and McFarlane.136  Bocji and McFarlane defined 
cyberstalking as a collection of behaviours based on which an individual, group of 
individuals or organisation harass one or more individuals via the use of information 
and communication technology.  
Harassment is defined with a view to establishing whether a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information about a course of conduct would believe that such 
conduct would lead another person to experience emotional distress. The 
distinguishing features of Bocji and McFarlane’s definition are: 
 
(1)  The definition highlights that cyberstalking is characterised by a group of 
behaviours as opposed to just one or two behaviours. This is an important 
observation which arguably recognizes that the activities engaged in by 
 cyberstalkers comprise of a non-exhaustive list of behaviours.  
 
(2)  The definition acknowledges that the cyberstalker could be an individual, a 
group of individuals or an organisation. This aspect of the definition gives a 
three-pronged perspective of a possible cyberstalker and is very persuasive 
given that there is usually an assumption in some available literature that the 
                                                          
136 Paul Bocji and Leroy McFarlane, ‘An Exploration of Predatory Behaviour in Cyber space’ (2003)   
     8 First Monday 9   
58 
 
cyberstalker is an individual as opposed to a group of individuals or an 
organisation. 
 
(3) The definition distinguishes between information and electronic communication 
as a means for a perpetrator or perpetrators to harass victims and in doing so, 
differentiates between the computer-based technologies that may be utilised by 
a cyberstalker and the communication techniques that may be utilised by a 
cyberstalker i.e. telephones, computers, fax machines and so on.  
 
(4) The definition identifies the effects of cyberstalking on a victim and in doing so, 
establishes that there is a causal link between the conduct of a stalker and the 
resultant effect on a victim.  
 
The above line of reasoning is evident in the recent UK case of Justine Reece who 
committed suicide on 22 February 2017 after being physically stalked and 
cyberstalked by her former partner Nicholas Allen for approximately six months. 
Prior to committing suicide, Ms Reece left a suicide note blaming the actions of her 
cyberstalker for her decision to take her life. On 28 July 2017, it was reported that 
Nicholas Allen was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment after pleading guilty to the 
manslaughter charge and accepting that his campaign of threats and harassment 
led to the victim’s death.137    
 
(5) The definition, applies the Subjective Test to define harassment as the  
                                                          
137 ‘Man Jailed for Manslaughter After Stalking His Former Partner’ (CPS, 2017)  
       <www.cps.gov.uk/news/lates_news/man-jailed-for-manslaughter-after-stlking-his-former-partner> accessed 29 July 2017  
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specific conduct engaged in by a cyberstalker. The test is similar to the test 
which is applied under s7 (2) of the recently amended PHA.  
 
2.2.1 Definition of cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime  
 
Focusing on victimisation, Pittaro asserts that the internet has resulted in the 
emergence of cyberstalkers138  This assertion raises the question of how cyberstalking 
can be understood within the generic conceptual framework of cybercrime. 
 
Chawki, Darwish, Khan and others suggest that the motives for computer related 
crimes are revenge, greed, lust, power, adventure and the desire for a thrill.139 From 
a victimisation perspective, it could therefore be argued that cyberstalking is a 
computer enabled crime which enable perpetrators with various motives to utilise 
various tools such as desktop computers, laptops and mobile phone Wi-Fi devices to 
victimise others.140 Consequently, from a psychological perspective, Ahlgrim and 
Terrance indicate that cyberstalkers repeatedly pursue victims in a bid to control, 
intimidate or monitor them utilising electronic or internet technology.141  
 
In the absence of a universal definition for cyberstalking, cyberstalking has been 
defined based on a twofold distinction by the UK government. Notably, in July 2016, 
the National Cyber Security Strategy defined cybercrime as an offence encompassing 
the closing linked aspects of cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes.142 
                                                          
138 Michael Pittaro,  in ‘Cyberstalking, Typology, Aetiology and Victims’  K Jaishankar  (ed)  Cyber Criminology, Exploring Internet 
Crimes and Criminal Behaviours  (Taylor & Francis Group, 2011)  277 
139 Mohamed Chawki, Ashraf Darwish, Mohamed Khan and Sapna Tyagi ‘Cybercrime: Digital Forensics and Jurisdiction’  (2nd ed, OUP) 1 
140 ibid 
141  Billea Ahlgrim ‘Perceptions of Cyberstalking: Impact of Perpetrator Gender and Cyberstalker/Victim Relationship (2018) 1-20 Journal 
of Interpersonal Violence < file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/Perception%20on%20cyberstalking%20.pdf> accessed 10 February 2019 
142 ‘Cybercrime-Prosecution Guidance’ (CPS, 23 May 2018)  <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/cybercrime-prosecution-guidance> accessed 
6 December 2018 
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Cyber-dependent crimes are crimes that are mainly aimed at computers or network 
resources where the devices are both the tool for committing the crime, and the target 
of the crime. Cyber-dependent crimes are significant because they are symbolically 
novel crimes - virtual crimes, wherein a digital system is the target as well as the 
means of attack.143  McGuire and Dowling acknowledge that there are various forms 
of cyber-dependent crimes.144 Cyber-dependent crimes encompass a variety of 
offences ranging from the theft of data to the destruction of computer systems and 
networks.145 Furnell therefore emphasises that the threats posed by hacking and 
malware specifically which are aspects of cyber-dependent crime have evolved with 
the passage of time and suggests that updated defences should be developed to 
reflect the change.146  
 
In comparison to cyber-dependent crimes, cyber-enabled crimes are crimes which can 
be increased in scale or reach via computers, computer networks or other forms of 
Information and Communication Technology.147 Cyber-enabled crimes encompass 
several traditional activities. The activities include economic crimes, malicious 
communications, child sexual offences and extreme pornography among others, 
                                                          
143 ‘House of Commons Home Affairs Committee E-Crime Fifth Report of Session 2013–14’ (Parliament, 17 July 2013) <www. 
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/70/70.pdf> accessed 5 December 2018 
144 Mike McGuire and Samantha Dowling ‘Cybercrime: A Review of the Evidence Chapter 1: Cyber-dependent crimes  
 Home Office Research Report 75’ (Govt, October 2013) 
<www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246751/horr75-chap1.pdf > accessed 18 
January 2020 
145 Cyber-dependent crimes include hacking, denial of service and botnet attacks. They also include malware attacks such as viruses, trojan 
horses and spyware 
146 Steven Furnell in ‘Hackers, Viruses and Malicious Software’, Yvonne Jewkes and Majid Yar (eds)  Handbook of internet crime   
(Wilan,2010) 173 
147 Mike McGuire and Samantha Dowling ‘Cybercrime: A review of the Evidence Chapter 1: Cyber-dependent crimes  
 Home Office Research Report 75’ (Govt, October 2013) 
<www.//assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246751/horr75-chap1.pdf> 
147 Mike McGuire and Samantha Dowling ‘Cybercrime: A review of the Evidence Chapter 1: Cyber-dependent crimes  Home Office 
Research Report 75’ (Govt, October 2013) 
<www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246751/horr75-chap1.pdf>  accessed 18 
January 2020 
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which are committed via the use of Information and Communication Technology. 
Applying the above criteria to cyberstalking, cyberstalking can thus be defined as a 
cyber-enabled crime. This is due to the fact, that cyberstalking may be viewed as an 
aspect of the traditional crime of stalking which can be increased in scale or reach via 
the use of computers, computer networks or other forms of Information and 
Communication Technology. 
 
The above definition of cybercrime has been applied in its’ entirety by the CPS as 
highlighted in its published guidance on the prosecution of cybercrime.148  From a legal 
perspective, the implication of this is that the CPS has validated the governments’ 
definition of cybercrime.  
 
2.2.2. The distinction between offline stalking and cyberstalking 
 
There is currently no consensus on whether cyberstalking should be viewed as an 
entirely new form of criminal behaviour, albeit related to offline stalking.149 The 
difference between offline stalking, otherwise referred to as stalking, and cyberstalking 
is that offline stalking occurs in the physical realm as opposed to cyberstalking which 
occurs in the cyber realm. Stalking has been defined as the intentional, malicious and 
repeated pursuit and harassing of another that makes the person fear for his or her 
safety.150 Melroy and Felthouse argue that stalking is generally characterised by the 
following three features: acts of unwanted pursuit that occur on more than one 
                                                          
148  Cybercrime-Prosecution Guidance’ (CPS, 23 May 2018)  <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/cybercrime-prosecution-guidance> accessed 
6 December 2018 
149  Suzanne Van der Aa,’ International (Cyber) Stalking, Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution’ (Pure, 1 January 2011)  
     <www.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1310512/Aa_International_cyberstalking_110216_posprint_embargo_1_y.pdf  > accessed 9 August 2018 
150 Reid Melroy and Alan Felthouse ‘Introduction to this  Issue: International Perspectives of Stalking’ (Wiley, 2011) 
<www.pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5a2a/589bc5d273c746f2adb684bcc73ce820de46.pdf> accessed 6 December 2018 
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occasion, a credible threat, and the induction of fear in the victim.151  To this effect, 
Worsley, Wheatcroft, Short and Corcoran highlight that the traditional form of stalking 
is a public health issue and acknowledge that the evolution of the internet has led to 
the phenomenon of cyberstalking which is a new way of offending.152 Consequently, 
from a law enforcement perspective, Reyns argues that the crime of stalking in the 
physical realm has been given another dimension on the internet.153  Similarly, 
Piotrowski and Lathrop highlight that there is a school of thought which argues that 
cyberstalking is a new form of stalking.154  
 
From a right to free speech perspective, Baer argues that cyberstalking is different 
from physical stalking because it gives rises to issues which relate to the right to 
freedom of speech155  Baer therefore suggests that law makers and enforcers should 
apply divergent considerations for identifying and prosecuting cyberstalking.  Goodno 
in comparison, highlights two similarities between stalking and cyberstalking.156 The 
first similarity is that stalkers and cyberstalkers have the common wish to exert control 
over the victim. The second highlighted similarity is that stalking, and cyberstalking 
require repeated harassing or threatening behaviour, which is often a start to more 
serious behaviours. Fundamentally, Goodno goes a step further by identifying 5 
differences between stalking and cyberstalking.157 Goodno acknowledges that 
although the offline stalker and the cyberstalker both share a common goal of 
                                                          
151 ibid 
152 Joanne Worsley, Jacqueline Wheatcroft, Emma Short and Rhiannon Corcoran ‘’Victims’ Voices: Understanding the Emotional Impact of 
Cyberstalking and Individual Coping Responses’ (Sage, April 2017) <www.journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2158244017710292> 
accessed 7 December 2018 
153 Bradford Reyns, ‘A Situational  Crime Prevention Approach to Cyberstalking Victimization: Preventative Tactics for Internet Users and 
Online Place Managers’  (2010)   2 Crime Prevention and Community Safety 9 
154 Peter Piotrowski and Peter Lathrop ‘Cyberstalking and College Students: A Biometric Analysis Across Scholarly Databases’ (2012) 46 
College Student Journal  3 
155 Merritt Baer ‘Cyberstalking and the Internet Landscape We Have Created’ (2010)  15 Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 2 
156 Naomi  Goodno, ‘Cyberstalking a new crime: evaluating the effectiveness of the current federal and state laws’ (2007) 72 MLR 128 
157 The differences range from the fact that cyberstalkers can instantly harass victims via the internet to the fact that cyberstalkers can offend 
anonymously 
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controlling the victim, there are various differences between the two criminal 
behaviours which makes stalking a distinct offence from cyberstalking.158Goodno’s 
perspective is in contrast to Vasiu and Vasiu’s stance that cyberstalking is construed 
by most people as a variant of stalking.159  
 
From an analytical perspective, Chawki like Goodno acknowledges that there are 
similarities and differences between stalking and cyberstalking.160 Specifically, Chawki 
argues that there are 3 specific similarities between cyberstalking and offline stalking 
based on the types of victims, the typology of offenders and the motives of the 
offenders.161 
 
Sheridan and Grant conducted a research study involving 1,051 self-defined stalking 
victims to investigate whether the experience of traditional stalking is distinct from 
cyberstalking. They found that there was no fundamental difference based on victim 
experience between cyberstalking and the traditional form of stalking in the physical 
realm.162  Furthermore, Drebing and his colleagues, conducted a research study 
based on 6,379 participants and found that victims can experience transitions from 
online stalking to offline stalking.163  Drebing and his colleagues therefore argued that 
cyberstalking is perceived to be a supplementary or similar behaviour to stalking.164   
                                                          
158 Naomi Goodno, ‘Cyberstalking A New Crime: ‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws’ (2007) 2 Missouri Law 
Review  1   
159 Ioana. Vasiu and Lucian Vasiu, ‘Cyberstalking Nature and Response Recommendations' (2014) 2 Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Studies 9  
160  Mohammed Chawki, ‘A Critical Look at the Regulation of Cybercrime’ (DROIT, 11 May 2005)   
< www.droit-tic.com/pdf/chawki4.pdf> accessed 8 May 2018 
161 Chawki additionally suggests that there are 3 differences between offline stalking and cyber stalking. The differences are that offline 
stalking requires the victim and the stalker to be in the same geographical area, technologies enable  cyberstalkers to target a victim via a 
third party and a cyberstalker does not need to physically confront the victim 
162 Lorraine Sheridan and Tim Grant ‘Is Cyberstalking Different’ Psychology, Crime and Law Review (2007) 13 Psychology, Crime and 
Law 6  
163Harald DreBing, Josef Bailer, Anne Anders, Henriette Wagnar and  Chrisitne Gallas, Cyberstalking in  A Large Sample of Social 
Network Users: Prevalence, Characteristics and Impact Upon Victims’ (2014) 17 CBSN 61  
164 The aim of the study was to investigate the prevalence of cyberstalking victimization, characteristics of victims and offenders and the 
impact of cyberstalking on the victim’s well-being and mental health. The research was based on an online survey of 6,379 participants 
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Conversely from a victimisation perspective, Alexy, Burgess, Baker and Smoyak 
conducted a research study involving 756 American university students and concluded 
that there were differences between stalking and cyberstalking.165  Specifically, they 
found that there was a higher occurrence of male cyberstalking victims in comparison 
to offline stalking victims.166   
 
Similarly, Berry and Bainbridge argue that cyberstalking is distinct from offline stalking 
given that there are different motivations and behaviour patterns.167 Additionally, 
Reyns, Henson and Fisher when comparing cyberstalking victimisation to stalking 
victimisation, investigated the lifetime prevalence of cyberstalking victimisation and 
cyberstalking offending among a large sample of 974 college students. Significantly, 
Reyns, Henson and Fisher found that strangers are more prone to offend in 
cyberstalking cases in comparison to stalking cases.168. From a clinical, and 
demographic perspective, Cavezza and McEwan compared 36 cyberstalking 
offenders with an age and gender matched sample of 36 online offenders.169 Their 
research found that there were few differences between cyberstalkers and offline 
cyberstalkers.170  
 
                                                          
165 Eileen Alexy, Ann Burgess, Tim Baker and Shirley Smoyak ‘Perceptions of Cyberstalking Among College Students’ (2005)  5 Oxford 
Journals 3 
166 There were three purposes of this descriptive study. The first purpose was to identify the labels, feelings, and behavioural reactions 
of college students about cyberstalking. The second purpose was to establish the prevalence and coping mechanisms of cyberstalking 
victims. The third purpose was to compare the labels, feelings, and behavioural reactions of cyberstalked to stalked victims 
167 Mike Berry and Sonya Bainbridge Manchester’s Cyberstalked 18-30s. Factors Affecting Cyberstalking.  4 Advances in Social Sciences 
Research Journal 18 
168 Bradford Reyns, Billy Henson and Bonnie Fisher ‘Stalking in the Twilight Zone: Extent of Cyberstalking Victimization and Offending 
among college students’ (2010) 33 DB 1 
169 Cristina Cavezza and Troy McEwan ‘Cyberstalking Versus Offline Stalking in a Forensic Sample’  (Researchgate, 2014) 
<www.researchgate.net/publication/264901467_Cyberstalking_versus_off-line_stalking_in_a_forensic_sample> accessed 9 December 2018 
170  Despite the findings, a significant aspect of offline stalking which distinguishes it from cyberstalking is that offline stalking occurs in the 
physical realm as opposed to cyberstalking which occurs in the virtual or digital realm. 
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Moreover, from a geographical perspective, Shimzu argues that the borderless and 
instantaneous access features of cyberstalking are aspects of the conduct which make 
it distinct from physical stalking.171 Shimzu further highlights that another 
distinguishing feature of cyberstalking is that perpetrators can utilise the internet to 
urge other people to harass or make threats to the victim.172  
  
The divergent academic evidence outlined above demonstrate that there are two 
schools of thought on the issue. The first school of thought is that cyberstalking is a 
distinct behaviour from offline stalking. The second, is that cyberstalking is a 
supplementary aspect of stalking in the physical realm.  
 
Despite these differing perspectives, a crucial difference between stalking in the 
physical realm and cyberstalking is that cyberstalkers can use the internet and ICT to 
victimise instantaneously, speedily, cheaply, anonymously and globally.173  
 
 
 
2.2.3 Cyberbullying: A divergent cyber enabled crime analogous to 
 Cyberstalking 
 
From a general perspective, Caven-Clarke defines cyberbullying as utilisation of the 
internet, emails, text messages or digital technology to intentionally embarrass or 
                                                          
171 Shimizu Aily ‘Domestic Violence in the Digital Age: Towards the creation of a Comprehensive Stalking Statute’ (2013)  28 Berkeley 
Journal of Law Gender and Justice 1 
172 ibid 
173 Additionally, cyberstalkers can encourage third parties to join in the victimization of an individual online thereby promoting an online 
mob culture  
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upset individuals.174  However, with specific reference to young people, Topaloglu and 
Topaloglu define cyberbullying as offences such as harassment, humiliation and 
intimidation of a child or adolescent by other individuals utilising the internet and 
mobile technologies.175 Similarly, O’Moore stress that cyberbullying is a common part 
of bullying amongst children and young people which is committed via technology 
devices predominantly smart phones and the internet.176   
 
From a victimisation perspective, Schwartz notes that cyber bullies create fake 
websites about their victims asking others to post comments about them.177 With 
specific reference to youths, Al-Rahmi and others highlight that new methods of 
communication have become prevalent among youths178 Al-Rahmi and others 
emphasise that smart phones and digital tools can lead to cyberbullying which is 
dangerous for students.179  Against this backdrop, Nixon argues that there is a co-
relation between cyberbullying victimisation and internalising issues and cyberbullying 
victimisation and externalising issues.180 Nixon therefore asserts that cyber bulling is 
a relatively new construct which has become an international public health concern 
amongst adolescents.181 
 
                                                          
174 Steffi Caven-Clarke ‘Cyber bullying  A Focus On’ (1st edn, Book life Publishing 2018) 8 
175 Murat Topaloglu and Aysegul Topaloglu ‘Cyber bullying Tendencies of High School Students’ (2016) 15 Int J Edu Sci (1) 
176 Mona O’Moore ‘Understanding Cyberbullying’ (1st edn, Veritas 2014)1 
177 Heather Schwartz , Cyberbullying (2nd edn, Raintree 2016) 1 
178  Waleed Mugahed Al-Rahmi, Noraffandy Yahaya, Mahdi Alamri, Nada Ali Aljarboa, Yusri Bin Kamin and Fahad Abdullah Moafa ‘A 
Mode of Factors Affecting Cyber bullying among University Students’ (Researchgate, November 2018) 
<www.file:///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/A_Model_of_Fact
ors_Affecting_Cyber_Bullying_Behavi%20(1).pdf > accessed 17 March 2019 
179 The methods of communication are SMS communication, social media platforms, chat forums, emailing, webcams, instant messaging 
apps and websites.  
180 Chrissie Nixon ‘Current perspectives: the impact of cyber bullying on adolescent health’ (2014) 5 Adolescent Health, Medicine and 
Therapeutics < http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4126576/> accessed 17 March 2019 
181 Nixon highlights internalizing issues as the development of negative affective disorders, loneliness, anxiety, depression, suicidal 
ideation, and somatic symptoms. Nixon further highlights the externalizing issues as the use of drugs, alcohol, carrying of weapons and the 
display of aggression 
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From a contrasting perspective, Rogers points out that cyberbullying is different from 
face to face bullying because cyber bullies can keep a distance between themselves 
and the victims thereby enabling them to remain anonymous online and having a 
perceived sense of security that they will not get caught.182 Rogers writes from a 
perspective which suggests that it is difficult to control electronically forwarded 
documents given that the cyber world enables people globally, to instantly view a 
single online communication numerous times. Similarly, Hogan argues that 
cyberbullying is different from traditional bullying because the internet enables cyber 
bullies to be crueller than they would be in real life.183 Additionally, Hayes states that 
the debate on the difference between cyberbullying and face to face bullying is two-
pronged184 and that the two-pronged aspects of the debate are significant.185  
 
Notably, Katz emphasises that cyber bulling is characterised by three features.186 The 
features are an imbalance of power which makes it impossible for the victim to defend 
him/herself, an intention to hurt, humiliate or intimidate the victim and a repletion in a 
campaign to hurt.187  From a comparative perspective, the researcher argues that 
these three elements of cyberbullying identified by Katz are also features of 
cyberstalking.  
 
 
                                                          
182 Vanessa Rogers ‘Cyber bullying’ (1st edn, Jessica Kingsley 2010) 1 
183 Shanna Hogan ‘Cyber bullying is worse than Traditional Bullying’ in Lauri Friedman (ed) Cyber bullying  (Greenhaven Press 2011) 11 
184 Susan Hayes ‘Cyber bullying is a Serious Problem’ in Lauri Friedman (ed) Cyber bullying (Greenhaven Press 2011) 11 
185 The first prong is based on the argument that cyber bullying is not as devastating as bullying because victims do not physically interact 
with the cyber bullies and can be separated from the cyber bullies by turning off their computers. The second prong of the debate is that cyber 
bullying is worse than traditional bullying because cyber bullies utilize the internet anonymously to intimidate, mock, threaten, embarrass and 
harass individuals. Additionally, the internet enables people to be more horrid than they would have be in real life. 
186 Adrienne Katz, ‘Cyber bullying and E-Safety What Educators and Other Professionals Need to Know’ (1st edn, Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers 2012) 1 
187 ibid 
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2.2.4 Comparisons of Cyberstalking and Cyberbullying  
 
McQuade, Rogers, Genty, and others argue that the internet and the world-wide- web 
have changed bullying and stalking.188 They highlight that bullies and stalkers are now 
able to escalate victimisation and to encourage others to join in via the usage of 
several technological tools.189  
 
The criminal behaviours of cyberbullying and cyberstalking share five common 
characteristics. The first shared characteristic is that cyberbullying and cyberstalking 
are both cyber enabled crimes. The second shared characteristic is that both 
behaviours can escalate from harassment in the physical realm to harassment in the 
cyber realm and vice versa. The third shared characteristic is that cyber bullies and 
cyberstalkers use information and communication technology to target and victimise 
individuals instantly, cheaply, speedily, anonymously and globally at the click of a 
button. The fourth shared characteristic of cyberbullying and cyberstalking is that 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking can affect the health of victims mentally, emotionally, 
psychologically, physically and sometimes lead to the death of victims either by the 
victims committing suicide or being murdered by the cyber bullies or cyberstalkers. To 
this effect, Fahy, Standsfield, Smuk and others examined the longitudinal associations 
between cyberbullying involvement and adolescent mental health based on a sample 
of 2,480 teenagers190 Fahy and others found that there is a high prevalence of 
cyberbullying and the potential of cyberbullying victimisation as a risk factor for future 
depressive symptoms, social anxiety and below average well-being among 
                                                          
188 Samuel McQuade, Marcus Rogers, Sarah  Genty and Nathan Fisk Cyberstalking and Cyber bullying  (1st edn, Chelsea House, 2012) 14 
189 The tools include desktops, laptops, computers, cell phones, electronic gambling devices and other mobile computing devices. McQuade, 
Rogers, Genty and Fisk argue that the tools enable bullies and stalkers victimise and spy on people in person and online using the internet 
from private or public places thereby breaking down communication barriers.  
190 Amanda Fahy, Stephen Stansfield, Melanie Smuk, Neil Smith, Steven Cummins and Charlotte Clarke ‘Longitudinal Associations 
between Cyber bullying Interactions and Adolescents Mental Health’  (2016) 59 The Journal of Adolescent Health 5   
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adolescents.191 Additionally, Betts highlights a case involving a young person whose 
death was attributed to cyberbullying and negative experiences in the digital world.192 
Further, Al-Rahmi and his colleagues suggest that cyberbullying is prominent in 
internet-based harassment and in some cases student suicides.193 
 
The fifth shared characteristics of cyberbullying and cyberstalking is that both 
perpetrators target victims by disseminating harassing messages via electronic 
communication, posting obscene and disparaging comments on social networking 
sites and posting humiliating pictures.  
 
Despite the similarities between cyberbullying and cyberstalking a significant 
difference is that there is a presumption that cyber bulling involves the victimisation of 
young children as opposed to adults. Consequently, Al-Rahmi and others argue that 
cyberbullying is different from cyberstalking on two grounds. The first being that 
cyberbullying usually occurs between minors. The second that cyberbullying is subtler 
in nature.194  Similarly, McQuade, Rogers, Genty and Fisk argue that  the primary 
difference between cyberstalking and cyberbullying is that in cyberbullying cases, the 
victim is known to the perpetrator and usually involves adolescents, whereas in 
cyberstalking cases the perpetrator is usually an adult with an unknown intent who 
usually has more menacing motives often sexual in nature.195  This thesis argues that 
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in cyberbullying cases, the victims sometimes do not know the perpetrators if they are 
anonymous. The thesis further argues that in some cyberstalking cases, the intent of 
the cyberstalker is usually apparent especially in cases involving domestic violence. 
Hence, Miller lists some of the motivations of stalking as a delusional belief in romantic 
destiny, a desire to reclaim a prior relationship and a sadistic urge to torment the victim 
out of revenge.196 
 
Furthermore, Katz argues that the rapid development of technology in the last decade 
has resulted in significant adult concern over the risks facing children from 
cyberbullying.197 Likewise, Nixon argues that cyberbullying has become so endemic 
in adolescent experience that they have come to expect and accept cyberbullying.198   
Similarly, Phippen acknowledges that cyberbullying is characterised by peer oriented 
online abuse.199  Therefore, this academic evidence demonstrates that cyberbullying 
is perceived as an aspect of cybercrime which relates to the victimisation of children 
as opposed to adults 
 
Considering the above, Hayes argues that cyberbullying is a serious problem on the 
grounds that increased reports of suicide and school violence appear to be connected 
to cyberbullying.200 From a criminalisation perspective, Sanchez therefore suggests 
that cyberbullying should be treated as a crime because some victims end up dead.201   
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Of more concern are statistics revealed by research carried out in the UK in 2013. The 
study which was based on a sample of 10,008 young people found that 7 in 10 young 
people experience cyberbullying and approximately 5.43 million young people in the 
UK have experienced cyberbullying, with 1.26 million subjected to extreme 
cyberbullying on a daily basis.202 Additionally, in 2017 a report highlighted that 1 in 8 
young people have been bullied on social media.203 The report further revealed that 3 
in 4 parents have looked for or received information or advice about how to help their 
child manage online risks.204 A further report found that 1 in 4 young people have come 
across racist or hate messages online.205 The reports reveal that cyberbullying is a 
cyber- enabled crime which blights the lives of young people in the UK. Additionally, 
the recent Annual Bullying Survey which was conducted in conjunction with secondary 
schools and colleges in 2019, revealed that 74% of 2,347 young people experienced 
cyber bullying between November 2018 and February 2019.206  
 
Considering the above, the prevalence of cyberbullying in the UK has led to charitable 
organisations such as Childline, NSPCC and the Cybersmile foundation implementing 
measures to increase public awareness on the issues while assisting young victims to 
cope with the aftermath. 
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From the adult perspective, the crime study for England and Wales indicates that in 
2015/16, 4.6% of women and 2.7% of men aged 16-59 were victims of stalking.207 
Additionally, it was revealed that 1 in 10 men and 1 in 5 women will be affected by 
stalking in their lifetime.208  Further, the National Stalking Helpline revealed in the year 
2015 to 2016, it received 16,000 calls.209 Crucially, previous data from the Crime 
Survey of England and Wales revealed that between 2009 and 2012, up to 700, 000 
women were stalked specifically.210 Also, the Office for National Statistics Crime 
Survey for England and Wales provided data on the prevalence of stalking and 
cyberstalking implicitly among adults aged 16 to 74 in the year ending March 2019. 
The survey found that 6, 144 male adults and 7, 397 female adults respectively, 
experienced stalking in the year ending March 2019 which is a combined total to 
13,541.211  
 
Significantly, despite the fact that the British Crime Survey in England and Wales 
estimated that 5 million people experience stalking each year, it has been highlighted 
that there are no official statistics on the percentage that have been cyberstalked.212  
Consequently, it has been implicitly acknowledged by the government that response 
to stalking at present can be improved by various agencies working together with a 
view to protecting victims.213  Hence, on 10 May 2018, the Metropolitan Police Service 
launched a global multi-agency specialist unit dedicated to tackling stalking in 
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partnership with Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust and the Suzy 
Lamplugh Trust.214 Crucially, the Stalking Threat Assessment Centre will provide a 
variety of services from various agencies in a bid to tackle stalking and protect victims 
through working together collectively.215 The researcher anticipates that this measure 
will help protect victims from cyberstalkers who have mental health issues and 
persistently offend by offering them the medical and rehabilitative help they need. 
Additionally, this thesis envisages that the measure will protect victims from stalkers 
who continue to victimise when imprisoned or continue to target victims after they have 
been released from prison who may not be deterred by the sanctions that are meted 
by the criminal justice system.  
 
2.2.5 Cyberstalking victimisation and police perceptions  
 
The growth and integration of the internet into every aspect of the lives of individuals 
has facilitated the commission of crimes inclusive of cyberstalking.216 Bocji notes that 
cyberstalkers can harass individuals through the transmission of offensive e-mail 
messages, identity theft and damage to data or equipment.217  From a culpability point 
of view, Maran and Begotti argue that a factor which contributes to victimisation is that 
students specifically are not as careful when communicating online with strangers as 
they would be when communicating in the physical realm.218  Consequently, Wright 
explains that individuals become vulnerable to cyberstalking which can also place 
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them at risk in the physical realm if they post personal information without thinking of 
the consequences.219    
 
Against the above backdrop, there have been research studies on cyberstalking 
victimisation globally. Specifically, Halder investigated cyberstalking victimisation of 
women in India and the effectiveness of laws.220  Halder concludes that cyberstalking 
is essentially an emotional crime which ought to be dealt with via a restorative process 
along with a therapeutic jurisprudential approach.221 Pereira and Matos on the other 
hand, examined cyberstalking victimisation and what predicts fear in Portugal utilising 
a sample of 627 young people 222 Pereira and Matos found that 61.9 % of the 
participants were repeat victims of cyberstalkers. From an international perspective 
Baum, Catalano and Rand conducted a study on cyberstalking victimisation in the US 
using a nationally representative sample of residents in the US aged 18 years and 
older based on the National Crime Survey and the Supplemental Victimisation 
Survey.223 Baum, Catalano and Rand found that 14 in every 1000 US adults aged 18 
and above had experienced this type of victimisation.  
 
The issue of cyberstalking victimisation has also been investigated by researchers in 
the UK.  Specifically, in 2011 Maple, Short and Brown conducted an online survey on 
cyberstalking victimisation based on 353 self-participants.224 Their study found that 
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cyberstalking can have several health impacts on victims and lead to changes in their 
working life, relationship and finance.225  
 
In London, to date, there have been no studies on the joint perceptions of police 
officers and prosecutors on cyberstalking and the threshold of acceptable behaviour 
on the internet. Instead, there have been related studies on police perceptions of 
stalking with regards to harassment and the role of victim-offender relationships. To 
this effect Sheridan, Scott and Nixon examined police officers’ perceptions of 
harassment in England and Wales utilising a sample of 135 police officers in England 
and 127 police officers in Scotland.226 They found that certain prejudices existed within 
the police officer’s perceptions of stalking. Furthermore, that a particular bias exists in 
that police officers in their sample considered former partners to be less dangerous 
than those who target strangers or acquaintances contrary to existing researching 
findings.227 Additionally, Weller, Hope and Sheridan investigated police and public 
perceptions of stalking with reference to the role of victim offender relationship utilising 
a sample of 132 police officers and 225 lay participants.228 They found that in both 
samples, the extent to which given scenarios were deemed to constitute stalking 
behaviours were determined by prior victim-stalker relationships.229  
 
In 2019 a UK study comprising of 165 participants, rated victims of cyber abuse 
encompassing cyberstalking on measures of direct victim blame and perceived social, 
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physical and task attractiveness.230 The study found that factors such as the volume 
and source of cyber abuse influences direct victim blame and perceptions of 
attractiveness. The study, however, did not investigate the joint perceptions of UK 
police officers and prosecutors on cyberstalking victimisation.  
 
Currently, there is a gap in both academic and public knowledge of police officers and 
prosecutors’ perception of cyberstalking victimisation in London in respect of the 
threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. This study therefore aimed to make 
several contributions to the growing research in this area on cyberstalking. Firstly, this 
study uses a representative collective sample of police officers and prosecutors in 
London to examine law enforcement perceptions of cyberstalking. Secondly, this study 
is among the first to examine the joint perceptions of police officers and prosecutors 
of cyberstalking victimisation and what they consider to be the threshold of acceptable 
behaviour on the internet. Furthermore, the study investigates the perceptions of 
police officers and prosecutors on whether the existing legislation on stalking in the 
UK are effective.  
 
Given that cyberstalking can sometimes escalate to stalking in the physical realm and 
result in fatalities, there is an onus on police officers and prosecutors from a law 
enforcement perspective to investigate and prosecute perpetrators in a bid to bring 
offenders to justice. However, the prospects of police officers and prosecutors 
successfully investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers may be determined to an 
extent, by how law enforcement professionals perceive cyberstalking. 
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At present, the existing literature on cyberstalking has not specifically addressed from 
joint investigative and prosecutorial perspectives, perceptions of police officers and 
prosecutors of cyberstalking victimisation and the thresholds of acceptable behaviour 
on the internet. On a global scale, researchers have instead, investigated perceptions 
of cyberstalking in relation to other aspects.  Specifically, Alexy, Burgess, Baker and 
Smoyak examined the perception of cyberstalking among college students, and found 
that the perpetrator was most likely to be a former intimate partner for those students 
who had been cyberstalked.231 Participants consisted of 756 students from two 
different universities.232 From a law enforcement perspective, Holt, Bossler and 
Fitzgerald investigated state and local enforcement perceptions of computer crimes 
based on the ground that there exists a significant gap in our knowledge of law 
enforcement agencies.233 The study found that in general law enforcement agencies 
have now focused on investigating economic driven computer offences given that local 
agencies are still investigating sex offences.234 
 
From a victimisation perspective, Cass and Rosay investigated college students’ 
perceptions of criminal justice response to stalking utilising a survey which was 
administered to 513 undergraduate students.235 The study made two important 
findings. The first finding is that the prior relationship and the gender of the target and 
the offender would have an impact on the decision of the police to arrest. The second 
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finding was that the gender of the target or the offender would also have an impact on 
police investigations and the filing of criminal charges given that offenders are often 
perceived to be males and victims are perceived to be females.  
 
Ahlgrim investigated cyberstalking perceptions with reference to the impact of 
perpetrator gender and the cyberstalker/victim relationship.236 Ahlgrim found that  
cyberstalking scenarios with a male perpetrator were viewed as more consistent with 
cyberstalking. Additionally, in relation to perception of victimisation, Ahlgrim 
established that female cyberstalking victims were attributed less blame than male 
victims.237 Ahlgrim’s findings demonstrate two fundamental points in relation to 
cyberstalking perceptions. The first point is that gender is a factor which can determine 
whether an individual is blamed for being victimised. The second point is that gender 
is a factor which can influence people in deciding whether a cyberstalking incident has 
occurred. 
 
With the aim of filling some of these existing gaps in knowledge, the researcher 
interviewed the police officers and prosecutors to discern their perceptions on 
cyberstalking and what they consider to be the threshold of acceptable behaviour on 
the internet. In doing so the researcher, adopted an empathetic approach in a bid to 
understand the shared experiences of the participants and imagine their reality as the 
primary law enforcement officials in the UK who are tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting cyberstalkers.238  
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As a CPS employee and a criminal justice insider, the researcher endeavoured to go 
on a journey with the participants by imaging herself in the position of the participants 
as they responded to the interview questions. This approach enabled the researcher 
to understand the frustrations of the participants more. Hence, Gair highlights that 
empathy enriches qualitative research by promoting the ability to hear, feel, 
understand and value the accounts of others and to convey the empathetic feelings 
back to the participant.239  
 
2.3. Regulation of cyberstalking in England and Wales 
 
 The internet has enabled people to communicate faster with one another on a global 
scale. However, the internet has additionally facilitated the harassment of people and 
organisations online by cybercriminals.240 Hyson therefore identifies cyberstalking as 
a type of cybercrime which can lead to individuals being victimised in various ways 
such as leaving messages on social media websites, emailing victims and hacking 
into the accounts of victims.241 Furthermore, McQuade highlights that cyberstalkers 
are the eighth out of twelve categories of cybercriminals who abuse information.242 
 
Cleland argues that the criminal law is a very poor ally for victims of cybercrime.243 
Cleland writes from a perspective which suggests that the general characteristics of 
criminal law coupled with the features of digital communication and technology create 
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impediments to responding to cybercrime.244  Consequently, McQuade asserts that 
cybercriminals are ahead of the criminal justice officials who seek to respond to and 
manage cybercrime.245  Brenner on the other hand, recognizes that there is a tension 
between the policing of cybercrime and the requirement to respect the privacy rights 
of individuals.246  
 
In respect of the above critical observations regarding the regulation of cybercrime, 
the researcher discusses how the UK government has utilised criminal law to an extent 
to regulate cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime.  
 
2.3.1. An overview and critique of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
(PHA) 
 
Historically, the PHA (1997) was enacted to tackle stalking. The legislation, however, 
did not categorically refer to stalking but instead, introduced two criminal offences of 
harassment. The first offence is pursuing a course of conduct amounting to 
harassment and the second offence is putting a person in fear of violence.247 
 
From a law enforcement perspective, the PHA was criticized by campaigners including 
the Protection against Stalking charity on the grounds that it was not effective in 
dealing with stalking specifically. Consequently in 2011, the coalition government 
responded to the criticism by commissioning an Independent Parliamentary Inquiry 
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into stalking law reform which was chaired by the Rt Hon Elfyn Llwyd.248 The findings 
of the report which was published in 2012, were noteworthy as they revealed that the 
victims of stalking did not have confidence in the criminal justice system. The report 
therefore recommended in addition to other reforms, that a specific law for stalking 
should be enacted in England and Wales. 
 
In response to the findings of the Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into stalking law 
reforms, on 25 November 2012, the government amended the PHA via s111 and s112 
of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 respectively by introducing two new offences 
of stalking.249  
  
2.3.2.Significance of the expanded Protection from Harassment Act 1997  
 
The amended Protection from Harassment Act introduced two new offences on 
stalking. The first offence that was created is the offence of “stalking” as provided 
under s 2A (1) of the PHA. The second offence that was created is “stalking involving 
fear of violence or serious alarm or distress” as provided under s4A (1) of the PHA.250   
 
From a law enforcement perspective, the significance of the expanded legislation is 
that although cyberstalking is not specifically defined as an offence, the newly created 
offences on stalking have been drafted broadly to incorporate elements of 
cyberstalking.251  The offences are discussed below. 
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2.3.3. Stalking offence under section 2A  
 
The offence of stalking as provided under s2A of the PHA is defined as pursuing a 
course of conduct which amounts to harassment and stalking.252 A person found guilty 
of this offence is liable on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of up to six 
months or a fine, or both. 
 
From a prosecutorial perspective, the significance of this offence is that it enables 
prosecutors to charge cyberstalkers with the offence of stalking if there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that there is a realistic prospect of conviction. From a penal 
perspective, the expanded legislation may enable judges to deter stalkers and 
cyberstalkers implicitly by sentencing convicted perpetrators to a maximum of 6 
months imprisonment or a fine or both. 
 
2.3.4. Stalking offence under section 4A  
 
Section 4A of the PHA (1997) creates the offence of stalking involving fear of violence 
or serious alarm or distress. The maximum prison sentence for the offence was 
doubled to 10 years from 3 April 2017 by the Policing and Crime Act 2017.253  The 
legislative amendment was introduced following a campaign by the National Stalking 
Advocacy Service, Paladin Stalking Charity, and a Ten-Minute Rule Bill introduced in 
October 2016 by Alex Chalk.254 
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From a penal perspective, the more serious offence of stalking involving fear of 
violence or serious alarm or distress offence enables judges to deter stalkers by 
sentencing them to a maximum of 10 years imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.  
 
The offence of stalking involving fear of violence is significant because the offence can 
be perpetrated in two ways as provided under sections 4A (1) (b) (i) and 4A (1) (b) (ii) 
respectively.  The first way of committing the offence is by causing a person to fear on 
at least two occasions that violence will be used. The second way of committing the 
offence is by causing serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect 
on the day to day activities of an individual. The two ways of committing the offence of 
stalking involving the fear of violence are discussed below. 
 
2.3.5 Stalking involving a fear of violence under section 4A (1) (b) (i) 
 
The offence of stalking involving a fear of violence under section 4A (1) (b) (i) has four 
parts. The first and second elements of the offence stipulate that there has had to be 
a course of conduct which causes another to fear that violence will be used against 
him/her. The third element of the offence specifies that the defendant either knows or 
ought to know that the course of conduct will cause another to fear that violence will 
be used against him/her. The fourth part of the offence stipulates that the defendant 
ought to know that his course of conduct will cause another to fear that violence will 
be used against them if a reasonable person in possession of the same information 
would think that the course of conduct would cause the other so to fear on that 
occasion. 
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Based on the above, prosecutors will only be able to charge a cyberstalker under s4A 
(1) (b) (i) of the PHA with the offence of putting a victim in fear of violence via stalking 
if the four highlighted elements are satisfied. 
 
2.3.6. Stalking Involving Serious alarm or distress   4A (1) (b) (ii) 
 
The offence of stalking involving serious alarm or distress under section 4A (1) (b) (ii) 
has three distinct elements. The first and second elements specify that there must be 
a course of conduct which amounts to stalking. The third element stipulates that the 
stalking conduct either causes another to fear on at least two occasions, that violence 
will be used against him or her or causes another person serious alarm or distress 
which has a substantial adverse effect on his or her usual day-to-day activities. 
 
Based on the above, prosecutors will only be able to charge a cyberstalker under   s4A 
(1) (b) (ii) with the offence of stalking involving serious alarm or distress subject to the 
three highlighted elements being satisfied. 
 
In summary, a stalker and cyberstalker implicitly may face imprisonment for up to ten 
years or a fine, or both if convicted under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment 
Act. Additionally, on summary conviction, a person is liable to imprisonment for a term 
of up to twelve months or a fine, or both.  
 
2.3.7 Legal Issues: Decision to charge and the Threshold Test 
 
The CPS is the prosecuting body in England and Wales. Prosecutors and police 
officers are required to work jointly during the process of investigating and prosecuting 
85 
 
criminal cases.255 In criminal cases a decision to charge will be made by either the 
police or the CPS depending on the category and seriousness of the crime committed 
if there is a realistic prospect of conviction against an accused on each charge. To 
ensure that charging decisions are fair and consistent, the Director for Public 
Prosecutions has published guidance on the charging of cases.256  The importance of 
the guidance on charging decisions is twofold in respect of police officers and 
prosecutors.257  
 
Fundamentally, during the investigation process, the police are required to refer 
certain cases to the CPS for charging decisions if the cases satisfy the Code Test 
which is a ‘realistic prospect of conviction’.258 Therefore, there is an onus on the CPS 
to consider cases that have been referred to it by the police with a view to establishing 
if the cases satisfy the Full Code Test.  
 
From a legal perspective, once the police refer cases to the CPS for charging advice 
on serious, complex or contested cases, this may result in the prosecutors instructing 
the police to provide further evidence before a charging decision can be made and to 
ensure a successful prosecution. The significance of the advice is that it will bring to 
completion, cases that cannot be strengthened by further evidence.  
 
                                                          
255 ‘Charging The Director’s Guidance 2013-fifth edition, May 2013 Revised Arrangements’ (CPS, May 2013) <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-
guidance/charging-directors-guidance-2013-fifth-edition-may-2013-revised-arrangements> accessed 23 March 2019 
256 The guidance specifies the cases that are to be charged by the police and the case that are to be charged by the CPS. Specifically, the 
guidance defines the responsibilities of police officers ranging from the charging of cases to the decision to take no further action. 
Additionally, the guidance defines the responsibilities of prosecutors ranging from the making of charging decisions to determining whether 
it is suitable to apply the Threshold test in cases where prosecutors are responsible for making charging decisions. 
257 In relation to police officers, the charging guidance is significant because it highlights the duty of police officers have to investigate 
offences, assess evidence before charging or referring cases to the CPS and defines the requirement on police officers to refer cases to the 
CPS. In relation to prosecutors, the Charing guidance is significant because it specifies the duty of prosecutors to assess the evidence provided 
by the police, highlights the duty to provide early investigative advice in certain cases and defines the requirement in all cases to meet the full 
code test 
258 ‘Police Investigations and the Role of the Crown Prosecution Service Third Report of Session 2015-2016’  (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 20 November 2015) <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmhaff/534/534.pdf> accessed 23 March 
2019 
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2.3.8. Legal Issues: The Full Code Test  
 
 
The Full Code Test is set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. It is a two staged 
process which must be applied by police officers and prosecutors prior to making 
charging decisions.259 The first stage is the evidential stage and the second stage is 
the public interest stage.260  Under the Evidential Test, prosecutors must be satisfied 
that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against 
each suspect on each charge.  
 
The evidential stage of the Full Code Test requires prosecutors to ascertain whether 
the evidence can be used in court, whether the evidence is credible, whether the 
evidence is reliable and whether there is any other information that might affect the 
sufficiency of the evidence.261 Additionally, the Evidential Test requires prosecutors to 
examine what the defence case may be, and how it is likely to affect the prospects of 
conviction.262  A case which does not satisfy the Evidential Test will not proceed to the 
next stage.263 
 
The Public Interest Test requires police officers and prosecutors to carefully weigh up 
the factors for and against prosecution prior to establishing how fundamental each 
factor is in the circumstances of a case and then make an overall assessment.264 
                                                          
259 ‘ The Code  for Crown Prosecutors’ (CPS, 26 October 2018)  <www.cps.gov.uk/publications-code-for-crown-Prosecutors> accessed  25 
March 2019 
260 ibid 
261 ibid 
262 The evidential test requires police officers and prosecutors to consider two point.  The first point is whether a court or jury is more likely 
to convict a suspect based in the available evidence. The second point is the effect of any likely defence 
263  Police Investigations and the Role of the Crown Prosecution Service Third Report of Session 2015-2016’  (House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee, 20 November 2015) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmhaff/534/534.pdf> accessed 23 
March 2019 
264 ‘Prosecutions and Case Management Charging and Case Preparation’   (ACPO, 2016) <www.app.college.police.uk/prosecution-and-
case-management-index/>  accessed 14 January 2016  
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There are seven public interest factors which can affect the decision to prosecute.265  
The public interest factors are the seriousness of the offence, the suspect’s culpability, 
the circumstances of and harm caused to the victim, the suspect’s age and maturity 
at the time of the offence, impact on the community, whether prosecution is a 
proportionate response and whether sources of information require protecting. 
 
In certain situations where the Full Code Test is not met, the Threshold Test may be 
applied to charge a suspect.266  Specifically, the Threshold Test will only be justified if 
the seriousness or circumstances of the case warrants the making of an immediate 
charging decision.267 Additionally, there must be substantial grounds for objecting to 
bail.268 Fundamentally, there are five conditions of the Threshold Test that have to be 
met to guarantee that the Threshold Test is only applied when required and that cases 
are not charged too soon. The five conditions of the Threshold Test will need to be 
satisfied for a suspect to be charged. The first condition is that there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the person to be charged has committed the offence. The 
second test is that further evidence can be obtained to provide a realistic prospect of 
conviction. The third condition is that the seriousness or circumstances of a case 
justifies the making of an immediate charging decision. The fourth condition is that 
there is continuing substantial grounds for objecting to bail. The fifth condition is that 
it is in the public interest. 
 
                                                          
265  The public interest factors are the seriousness of the offence, the suspect’s culpability. The circumstances of and harm caused to the 
victim, the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence, impact on the community, whether prosecution is a proportionate response 
and whether sources of information and national security will be harmed 
266 ‘The Code For Crown Prosecutor’ (CPS, 26 October 2018) <www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors> accessed 1 April 
2018 
267 ibid 
268 ibid 
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2.3.9. The implication of legal issues under the Full Code Test and the 
Threshold Test on the prosecution of cyberstalkers 
 
The CPS is legally required to make decisions about cyberstalking cases in 
accordance with the code for Crown Prosecutors to determine whether there is a 
realistic prospect of conviction. Consequently, the legal issues discussed above may 
have an implication on the pre-charge decisions and the charging decisions that are 
made by the police officers and prosecutors respectively.  
 
From a pre-charge perspective, the implication of the legal issues identified above is 
that certain cyberstalking cases which have been referred to the CPS by the police for 
a pre-charge advice may be concluded if further evidence will either not strengthen 
such cases or lead to successful outcomes. This is arguably more so in cases involving 
anonymous cyberstalkers or cyberstalkers via proxy whose veils of anonymity cannot 
be unmasked either by the police or by the ISPs. 
 
From an evidential perspective, the Evidential Test will require police officers and 
prosecutors to consider whether a court or jury is more likely to convict a cyberstalker 
of a charge after hearing the evidence.269 Additionally, the Evidential Test requires 
police officers and prosecutors to consider the effect of any likely defence or 
information from a cyberstalker’s defence team. Given that there are various evidential 
difficulties which could impede the investigation of cyberstalkers, police officers and 
prosecutors may be unable to meet the evidential threshold of a realistic prospect of 
conviction in cases that are evidentially weak which do not connect a cyberstalker to 
                                                          
269 If police officers or prosecutors decide that a court or jury is more likely than not to convict a cyberstalker of a charge after hearing the 
evidence, then the evidential evidence will be met and they can proceed to consider the public interest test 
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a charge. Crucially, a cyberstalking case which does not pass the evidential stage will 
not proceed, no matter how serious or sensitive it may be. 
 
From a public interest perspective, in every cyberstalking case where there is sufficient 
evidence to justify a prosecution, prosecutors will then proceed to consider whether a 
prosecution is required in the public interest. In effect, a cyberstalker will be prosecuted 
unless the prosecutor is satisfied that there are public interest factors tending against 
prosecution which outweigh those leaning in favour of a prosecution ranging from the 
seriousness of the offence to the age and maturity of the cyberstalker at the time of 
the offence. 
 
In addition to the above, police officers and prosecutors will be unable to apply the 
Threshold Test to a cyberstalking case if the prerequisite 5 conditions are not met. 
 
2.3.10. Legal issue- Meeting the Reasonable Person Test 
 
The legal issue that may be faced by judges is establishing how the Reasonable 
Person Test can be effectively applied to determine whether a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information as a stalker, would have known that his or her 
conduct will firstly cause a victim to fear that violence will be used against them or 
secondly cause a victim serious alarm or distress.  
 
A further legal issue which may arise is identifying how stalking can have a 
substantially adverse effect on the day-to-day activities of the victims given that the 
phrase has not been defined under section 4A of the PHA. Consequently, the Home 
Office has outlined six examples of lifestyle changes which may constitute evidence 
90 
 
of the substantial adverse effects that stalking has on individuals.270 Specifically, this 
highlights that the evidence ranges from the victim changing their routes to work to the 
victim stopping or changing the way they socialise. Significantly, the Home Office 
acknowledges that the adverse effects may relate to cyberstalking too.271  
 
2.3.11 Legal Issues-Defining cyberstalking implicitly and a course of conduct 
 
In the current legislative landscape, the PHA does not legally define stalking and 
cyberstalking implicitly. Instead, section 2A (3) of the act lists seven behaviours that 
may be construed as stalking and cyberstalking implicitly.272 Specifically, the second, 
third, fourth and sixth listed behaviours implicitly relate to cyberstalking.273  
 
Given that s.2A(3) is not an exhaustive list and that the courts are required to consider 
other acts by a defendant and determine whether those acts constitute stalking, a  
legal issue which may arise in the prosecution of stalkers and cyberstalkers implicitly 
is that some lawyers representing cyberstalkers lawyers may argue that certain 
behaviours associated with stalking should be classified as harassment and not 
stalking.274 This legal issue could result in the lawyers therefore arguing that the 
cyberstalkers are guilty of harassment and not stalking.  
  
                                                          
270 ‘Home Office Circular A Change to the Protection from Harassment Act 2007’ (16 October 2012)  
<www.homeoffice.gov.uk/aboutus/corporate-publications-strategy/home-office-circulars/circulars-2012/018-2012/> accessed 1 January 
2019 
271 ‘Briefing Note for Amendments to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 22 January 2013’ (College of Policing, 23 January 2013) 
<www.ibrary.college.police.uk/docs/college-of-policing/stalking-and-harassment-amendment-2013.pdf> accessed 31 December 22018 
272 ‘Stalking and Harassment’ (CPS, 23 May 2018) <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/stalking-and-harassment> accessed 1 January 2018 
273 The behaviours are contacting or attempting to contact a person by any means, publishing a statement or material either relating to a person 
or purporting to originate from a person, monitoring the use by a person of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication 
and interfering with property of an individual. 
274 Section of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 specifies the elements of the harassment offence as a course of conduct which 
amounts to harassment and the defendant knew or ought to have known that the conduct amounts to the harassment of another  
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In addition to the above, section 7 of the PHA stipulates that a person will be found 
guilty if omissions have caused a victim to be in fear of violence on two or more 
occasions.275  The Act however, does not define the length of time that should pass 
between stalking incidents. This legal issue might, therefore, make it difficult for judges 
to establish what constitutes a course of conduct when determining cases that are 
characterised by cyberstalking incidents that are distant apart.  Against this backdrop, 
it has been suggested that certain behaviours may be distant apart and still constitute 
a course of conduct given that every case will be determined on its own facts.276  
 
In September 2018, the Crown Prosecution Service published statistics on 
prosecutions for stalking offences in its annual Violence against Women and Girls 
report.  The eleventh report significantly indicates that in 2017-18, 1,616 prosecutions 
were started for stalking offences which is a 68.5 per cent increase from 959 in 2016-
17. As previously highlighted ( Chapter 1, section 1.3)  on 12 September 2019, while 
discussing the latest figures on prosecutions involving Violence against Women and 
Girls (VAWG), the current Director for Public Prosecutions Max Hill revealed that 1n 
2018-2019, stalking prosecutions increased from 1,616 to 2,209  which was an 
increase of 36.7% and the highest volume ever recorded.277   
 
The above statistical data is important because it demonstrates that the CPS and the 
police are working jointly together with a view to investigating and prosecuting stalkers 
                                                          
275 Section 7 defines a course of conduct as being on at least two occasions 
276 Stalking and Harassment’ (CPS, 23 May 2018) <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/stalking-and-harassment> accessed 1 January 2018 
277 ‘Annual Violence against Women and Girls report published’ (CPS, 12 September 2019) < www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/annual-violence-
against-women-and-girls-report-published-0> accessed 12 September 2019 
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and cyberstalkers implicitly. The data further indicates that the CPS and the police are 
prosecuting stalkers despite the highlighted legal issues.278  
 
In summary, the two stalking offences which have been introduced in the PHA can be 
used by police officers and prosecutors to bring stalkers, and cyberstalkers implicitly, 
to justice given that some countries are yet to regulate stalking and may not perceive 
stalking and cyberstalking as serious offences which warrant a specific legislation.  
 
2.3.12 Regulation of cyberstalking which involves hate speech crimes 
 
Hate crimes can be defined as offences which are motivated by any form of 
discrimination against the victim's ethnic or national origin, gender, disability, age, 
religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender identity.279  Hate crime occurs if victims 
are subjected to hostile treatments on the above highlighted grounds. The required 
evidence of hostility can be obtained via face to face communication, written 
communication and online or social media communication.280  
Applying the above definition of hate crimes to cyberstalking, cyberstalking can be 
regarded as a hate crime if a cyberstalker’s hate speech was motivated by any form 
of discrimination against the victim's ethnic origin, national origin, gender, disability, 
age, religion, belief, sexual orientation or gender identity. 
 
                                                          
278 The researcher anticipates that there will be a consistent rise in the number of prosecutions if to the CPS and the police continue to work 
together in a bid to prosecute stalkers 
279  ‘Social Media - Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent  via social media’ (CPS, 21 August 2018)  
<www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/social-media-guidelines-prosecuting-cases-involving-communications-sent-social-media> accessed 8 
December 2018  
280 ‘Hate Crime, What it is and What to Do About It’ (CPS, 2016) 
<www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/hate_crime_leaflet_2016.pd >accessed 9 December 2018 
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Yar highlights that the criminalisation of hate speech is controversial due to the fact 
that critics may argue that it will lead to an infringement of the freedom of expression 
on the internet.281  Yar makes his argument from a perspective which indicates that 
the criminalisation of hate speech could lead to political, journalistic academic and 
artistic censorship.282  However, from a punitive perspective, it can be counter argued 
that if hate speech is not regulated, it could result in criminals like cyberstalkers 
victimizing individuals and not being held accountable for their actions.  
 
From a judicial perspective, Baer suggests that if cyberstalking involves threats, the 
result of a claim concerning a criminal threat is dependent on the contents of the 
speech and the standards applied by the courts to consider the likelihood and depth 
of the harm threatened.283 Baer therefore, makes a distinction between threats that 
will be deemed a greater danger and threats which are merely generalized and are 
proposing intangible harm. 
The following four aspects of hate crime that have been regulated in England and 
Wales are: 
1 racially and religiously aggravated crimes 
2 homophobic crimes 
3 biphobic and transphobic crimes 
4 disability hate crime crimes284 
 
                                                          
281 Majid Yar, Cybercrime and Society (2nd edn, Sage 2013) 
282 ibid 
283 Merritt Baer ‘Cyberstalking and the Internet Landscape we Have Created’ (2010)  15 Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 2 
284 ‘Hate Crime’ (CPS) <www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime> accessed 18 January 2019 
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From a legal perspective, sections 28 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and 
sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 respectively, empower 
prosecutors to apply for an uplift in the sentence of those convicted of hate crimes.285 
This means that because of the serious nature of hate crimes, the CPS can apply to 
the courts for a sentence uplift which is an increased punishment for a crime. The 
implied implication of the legislative provisions with reference to cyberstalking via hate 
speech is that on conviction, a cyberstalker may receive a higher sentence for 
demonstrating hostility to a victim based on the victim's race, religion, disability, sexual 
orientation or transgender identity.286  
 
From a prosecutorial perspective, on 18 October 2018, the CPS confirmed that in 
2016/17, 83% of hate crimes cases that were prosecuted led to a conviction or guilty 
plea.287  The CPS further confirmed that in 2017, more than half of the organisation’s 
requests for a sentence uplift led to offenders having their sentence increased 
because it was motivated by hate.288 
 
From a historical perspective, in March in 2012, the Law Commission published the 
Government’s Hate Crime Action Plan which described its three key principles.289  The 
principles are preventing hate crimes, increasing reporting and access to support and 
improving the operational response to hate crimes.290  In addition to the above, in 2016 
                                                          
285 ‘Hate Crime’ (CPS, 16 October 2018) <www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime> accessed 9 December 2018 
286 This is due to the fact that given the serious nature of these offences, the CPS can apply to the courts for a 'sentence uplift' which is an 
increased punishment for the crime. 
287 Hate Crime’ (CPS, 16 October 2018) <www.cps.gov.uk/hate-crime> accessed 9 December 2018 
288 ibid 
289 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 213 Hate Crime: The Case for Extending the Existing Offences A Consultation Paper’ (Law 
Commission, 2012)  < www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2015/03/cp213_hate_crime_amended.pdf> accessed 9 December 2018 
290 The reason for this legislative action was because the government felt that at the time of the publication of the Law Commission’s action 
plan, existing criminal  offences dealing specifically with hate crimes specifically, did not recognize the five protected prejudicial grounds 
that motivate offenders which are race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity 
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the government published an action plan to tackle hate crime.291 The plan focused on 
five themes. The first theme is preventing hate crime by challenging beliefs and 
attitudes. The second theme is responding to hate crime within our communities. The 
third theme is increasing the reporting of hate crime. The fourth theme is improving 
support for victims of hate crime. The fifth theme is building the understanding of hate 
crime. 
 
The CPS has since confirmed that it has implemented the Hate Crime Strategy for the 
specific period of 2017 to 2020.292  The two-pronged aim of the strategy is to obtain 
justice for victims of hate crimes and support everyone thus affected. The strategy 
highlights the aims and the key commitments of the CPS towards the tackling of hate 
crimes.293  Additionally, the CPS has revealed that in April 2020, the CPS will publish 
its new strategy, ‘CPS 2025’.  It is anticipated that the strategy will set out the CPS 
vision and aims over the next five years and that the CPS’ equality and diversity 
objectives will be integrated into the strategic framework, and through their annual 
business planning and reporting cycle.294 Therefore, the CPS has confirmed that it will 
report on the progress made against each of their strategic aims.295  
 
Significantly, in October 2018 Alison Saunders the former Director for Public 
Prosecutions confirmed that the recorded sentence uplift increased to 67.1% which 
                                                          
291 ‘Action Against Hate the UK Government’s for Tackling Hate Crime Two Years On’  (Government, 18 October 2018) 
<www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748136/Hate_Crime_report_Easy_Read_
FINAL_WEB_ACC.PDF> accessed 3 April 2018 
292 Hate Crime Strategy 2017-2020’   (CPS, 2017) <www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/CPS-Hate-Crime-Strategy-
2020-Feb-2018.pdf> accessed 9 December 2018 
293ibid  
294 ‘Hate Crime Report’ 2018-2019 (CPS 2019) < https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/CPS-Hate-Crime-
Annual-Report-2018-2019.PDF > accessed 19 January 2020 
295 ibid 
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exceeds the level of ambition which was set in the CPS 2020 business plan.296  
Notably, in the Hate Crime Report 2018-2019 which was published on 25 October 
2019, the Director for Public Prosecutions Max Hill confirmed that the CPS in hate 
crime cases, ask the court for an increased sentence or sentence uplift to reflect the 
additional level of seriousness.297 Further, the Director for Public Prosecutions 
confirmed that in 2018-19, the number of convictions where the court announced a 
sentence uplift reached the highest level yet at 73.6%.298  
 
From a privacy perspective, a cyberstalker may decide to argue that his right to 
freedom of expression has been infringed under Article 10 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights if he has been convicted of a hate speech based on the racial or 
religious grounds. However, in the case of DPP v Collins, the court held that a person 
can be prosecuted for using communications system to leave racist messages.299  The 
significance of this case is that it prevents criminals like cyberstalkers who have been 
convicted of racist or religious hate crime speech offences from arguing that their rights 
to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on 
human rights have been infringed. Additionally, it may be difficult for a cyberstalker to 
prove that hate speech is a protected speech. This is due to the fact that Article 10 is 
a qualified right which provides that an individual’s right to freedom of expression can 
be lawfully restricted in certain circumstances.300 The circumstances are if it is in the 
interests of public safety or if restriction is required for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
                                                          
296 ‘Hate Crime Annual Report 2017-2018’ (CPS, 16 October 2018) < www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-hate-
crime-report-2018.pdf> accessed 9 December 2018 
297 ‘Hate Crime Report 2018-2019 (CPS, 25 October 2019) < www.cps.gov.uk/publication/hate-crime-report-2018-2019> accessed 13 
November 2019 
298 ibid  
299 [2006] 1.WLR 2223 (QBD) 
300 ‘Human Rights and Criminal Prosecutions: General Principles’ (CPS, 2017) < ww.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/human-rights-and-criminal-
prosecutions-general-principles> accessed 9 December 2018 
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2. 4 Theoretical framework- Application of traditional criminological          
theories to cybercrime 
Historically, traditional criminological theories have been used to explain the reasons 
behind traditional behaviour. The development of the internet has however, created   
challenges in applying traditional criminological theories to cyber space because 
Cyber space is characterised by architectural and societal hallmarks which differ 
significantly from the environments in the physical realm. 
A specific criminological challenge in applying traditional criminological theories to 
cyber space is establishing where a cybercrime offence occurs given that traditional 
criminological theories assume that crimes occur in distinct local environments. 
Consequently, Stalder highlights that there is no distance at all in cyber space.301 In 
this context, D’ Ovidio, Mitman, Jamillah and  El-Burki  emphasise that computer 
networks including the internet have reduced the impact of time and space on social 
interactions.302 D’ Ovidio,  Mitman, Jamillah and  El-Burki  further stress that the 
disembodiment of humans and the resulting cyber communication via virtual 
communities has challenged the traditional concept that communities consist of people 
and entities that are connected by geographical proximity.303 
Within the above framework, Yar points out that cyber space cannot be divided into 
geographical locations in comparison to the real world where geographical 
distinctions, for example, can be made between neighbourhoods and districts.304 Yar 
therefore concludes that the issue of establishing where crimes occurs in cyber space 
                                                          
301 Felix Stalder ‘The logic of networks. Social landscapes vis-a vis the space of flows’ (CT, 1998)  
<www./journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/article/view/14884/577 > accessed 3 November 208 
302 Rob D’Ovidio, Tyson Mitman, Imaani Jamillah and El-Burki  Wesley Shumar ‘Adult-Child Sex Advocacy Websites as Social Learning 
Websites: A Content Analysis’  (2009) 3 International  Journal  of Cyber Criminology 1   
303 ibid  
304  Majid Yar, ‘Cybercrime and Society’ (2nd edn, Sage 2013) 
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demonstrates that applying criminological views found on spatial divergence can be 
of limited use. 
In relation to cyberstalking, the researcher examined four traditional criminological 
theories and two modern criminological cybercrime theories in a bid to identify a 
theoretical schema that can explain cyberstalking victimisation. The traditional 
theories are the social learning theory, self-control theory, lifestyle theory and the 
routine activity theory. The two modern theories are the space transition theory and 
cyberlifestyle routine activity theory. A review of these theories follows. 
 
2.4.1 Self- Control Theory: A theoretical application to cyberstalking 
victimisation 
 
The general theory of crime was postulated in 1990 by Gottfredson and Hirschi and 
posits that low self-control is the primary factor that causes crime and deviance.305  
Gottfredson and Hirschi suggest that the theory consists of six personality traits which 
collectively determine if individuals tend to commit crimes.306  
 
From a victimisation perspective, Baek, Losavio and Higgins applied the general 
theory of crime to online harassment to ascertain if adolescents with low level of self-
control will be more likely to commit online harassment than those with high level of 
self-control.307  Baek, Losavio and Higgins found that adolescents with low levels of 
self-control were more likely to commit online harassment than those with high levels 
                                                          
305 Fawn Ngo and Raymond   Paternoster  ‘Cybercrime Victimization: An Examination of Individuals and Situational Level Factors’ (2011) 
5 International  Journal  of  Cyber Criminology 1   
306 The six personality traits of the self-control theory are impulsivity, risk seeking, self-centredness, bad humour and a preference for 
simple, physical activities 
307  Hyunin Baek, Michael Losavio and George Higgins ‘The Impact of Low Self-Esteem on Online Harassment: Interaction with 
Opportunity’ (2016) 11 Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law  3 
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of self-control.308 Similarly, Donner and others found that there is a connection 
between self-control and various forms of online behaviours such as threatening or 
insulting others through email or instant messaging.309 Likewise, Reyns, Fisher and 
Randa investigated cyberstalking victimisation among 1,987 college students by 
applying three theories which included the self-control theory.310  The study revealed 
that the self-control theory is one of three theories that can be used to explain 
cyberstalking victimisation.311 
 
Collectively, the above findings suggest that online harassment in general and 
Cyberstalking victimisation in particular may be explained from the theoretical lens of 
the self-control theory.  
 
2.4.2 Social learning and behavioural theories of crime: Theoretical 
applications to cyberstalking victimisation 
 
 
The Social Learning theory posits that crime and deviance are learned responses. The 
hypothesis can be traced to the differential association theory which was postulated 
by Edwin Sutherland in 1947.312 The sociological theory postulates that crime is a 
social product which is learnt from several social interactions in personal groups or 
social settings.313 
                                                          
308 The sample size was 1,0971 and the data was collected by the Korean Institute of Criminology. The data was based on self- reports 
surveys collected from school children 
309 Christopher Donner, Catherine Marcum, Wesley Jennings, George Higgins and Jerry Banfield ‘ Low Self-Control and Cybercrime 
Exploring the Utility of the General Theory of Crime Beyond Digital Piracy’  (2014)  34 Computers in Human Behaviour  
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From a psychological perspective, Albert Bandura posited the social learning theory 
which proposes that new patterns of behaviour can be learned through direct 
experience or by observing the behaviour of others.314 The theory suggests that 
individuals learn from their interactions with others in a social context specifically via 
observation, imitation and modelling. Bandura’s observations are significant because 
they demonstrate that the replication of deviant behaviours was more likely to occur 
when the actor admired the person who had originally demonstrated the behaviour. 
Applying this line of reasoning to cyberstalking, it can be argued that cyberstalkers 
may imitate other perpetrators who they have read about in the press or on the internet 
and whom they admire having observed them. Based on Bandura’s theory, it follows 
that cyberstalkers are more likely to offend if they observe other actors, retain 
knowledge on the observed deviant cyberstalking acts and then being motivated 
reproduce such acts. 
 
Therefore, it may be considered that offenders engage in cyberstalking activities after 
observing and imitating the behaviours of other cyberstalkers. This argument is 
however flawed because it cannot be used to explain cases involving cyberstalkers 
who have not engaged in offending after observing and imitating others but have 
instead, victimised former partners or complete strangers independently. 
 
From an empirical perspective, there does not appear to be a body of work in relation 
to cyberstalking.315 Consequently, Fox, Nobles and Akers emphasise that their study 
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of stalking victimisation within the framework of social learning theory is the first study 
on stalking perpetration.316  From an analytical perspective, Munro and Jeffrey 
acknowledge that the social learning theory has been referred to as a bridge between 
behaviourist and cognitive learning theories because the theory encompasses 
attention, memory, and motivation.317 However, Munro and Jeffrey argue that the 
Social Learning theory has conceptual weaknesses due to the fact that it is difficult to 
measure social learning either as a process or an outcome.  
 
Nabavi on the other hand, acknowledges that the Social Cognitive Learning theory is 
derived from the Social Learning theory.318 The Social Cognitive Learning theory 
posits that people learn by observing the actions of others and that the human thought 
process is the key to understanding personality. From a critical perspective too, Nabavi 
equally emphasises that the Social Cognitive Learning theory has several strengths 
and weakness.319 Some of the strengths of the theory are the collection of a 
magnificent accumulated research record, the theory is open to change because it is 
evolving and the theory focuses on fundamental human social behaviours. These 
strengths of the theory relate to the research because the accumulated research 
record validates the application of this theory to the study. Additionally, the theory can 
be used to explain the worrying human social behaviour of cyberstalking. Some of the 
weaknesses of the Social Cognitive Learning theory are that some academics 
consider it to be a loosely organised theory, the theory is based on initial findings and 
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the theory fails to consider two factors. The first factor is maturity and changes over a 
lifespan. The second factor is that little attention is paid to motivation, conflict and 
emotions.   
 
 
2.4.3 Space Transition Theory: A theoretical application to cyberstalking 
victimisation 
 
The space theory was developed by Jaishankar in 2008 to explain the causation of 
cybercrime.320  The theory posits that people behave differently when they move from 
the physical space to the cyber space.  The space transition theory has seven 
principles based on which it is suggested that people act differently when they move 
from one space to another.321 Danqauah and Longe conducted research to ascertain 
if the postulates of the space transition theory constituted a logical and credible basis 
for predicting and determining the cause of cybercrime.322 Danquah and Longe found 
that the space transition theory is not applicable to all categories of cybercrime.323   
 
The first and second postulates of the space transition theory specifically may be 
significant in examining cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime.  The first postulate 
of the space transition theory suggests that people with repressed behaviour in the 
physical realm have tendencies to commit crime in cyber space which they would not 
otherwise, commit in the physical realm. Based on the first postulate of the space 
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transition theory, it can be argued that cyberstalkers are individuals with repressed 
criminal behaviour in the physical realm who have the propensity to victimising 
behaviours in cyber space which they would not otherwise commit in physical space. 
The researcher however suggests that it may be problematic to strictly apply the first 
postulate of the space transition theory to cyberstalking given that sometimes, 
cyberstalkers have the propensity to victimise in the physical realm in addition to the 
cyber realm. Crucially, some cyberstalkers victimise in the physical realm prior to 
targeting individuals in the cyber realm and vice versa.  
 
The second postulate of the theory highlights that identity flexibility, dissociative 
anonymity and a lack of deterrence factor in the cyber realm enable perpetrators to 
commit cybercrimes. The second postulate of the space transition theory may be 
equally relevant to cyberstalking victimisation given that the three theoretical features 
of identity flexibility, anonymity and the absence of deterrent factors enable 
cyberstalkers to offend. From a law enforcement perspective, the three factors can 
constitute investigative difficulties which may impede the prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
 
 
2.4.4 Lifestyle Exposure Theory and Routine Activity Theory: Theoretical 
Frameworks Applied to cyberstalking victimisation 
 
The Lifestyle exposure theory of victimisation was postulated by Handling in 1978.324 
The theory posits that an individual’s daily activities contribute to victimisation.325 The 
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Lifestyle Exposure theory further suggests that the decision to engage in risky 
activities can be arrived at through individual rational choice.326  Against this backdrop, 
Reyns, Henson and Fisher found that individuals who engage in risky online 
behaviours such as opening numerous social networks accounts and connecting to 
strangers were more likely to be victimised.327 The theory may be used to explain 
cyberstalking victimisation based on the argument that individuals may expose 
themselves to victimisation if they engage in risky activities on the internet. 
 
Support for the notion of victimisation by prior romantic partners is proved by Wick, 
Nagoshi, Basham and colleagues who conducted research which was based on a 
sample of 298 college students who completed an online survey about their 
experiences of being victimised. The research found that the Routine Activity theory 
can be partially used to explain victimisation and perpetration of cyber harassment by 
romantic partners.328  Specifically, the study found that victimisation for women was 
associated with greater general risk-taking propensity and online exposure.329 
 
The Routine Activity theory was proposed by Cohen and Felson in 1979.330 In 
comparison, to the Lifestyle Exposure theory, the Routine Activity theory suggests that 
the probability of victimisation occurring is contingent on three factors. If the three 
factors synchronize in a given space and time.331  The factors are the presence of a 
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motivated offender, a requisite victim and the absence of capable guardians.332 Within 
this framework, Choi argues that this theory is an extension of the Lifestyle Exposure 
theory postulated by Handling and others on the grounds that it adopts the theoretical 
principle of the Lifestyle Exposure theory.333  Choi based his argument on the findings 
of a study which applied the Routine Activity theory to computer-crime victimisation.334  
The Routine Activity theory is therefore considered an extension of the Lifestyle 
exposure theory of victimisation which focuses on the vocational or leisure activities 
of individuals.335  
 
Considering the above, it is proffered that the Routine Activity theory may be applied 
to the cyberstalking victimisation model based on a three-fold construct. The first 
theoretical construct grounded in the Routine Activity theory with reference to 
cyberstalking victimisation is that the cyberworld constitutes an environment for 
several cyberstalkers to look for cyberstalking victims who are suitable targets. To this 
effect, Yar suggests that suitable targets comprise of online users who connect to the 
computer without safeguards or enough computer safety.336  
 
The second theoretical construct grounded in the Routine Activity theory is that 
cyberstalkers are motivated offenders who are determined to engage in cyberstalking 
offending. The second theoretical construct reflects Cohen and Felson’s suggestion 
that motivated offenders have the propensity and capability to commit crimes.337  
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The third theoretical construct, which can be used to explain cyberstalking 
victimisation is that the absence of capable guardians enables cyberstalkers to access 
and target victims. Specifically, computer based capable guardians consist of anti-
virus programmes, anti-spyware programmes, firewall programmes and other cyber 
security programmes that are manufactured to scan computer networks and files.338  
However from a critical perspective, Holt and Bossler suggest that although protective 
software can assist in the reduction of risks, the measures cannot eliminate the 
likelihood of victimisation.339 
From a twofold perspective, the Routine Activity theory and the Lifestyle-Exposure 
theories have been applied to computer-crime victimisation with a view to developing 
a computer-crime victimisation model. In doing so, Choi developed the principle of 
digital guardianship with regards to the routine activity theory.340 The significance of 
Choi’s study is that it found that the two factors of online activities and digital guardians 
will contribute to computer victimisation. Applying the findings of Choi’s study, the 
researcher argues that cyberstalking victimisation may be reduced if victims install 
digital guardians in the forms of antivirus programmes, antispyware programmes and 
firewall programmes and do not engage in a risky online lifestyle. 
 
Choi further argues that a means of avoiding computer victimisation is by applying the 
targeting-hardening strategy of the Routine Activity theory in the forms of up-to-date 
and adequate computer security systems.341 Adopting the targeting-hardening 
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strategy may in reality, not be a viable option to avoid cyberstalking victimisation. This 
is due to the fact that cyberstalkers engage in actions such as the dissemination of 
obscene and threatening messages on numerous publicly accessible social media 
websites involving online communities which would make it difficult for victims to 
absolutely avoid victimisation. Against this backdrop, Hutchings and Hayes carried out 
an exploratory study involving 104 participants, 50 of whom reported to having 
received a phishing email. The study found that cyber security safeguards may not 
prevent victimisation if email filters specifically are utilised in blocking a large number 
of spam emails.342 This finding suggests that in some instances, computer 
victimisation can still occur after cyber security measures have been implemented.343  
 
From an analytical perspective, a significant element of the Routine Activity theory is 
the requirement for the target to be in close physical and temporal proximity with the 
offender to be known and recognised.344  Therefore, Holt and Bossler highlight that in 
cybercrime offences, there is no physical convergence in space and time of offenders 
and victims.345  
 
From a critical perspective, the theoretical elements of physical and temporal proximity 
may affect the applicability of the Routine Activity theory to cyberstalking victimisation 
given that cyberstalkers and victims do not interact in the same physical location 
because cyberstalking is a crime which does not involve face-to-face contact between 
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victims and offenders. Consequently, Yar argues that the Routine Activity theory and 
other theories of crime and causation seem to be of limited use in an environment that 
goes against presuppositions about how the socio-interactional context of the routine 
activities is constructed.346 However, in contrast to Yar’s views, Kranebarg, Holt and 
Van Gelder argue that although there is no convergence in space and time of offenders 
and victims in cybercrime cases, previous research indicates that offenders and 
victims in the end, interact with one another for cybercrime to take place 
asynchronously.347   
 
From a critical perspective, Leukfeldt and Yar further highlight that the available 
studies that have been conducted so far on the Routine Activity theory and cybercrime 
victimisation are subject to various limitations such as the reliance on a limited 
sampling set, limited sample size and the focus on a single aspect of crime.348  
Leukfeldt and Yar write from a standpoint which argues that given that cybercrime 
occurs in the virtual realm where there is no convergence in time and space, certain 
aspects of the theory cannot therefore, be used to explain cybercrime. 
 
Considering the above criticisms, the challenge for criminologists seeking to utilise the 
Routine Activity theory to explain cyberstalking victimisation with reference to the 
theoretical tenets of a convergence in time and space of the offenders and victims is 
two-fold. The first challenge for criminologists is to establish that cyberstalkers and 
victims converge in virtual time and space resulting in victimisation. The second 
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challenge for criminologists is to modify the traditional theoretical aspect of the Routine 
Activity theory to encompass offences that occur in the cyber realm. Crucially, Eck and 
Clarke suggest that the Routine Activity theory can be varied to explain crimes in which 
the victim and the offender do not interact at the same physical location. Specifically, 
Eck and Clarke argue that an offender may be able to reach a target through a network 
if they are part of the same geographically separate network.349  
 
From a theoretical reformatory perspective,  Reyns highlights that the growth in remote 
internet based routine activities and a consequential increase in criminal activities has 
led to a transformation of the theory to crimes in which the offender and the victim do 
not converge in time and space.350  Reyns therefore, suggests that although the 
Routine Activity theory was developed to explain offences involving direct contact 
between the offender and the victim, it can be used to explain crimes which occur at 
a distance.351 
 
Applying the reasoning of Reyns and of Eck and Clarke respectively to the 
cyberstalking victimisation model, it can be argued that although cyberstalkers and 
cyberstalking victims do not occupy or interact within the same physical location or 
converge in space and time, the traditional tenets of the Routine Activity theory is 
observed via the communication of cyberstalkers and victims within a network.  
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Importantly, Holt, Fitzgerald, Bossler and others, applied the Routine Activity theory to 
examine the relationships between online behaviours, target suitability, and cyber and 
mobile phone–based bullying victimisation.352 The study found that three factors 
predict online bullying and phone bullying victimisation.353 The three factors are access 
to technology, online routine behaviours and the target suitability. The findings indicate 
that Routine Activity theory is a credible framework that may be applied to explain 
online bullying. Given that cyberstalking and cyberbullying are similar digital offences, 
from the Routine Activity theory conceptual perspective, the findings of Holt and others 
can be used to explain the relationship between cyberstalking and cyberstalking 
victimisation.354  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.5 Cyberlifestyle–Routine Activities Theory: Theoretical application to 
cyberstalking victimisation 
 
 
 
The Lifestyle Exposure theory and the routine activities theory have been implicitly 
combined to posit a theoretical perspective referred to as the Lifestyle-Routine 
Activities theory.355 The theory postulates that the daily routines and behaviour of 
individuals can expose them to the risk of victimisation by criminals. Given the 
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academic debate on whether the Routine Activity theory can be applied to cybercrime 
because in the cyber environment, there is a divergence in time and space between 
the offender and the victim, the Cyberlifestyle-Routine Activities theory has been 
postulated. This iteration of the theory argues that the convergence of potential victims 
and offenders in time and space may not be the only necessary requirements to create 
an opportunity for victimisation within a cyber space environment.356 The theory was 
tested by Reyns, Henson and Fisher 357Their findings highlight that the predictors of 
cyberstalking victimisation are an increased exposure to motivated offenders, an 
increased proximity to motivated offenders, an increased online target attractiveness 
and online deviance. An additional significance of Reyns, Henson and Fisher’s study 
is that the findings suggest the risks for cyberstalking victimisation will be reduced if 
there is online guardianship to prevent against victimisation by disrupting criminal 
opportunity structures, thereby decreasing the likelihood of victimisation.358  
The importance of Reyns, Henson and Fisher’s study is that the authors utilised a 
modified Lifestyle-Routine Activities theory to empirically explain cyberstalking 
victimisation. In doing so, the authors expanded existing theories to victimisation in 
cyber space. However, the researcher did not apply the cyberlifestyle-routines 
activities theory to the current research because at the time of the study, the theory 
had not been sufficiently examined empirically with a view to establishing its 
applicability to cybercrime 
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In summary, there are two schools of thought that determine whether cyberstalking 
victimisation can be strictly viewed from the theoretical lens of the Routine Activity 
theory. The first school of thought holds that the theory cannot be applied to 
cyberstalking victimisation because cyberstalking is new crime which is committed in 
the new environment of cyber space. The second school of thought upholds 
Grabosky’s analogy of ‘old wine in a new bottle’ by arguing that cybercrime is simply 
an old offence in a new environment and can therefore be examined by application of 
the Routine Activity theory. The researcher identifies with the second school of thought 
and therefore applied to the coding of the data in this study, the three vital elements 
of the Routine Activity theory schema of a criminogenic environment namely motivated 
offender, suitable target and absence of a suitable guardian.   
 
In conclusion, having reviewed the aforementioned seven theories, the researcher felt 
that the Routine Activity theoretical framework provided the best fit to the current study. 
The researcher chose this theoretical framework for two reasons. First, the theory has 
three distinct aspects which can be used to explain cyberstalking offending and 
victimisation. Second, the theory has been tested by different studies to explain 
cyberstalking victimisation.  Consequently, the researcher analysed the interview date 
via the theoretical lens of the Routine Activity Theory in order to identify related coding.  
 
 
2.5 The UK Cybercrime Strategies 
 
Given that cyber criminals can take advantage of weaknesses in new technologies to 
threaten the safety of individuals, government, businesses and the economy, the UK 
government has introduced several measures to tackle cybercrime. Historically, 
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between 2009 and 2015, the UK introduced several strategies in a bid to tackle 
cybercrime in the UK with a view to protecting individuals, companies and the society 
at large. The strategies were superseded by the current National Cyber Security 
Strategy of 2016-2021. All the strategies are discussed in the sub-sections that follow:  
 
2.5.1 The Digital Britain Strategy 2009 
 
In March 2009, the government published the final report of the Digital Britain 
Strategy.359 From business and consumer perspectives, the report highlighted the 
need for the internet to be a secure means of communication. From a general 
perspective, the report highlighted the need for the internet to be safe to enable 
everyone to have confidence in utilising the internet for both business and pleasure.360 
In doing so, the government recognised that giving everyone access to the internet 
raises safety and security issues which had to be addressed such as the  prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of cyber criminals.361  
 
2.5.2 The Cyber Crime Strategy and the Cyber Security Strategy: Aimed at 
protecting the UK in a digital world 
 
Historically, one of the measures that has been introduced by the government to tackle 
cybercrime is the publication of the Cyber Crime Strategy by the Home Office in March 
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2010.362 The aim of the Cyber Crime Strategy was to develop an amalgamated 
approach towards addressing the threats that have arisen with the development of the 
internet and associated technological devices.363 Specifically, the Home Office 
proposed to tackle cybercrime via this strategy by implementing five steps.364  The 
government’s strategy was subsequently updated as discussed in   sub-section 2.5.3. 
 
A second measure that was introduced by the government to tackle cybercrime was 
the publication of a UK Cyber Security Strategy titled ‘Protecting and Promoting the 
UK in a Digital world’.365 The strategy was significant because it highlighted that the 
government had established the office of Cyber Security Strategy in a bid to tackle 
cybercrime.  The Cyber Security Strategy which was published on 25 November 2011 
and highlights that the office was established to undertake two specific roles.366 The 
introduction of the office of Cyber Security Strategy indicates that the government is 
taking positive steps to enhance safe communication in the cyber realm. The 
governments’ commitment towards tackling cybercrime is further evidenced by its 
willingness to work with other government sectors and agencies to guarantee a 
coherent approach towards the tackling of cyber security threats.367   In the year 2015, 
the government indicated that it aims to achieve the vision of protecting individuals 
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and businesses from cyber-attacks utilising the Cyber Security Strategy via four 
primary objectives.368   
 
In 2016, it was revealed that the 2011 National Cyber Security Strategy had delivered 
significant improvements to UK cyber security and achieved crucial results by 
investigating the market to steer secure cyber behaviours, the measure did not attain 
the range and rate of change necessary to outride the fast moving threat.369 
Consequently, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the UK 
government during the duration of the 2016-2021 subsequent National Cyber Security 
Strategy, will invest £1.9 billion into cyber security in a bid to achieve three cyber 
security aims.370  The aims of the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2012 as 
discussed in section 2.5.4, are defending systems and infrastructure, deterring 
adversaries, and developing societal capability ranging from companies individual 
citizens.371 
 
Given the above announcement, the researcher questions whether the 2011 Cyber 
Crime and Cyber Security Strategy highlighted above, assisted the government to 
counter cybercrime in general and cyberstalking specifically.  
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2.5.3   The UK Digital Strategy 2017 
In March 2017, the government published the UK Digital Strategy 2017.372 The 
strategy has four primary aims. The aims are the growth of digital businesses, the trial 
of new technology and the promotion of advanced research. An additional aim is to 
ensure that every individual and every business acquires the skill and confidence 
required to embrace digital technology while having access to high quality internet.373  
The UK Digital Strategy 2017 has seven key strands which is envisaged will assist the 
government to fulfil specific goals. The first strand is the building of a world digital 
infrastructure for the UK to enhance connectivity or effective digital communication.374  
This aspect of the strategy is geared towards ensuring that the UK can control heavy 
internet traffic. The second aspect of the strategy promotes the acquisition of relevant 
digital skills which will enable everyone to have digital access.375 The third aspect of 
the UK Digital Strategy 2017 is to ensure that the UK is the leading place to commence 
and grow a digital business. The fourth aspect of the strategy is geared towards 
assisting every British business to become a digital enterprise.376 
 
The fifth aspect of the UK Digital Strategy 2017, focuses on the promotion of a safe 
and secure cyber space with a view to ensuring that UK is the place globally to live 
and work in.377 This aspect of the strategy if successfully implemented will be crucial 
in preventing cybercrime victimisation given that measures will be introduced to tackle 
internet safety and security risks.  The sixth aspect of the UK Digital Strategy 2017 is 
                                                          
372  ‘UK Policy Paper Digital Strategy 2017’ (1 March 2017) /<www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-strategy/uk-digital-
strategy>  accessed 14 December 2018  
373 ibid 
374  This measure  will assist hardware and software devices to communicate effectively with a range of other devices 
375 The government anticipates that this will be achieved via a digital skills and inclusion process   
376 This aspect of the strategy is based on a wider economy vision which is aimed at businesses  
377 It is envisaged that this aspect of the strategy will be particularly effective in tackling cybercriminals  
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geared towards supporting the UK government as a global head in serving British 
nationals. The seventh and final aspect of the UK Digital Strategy 2017 is targeted 
towards improving public confidence in using data within the UK. 
 
Given that the UK Digital Strategy 2017 is aimed at promoting a safe and secure cyber 
space environment for UK businesses and citizens through the implementation of 
several measures, the researcher anticipates that  certain aspects of the strategy may 
contribute to countering cybercrime in general and cyberstalking in particular by 
equipping  UK citizens and businesses  with the relevant digital skills that will promote 
cyber safety awareness and protect them from wide ranging victimisation online.  
 
2.5.4 National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 
 
The strategy is a reflection of the governments’ decision to protect the UK economy 
and the privacy of citizens in a bid to secure UK technology from the ever growing 
threat of cyber - attacks.378  The government envisaged that the five year strategy will 
make the UK confident, capable and resilient in the fast-moving digital world by 
introducing stronger defences and promoting better cyber skills.379  Consequently, the 
government has invested £1.9 billion in defending the UK systems and infrastructure 
in a bid to deter cyber criminals who target businesses and individual citizens.  
 
In light of the above, the researcher anticipates that the strategies that have been 
implemented by the government to equip companies and individuals with the skills that 
                                                          
378 National Cyber Security Strategy  2016-21 (HM Government, 2016) 
<www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/national_cyber_security_strategy
_2016.pdf> assessed 14 December 2018 
379 Ibid  
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they require to defend themselves from cybercrime, might also educate individuals on 
how to protect themselves from cyberstalking victimisation given that cyberstalking is 
an aspect of cybercrime.  
 
2.5.5 National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime for 2018 
 
 
The National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime for 2018 
(hereafter ‘NSA’), is an assessment based on intelligence which was introduced by 
the National Crime Agency.380  Significantly, the NSA on behalf of law enforcement 
identifies serious and organised crimes that are faced by the UK in order to coordinate 
responses to threats.381  The significance of the NSA in relation to cyberstalking as an 
aspect of cybercrime is that the assessment highlighted certain issues which may 
hinder the ability of law enforcement to act.  
 
In summary, the various strategies highlighted above indicate that the UK government 
has taken positive steps to counter cybercrime from public, business and consumer 
perspectives. It is envisaged that certain aspects of the strategies will assist in tackling 
cyberstalking given that it is a type of cyber enabled crime.  
 2.6 Specialist UK Cybercrime Units  
 
 
 
In the last decade, the UK government has created several units to assist law 
enforcement in countering cybercrime. The units all have the common aim of 
                                                          
380 ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organized Crime’ (National Crime Agency, 2018) 
<www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/905-national-strategic-assessment-for-soc-2018/file> accessed 14 December 2018 
381 In doing so, the NSA has identified cybercrime as one of the serious threats  
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strengthening the UK defences against cybercrime. Some of the units are discussed 
below. 
  
2.6.1 National Crime Agency 
 
 
The National Crime Agency is one of the agencies which has been created by the UK 
government to tackle cybercrime.382   The aim of the agency is to protect the public by 
tackling organised crime and bringing perpetrators to justice given that organised 
crime damages the lives of people and has a financial impact on the economy. The 
organised crimes range from cybercrime to the sexual exploitation of children.383 
 
Crucially, the National Crime Agency unit strengthens the UK borders, fights fraud and 
protects children and young people from sexual abuse and exploitation.  In doing so, 
the unit works with several partners. Significantly, the agency has identified cybercrime 
as one of the organised crimes that poses a threat to the UK. The National Crime 
Agency has also, identified the theft of personal information in bulk from individuals, 
businesses or corporate networks for financial gain as an aspect of organised 
cybercrime which have been facilitated by the internet via online banking and e-
commerce. Against this backdrop, it is arguable that as a hybrid of cybercrime, 
cyberstalkers may be investigated by officials of the National Crime Agency if the crime 
can be linked to offences that have been committed by online fraudsters for example 
who have targeted individuals, organisations and corporate networks for profit. This is 
more so because, the seven common cyber threats against consumers that have been 
                                                          
382 ‘National Crime Agency’ (NCA) <www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/cyber-crime >accessed 14 December 2018 
383 The common threats that UK faces from organized crime which have been identified by the national crime agency are child sexual 
exploitation and abuse, counterfeit currency, cybercrime, drugs, firearm, human trafficking, identity crime, intellectual property crime, 
kidnap and extortion, money laundering, organized theft, organized crime group and people smuggling 
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identified by the National Crime Agency are activities that can be engaged in by 
cyberstalkers.384  
  
2.6.2 National Cyber Crime Unit  
 
 
The National Cyber Crime Unit is part of the National Crime Agency in the UK. The 
unit was created by the government to coordinate a response to the most serious 
cybercrime threats. The significance of the unit is that law enforcement officials in the 
unit have specialist capabilities which enable the unit to respond promptly to evolving 
cyber threats.385  In doing so, the unit works with other partners in a bid to tackle 
crime.386   
 
The National Cyber Crime Unit collaborates with partners to reduce crime by 
implementing four measures. The first measure is pursuing criminals on a national and 
international level via the provision of strong investigation responses to the most 
serious crimes. The second measures are adopting a proactive stance towards 
tackling criminal vulnerabilities and preventing criminal opportunities. The third 
measure that has been introduced by the National Cyber Crime Unit is helping the 
National Crime Agency to investigate cybercriminals.  In doing so, the National Cyber 
Crime Unit offers technical support, intelligence support and training of the regional 
cybercrime units. The fourth measure adopted by the National Cyber Crime Unit 
through collaborating with other partners to reduce cybercrime is supporting partners 
                                                          
384 The highlighted common cyber threats against consumers are phishing, key logging, web cam manager, file hijacker, screenshot 
manager and ad clicker. The highlighted common cyber threats against businesses are hacking and distributed denial of service attacks 
385 National Cyber Crime Unit (National Crime Agency) <www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/w.t> accessed 15 December 2018  
386 The partners include the Regional Organised Crime Units  and the Metropolitan Police Cyber Crime Unit 
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within the law enforcement sectors to effectively protect themselves against 
cybercrime.387 
 
The researcher anticipates that the measures highlighted above will be utilised by 
police officers to tackle cyberstalking offending that is linked to organised crime such 
as hate speech, cyber terrorism, online sexual exploitation of children and online fraud   
for example. The National Cybercrime Unit offers training to law enforcement officials 
working in the specialist regional cybercrime units as opposed to all police officers and 
law enforcement professionals.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2.7 Risk assessment of stalking victims 
 
 
The concept of risk has various aspects. The concept refers to identifying the nature 
of a threat, analysing the likelihood of the threat occurring and establishing the 
frequency of the threat with a view to either managing or eliminating the threat. 
Therefore Kropp, Hart and Lyon emphasize that the risk assessment of stalkers is 
difficult due to various factors ranging from the fact that stalking may encompass 
behaviors that are implicitly or indirectly threatening, and that the crime can be 
perpetrated over a long period of time.388 
 
Rosenberg highlights various risk factors that are unique to stalking which include a 
prior relationship between the stalker and the offender, substance abuse, mental 
                                                          
387 ibid 
388 Randall Kropp, Stephen Hart and David Lyon. ‘Risk Assessment of Stalkers: Some Problems and Possible Solutions’  (2002)  29 
Criminal Justice Behaviour 5  
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disorder and a history of offending.389 Rosenberg further argues that the fear of 
violence is one of the primary concerns experienced by stalking victims.390  McEwan, 
Pathe and Ogloff on the other hand, stress that the most effective way to measure 
and convey necessary information about individually relevant risk factors is by 
considering and analysing an individual’s personal history of violence or 
functional analysis of past behaviour.391 Significantly, McEwan, Pathe and 
Ogloff indicate that stalking victims and stalkers themselves face four potential 
adverse outcomes ranging from the risk of physical violence towards the victim 
or a third party to the risk of psychosocial damage to the stalker. 
 
It is arguable that the risk assessment of stalking and cyberstalking victims can 
enhance witness protection and facilitate the rehabilitation of offenders by ensuring 
that risks are identified, and interventions formulated to either manage or reduce the 
risk.  
 
In the United Kingdom, some measures have been adopted by law enforcement and 
medical practitioners in the front line to risk assess stalking victims. To this effect, from 
a forensic psychiatric perspective, the specialist National Stalking Clinic was 
established in 2011.392 The clinic provides assessment and consultations for 
individuals who commit stalking offences and implicitly, cyberstalking offences.393  The 
private clinic is significant because psychiatrists at the clinic provide reports based on 
                                                          
389 Barry Rosenberg ‘Violence Risk Factors  in Stalking  and  Obsessional Harassment  A Review and Preliminary Meta-Analysis 
31 Criminal Justice and  Behaviour  (2004)  1 
390 ibid 
391 Troy McEwan, Michele Pathe  and James Ogloff  ‘Troy Advances in Stalking Risk Assessment’  Behavioural  Sciences and the Law    
(wileyonlinelibrary,2011)  
<http://www.fixatedthreat.com/perch/resources/mcewan-pathe-ogloff-2011-risk-assessment.pdf> accessed 19 April 2019 
392 The clinic is situated in Chase Farm hospital in Enfield North London. 
393 National Stalking Clinic (NHS, 2018 ) < http://www.beh-mht.nhs.uk/mental-health-service/mh-services/national-stalking-clinic.htm> 
accessed 12 October 2018 
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the formal assessment of individuals who engage in stalking behaviour. The risk 
assessment reports provide suggestions on how identified risks can be managed. 
Additionally, the National Stalking Clinic provides assessments and consultation 
services regarding stalking circumstances in certain situations 394  Given that there is 
currently only one stalking clinic in the United Kingdom, the researcher anticipates that 
more clinics will be provided by the government in the future if it is financially viable 
for the government to do so. At the time of the study, additional stalking clinics had not 
been created to cater to stalkers and cyberstalkers implicitly. 
 
As the primary prosecuting authority in England and Wales, the Crown Prosecution 
Service advises that prosecutors should when presented with a case either for charge 
or at court, ensure that police officers perform a full risk assessment.395 The CPS 
further recognizes that it is important that all the risks to a victim or the suspect are 
identified by the police  or other agencies involved with the victim or suspect with a 
view to where possible, taking appropriate actions to reduce or remove such risks.396  
From an investigatory perspective, in 2009, the Association of Chief Police Officers 
introduced a risk identification assessment model for the offences of domestic 
violence, stalking and honour based violence (DASH).397 This measure was 
introduced to ensure that the police during the investigation process and other 
individuals who are in contact with the victim will implement measures to either identify 
or remove the risks.  Consequently, as a result of the stalking law reform inquiry, twelve 
                                                          
394 The National Stalking Clinic receives referrals for risk assessment reports from various criminal justice agencies 
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specific questions were incorporated in the DASH tool about stalking.398 The 
significance of the risk assessment tool with reference to stalking and cyberstalking 
implicitly, is that the tool has been designed in such a way which indicates that it is 
relevant to traditional stalking cases that involve perpetrators whose identities are 
known. This is evident in the fact that some of the questions on the stalking check list 
require victims to highlight how their safety is being threatened by a given stalking 
offender.  
 
The DASH risk assessment tool was updated in 2016 and highlights that the four areas 
that trained front line officials are required to cover are; who is at risk, the context of 
the behaviour, how the risk factors interact with each other and the victim’s perception 
of risk.399 The problem with the DASH risk assessment tool is that some of the 12 risk 
assessment questions as provided in the checklist cannot be applied to cases where 
victims are being stalked anonymously by a cyberstalker. This is because in such 
cases, the victims may be unable to provide definite information about anonymous 
cyberstalkers. Therefore, the police officers may be unable to foresee the risks that 
might place victims in danger and may then, be unable to protect the victims from 
imminent or potential risks.  
 
In 2011, the police introduced the Violent Crime Integrated Offender Management 
system to ensure that the police and other criminal agencies collectively monitor the 
most prolific offenders who cause harm in the community.400 Grimstead, highlights that 
                                                          
398 ‘Stalking and harassment screening questions -S-DASH’ (2012)  <http://www.dashriskchecklist.co.uk/stalking> accessed 12 October  
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stalking risk assessments are provided under the Violent Crime Integrated Offender 
Management. The risk assessments are be based on the S-Dash stalking risk 
assessment tool. Two additional risk assessment tools which are identified as part of 
the Violent Crime Integrated Offender Management are the Stalking Assessment 
Manual and the Stalking Risk Profile which provide police officers the opportunity to 
make informed decisions when risk assessing stalking victims.401 It is anticipated that 
the three stalking risk assessment tools highlighted above will assist police officers in 
gauging the dangers that stalking victims are in.  Additionally, NPCC and CPS have 
developed a joint NPCC and CPS Checklist which is used by police forces and CPS 
in cases of Harassment or Stalking. The S-Dash stalking risk assessment tool and the 
joint NPCC and CPS Checklist – for Use by Police Forces and CPS in Cases of 
Harassment or Stalking are contained in Appendix 5.  
 
It is arguable that the above highlighted tools will enable police officers to risk assess 
victims of stalking in the physical or cyber realm whose identities are known 
specifically as opposed to anonymous cyberstalkers. This is because as previously 
mentioned, some of the screening questions on the above highlighted risk assessment 
tools are only applicable to cases involving stalkers whose identities are known.  The 
Stalking and Harassment Screen Questions (S-Dash) is contained in Appendix 5.  
 
In 2015, the Home Office published the key principles of the Integrated Offender Model 
which is aimed at ensuring that criminal agencies work together to ensure that specific 
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persistent offenders receive the required support and are rehabilitated with a view to 
reducing offenders.402  
 
2.7.1 The challenge of risk assessing cyberstalking victims: the issue of 
anonymity 
 
From a preventative perspective, applying the concept of risk to the specific offending 
behaviour of cyberstalking may assist law enforcement and medical practitioners to 
develop the appropriate tools for risk assessing both cyberstalking victims and 
cyberstalkers. It is therefore important for law enforcement officials to adopt a dual 
approach to stalking risk assessment by firstly, risk assessing victims to ensure their 
safety and by secondly risk assessing perpetrators who have been engaging in 
cyberstalking behaviour with a view to managing the risks. 
 
From a psychiatric disorder perspective, Mullen and others stress that stalking is a 
common social problem, often driven by psychiatric disorder in its perpetrators and 
productive of psychological and social damage in its victims.403  Mullen and others 
argue that the assessment and management of risk should indicate the following 
concerns of victims: 
1. Whether the stalking will continue, or, if it has stopped, will it recur? 
2. Whether the victim will suffer significant psychological and/or social damage,     
                                                          
402 ‘Integrated Offender Management Key Principles’ (Gov, 2015)  
<http://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/406865/HO_IOM_Key_Principles_docu
ment_Final.pdf> 
403 Paul Mullen, Rachel Mackenzie, James Ogloff, Michele Pathe, Troy McEwan, BA, and Rosemary Purcell, Assessing and managing the 
risks in the stalking situations, https://paladinservice.co.uk/wp-
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     which may include suicidal ideation or behaviour. 
 3. Whether the stalking will escalate to physical and/or sexual assault.404 
 
In theory, if the identity of the cyberstalker is known, law enforcement officials may be 
able to risk assess victims with a view to identifying potential risks and enhancing the 
safety of victims. The prompt and accurate risk assessment of cyberstalking victims 
may be a difficult task for police officers to accomplish if the cyberstalkers are 
anonymous. Consequently, police officers may be unable to assess and manage the 
risks of anonymous cyberstalkers to victims with a view to addressing the three areas 
of concerns highlighted above.  
 
From an academic perspective with reference to stalking in the physical realm 
specifically, Kropp, Hart and Lyon argue that the risk assessment of stalkers is difficult 
due to a diversity of stalking-related behaviours.405 Applying this line of reasoning to 
the related behaviour to cyberstalking which can be perpetrated anonymously, it is 
plausible that it may be challenging for police officers to risk assess victims due to the 
varied nature of cyberstalking which is an aspect of the traditional crime of stalking in 
the physical realm. 
 
Given that cyberstalking can lead to the deaths of victims, there is an onus on the ISPs 
to prevent perpetrators from harassing, threatening and intimidating victims online 
anonymously to ensure that police officers and prosecutors are able manage and 
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avoid risks more especially given that cyberstalking can escalate to stalking in the 
physical realm and vice versa. 
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Chapter 3    Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the Methodology used to undertake the research for the thesis. 
3.1 Rationale for the current research: 
                                           
The research in this thesis sought to examine the perceptions of police officers and 
prosecutors on the law enforcement challenges that impede the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers in London. With this objective, the researcher discovered 
crucial issues perceived by the participants that frustrate them during the investigation 
and effective prosecution of cyberstalkers. The primary issues are difficulties in risk 
assessing victims due to staff shortages, the anonymity of cyberstalkers, lack of 
knowledge, victims refusing to support prosecutions due to a lack of confidence in the 
criminal justice system and lack of resources-manpower which result in heavy 
caseloads. The secondary issues are victim behaviour, evidential difficulties and lack 
of an effective specialist cyberstalking unit.  
 
This research area was chosen because there is currently no joint research study on 
how both police officers and prosecutors in London perceive the investigative and 
prosecutorial challenges they face when dealing with cyberstalking offences. 
 
The researcher applied Reyns research methodological approach to the study 
because it enabled her to recruit a sample of participants consisting of experienced 
law enforcement officials who provided relevant data. In doing so, the researcher 
moved beyond the conceptualisation of historically assumed common law 
enforcement difficulties which police officers and prosecutors encounter in the 
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investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers to identification of the actual difficulties 
which police officers and prosecutors perceive hinder them from investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. The findings provide support for the identified 
recommendations.  
 
 
3.1.1 Position of the Researcher in relation to the recruitment of her sample 
 
 
It is noteworthy that the researcher was in the privileged position of being employed 
as a para legal officer by the Crown Prosecutor Service (CPS) which gave her access 
to prosecutors and police officers.  The privileged position of the researcher enabled 
the researcher to hear first - hand accounts of participant views on the research topic. 
Further, given the law enforcement background of the researcher, her personal goal 
to research cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime influenced the researcher’s 
decision to choose this research area. Therefore, it has been acknowledged that it 
may be beneficial if a research study is influenced by personal goals and 
experiences.406 Strauss and Corbin argue that it may not be a limitation to choose a 
research problem through the professional route given that an individual researcher’s 
experience may be more important as a measure for the researcher to gauge whether 
a potential research endeavour will be successful.  
 
As an employee of the CPS, the researcher recognised that her professional 
background may potentially lead to research bias during various stages of the 
research process. Simundic highlights that bias can occur in research either 
intentionally or unintentionally and can result in conclusions that are inaccurate and 
                                                          
406  Anslem Strauss and Juliet Corbin, Basics For Qualitative Research: Techniques for Developing Grounded Theory (2nd edn, Sage, 1988)  
      35 
131 
 
potentially misleading.407  Bias can lead to the distortion of truth and affect the reliability 
of findings. This is more so given that bias can occur at different stages of the 
research.408   
 
Crucially, bias can also lead to false conclusion and deviation from the truth.409 
However, Smith and Noble argue that bias is present in all research and is difficult to 
eliminate.410 Specifically, Pannucci and Wilkins acknowledge that research bias can 
occur in planning, data collection and the analysis phase of research.411  Sica argues 
that a biased study can lose its validation in relation to the degree of the bias and 
acknowledges that it is impossible to eliminate bias.412 From an analytical perspective, 
Kilp suggests that bias in perceptions, behaviours and understanding refers to the 
extent to which evaluations lack an objective basis.413 Kilp therefore argues that there 
are various reasons for bias. 
 
Given the above academic views on bias, the researcher recognised that research 
bias could occur during the selection and the interview stages of the research 
process.414 The researcher was particularly aware that given that she is a confident 
black, female professional who works alongside some of the participants, the issue of 
bias could prevent some of the participants from providing detailed responses due to 
a fear of losing their jobs. Additionally, the researcher was aware that due to the 
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working relationship between her and the participants, the participants may be 
reluctant to fully divulge the issues that frustrate them in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers due to a fear of possible disciplinary repercussions. 
Crucially, Vercruyssen, Wuyts and Loosveldt highlight that the characteristics of an 
interviewer can influence survey data collection processes.415 Vercruyssen, Wuyts 
and Loosveldt therefore suggest that the socio-demographic characteristics of 
interviewers can affect the probability of cooperation and the quality of the 
respondent’s responses.  
 
Since the researcher has been employed within the criminal justice sector for over 
fifteen years, most of the different causes of bias highlighted above did not arise 
because the participants felt comfortable in the researcher’s presence and were 
therefore willing to give honest responses to the researcher’s questions. This was 
evident in their desire to take part in the study, answer questions in details, and provide 
additional responses when asked for clarifications and keenness to divulge additional 
information.  
 
Nevertheless, the researcher acknowledges that it may be difficult for an outsider to 
gain access to closed professions such as the police force, armed forces and health 
services if the relevant gatekeepers are unwilling to act as middlemen between the 
researchers and the participants. Therefore, Clark acknowledges that the relationship 
between researcher and gatekeepers is crucial to gaining and maintaining access.416  
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Gatekeepers are individuals, groups, and organisations that act as intermediaries 
between researchers and participants.417 Importantly, gatekeepers support the 
research process by providing an efficient and expedient conduit for access between 
researchers and participants.418 Clark argues that one of the reasons why gatekeepers 
may refuse to agree to a research request is if the research will lead to intrusion and 
the study is viewed as either as being critical towards a given gatekeeper or is in 
danger of exposing an area of practice that the gatekeeper does not want to be 
represented within the public domain.419 Clark further suggests that in such scenarios, 
it does not follow that such family or organisations in refusing research requests, have 
something to hide which ought to be revealed by the researcher but rather signifies 
that the gatekeepers face the danger of giving up control of how the researcher 
portrays their reality.420 Notably Holt, Bossler and Fitzgerald in explaining why there 
was a low response rate among specific law enforcement research participants, 
highlighted that participants may have had some reservations over proffering 
information on behalf of their organisations on matters relating to training and 
caseloads.421  
 
Okumus, Atinay and Roper emphasise that the difficulty of gaining access into 
organisations is one of the several issues that qualitative researchers encounter.422 
Further, Okumus, Atinay and Roper note that it may be difficult to enter into an 
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organisation if the research is based on a sensitive topic.423 Importantly, Sleath and 
Bull stress that it may be difficult to recruit meaningful samples of police officers 
especially if the research topic is sensitive.424 Additionally, Sixsmith, Boneham and 
Goldring argue that there are inherent difficulties in gaining access to community 
research participants specifically.425 
 
Given that the police force like the armed forces is a closed profession, the researcher 
acknowledges that the police officers who took part in this study may have been 
reluctant or unwilling to be interviewed if she was not an insider who is currently 
employed within the CPS law enforcement sector. 
 
Sampling bias is a type of bias which occurs when members of a selected population 
are less likely to be recruited than others.426 Sample bias occurs if the segment of 
respondents interviewed do not represent the group of interest thereby resulting in the 
interviewer interviewing the wrong people.427 Ngongo, Frick, Hightower and others  
highlight that sample bias can occur if research protocols are not observed thereby 
impeding the prospects of obtaining reliable survey data with regards to different 
interviewers interviewing a given population.428 In doing so, Ngongo,  Frick, Hightower 
and others acknowledge that differences in gender, personality and familiarity can 
result in systematic bias. In addition to the above, the questions of interviewers can be 
                                                          
423 ibid 
424 Emma Sleath and Ray Bull ‘Comparing Rape Victim And Perpetrator Blaming In A Police Officer Sample’ (2012) 39 Criminal Justice 
and Behaviour 5  
425 Judith Sixsmith, Margaret Boneham and John Goldring (2003)  ‘Accessing the Community: Gaining Insider Perspectives From the 
Outside’13 Qualitative Health Research 4 
426 Carrie Ngongo, Kevin Frick, Allen Hightower, Florence Mathingau, Heather Burke and Robert Breiman ‘The Perils of Straying from 
Protocol: Sampling Bias and Interview Effects’ (2015)  10 PLOS One 2 
<http://www.journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0118025>  accessed 11 March 2019 
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biased of if they influence the answers of the respondents given that the interviewers 
are in control of the question. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Given the above, the researcher adopted several measures in a bid to eliminate bias. 
The first measure that was adopted by the researcher to eliminate research bias was 
to recruit participants from different CPS and MPS offices to ensure that participants 
who had never worked with the researcher were recruited for the study. This measure 
enabled the researcher to recruit participants who had diverse views based on their 
varied experiences of working in different departments of the CPS and the MPS 
respectively. Therefore, when the study population was identified, the researcher used 
the same criteria to recruit the participants which involved, recruiting participants who 
had been employed as police officers or Prosecutors for over one year who had the 
experience of prosecuting defendants in different departments of the CPS and the 
MPS. 
 
The second measure which the researcher adopted to eliminate research bias was to 
adopt a rigorous procedure. She achieved this through asking the participants 
standardized questions and using a consistent method for recording, analysing and 
interpreting the research data. In doing so, the researcher adopted the constant 
comparison analytical process which enabled her to analyse data in order to develop 
a grounded theory.  
 
The third measure which the researcher implemented to avoid bias is asking general 
questions before specific questions during the interview so as not to influence the 
outcome of the participant answers. Additionally, the researcher adopted a fourth 
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measure to reduce bias which was to build a rapport with the interviewees in a bid to 
obtain honest and open responses. This approach enabled the researcher to 
summarize the responses of the participants at the end of the interviews and then 
question them to determine if the information that had been written down by the 
researcher was accurate.  
 
This measure also enabled the researcher to analyse the data with an open mind and 
to challenge her assumptions. The fifth measure which the researcher adopted to 
prevent her own bias was to have an open mind during the data analysis and 
interpretation processes and to consider alternative causal explanations to the 
research findings as opposed to being overconfident in her own judgement.  
 
The sixth measure that the researcher implemented was to screen and recruit 
prosecutors and police officers who represent the law enforcement officials that are 
responsible for investigating and prosecutors in London. The researcher did so by 
recruiting various experienced participants who work in the different departments of 
the CPS and the Metropolitan Police Service who investigate and prosecute 
cyberstalkers. The measures enabled the researcher to prevent confirmation bias by 
recruiting participants from diverse backgrounds treating all data equally. The seventh 
measure that the researcher implemented to prevent biased question was to write and 
ask neutral questions. Further, the researcher avoided asking the participants leading 
questions which infer the answers.  
 
The researcher implemented the above measures to avoid deviation from the truth 
and to ensure that the study was credible given that some of the participants were her 
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colleagues. To this effect, Bogdan and Taylor highlight that a researcher may be able 
to recruit participants in the course of her daily activities.429   
 
Given that at the time of the study, the specific job roles of specialist cyberstalking 
Prosecutors or police officers had not been created at the CPS and the MPS, the 
researcher selected a sample of experienced prosecutors and police officers in a bid 
to obtain several points of view. This strategy resulted in the participants expressing 
divergent opinions and experiences which collectively provided an insight into the 
phenomenon under investigation. 
 
In addition to the above the researcher was aware that her role as an interviewer might 
result in an unequal power balance. To this effect, Haworth argues that the role of 
every participant in interviews is defined and controlled.430 Haworth writes from a 
perspective which suggests that in police interviews, these roles are unequal in 
relation to the distribution of power and control.431 Consequently, in conducting the 
interviews, the researcher was aware that as an experienced employee of the CPS 
who has been employed for fifteen years given her institutional status, her role as an 
interviewer may be perceived as controlling. To maintain the balance of power and 
control between herself as the interviewer and the participants, the researcher 
implemented certain strategies to ensure that the participants disclosed information 
without challenging the interviewer. The strategies are establishing a rapport with the 
participants, listening attentively to their responses, being empathetic, seeking 
                                                          
429  Robert Bogdan and Steven Taylor, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods (1st edn, John Wiley & sons, 1975) 103 
430 Kate Haworth ‘The Dynamics of Power and Resistance in Police Interview Discourse’  (2008) 17  Discourse and Society 6  
<http://publications.aston.ac.uk/16409/1/Dynamics_of_power_and_resistance_in_police_interview.pdf> accessed 13 March 2019 
431 Haworth therefore argues that by controlling the setting of the interviews and having the ability to make decisions about the interviewee’s 
freedom based on the outcome, the police exert power over the interviewee. Further, Haworth suggests that the interviewees however have 
control over what they say. Additionally, Haworth asserts that the outcome of the interview is determined by the interviewee suspect despite 
the fact that the police is in control of the situation.  
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clarifications in a sensitive manner and not being judgmental. The strategies were 
significant because, given that the participants had institutional status too as 
investigative and prosecutorial law enforcement officials, there was a risk that the 
dynamics of the discourse could have been affected by their institutional roles and 
relative knowledge on the research topic.  
 
Against the above backdrop, Haworth argues that factors such as the institutional roles 
of participants, the discursive roles assigned to them and their relative knowledge are 
factors which can affect the dynamics of power and resistance in a discourse.432  
 
The researcher interviewed the participants to obtain the required data. In doing so, 
the researcher was conscious of the fact that personal traits can influence the data 
collection process. 433  To this effect, Vecrussyen, Wuyts and Loosveldt investigated 
the consequences of mismatching interviewers and sample units in relation to age, 
gender and education level on non-responsive indicators in Belgian data. Significantly, 
Vecrussyen, Wuyts and Loosveldt found that sample units participate more if the 
interviewer is more like them in age and gender. Similarly, Manderson, Bennett and 
Andadjani-Sutjahjo explored the social dynamics of interviews in respect of age, 
gender and class based on a sample of 50 participants with locomotor impairments.434 
Manderson, Bennett and Andadjani-Sutjahjo concluded that factors such as age, 
gender and socioeconomic status can shape interviews and produce knowledge.435 
                                                          
432 Kate Haworth ‘The Dynamics of Power and Resistance in Police Interview Discourse’  (2008) 17  Discourse and Society 6  
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434Lenore Manderson, Elizabeth Bennett and Sari Andadjani-Sutjahjo ‘The Social Dynamics of the Interview: Age, Class and Gender’ 
(2006) 16 Qualitative Health Research 10 
435 Manderson, Bennett  and Andadjani-Sutjahjo  found that the social relationship established  during  an  interview is  fundamental in  
multiple  interview interactions 
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Manderson, Bennett and Andadjani-Sutjahjo also found that the interviewer would be 
in a privileged position if his or her workplace was used for the study. This is of interest 
in the current study as the researcher interviewed some of the participants at her 
workplace because they were her colleagues. Additionally, to ensure that certain 
participants were relaxed, the researcher interviewed some participants in public 
venues such as a coffee shop, a juice bar and cafes as requested by the interviewee. 
As previously discussed of, the researcher implemented several measures to avoid 
her privileged position leading to research bias.  
 
3.1.2   Aims and objectives of the current research 
 
The research in this thesis aims to examine the prosecution of cyberstalkers in the 
UK. The research relies on the experiences and perceptions of London prosecutors 
and police officers.  
 
The main objective of the research is to identify the factors that police officers and 
prosecutors feel prevent them from investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers. In so 
doing, the study will seek to explore the following: 
 
(a) The extent to which perceived lack of knowledge impacts on the prosecution 
of cyberstalkers and the measures that are taken by police officers to 
acquire the knowledge they lack 
(b) How the  issues of anonymity and lack of resources might affect the effective 
risk assessment of victims of cyberstalkers 
(c) The impact of perceived lack of resources on the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers 
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3.1.3 Research Questions  
 
In order to meet these aims and objectives the following research questions were 
investigated: 
(1) What are the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on cyberstalking and 
the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the 
internet from cyberstalking? 
(2)  What factors do police officers and prosecutors perceive could frustrate them in 
the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers? 
(3)  What challenges do police officers perceive impede the risk assessment of 
cyberstalking victims? 
(4) Do police officers and prosecutors perceive evidential challenges 
lack of resources and lack of training as presenting law enforcement difficulties?  
 
 
 
3.2 The researcher’s theoretical worldview 
 
 
The epistemological, assumption which was at the core of the researcher’s study is 
that the most effective way to understand a phenomenon is to recognize that there is 
no single unitary reality apart from our perceptions given that each individual has a 
point of view and experiences a different reality. This epistemological assumption 
recognizes that multiple realities exist.436  
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Given the epistemological aspect of a theoretical perspective relates to learning about 
the world based on a paradigm, Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls and others suggest that 
epistemology has two aspects. The first aspect concerns how people can learn about 
reality and the second aspect examines what constitutes the basis of knowledge.437 In 
effect, an epistemological issue refers to what is or what should be regarded as 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline.438 Bryman argues that research can be affected 
by several epistemological positions.  
 
The researcher explored epistemological considerations in examining certain 
theoretical philosophical ideas. Specifically, the researcher applied the qualitative 
approach in contrast to the post-positivist approach because it is reliant on the 
historical and social perspectives of the participants as opposed to facts obtained from 
scientific experiments. The researcher’s theoretical underpinning was therefore of a 
qualitative dimension rather than that of a positivistic quantitative dimension because 
the qualitative assumption of the world is based on subjective interpretations as 
opposed to the quantitative principle of objective reality. Furthermore, if the researcher 
had applied the positivistic approach to the study, her role as a researcher would have 
been restricted to the collection of data and the interpretation of the data via an 
objective approach. In effect, applying the post-positivist approach would have 
entailed the researcher taking on the role of an independent observer as opposed to 
a researcher who is engaged with the participants in the research process.439  
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Therefore, Bogdan and Taylor emphasise that we lose sight of the subjective nature 
of human beings when we reduce them to statistical aggregates.440 
 
3.3 Interpretivism  
 
In addition to the above, the researcher examined the interpretivist epistemology to 
establish if it was an effective method to apply in the collection, analysis and 
interpretation of data. Interpretivism is a word attributed to a divergent epistemology 
to positivism.441 Bryman argues that interpretivism requires social scientists to 
embrace the subjective meaning of the social world as opposed to the application of 
a scientific model to the study of the social world442  
 
Based on the above analysis in relation to interpretivism and constructivism, the 
researcher concurs with Ritchie and her colleagues on the following points: 
 
1 Understanding the social world of people being studied and focusing on their 
meanings and interpretations produces knowledge 
2 Meanings and interpretations based on the participants views can be 
constructed by researchers 
3 The research process is essentially inductive because the interpretation is 
based on the data 
4 Given that there are different perceptions and understandings, social reality 
cannot be captured accurately 
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3.4    Qualitative methods 
 
A significant feature of qualitative research is that it emphasises the significance of 
conducting the study from the perspective of the participants.443  An important feature 
of the qualitative research approach is the investigation of a phenomenon from the 
subjective viewpoints of the participants.444 William emphasises that qualitative 
research involves explaining, describing and interpreting data that has been collected. 
Therefore, in conducting this study, the researcher sought prosecutors and police 
officers who were willing to express their feelings by giving descriptive accounts of 
their views in relation to the cyberstalking phenomenon. The outcome was that the 
researcher described her findings from the subjective viewpoints of the participants. 
 
Another reason why the researcher chose the qualitative method is because it enabled 
her to have direct contact and get close to the participants during the study. Patton 
suggests that the dual features of personal contact and insight constitutes the basis 
on which a researcher can gain an understanding of a phenomenon.445   
 
The researcher employed the qualitative approach to explore the meanings that 
certain individual prosecutors and police officers attribute to the phenomenon of 
cyberstalking from the perspective of law enforcement challenges. The qualitative 
approach afforded the researcher the opportunity to ask participants broad questions 
and to collate their comprehensive data based on their verbal accounts. 
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There are five aspects of qualitative research which include case study, ethnography, 
phenomenological study, grounded theory and content analysis.446  Hancock, Ockford 
and Windrige argue that the aim of a qualitative research is to develop explanations 
of social phenomena. Notably, the researcher applied the phenomenological aspect 
of qualitative research with a view to developing an explanation on the topic under 
investigation.  
 
3. 5   Phenomenology  
 
Phenomenology is a qualitative methodological approach.447 The two features of 
phenomenology are that it studies the lived human experiences and the way things 
are perceived by individuals to the consciousness. Bogdan and Taylor argue that 
phenomenologists analyse the words of human behaviour as a means of gauging how 
people interpret the world. As a qualitative approach, phenomenology therefore allows 
interviewees the opportunity to give comprehensive views of the phenomena being 
researched.  
 
From a historical perspective, phenomenological ideas can be traced to Edmund 
Husserl and Alfred Schutz.448 Bogden and Bilken suggest that the subjective aspects 
of individual behaviours are highlighted by phenomenologists who seek to access the 
conceptual world of participants. Given that the words and actions of the participants 
are sources which indicate how people view their world, it has been suggested that a 
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phenomenologist will endeavour to visualize things from an individual’s behaviour.449 
This is more so given that human beings understand reality only in the form which it is 
perceived.  
 
Crucially, the researcher chose phenomenology as a methodology because it ensured 
that the detailed descriptions given by the participants were grounded in their 
perspectives.450  The phenomenology study enabled the researcher to understand the 
reality of London prosecutors and police officers who are responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting cyberstalkers.451  
 
Additionally, the researcher applied the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
(IPA) based on which, the researcher identified emergent themes from the data, coded 
the emergent themes and analysed the experiences of the participants as evidenced 
in the numerous interview transcripts. To this effect, IPA has been specifically 
identified as an aspect of phenomenology which recognizes the dialogue between the 
researcher and the participants based on which the subjective viewpoints of the 
participants will be construed.452  Hancock, Ockleford and Windridge, stress that this 
approach recognizes that in attempting to analyse the experiences of the participants, 
the researcher will be required to interpret the accounts of the participants and then 
code the data for emergent themes. 
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Specifically, the researcher applied IPA as a qualitative method to understand the 
subjective realities of the professionals through personal interpretations of their lived 
experiences and the meanings they attach to the experiences. Smith and Osborn 
suggest that the aim of IPA is to explain in detail how participants are making sense 
of their personal and social world.453 
 
Additionally, Smith and Osborn assert that the IPA approach is phenomenological 
given that it entails the detailed examination of a person’s lifeworld, endeavours to 
analyse an individual’s personal experience and is focused on an individual’s personal 
perception of an object or an event. Larkin, Watts and Clifton suggest that researchers 
should be amenable to adapting their views and be responsive to interpretation of data 
which is based on the responses of the participants.454  
 
Considering the above, IPA enabled the researcher to explore the lived experiences 
of the professionals and to develop an interpretative analysis of their experiences 
within social and law enforcement contexts. Significantly, the IPA enabled the 
researcher to understand that the experiences of the participants are within the 
specific research context in respect of the phenomena being investigated. Further, the 
IPA enabled the researcher to describe the perceptions of the professionals on 
cyberstalking victimisation and the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet.  
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3.6 Research Methods 
 
The researcher used two types of exploratory research methods to gather background 
data on the research topic. 
 
3.6.1. Interviews 
 
The first type of exploratory research design utilised by the researcher was in depth 
one to one qualitative interviews with a sample of the CPS and MET officials. 
Qualitative interviews are a vital research method for gauging or analysing the values 
or attitudes of individuals.455 Seale suggests that participants provide a better 
response to open ended questions and flexible questions in comparison to closed 
questions. In respect of the research study, the interviews enabled the researcher to 
gain an insight into the law enforcement challenges that are faced by prosecutors and 
police officers in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. The interviews also afforded the 
researcher the flexibility of encouraging the elaboration of issues. 
  
  
The researcher utilised interviews as a qualitative research technique because it 
afforded her the opportunity to conduct detailed interviews with the limited sample size 
with a view to exploring their perspectives on the phenomena under investigation. In 
doing so, the researcher was given the opportunity to collect detailed data on the 
research questions. Additionally, the interviews ensured that the researcher was able 
to directly control the interview process with a view to seeking clarification of certain 
issues during the interview process if required.  
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The researcher relied principally on the verbal accounts with a view to obtaining data 
on the phenomenon under investigation and utilised open-ended questions to access 
the views of participants. In particular, the researcher used semi-structured interviews 
which lasted between 1 to 2 hours approximately. In conducting the interviews, the 
researcher ensured that the duration of the interview was adequate to address the 
issues that were raised on the one hand and that both she and the participants were 
not tired at any given point of the interviews.456 
 
During the interview, the participants gave descriptive accounts of their opinions and 
an insight into the real challenges faced by London prosecutors and police officers in 
the prosecution of cyberstalkers. The first phase of the researcher’s interviews 
involved the researcher interviewing 25 experienced police officers, a Member of 
Parliament and a government adviser who were knowledgeable on the phenomenon 
being investigated. The second phase of the researcher’s interview involved the 
researcher interviewing 30 London prosecutors. The narrative of the police officers 
and the prosecutors provided further information on the phenomenon being 
investigated. Collectively, the interviewees confirmed the difficulties the prosecutors 
and police officers face in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
The researcher collected data from one respondent at a time. The interviews were all 
transcribed and produced a lot of data. The researcher analysed the data with a view 
to identifying emergent and common themes. The researcher stopped interviewing 
when she reached theoretical saturation. Given the number of interviews, a lot of 
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qualitative data was produced which required interpretation and the researcher 
struggled to maintain an objective approach about the result and sought to prevent 
any preconceived idea from influencing the interpretation by staying focused on the 
research data.  
 
In addition to the above, the researcher considered the findings of the Echo Pilot 
Survey on the analysis of cyberstalking in the United Kingdom prior to establishing the 
rationale for her research.457 The survey highlighted the impact of cyberstalking on 
victims from the perceptions of victims in addition to other points.  
 
The issues of the regulation of cyberstalking and cyberstalking victimisation shaped 
the researcher decision to choose the research topic. This more so because in May 
2015, the coalition government subsequently launched an online consultation on 
stalking laws.458 The final report highlighted the need for law enforcement officials to 
tackle the offence.459 From a victimisation perspective, the researcher analysed the 
finding of Short, Guppy, Jacqui Hart and James Barnes.460 
 
The above literature search shaped the research questions that were devised by the 
researcher which examines how police officers and prosecutors as front-line law 
enforcement officials perceive cyberstalking and the challenges that hinders them from 
investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers. 
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Additionally, the researcher considered the finding of Drebing and others study on 
cyberstalking in large sample of social media users.461 The additional findings of 
Henselr-Mcginniss on the effect of cyberstalking victimisation on the academic 
performance of victims and the resulting psychological effects provided further 
information. From a domestic violence perspective, the findings of Alexy, Burgess, 
Baker and Smoyak on the perceptions of cyberstalking among college students was 
also considered.462 The findings indicate that victims of cyberstalking are more likely 
to be targeted by former partners.  
 
3. 6. 2.    Literature search (Secondary data analysis) 
 
The second method of exploratory research design that the researcher used was the 
literature search which enabled the researcher to gather information from academic 
texts, online journals, news media and published statistics. The researcher conducted 
a literature search prior to conducting the interviews to formulate the grounds for the 
research and establish the basis for formulating her line of enquiry.  In doing so, the 
researcher considered the issues which were highlighted by the UK government 
consultation report on stalking which commenced on 14 November 2011.463 The aim 
of the consultation report was to identify how best to tackle stalking and cyberstalking 
with a view to protecting victims. 
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The findings of the Independent Parliamentary Enquiry into stalking law reforms which 
was published in 2012 was additionally analysed by the researcher.464 From a 
legislative perspective, the report provided an insight on the criminalisation of 
cyberstalking in the UK. The findings of the report were the basis of the researcher’s 
question on the perceptions of the participants on cyberstalking and the threshold for 
distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking.  
 
Additionally, the findings of the review on cyberstalking in the UK conducted by the 
National Centre of Cyberstalking Research, shaped the research questions which 
were devised by the researcher.465  From a subjective perspective, the study is 
significant because it provided findings on the impacts of cyberstalking on victims 
based on the subjective experiences of 353 participant victims.466   The findings of the 
study shaped the researcher’s questions designed to explore the factors perceived by 
police officers and prosecutors which frustrate them in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers given the impact of cyberstalking on victims. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher reviewed the UK risk identification assessment model for 
the offences of domestic violence, stalking and honour based violence which was 
introduced in 2009 by the Association of Chief Police Officers.467  The researcher also 
considered the twelve specific questions incorporated in the domestic violence, 
stalking and honour based violence tool about stalking as a result of the stalking law 
                                                          
464 ‘Independent Parliamentary enquiry into Stalking Law Reforms’  (Dashriskchecklist, 2012) < www.dashriskchecklist.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Stalking-Law-Reform-Findings-Report-2012.pdf>  Accessed  21 January 2019 
465 Cyberstalking in the United Kingdom An analysis of the echo pilot survey’ (Paladin, 2013) <www.paladinservice.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/echo-pilot-final-cyberstalking-in-the-uk-university-of-bedfordshire.pdf> accessed 27 February 2018 
466 Two hundred and forty of the victims were female and one hundred and nine were male 
467 Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Harassment and Honour Based Violence (DASH, 2009) Risk Identification and Assessment and 
Management Model 
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reform inquiry. The DASH tool and the risk assessment tools were introduced to 
ensure that the police during the investigation process will risk assess victims and 
manage identified or potential risks.  
 
Additionally, the researcher analysed two further risk assessment tools which are 
identified as part of the Violent Crime Integrated Offender Management.  The 
additional tools are the Stalking Assessment Manual and the Stalking Risk Profile 
which provide police officers the opportunity to make informed decisions when risk 
assessing stalking victims.468 The researcher analysed specific risk assessment tools 
and reviewed relevant literature on the risk assessment of stalking victims in a bid to 
devise questions regarding the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on the 
risk assessment of cyberstalking victims.  
  
In addition to the above, the researcher reviewed three relevant policies of the 
Metropolitan Police Service and one relevant guideline of the Crown Prosecution 
Service. The policies are the protocol on the appropriate handling of stalking or 
harassment offences between the National Chief’s Council and the Crown Prosecution 
Service, the Stalking and Harassment Checklist and the ACPO Practice Advice on 
Investigating Stalking and Harassment.469 The relevant guideline of the Crown 
Prosecution Service which was reviewed by the researcher is the guideline on the 
prosecution of cases involving social media which was published in 2014. The various 
MPS and CPS policies enabled the researcher to devise questions on the factors 
                                                          
468 ibid 
469 ‘Major Investigation and Public Protection Stalking and Harassment’ (ACPO, 13 March 2014) <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-
content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/stalking-and-harassment/> accessed 2 February 2019 
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which police officers and prosecutors perceive hinder them in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
 
Prior to the researcher devising the research questions, the researcher also analysed 
the findings of five relevant cases as reported by the media during the early stages of 
the research. The first case which the researcher considered was the case of Nigel 
Harris who was jailed on 15 October 1999 for using the internet to continue to stalk a 
victim who was his former partner despite a court order which prevented him from 
doing so.470 The case was significant as it was reported by the media as the first case 
of internet stalking in the UK which had resulted in the stalker being imprisoned.471  
The second case which the researcher considered was the case of Shane Webber 
who was jailed on 11 October 2011 on for sending explicit photos of his former partner 
to her family, friends and adult websites and secretly posting twelve graphic photos of 
her to four social networking sites.472 The case was important because the victim who 
was cyberstalked for approximately 3 years by her boyfriend became suicidal and 
subsequently aborted their unborn baby as a result of stress.473  
 
The third case that the researcher considered was the case of Martin Poulter who 
made 16,690 random telephone calls to victims and received a 30 months custodial 
sentence in September 2012.474 The case was significant because it revealed that 
sometimes cyberstalkers target victims via phone only.  
                                                          
470 ‘Three Months Jail’ for Internet Stalker’ (The Guardian, 16 October 1999) <www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/oct/16/gerardseenan>  
accessed 2 February 2019 
471 Ibid 
472 ‘Internet Stalker Jailed for Putting Explicit Pictures of Girlfriend Online’ (The Guardian, 11 October 2011) 
<www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/31/internet-stalker-explicit-pictures-girlfriend> accessed 2 February 2019 
473 The victim was prescribed antidepressants, developed symptoms of obsessive  This compulsive disorder, stopped eating at times and had 
to retake her university exams because the abuse affected her so badly 
474 Francesca Shanahan,  ‘Married pervert spent over £5,000 of his benefits making lewd late night phone calls to random women’ (The 
Daily mail, 25 September 2012)  <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article> accessed: 30/10/12 
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The fourth case is the case of Andrew Meldrum who was convicted on 30 May 2014 
of stalking and cyberstalking implicitly.475 Andrew Meldrum was convicted for spying 
on 2 victims through his computer after installing sophisticated spyware on their 
computers.476 This case was crucial because it highlighted that cyberstalkers can 
target complete strangers. 
 
The fifth case that the researcher considered was the case of Clifford Mills who 
murdered his former girlfriend on 3 February 2011 Lorna Smith after stalking her via 
Facebook, text messages and telephone calls.477  This case was significant because 
it indicated that cyberstalking can lead to the death of victims in domestic violence 
cases. 
 
Collectively, the five cases highlighted above indicate that cyberstalkers can target 
former partners or complete strangers via computer and phones and that the impact 
of cyberstalking on victims can range from psychological effects to the loss of life. 
Notably, the cases shaped the researcher’s question on whether it was realistic to 
expect police officers investigating cyberstalking cases to eliminate and manage all 
risks that threaten the safety of victims given that victims range from former partners 
to complete strangers.  
 
                                                          
475 Nicola Fifelied ‘Cyberstalker bugged Women’s Computer s to Spy on Them in their Bedrooms’ (The Telegraph, 30 May 2014)  
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/10866262/Cyber-stalker-bugged-womens-computers-to-spy-on-them-in-their-bedrooms.html> 
accessed 2 February 2018 
476 He was ordered by the judge to undergo two years of probation supervision and do 20 sessions of one-on-one specified activities. He was 
also, placed on the sex offenders register for ten years and must pay £2,100 in costs to the prosecution  
 
477 Facebook Stalker Murdered ex -Girlfriend < www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9041971/Facebook-
stalker-murdered-ex-girlfriend.html> accessed 2 February 2019 
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The above literature consisting of policies, guidelines, research studies, reports and 
case studies enabled the researcher to devise the research questions regarding the   
factors that  police officers and prosecutors perceive  frustrate them in the investigation 
and prosecution of cyberstalkers, the challenges that police officers and prosecutors 
perceive impede the risk assessment of victims, the criminalisation of stalking in the 
UK and the proactive measures that are taken by police officers and prosecutors to 
tackle the issue of lack of knowledge.  
 
The literature search influenced how the researcher devised the research questions. 
Crucially, the review revealed that cyberstalking can have a devastating impact on 
victims, that the regulation of cyberstalking has been a cause for public concern in the 
UK within this decade, that certain factors may affect the risk assessment of victims 
and that that it may be challenging for police officers and prosecutors to bring 
cyberstalkers to justice.  
 
The researcher visited various libraries when conducting the literature search. In 
conducting the exploratory research, the researcher did not use the ethnography 
research tool because the study did not require a detailed observation of the research 
participants. Further, the researcher did not use focus groups which are another type 
of exploratory research because of time constraints. The focus group session would 
have provided an additional means of gathering data as opposed to individual 
interview sessions. The researcher did not use focus groups because she would have 
found it challenging to arrange for selected law enforcement officials to simultaneously 
attend focus group interview sessions given the demanding job roles of the 
participants. It would have been difficult to organise focus group sessions as most of 
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the participants were busy reviewing cases, prosecuting defendants at court and 
investigating crimes.  
 
The researcher did not apply the causal research design which seeks to establish the 
cause-and effect between variables because the design relies on experiments to 
determine cause and effect.  This study did not require an experiment due to the nature 
of the research. 
 
 
3.7. The PhD design 
 
The research in this thesis used a qualitative approach. The scope of the research 
was determined by the accessibility of most of the research participants who are law 
enforcement officials. It was initially envisaged that the research will be based on a 
cross-jurisdictional study requiring the researcher to investigate the challenges faced 
by law enforcement officials in the UK, Ireland and the US in the prosecution of cross-
jurisdictional cyberstalkers. However, three years into the study, the researcher 
narrowed the scope of the research because it became apparent that what the 
researcher set out to accomplish was clearly over ambitious for a single PhD. 
Consequently, the research study was confined to the UK jurisdiction given that most 
of the data was obtained from prosecutors and police officers based in the UK as 
opposed to international law enforcement officials. This change resulted in a narrower 
research scope which required the researcher to focus the study on the UK jurisdiction 
as opposed to the additional jurisdictions of Ireland and the US. In doing so, the 
research covered the three following areas: 
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1  How lack of resources and lack of staff training are perceived by police officers 
and prosecutors in London as difficulties which frustrate them in the investigation 
and prosecution of cyberstalkers 
2 The proactive measures that are taken by police officers and prosecutors in  
London to acquire the knowledge which they perceive to be lacking in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers 
3 The investigative impediments to the risk assessment of victims of cyberstalking 
as perceived by police officers and prosecutors in London who comprised the 
research sample. 
 
The various sources of research data are interviews, texts, web pages and reports.  
Westbrook acknowledges that interviews are a valuable qualitative method and source 
of research data.478  Westbrook suggests that the onus is on the researcher to choose 
between structured and unstructured interviews. Notably, Caron, Bloom and Bennie 
acknowledge that although there might be a loss of information due to the pre-
determined focus of the semi-structured interview, it could however result in an 
investigation of the concepts and ideas which are deemed to be the most crucial 
aspects of the phenomenon under investigation.479 
 
Taking the above factors into consideration, the researcher chose one to one semi 
structured interviews which comprised of open-ended questions. The settings for the 
interviews were the various CPS offices, police stations, police buildings, Westminster 
parliament and a government building in Northern Ireland.  
                                                          
478 Lynn Westbrook, ‘Qualitative Research Methods: A Review of Major Stages, Data Analysis Techniques and Quality Controls’  
    (Deep blue, 1994) <www.deepblue.lib.umich/edu> accessed 17 May 2017 
479 Geoffrey Caron, Gordon Bloom and Andrew Bennie: ‘Canadian High School Coaches Experiences, Insights and Perceived Roles With 
     Sport Related Concussions’ (Sports psych, 2015) <www.sportspsych.mcgilla.ca/pdf/publications/ISCJ/_carons_et_al_2015.pdf >  
      accessed 9 June 2017 
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The researcher found the interviews an advantageous method for collecting data for 
two reasons. First, the interviews enabled the researcher to ask the participants 
precise questions connected to the phenomenon under investigation. Second, the 
interviews afforded the researcher the opportunity to probe the participants for details 
of their experiences and to seek clarifications on initial points that they had made. 
Various accounts emerged from the interviews which provided an insight into the 
phenomenon under investigation.  
 
 
3.8 Sampling  
 
Collingridge and Gantt suggest that there should be a clear rationale for selecting 
participants and that they should fulfil a specific purpose related to the research 
question.480  Given the purpose of the study, the rationale for the sample was to recruit 
participants who as primary law enforcement officials, can provide dense information 
on the phenomenon under study based upon their professional knowledge and 
personal experiences. To this effect, Cleary, Horsfall and Hayter highlight that the 
purpose of the inquiry among other factors will determine the make-up of the 
participants and numbers of participants.481  Further, Cleary, Horsfall and Hayter list 
the purposeful choosing of participants, the intense studying of small numbers and the 
identification of a rationale for the selection as some fundamental principles of 
participant selection and this approach felt relevant for the current research.  
 
                                                          
480 Dave Collingridge and Edwin Gantt ‘The Quality of Qualitative Research’  (2008)  23 American Journal of Qualitative Research  5 
481 Michelle Cleary, Jan Horsfall and Mark Hayter ‘Data Collection and Sampling in Qualitative Research: Does Size Matter?’  (2014)  70 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 3  
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Notably, the researcher applied Reyns research methodological approach to the to the 
study by recruiting a sample of participants who either had the experience or were 
experiencing the research topic under investigation as law enforcement officials who 
are in the frontline of bringing cyberstalkers to justice. This approach, therefore, 
enabled the research to obtain data from police officers and prosecutors who are in 
the field of investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers and directly involved in bringing 
them to justice.  
 
Specifically, the police officers have personal experiences of investigating 
cyberstalkers and the prosecutors have the experience of both charging cyberstalkers 
and reviewing cases on cyberstalking. Collectively, the sample chosen by the 
researcher provided dense and credible data which enabled the researcher to give an 
account of the phenomenon under investigation. On identifying the rationale for the 
study, the researcher selected the sample with a view to interviewing the participants 
in detail given their personal experiences in investigating and prosecuting 
cyberstalkers.  In choosing the sample, the researcher envisaged that the participants 
would be able to provide rich data on the research questions which will enable the 
researcher to provide a persuasive account of the phenomenon of interest.  
 
Purposive sampling is the most appropriate sampling method to employ in qualitative 
research.482  Maxwell emphasises that the significance of purposive sampling is that 
it can be used when a particular setting, individuals, or events have been selected due 
to the fact that they capture the diversity of a population. Based on Maxwell’s line of 
reasoning, the researcher utilised the purposive sampling method to select a sample 
                                                          
482 Joseph Maxwell, ‘Designing A Qualitative study’ In Leonard Bickman and Debra Rog (eds), The Sage Handbook of Applied Research 
Methods  (Sage 2009) 
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of London prosecutors and police officers respectively because they could provide 
data on the cyberstalking phenomenon given that they are the primary law 
enforcement officials in the UK for prosecuting cyberstalkers. 
 
Additionally, the researcher utilised the snowball sampling method which entails the 
researcher identifying the specific participants that have been interviewed to request 
further interviewees.483 Dragan and Isaic-Maniu argue that the primary benefit of the 
snowball sampling method is that it enables researchers to access segments of the 
hidden population that are not easily accessible. Applying this line of reasoning to her 
study, the researcher argues that utilising snowball sampling enabled her to further 
recruit participants within sections of the population. The snowball sampling method 
specifically enabled the researcher to recruit participants who were based at the 
Serious Organised Crime Agency, New Scotland Yard and the Police Central e-Crime 
Unit. The snowball sampling method also enabled the researcher to recruit 
prosecutors who were based in other CPS offices such as the Crown Court Unit, Fraud 
Unit, Serious Complex Casework Division, and the Rape and Serious Sexual Offences 
Units. This was facilitated by the fact that some of the participants who were 
interviewed by the researcher recommended other experienced participants who 
could contribute to the research study.  
 
The researcher gained access to the further participants after she was given the 
names, telephone numbers, email addresses and office locations of specific police 
officers and prosecutors who it was felt could contribute meaningfully to the research 
                                                          
483 Irina- Maria  Dragan and Alexandru Isaic-Manu, ‘Snowball Sampling Completion’ (2013)  5(2) Journal of Studies In Social Sciences 
<www.infinitypress.info/index.php/jsss/article/download/355/207 > accessed 13 September 2017  
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given their specialist backgrounds. The researcher contacted the recommended 
participants to request interviews with them at a place and at a time that was 
convenient from them. The participants when contacted, expressed their willingness 
to take part in the study and confirmed the dates, the time and the locations of the 
interviews. Two factors contributed to the researcher gaining access to the specialist 
participants. The first factor is that the researcher is currently employed by the CPS 
and as such, the participants were not suspicious of her research motives. The second 
factor is that the study has been approved by the CPS and the MPS respectively and 
as such, the participants were aware that the researcher had legally obtained the 
permission of their respective employers to approach the participants for an interview.  
 
Specifically, through snowball sampling, two police officers who were interviewed 
recommended that the researcher recruits senior police officers who were based at 
New Scotland Yard and the Police Central e-Crime Unit respectively because they 
would provide specialist insight on the research topic. In doing so, the police officers 
provided the names and contact details of the recommended participants following 
which, the researcher contacted the recommended participants to recruit them for the 
study. In a similar vein, during the interviews four prosecutors provided the details of 
specialist prosecutors in the Crown Court Unit, Fraud Unit, Serious Complex 
Casework Division, Fraud Unit and the Rape and Serious Sexual Offences Units.  
 
The researcher was granted access to four additional prosecutors because some 
prosecutors whom she had previously interviewed, recommended the additional 
specialist prosecutors whose specialist experience was relevant to the study.  As a 
result of her contacts within the CPS, the researcher was therefore, able to recruit 
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additional prosecutors who were willing to take part in the study. In doing so, the 
researcher travelled to the various offices to the conduct the interviews. On initially 
contacting the participants via email, the researcher provided an overview of the 
research objectives and the researcher’s background. The researcher also followed 
this up dealing with the pre-interview queries that were raised by some of the 
participants to ensure that they were fully informed on the objectives of the study.  
 
The researcher adjusted the makeup of her sample slightly because while 
interviewing, she became aware that a Member of Parliament who chaired the UK 
inquiry into stalking law reforms had just published his finding based on which the 
coalition government had subsequently agreed to create new legislation on stalking. 
Consequently, the researcher decided to recruit the Member of Parliament (MP) as a 
participant with a view to establishing whether his recommendation covered the 
criminalisation of cyberstalking specifically and the prosecution of cyberstalkers in 
general. The researcher recruited the Member of Parliament to ascertain whether his 
recommendations reflects the perceptions of the police officers and the prosecutors 
given that he is a policy maker. Crucially, the researcher’s aim in recruiting the Member 
of Parliament was to establish whether his recommendations reflect the reality of the 
police officers and the prosecutors who are the law enforcement officials in the 
forefront tasked with bringing cyberstalkers to justice.  
 
In relation to social media providers, the Member of Parliament raised the issue of 
Facebook changing the privacy settings of customers without notifying them thereby 
enabling cyberstalkers to target customers. The Member of Parliament further raised 
the point that some members of the public enable cyberstalkers to target them by 
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putting pictures on Facebook and posting messages on Facebook without realizing 
that Facebook operates an open profile for all as opposed to a private profile. 
Consequently, the Member of Parliament argued that a combination of the open profile 
that is operated by Facebook and the changing of privacy settings by Facebook 
provides avenues for cyberstalkers to target victims. The Member of Parliament 
therefore stressed that this situation was particularly worrying given that children under 
the age of 13 can open accounts on Facebook despite the fact that they are under-
aged. He therefore recommended that there should be an intensive public awareness 
programme and an education of the public on these issues. 
 
In relation to the ISPs the Member of Parliament suggested that the ISPs should take 
more responsibility to monitor the information that customers provide when they sign 
up for an account. He therefore questioned why customers can sign up for internet 
accounts using fake details without thinking that they might be sued for libel.  
 
Some of the above perceptions of the Member of Parliament on cyberstalking 
victimisation mirrors the perceptions of certain participants in relation to training, 
education and the responsibility of ISPs. 
3.9 Access 
 
 
On identifying the organisation where they would like to carry out research, several 
academics may encounter various impediments in attempting to gain access to 
several institutions.484 Johl and Renganathan argue that organisations are often 
suspicious about the role of strangers. 
                                                          
484  Satirenjit Johl and Sumathi Renganathan, ‘Strategies in Gaining Access for Doing Fieldwork: Reflection of Two Researchers’ (2010) 8 
(1) Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods  <http://www.ejbrm.com/issue/download.html?id/article  > accessed 20 May 2017 
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In relation to the CPS given that the researcher is an employee of the organisation, 
the CPS management were very supportive of the researcher’s goals. Consequently, 
the organisation promptly approved the research and granted the researcher access 
to several London prosecutors. In addition, the organisation paid for the researcher to 
attend a relevant conference which was organised by the MPS. 
 
In relation to the MPS, the organisation was initially sceptical about the researcher’s 
motives given that she is not employed by the organisation. However, after an official 
of the strategy and research policy department carried out enquiries which confirmed 
that the researcher was an employee of the CPS, the MPS formally gave their consent 
for the researcher to interview 30 police officers. Consequently, in June 2012, the 
official at the research and strategy department confirmed that the researcher did not 
require additional vetting because the researcher was an employee of the CPS. The 
official acted as the gatekeeper for the MPS in this regard by providing formal access 
to the police officers. This research privilege enabled the researcher to gain access to 
the interview police officers without being additionally vetted because she was 
employed by the CPS.  
 
The researcher recognizes that another researcher who works outside the criminal 
justice system would not have been given formal access to the research participants 
without being additionally vetted. To this effect, Ray and Zaretsky highlight that 
researchers and educators are required to explore the concepts of privilege and bias 
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as part of doctoral training as professional experiences develop.485 Consequently, the 
researcher acknowledged the concept of research privilege by ensuring that she 
applied the principles of confidentially, anonymity and voluntary consent when 
interviewing the participants and also ensured that measures were put in place to 
guard against bias in the research as previously described in detail in Section 3.1 of 
chapter 3. 
 
 
 
3.9.1 Access to the prosecutor sample 
 
Following receipt of approval by the CPS, their communications department notified 
all members of staff in London by sending out a general email. The email informed 
members of staff of the researcher’s topic and requested that all the prosecutors co-
operate with the researcher to take part in the study. A senior CPS official acted as a 
gatekeeper for the CPS stakeholder in this regard by providing access to the 
prosecutors. 
 
Gaining access to the research sites entailed the researcher travelling to various CPS 
offices to interview the prosecutors. Some of the offices that the researcher travelled 
to include the Serious Organised Crime department, the Rape and Serious Sexual 
Offences department, the Crown Court department and the Magistrates Court 
department which was formerly based in Croydon. Additionally, the researcher visited 
various crown courts such as Isleworth crown court, Inner London Crown Court and 
                                                          
485 Sarah Ray and Jill Zaresktyy ‘Questioning Privilege: Tools for Research and Teaching’ (New Prairie Press, 2016)6 
<www.newprairiepress.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1014&context=aerc>  accessed 4 
February 2019 
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Snaresbrook Crown Court to interview Higher Court Advocates who are prosecutors 
that have been given higher advocacy rights.  
 
3.9.2   Access to the police officer sample 
 
Subsequent to receiving approval from the MPS strategy and research department, 
the researcher interviewed experienced police officers who were based at Acton police 
station, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, New Scotland Yard and the Police 
Central e-Crime Unit. The MPS official acted as a gateway for the Metropolitan Police 
Service by providing access to the police officers. 
 
3.9.3   Access to a Member of Parliament   
 
A parliamentary research assistant provided access to a Member of Parliament who 
the researcher interviewed at Westminster parliament. The parliamentary research 
assistant acted as a gateway facilitating the interview.  
 
3.9.4   Access to the ISPs  
 
It was challenging to gain access to the ISPs because the researcher was unable to 
contact Google, Facebook or Twitter officials as at the time of the study, there were 
no apparent means of directly contacting the organisations via email or telephone. It 
would seem that the only measure that has been provided by ISPs is for customers to 
use the Help Centre for the sole purpose of reporting problems with their accounts. 
There were no identifiable gatekeepers for the ISPs. Although the study did not 
indicate the views of the ISP representatives, a lot of useful data was generated from 
the various interviews with other participants.  
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3.9.5 Recruitment of the prosecutors and police officers 
 
 
A vital aspect of conducting qualitative research is recruiting participants for the 
study.486  Namageyo-Funa argues that it may be tasking for a researcher to choose 
the most appropriate recruitment method. In carrying out the study, the researcher 
chose to recruit prosecutors and police officers because they are the primary law 
enforcement officials in the UK for prosecuting cyberstalkers. In recruiting the 
participants, the researcher chose several methods which include face to face 
interactions, emails and telephone calls. In doing so, the researcher sent a covering 
email to some of the participants. The email provided information on the topic of the 
researcher’s study, her job role, the length of the proposed interview and confirmation 
that her study had been approved by the CPS management. 
 
In attempting to recruit participants, the researcher also sent follow up emails to 
specific prosecutors whom she wanted to interview for the study based on their 
experience and availability.  
 
As there was neither a specialist cyberstalking department in the CPS nor a specialist 
cyberstalking prosecutor at the time of the study, the researcher ensured that the 
prosecutors that she recruited represented a sample of the prosecutors based in the 
core CPS offices. The prosecutors worked in the Domestic Violence Unit, the 
Magistrates Court Unit, Rape and the Serious Organised Casework Crown Court Unit. 
The first, second and third prosecutors were senior crown prosecutors who specialized 
                                                          
486 Apophia.Namageyo-Funa, Rimando, Brace, Christiana, Fowles, Davies, Martinez and Sealy: ‘Recruitment in Qualitative Research: 
Lessons Learned During Dissertation Sample Recruitment’ (2014) 19 Qualitative Report 4 
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in domestic violence cases and rape and serious sexual assault cases and serious 
casework cases. They were responsible for reviewing cases, preparing cases for trial 
and liaising with police to ensure that the cases were robust evidentially. They were 
based in the crown court unit of the CPS.  The fourth prosecutor had the managerial 
role of a Borough Crown Prosecutor. He was based in the magistrate’s court unit of 
the CPS and line managed some of the prosecutors.  
 
The researcher’s rationale for recruiting a varied sample of prosecutors is that given 
that the review of cyberstalking cases is not confined to one department, there was a 
strong likelihood that the participants would have some routine experience of 
prosecuting cyberstalkers in their everyday activities. The researchers applied the 
same rationale in recruiting police officers from various police departments.  
 
In recruiting the prosecutors and the police officers, the researcher used three 
measures which include face to face recruitment of the prosecutors and police officers, 
recruitment via the recommendations of participants, recruitment via emails and 
recruitment via telephone calls. An important feature of the researcher’s recruitment 
method was that her relationship with the participants was based on mutual trust and 
respect.  
 
Bogdan and Taylor argue that researchers should not recruit colleagues as 
participants as the participants may only reflect the views that are beneficial to them.487  
Therefore, the researcher acknowledges that given the sensitive nature of the data 
that was gathered from the study, the participants as high-ranking professionals may 
                                                          
487 Robert Bogdan and Steven Taylor, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods (1st edn John Wiley & sons, 1975) 103 
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have felt their professionalism could be threatened by their honest revelations of the 
difficulties that they face in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
Nevertheless, their feelings of frustration were coupled with an anticipation that this 
research finding will in some way, lead to the implementation of suggested reforms. 
From this perspective, recruiting certain prosecutors who are the researcher’s 
colleagues was beneficial to the researcher’s study.  
 
It should be reiterated that, significantly, the researcher was in the privileged position 
of being employed as a para legal officer by the CPS which gave her access to eight 
prosecutors who the researcher had previously worked with ten years prior to the 
research and twenty two other prosecutors who the researcher had never worked with. 
The eight prosecutors who the researcher had previously worked with included two 
higher court advocates who have higher right of audience in the crown court and six 
office based crown court prosecutors. The higher court advocates are responsible for 
drafting indictments, preparing cases for trials and presenting cases in court. The 
prosecutors are responsible for giving charging advice to police officers, liaising with 
police officers, reviewing case, drafting indictments and preparing cases for trials. The 
researcher previously worked with the eight prosecutors ten years ago in her capacity 
as a regional Direct Communications with Victims Co-ordinator which entailed her 
writing to victims and meeting victims and their families when charges had been 
dropped by the CPS.  
 
The privileged position of the researcher enabled the researcher to hear first-hand 
accounts of participant views on the research topic. Further, given the law enforcement 
background of the researcher, her personal goal to research cyberstalking as an 
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aspect of cybercrime influenced the researcher’s decision to choose the research 
area. 
 
As an employee of the CPS, the researcher recognizes that her professional 
background may lead to research bias during various stages of the research process. 
The issue has been dealt with earlier in Section 3.1.2.  
 
The researcher encountered two problems when attempting to recruit prosecutors for 
the study. The first problem was that five out of the thirty prosecutors whom the 
researcher approached for an interview, did not respond to her emails. To overcome 
the challenge, the researcher used additional recruitment tools such as follow up 
emails, repeated telephone calls and follow up face to face conversations. 
 
The second recruitment problem the researcher encountered was that although the 
participants whom she recruited gave verbal consents, when she subsequently sent 
them consent forms via emails to sign and date, only some of the participants 
submitted their completed forms. The lack of response could be attributed to the fact 
that due to the researcher’s professional relationship with the participants, the 
prosecutors were content to rely on the initial consents that they had all given.  
Additionally, the fact that the participants gave their consents via emails without 
explicitly signing the forms could be viewed as implied consent.   
 
3.9.6   Recruitment of the UK Member of Parliament and Probation officials  
 
As previously mentioned, the researcher recruited the Honourable Elfyn Llywd M.P. 
who was a senior Member of Parliament and his parliamentary assistant to take part 
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in the study. The researcher recruited the Member of Parliament for two reasons. First, 
he chaired the parliamentary inquiry into stalking law reforms in the UK and published 
his findings based on which the government enacted legislation to criminalise face to 
face stalking and implicitly cyberstalking. Second, in conducting the enquiry, he heard 
evidence from various UK law enforcement officials. The researcher elicited useful 
responses from the Member of Parliament who provided additional information on the 
topic under investigation based on the findings of his own inquiry.  
 
In addition to the above, the researcher recruited the former chair of the National 
Probation Service to take part in the study. The researcher recruited the probation 
official because he was part of the inquiry which had reviewed the stalking legislation 
in the UK on behalf of the coalition government. The participant provided an insight 
into the phenomenon under investigation from the perspective of victims.  
 
3.9.7 Interviews 
 
The researcher used qualitative interviews to collect the relevant data for the study. In 
particular, the researcher used semi structured interviews. Qualitative and semi-
structured interviewing share some common characteristics.488 The first characteristic 
is the holding of face to face dialogue with two or more participants. The second 
characteristic is that the interview methods are both based on selected themes the 
researcher has chosen to investigate via flexibly structured interviews. The third 
shared common characteristic between qualitative and semi-structured interviews is 
that there is an onus on the researcher to obtain knowledge based on the perspectives 
                                                          
488 Rosalind Edwards and Jane Holland, What is Qualitative Interviewing? (first edn Bloomsbury academic, 2013) 13 
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of the participants which need to be put in context.489 These three features were 
manifested in the researcher’s interviews.  
 
It is acknowledged that participants will be able to identify with academics and more 
willing to take part in a study if they are informed of the researcher’s motive.490  
Consequently, prior to starting the interviews, the researcher informed the participants 
that her motive for embarking on the study was to present relevant findings for the 
benefit of the law enforcement officials and to add knowledge to this developing area 
of criminal law. On receiving the notification, the participants were keen to contribute 
to the study. The interview questions were prepared in advance and consisted of 
several open-ended questions. The questions can be found in Appendix 3.  
 
3.9.8   Analysis of the data 
 
The researcher adopted a two-staged process in the analysis of data. The approach 
enabled her to conduct a preliminary analysis and identify common themes at a very 
early stage of the study. Preliminary analysis of the data enabled the researcher to 
identify emergent themes and to ascertain the issues that require clarification via 
literature review. Consequently, the researcher conducted an analysis of the data in 
conjunction with the literature review. 
 
The emergent themes which were identified are anonymous cyberstalkers, risk 
assessment of victims, risk assessment of cyberstalkers, lack of resources, lack of 
experts, proving cases, lack of training, lack of knowledge, evidential difficulties, under 
                                                          
489 ibid 
490 Robert Bogdan and Steven Taylor, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods (first edn John Wiley & sons, 1975) 105 
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reporting by victims, victims not cooperating in domestic violence cases, meeting the 
evidential threshold, ISP, delays, demanding caseloads, personal online 
responsibility, cyberstalking via unregistered SIM cards and mentally ill cyberstalkers. 
As previously mentioned in section 3.6.1, as part of the literature review, the 
researcher analysed the relevant MPS policies and CPS guidelines in addition the 
researcher examined the relevant academic texts, research studies journal articles 
and case law. 
3.9.9   Coding 
 
On analysing the data, the researcher employed the qualitative analysis strategies of 
coding.491  Braun and Clarke suggest that codes pinpoint the characteristics of the 
data which refer to the essential segments or elements of the raw data that can be 
evaluated in a significant method regarding the phenomenon of interest. 
 
Coding connotes the process of analysing data.492  Coding is the principal categorizing 
strategy in qualitative research.493  The coding of data facilitates the identification of 
themes by looking for word repetitions, looking for key-words-in texts, reading 
unmarked texts, and cutting up and sorting the transcripts.494  The researcher applied 
the coding strategy to the data analysis process because it enabled her to ascertain 
the repeated words, common phrases and identical patterns of sentences in the data. 
A main goal of the coder is to establish repetitive patterns and their consistencies as 
                                                          
491  Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology < 
<http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/11735/2/thematic_analysis_revised_-_final.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa> accessed 16 
February 2019 
492 Sharon Kolb, ‘Grounded Theory and The Constant Comparative Method: Valid Research Strategies for Educators’ (2012) 3 (1) Journal 
of Emerging Trends In Educational Research And Policy Studies <http://www.jeteraps.scholarlinkresearch.com/articles/grounded>accessed 
24 September 2017 
493 Joseph Maxwell, ‘Designing A Qualitative study’ in Leonard Bickman and Debra Rog (eds), The Sage Handbook of Applied Re Methods  
(Sage 2009) 
494 Gerry Ryan and Russel Bernard, ‘Techniques To Identify Themes, Field Works’ (NERSP, 2003) 
<www.nerps.osg.ufl.edu/~urufus/documents/ryan > accessed 20 May 2017 
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evidenced in a given piece of data. Saldana highlights that coding is a cyclical 
process.495 
 
Taking the above factors into consideration, the researcher applied thematic coding in 
analysing the qualitative data. The advantages of thematic coding are that it minimizes 
the quantity of data, ensures that the reduced data can be easily read and facilitates 
the usage of specific themes to establish concepts.496  In applying thematic coding, 
the researcher broke down the data contained in the interview transcripts into themes 
in a bid to identify underlying concepts.  
 
In analysing the data, the researcher read the transcripts repeatedly with a view to 
understanding the data comprehensively. This approach enabled the researcher to 
identify and keep a record of the themes and categories of themes. On identifying the 
themes, the researcher highlighted the similar segments of the transcripts with a code 
label to enable the researcher to retrieve them subsequently for further comparison 
and analysis.  The researcher based her coding on key words, themes, phrases and 
topics.  The researcher created new codes on discovering that a theme identified from 
the data does not reflect the codes already identified.  The advantage of the approach 
that the researcher took to coding the data is that it enabled the researcher to go 
through the data methodically and to identify the subject matter contained in the data.  
 
 
The researcher used highlighters and post-it notes to distinguish the various concepts 
and categories. The researcher also noted the relevant codes in the margin next to 
                                                          
495 Johnny Saldana, The Coding Manual For Qualitative Research (3rd edn ,Sage 20012) 45 
496 ibid 
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the relevant data in the hard copy of the transcripts. The open coding generated a long 
list of codes which the researcher classified into categories and via the use of spider 
diagrams. The list of codes are contained in Appendix 6.  
 
On completing the open coding, the researcher applied the second stage of axial 
coding which is the process of exploring the relationship between the categories of 
identified data and their highlighted properties. The significance of axial coding is that 
it facilitates the construction of data that was previously categorized via open 
coding.497 This approach enabled the researcher to determine the relationship 
between the concepts and the categories.  
 
On completing the axial coding process, the researcher embarked on the selective 
coding process which enabled the researcher to identify one category of codes as the 
primary category around which all other categories are based. In addition the 
Researcher applied three elements of the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 
1979) (motivated offender, suitable targets and absence of a suitable guardian) to the 
codes in order to identify those codes that might relate to the theory, these codes are 
marked with an asterisk in Appendix 6). The coding process enabled the researcher 
to develop a plot that explains the study in relation to the primary category.  
The three stages of coding identified above resulted in a thematic analysis of the 
qualitative data.  
 
3.9.11 Constant comparison 
 
                                                          
497 Johnny Saldana, ‘The Coding Manual  for Qualitative Research’ (33rd edn Sage,2012) 159 
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There is a requirement for qualitative analysis to examine data carefully and explore 
all its dimensions.498 In analysing the data, the researcher therefore applied the 
grounded theory principle of constant comparison which requires a researcher to code 
each passage of text that is read and then subsequently compare it with all the 
passages that have previously been coded. The researcher found this approach 
beneficial because it enabled her to adopt a consistent approach to coding the data 
while giving her the opportunity to highlight aspects of the data that required alternative 
coding.  
 
 
3.9.12   Inductive approach to coding  
 
As the interviews produced a substantive amount of data and various common 
themes, the researcher coded some data in a bid to evaluate segments relating to 
emergent themes, ideas and perspectives. In coding the data, the researcher adopted 
an inductive approach to analysing the data. Inductive analysis entails a researcher 
being engrossed in details of the data to identify significant categories and aspects of 
a data as opposed to testing hypothesis derived theoretically.499 
 
The researcher applied the qualitative approach of content analysis. In doing so, she 
implemented a four-step process which involved pinpointing the themes, allocating 
codes to the primary themes, categorizing responses under the primary themes and 
assimilating themes and responses into the text of her report.500 Although the 
researcher found the task of analysing the data laborious due to the vast content of 
                                                          
498 Anslem Strauss and Juliet Corbin, ‘Grounded Theory in Practice’ (2nd edn Sage, 1998) 75 
499 Michael Patton, ‘Qualitative Evaluation and Research Method’ (2nd edn Sage, 1990) 40 
500  Ranjit Kumar, ‘Research Methodology: A Step -By- Step Guide to Research Methods’ (4th edn Sage, 2014) 318 
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the data generated from the interviews, she ensured that she repeatedly read through 
the transcripts, recorded themes and searched through data for recurring 
conversations and possible patterns.  The researcher adopted measures such as the 
use of coloured coded schemes, the use of highlighters, interview notes and excel 
spreadsheets. These measures enabled the researcher to discover an analytical 
direction which influenced her integration of the major themes in the data into her 
findings.  
 
The researcher initially, coded the data manually. To this effect, it has been highlighted 
that manual coding enables a researcher to obtain a better literal perspective which 
may not be possible via electronic coding.501  Saldana suggests that a researcher 
might have more control of a given piece of research work if the qualitative data is on 
paper and coding is conducted manually via the use of pencil so to speak. Significantly, 
manual coding gives a researcher the option to hand code qualitative data by using a 
scheme based on colour coding and the cutting and pasting of text segments onto 
note cards.502  
 
On completing the manual coding, the researcher embarked on electronic coding by 
using the “find and replace” tool on the word Microsoft office tool to confirm the themes 
and organise the information generated by the manual coding process.  
 
3.9.13   Ethical considerations  
 
                                                          
501 Johnny Saldana, ‘The coding Manual for Qualitative Research’ (3rd edn Sage, 2012) 22 
502 John Creswell, ‘Research Design’ (3rd edn Sage, 2009) 188 
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There is a requirement for ethical issues in qualitative research to be addressed with 
a view to protecting the interest of those participating in the study as a result of the 
research.503 Halai acknowledges that some of the research ethical issues include 
informed voluntary consent, confidentiality of information shared and anonymity of 
research participants. Against this backdrop, Corti and Blackhouse suggest that 
research should be conducted subject to the participants freely informed consent. 504 
In conducting the study the researcher ensured that her study was guided by ethical 
considerations. In doing so, the researcher protected the interest of the participants by 
implementing four measures. The first step that the researcher took was to obtain the 
approval of the senior management officials of the CPS and the MPS stakeholders 
who provided access to the prosecutors and police officers. Hence, it has been 
emphasised that gaining the consensus of individuals in authority to provide access to 
research participants is a vital ethical consideration for data collection.505 
 
The second measure that the researcher implemented to protect the interest of the 
participants was that on visiting the various research sites, she applied the principle of 
informed consent which has been highlighted as a significant ethical consideration 
which should guide a study.506 In doing so, the researcher notified participants of the 
nature of the study and informed them of their rights to participate in the study on a 
voluntary basis and to refuse to participate. 
  
                                                          
503 Anjum Halai,‘Ethics in Qualitative Research, Issues and Challenges’ (EdQual,2006) <www.assetes.publishing.service.gov/media/57>  
    accessed 21 May 2017 
504 Louise Corti, Annette Day and Gill Blackhouse, ‘Confidentiality and Informed Consent: Issues for Consideration in the Preservation of 
and Provision of Access to Qualitative Data, (2000)  1 Qualitative Social Research 3 
505 John Creswell, ‘Research Design’ (3rd edn Sage, 2009) 90 
506  Louise Corti , Annette Day and Gill Blackhouse, ‘Confidentiality and Informed Consent: Issues for Consideration in the Preservation of 
and provision of Access to Qualitative  Date (2000) 1 Qualitative Social Research 3 
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The third measure that the researcher implemented was to conduct the interview 
anonymously as requested by the participants. In doing so, the researcher respected 
the decisions of the participants not to have tape recorded interviews and recognised 
the concerns that the participants had raised due to the sensitive nature of their jobs.  
The researcher therefore protected the identities of the police officers and Prosecutors 
by using codes when analysing the data. Against this background, it has been 
highlighted that to protect the identity of participants, researchers may be required to 
conceal the identity of participants and places in the dissemination of the study.507 
 
The fourth measure that the researcher applied was to uphold the principle of 
confidentiality by not divulging any information which was obtained during the 
interviews without the permission of the participants. In effect, the researcher ensured 
that she did not reveal any data gathered from the interviews with the law enforcement 
officials either deliberately or accidentally by being cautious at all times to safeguard 
the data.  
 
In addition to the above, the researcher sought and received ethical approval from the 
University Academic School’s Research Committee for the School of Law.  Based on 
the ethical principles, the researcher informed the participants prior to interviewing 
them of the nature of the research, the right to withdraw from the study and the fact 
that the study will be conducted on a voluntary, anonymous and confidential basis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
507 Graham Crown, Sue Heath, Rose Wiles and Vikki Charles, ‘Managing Anonymity and Confidentiality in Social Research’  (2008) 11 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology  5 
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Chapter 4:  Data analysis, findings and result 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the research findings from the interviews with the 63 law 
enforcement officials who took part in the study. The purpose of this study is to analyse 
the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors in London in relation to cyberstalking 
and what they consider to be the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. A 
further objective of the research is to identify the perceptions of police officers and 
prosecutors in London in respect of the factors which frustrate them in the investigation 
and prosecution of cyberstalkers. In so doing, the study will seek to explore the 
following: 
(a) The extent to which lack of knowledge and training hinder the 
investigation and successful prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
(b) How the issues of anonymity and lack of resources can affect the risk 
assessment of both victims and cyberstalkers. 
(c) The effects of evidential difficulties and victim behaviour on the 
investigation and successful prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
The researcher interviewed various London law enforcement officials to obtain a 
cross-section of opinions. The research sample comprised of the following 
participants: 
Owing to the need to ensure total anonymity the participants were allocated 
pseudonyms as below…. 
(a) 25 Police Officers                  PO (Numbers 1-25) 
(b)  30 Crown Prosecutors                 PRO (Numbers 1-30) 
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(c) 1 UK Member of Parliament               MEP (MEP)  
(d) 1 UK Parliamentary Research Assistant 
(e) I UK Probation Official                         PROB 
(f) 1 Northern Ireland Government Adviser 
 
4.2   The data  
 
The study produced a large quantity of data due to the number of interviews that were 
conducted. The quantity of the data is justifiable because the data provided findings 
which are relevant to the research objectives. Further, the data reinforced commonly 
held views based on which the emergent themes were identified. 
 
The interviews were transcribed using Saldana’s coding method which required the 
researcher to identify themes by looking for word repetitions, looking for key-words-in 
texts, reading unmarked texts, and cutting up and sorting the transcripts.508Saldana 
highlights that coding is a cyclical process.509  Specifically, the researcher applied 
Saldana’s cyclical approach to coding the research data based on five cycles of 
coding.  
 
In addition to interviewing 25 police officers and 30 Prosecutors, the researcher 
interviewed 4 other UK law enforcement officials. These interviews produced 
additional data which were relevant to the study. The additional interviews enabled the 
participants to answer the researcher’s questions from the perspectives of a Member 
                                                          
508 Gerry Ryan and Russel Bernard, ‘Techniques To Identify Themes, Field Works’ (NERSP, 2003) 
<www.nerps.osg.ufl.edu/~urufus/documents/ryan > accessed 20 May 2017 
509 Johnny Saldana, The Coding Manual For Qualitative Research (3rd edn ,Sage 20012) 45 
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of Parliament, parliamentary research assistant, probation officer and government 
policy adviser. 
 
This data analysis chapter examines the backgrounds and experiences of the 
participants. The chapter also, explores the perceptions of the participants on what 
constitutes the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments from cyberstalking on the internet. Additionally, this chapter discusses the 
perceptions of police officers and prosecutors in London on the perceived challenges 
that hinder police officers and prosecutors from risk assessing victims of cyberstalking. 
Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on how 
lack of legislative difficulties, lack of knowledge, training and resources, risk 
assessment difficulties, evidential difficulties and victim behaviour frustrate police 
officers and prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
 
4.2. 1.The background and experience of the London police officers 
 
Twenty-five police officers were interviewed for the research study. The police officers 
consisted of an assistant chief constable, 3 detective sergeants, a chief inspector, 15 
detective constables and 5 police constables. The participants acquired the relevant 
experience while working in different departments of the MPS. The participants worked 
in various offices such as the department of the assistant chief constable, community 
safety unit, domestic violence unit, Police Central e- Crime unit, the extradition unit of 
New Scotland Yard and the Serious Organised Crime Agency. The research 
participants had a range of experiences pertaining to domestic violence cyberstalking, 
celebrity cyberstalking, online grooming, cyberstalking of a religious leader, 
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cyberstalking of a high ranking official and cyberstalking of strangers. The police 
officers provided useful data from a law enforcement perspective. 
 
The researcher travelled to various offices in the UK to conduct the interviews. The 
offices included the police headquarters in Manchester, the Senior Organised Crime 
Unit and the Police Central Cyber e-Crime Unit. Additionally, the researcher travelled 
to New Scotland Yard, Acton and Kilburn police stations in London to conduct the 
interviews. The researcher conducted the interviews over a twelve month period. 
 
The researcher asked the participants if they had any experience of investigating and 
prosecuting cyberstalkers. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, depict the ranges of 
responses of the police officers. Of the 25 police officers, 15 had the experience of 
investigating cyberstalking cases involving strangers, 1 police officer had the 
experience of investigating a case involving online grooming and 7 of the police 
officers had the experience of investigating cases involving domestic violence. 
Additionally, 1 police officer had the experience of investigating cases involving a 
celebrity and another police officer had no experience of investigating a cyberstalking 
case.  The respondent who had no experience of investigating a cyberstalking case 
however, confirmed that he had investigated fraud cases which had been committed 
digitally. 
 
Table 4.1 below illustrates the various experiences of the police officers. Table 1 
indicates that a majority of the police officers which is 60% out of 100% of the police 
officers had the experience of investigating cases involving strangers as opposed to 
28% out of 100% of the police sample which had the experience of investigating 
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cyberstalking cases that were linked to domestic violence. The findings further suggest 
that some cyberstalking cases involve domestic violence victims. 
Table 4.1: Police officers experience of Cyberstalking by type  
 
Experience type Frequency Percentage of Sample  
Cyberstalking  15 60 
Online grooming  1 4 
Domestic violence  7 28 
Celebrity  1 4 
No Experience 1 4 
Total 25 100 
 
The data in Table 4.1 further illustrate that 1 out of 25 police officers had the 
experience of investigating cases relating to online grooming. This demonstrates that 
online grooming can involve elements of cyberstalking. This is not surprising given 
that cyberstalking and online grooming both involve the harassment of victims via 
information and communication technology. The data in Table 4.1 additionally 
indicates that 1 out of 25 police officers had no experience of investigating cases on 
cyberstalking. 
 
Out of the 25 police officers, 1  revealed that  he did not prosecute cyberstalkers who 
disseminated offensive messages to colleagues and former partners because, he 
gave the culprits harassment warnings instead. The police officer stated that such 
perpetrators were let - off on those occasions on the condition that they do not harass 
the victims again. The police officer also indicated that such perpetrators were warned 
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that they would be formally prosecuted if they re-offend. Importantly, the police officer 
stated that he gave cyberstalkers harassment warnings to give them another chance.  
Out of the 25 police officers, 2 others also discussed penalising cyberstalkers by giving 
them harassment warning notices.  This demonstrates that depending on the facts of 
certain cases, police officers may decide to divert cases from the court system by 
sanctioning cyberstalkers through harassment warnings.510  
4.2.2: The background and experience of the London prosecutors  
 
In addition to police officers, the researcher interviewed 30 prosecutors. The 
prosecutors comprised of participants who work in various departments of the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) which include the Magistrates’ Court, the Crown Court 
department, the serious casework department and the rape and serious sexual 
offences department. The prosecutors consisted of Magistrates’ Court prosecutors, 
Crown Court prosecutors, rape specialists, higher court advocates and borough crown 
prosecutors. The borough crown prosecutors were in senior managerial positions. The 
prosecutors provided useful data from a managerial perspective given their legal 
backgrounds and experiences. 
 
The researcher recruited diverse participants because there were no designated 
specialist cyberstalking prosecutors at the time of the study. The prosecutors had 
therefore acquired varied experiences of prosecuting cases involving aspects of 
cyberstalking in the general course of their jobs while working at various CPS offices. 
                                                          
510 Harassment warnings are usually given by police officers to suspects when a single act is alleged to have occurred in a bid to notify a 
suspect that his act has caused harassment and to warn the individuals that if a subsequent act is reported, the individual may be arrested and 
charged for the offence of harassment. Harassment warnings are not convictions or cautions 
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The researcher interviewed the prosecutors during the second and third years of the 
study.  
 
The researcher conducted the interviews while based at Isleworth Crown Court as a 
para legal officer. Due to the fact that there was no specialist cyberstalking department 
at the time of the study, the researcher interviewed a varied sample of prosecutors in 
a bid to obtain a cross section of views. As a result, the researcher travelled to the 
different CPS offices in Southwark, Croydon, London Bridge and Pimlico to interview 
the Prosecutors. Additionally, the researcher visited Isleworth, Snaresbrook and Inner 
London Crown Courts respectively to interview three higher court advocates. The 
higher court advocates are prosecutors who have been granted extended advocacy 
rights to present cases in the crown courts.  
 
Due to the fact that there is no specific legislation in the UK on cyberstalking, most of 
the participants had reviewed the related cases of harassment, which encapsulates 
aspects of cyberstalking. The varied experiences of the prosecutors just like the 
experiences of the police officers were significant because different categories of 
cyberstalking victims were identified from the resulting data.  
 
The data in Table 4.2 indicate that a majority of the participants (77% out of 100%) 
prosecutors had the experience of investigating cases involving the cyberstalking of 
strangers. The data in Table 4.2 further illustrate that a minority of the prosecutors, (1 
out of 30 prosecutors to be precise), had the experience of investigating a fraud case 
involving an aspect of cyberstalking. In addition, the data in Table 4.2 indicate that 4 
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out of 30 prosecutors had experience of prosecuting cyberstalking cases involving 
domestic violence. 
 
The data in Table 4.2 further reveal that a majority of the prosecutors had the 
experience of investigating cyberstalking cases as opposed to a minority of the sample 
which had the experience of investigating cases involving celebrities. This suggests 
that like the police officers, the sample of prosecutors had a wide range of experiences. 
The findings further reveal that there are similarities in the experiences of the police 
offices and the prosecutors. In particular, the participants in both samples had more 
experience of investigating cyberstalking cases involving strangers in comparison to 
cases involving former partners. A high percentage of the sample had investigated 
cyberstalking cases involving strangers and domestic violence.  
 
The data in Table 4.2 show that in congruence with the experience of the Police 
officers the majority, (77% out of 100%), of the sample of prosecutors had the 
experience of investigating cases on cyberstalking involving strangers in comparison 
to just 7% out of 100% of the sample of prosecutors which had the experience of 
investigating cases involving celebrities.  
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Table 4.2: Prosecutor’s experience of Cyberstalking by type 
 
 
  Experience type 
 
Frequency 
 
Percentage of sample 
Cyberstalking of strangers 23 77 
Domestic Violence  4 13 
Celebrity  2 7 
Fraud 1 3 
Total 30 100 
 
 
4.2.3 The background and experience type of the UK law enforcement officials 
 
To obtain the perspective of a government official on the research topic, the researcher 
visited Portcullis House in Westminster to interview a Member of Parliament and a 
parliamentary research assistant. The participants provided insights on the research 
topic from the perspective of government officials tasked with reviewing the 
effectiveness of the stalking legislation in the UK.  
 
To obtain the views of other criminal justice officials, the researcher interviewed a 
senior UK chief executive of the national probation office who had assisted the 
government in implementing legislation on stalking in the UK. The interviewee 
provided an insight on the research topic from the perspective of the probation service. 
 
In addition to the above, the researcher travelled to Northern Ireland to interview a 
government policy adviser with a view to obtaining their perspective on the best 
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working practices. The interviewee was responsible for advising the Northern Ireland 
government on the enactment of legislation to regulate new criminal behaviours. The 
interviewee provided useful comparative data given that stalking is not yet a specific, 
criminal offence in Northern Ireland. The participant informed the researcher that in 
Northern Ireland due to political tensions in the country at the time of the study, the 
focus on cybercrime for government officials was in relation to terrorism. 
The data in Table 4.3 indicate that 3 out of 4 UK law enforcement officials had 
experience of dealing with cases involving harassment. The data in Table 4.3 further 
indicate that 1 UK law enforcement official had the experience of dealing with cases 
involving cyberstalking. It should be noted that at the time of the study, the term 
harassment connoted either face to face stalking or cyberstalking and was at times, 
used interchangeably.  
 
 
Table4. 3: Government Official’s Experience of Cyberstalking by type  
 
UK Law 
Enforcement 
Officials 
Experience Type Frequency Percentage of 
Sample 
Member of 
Parliament 
 
Harassment 
1  
25 
Research 
Assistant 
 
Harassment 
1  
25 
 
Probation Official 
 
Cyberstalking 
1  
25 
Northern Ireland 
Official 
 
Harassment 
1  
25 
Total  4 100 
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The data in Table 4.3 depict the various backgrounds of the 4 UK law enforcement 
officials. The data illustrate that 2 out of 4 law enforcement officials were affiliated with 
Parliament at the time of the study and that 1 of the law enforcement officials was a 
probation official who was an executive official of the UK national probation agency at 
the time of the study. 
 
4.2 Data from interview transcripts of the prosecutors and police officers-
significant themes 
 
The data from the interview transcripts were analysed using the coding methods 
previously described. The analysis produced several main themes. The views of the 
participants have been paraphrased in this chapter to support the themes. The themes 
identify some of the perceptions of London police officers and prosecutors on 
cyberstalking and the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. Most of the 
participants highlighted several factors which distinguish rudeness, abuse and 
unpleasant comments from cyberstalking. The themes also reveal the issues that 
frustrate London police officers and prosecutors in the investigation and successful 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
 
The seven  main themes that emerged  are ‘threshold of acceptable online behaviour’, 
‘legislation’, ‘lack of training and knowledge’, ‘lack of resources’, ‘risk assessment 
challenges’, ‘evidential challenges’ and ‘victim behaviour’. The findings are discussed 
in relation to the main themes. The themes presented in this chapter are validated by 
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extracts from the data. The participants who took part in the study were given 
participant codes in order to provide anonymity and retain confidentiality. 
    
4.2.1 Theme 1: Threshold of acceptable online behaviour 
 
As previously shown, the participants had various experiences of investigating and 
prosecuting cyberstalkers in both domestic violence and non-domestic violence cases. 
Given the varied experiences of the participants with different types of cyberstalking, 
the majority of the participants discussed the thresholds for distinguishing routine 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking. The 
majority of the participants stressed that they perceived there to be various thresholds 
for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking.  
 
The findings of this study reveal that all the police officers and 96% of the prosecutors 
shared the perception that various factors ought to be considered when determining 
the threshold for distinguishing between rude, abusive and unpleasant comments on 
the internet and cyberstalking. Further, the findings as contained in Tables 4.4 and 
4.5, reveal that the police officers and prosecutors identified between 9 and 11 
different factors which they perceive distinguish rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking.   
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Table 4.4: Perceptions of prosecutors on the threshold for distinguishing 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
Cyberstalking: 
 
Threshold Number  of  prosecutors Percentage of sample of  
prosecutors 
Subjective view of the 
victim  
4 13 
Objective Test 2 7 
Content of messages 3 10 
Intention of cyberstalker 3 10 
Impact on victims 4 13 
Reaction of  victims 1 3 
Statutory definition  3 10 
Duration of the conduct 4 13 
Cyberstalker’s awareness  
of the impact on victims 
1 3 
Gravity of  the offence` 2 7 
Vulnerability of victim  2 7 
Total 29 96 
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Table 4.5: Perceptions of police officers on the threshold for distinguishing 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
Cyberstalking: 
 
Threshold Number of  police 
officers 
Percentage of Sample 
of police officers 
Subjective view of the 
victim  
7 28 
Objective Test  1 4 
Facts of a case and 
motives of  the 
Cyberstalker 
1 4 
Impact on the victim 3 12 
Statutory definition  3 12 
Intention of the 
Cyberstalker 
3 12 
Duration of the conduct 5 20 
Size of the electronic 
platform that was used to 
disseminate messages 
1 4 
Prior relationship with the 
victim                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
1 4 
Total 25 100 
 
 
The participants acknowledged that the threshold depends on the Subjective Test as 
defined in Chapter 2 (section 2.2).  Hence PO20 said “it depends on how the message 
was perceived by the recipient”. PRO22 echoed the view of PO20 that the threshold 
for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking is the Subjective Test. Therefore, in his extract, PRO22 emphasised that 
not all individuals might be bothered by the same offensive messages of a 
cyberstalker; 
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PRO22: “The test is subjective. For example, if you put 12 people in a room 
and put up offensive comments about them from a cyberstalker, 6 might be 
bothered and 6 might not be bothered by the same offensive messages”. 
 
 
PRO17 shared the perception of PO20 and PRO22 that the threshold will depend on 
the Subjective Test.   Therefore, PO17 stated that the threshold for distinguishing 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking is “the 
victim’s perception”.  
Int: What in your opinion is the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and 
unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking? 
      
PRO17: “It boils down to the victim’s perception. Does the victim feel the 
conduct is causing her alarm? You have to take the victim’s account or reaction 
into play. It is a Subjective Test. would the victim find the conduct offensive?” 
 
 
Similarly, the participants perceived the reaction of victims to be the threshold. 
Hence, PO18 echoed the views of PRO17, PO20 and PRO22. Hence PRO18 said in 
the last statement of his extract, “I think it depends on the victim”.  
 
PO18: “I think it depends on the victim. I investigated a case which involved a 
cyberstalker who set up as negative fan mail page about the victim. The victim 
in this case was not particularly bothered by the negative comments and only 
wanted the cyberstalker to be stopped. I had another case which started off as 
an anonymous case and then developed into a personal attack. The 
cyberstalker in this case hacked into the victim’s computer and posted false 
malicious messages about the victim online and on Facebook. The victim in this 
case was severely affected by the actions of the cyberstalker unlike the 
previous case that I dealt with. So as you see, it depends on the individual”. 
 
Similarly, the participants shared the perception that the threshold will depend on the 
impact of the behaviour on the health of victims. Hence, PROB1 expressed the view 
that the question to be asked in determining the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, 
abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking is whether the 
victim was psychologically damaged.  PROB1 indicated in his extract that it will also 
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have to be ascertained “if the harassment has caused the victim to change her normal 
routine”;  
PROB1: “It depends on the impact on the victim. Is the victim damaged 
psychologically? If the harassment has caused the victim to change her normal 
routine then this is significant. For example, there was a cyberstalking case that 
resulted in the victim suffering from anorexia. The effect of the conduct indicates 
a progression from rudeness and unpleasant comments to outright 
cyberstalking”. 
 
 
While discussing the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking, a minority of the participants made a 
distinction between cyberstalking victimisation in relation to celebrities and 
cyberstalking victimisation in relation to the general the public. In doing so, the 
participants attributed the threshold to “where an individual sits with society” (PO2) 
and “people in the limelight” (PO12). 
 
Remarkably, PO2 asserted that celebrities have an ulterior motive for reporting 
cyberstalking victimisation which might lead to a false public expectation. PO2’s 
extract below echoes the view of the participants;  
 
PO2: “It depends on the impact on the victim. An individual may regard an 
online abuse or harassment as ‘water off a duck’s back’ whereas another 
individual may be distressed by the same online abuse or harassment and will 
contact the police as a result.  It also depends on where an individual sits with 
society”.  
 
Int: Follow-up Question: What do you mean by it also depends on where an 
individual sits with society? 
 
PO2: “Victims that have high positions or that are celebrities report such 
incidents because they expect that it will be investigated because of their 
standing in society. They also do so because they want to be seen taking a 
stand against the conduct. This gives a false expectation to victims who are 
part of the general public because they will not receive the same treatment 
when they approach the police for help after  being subjected to the same online 
abuse that has been experienced by the celebrity”. It was not evident from the 
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interview why the police made this point. Suffice it say that the assumption that 
could be made is that a victim’s social or societal standing may affect how a 
cyberstalking incident is investigated.  
 
While discussing the threshold, some of the participants shared the perception that “it 
is a matter of intent and depends on the motives of the cyberstalker” (PO23).  However 
in contrast, PO12 in his extract, expressed the view that because cyberstalking is not 
done face to face, “a cyberstalker may be unaware of the impact that his conduct has 
on a victim”;  
 
 
PO12: “There is the possibility that the cyberstalker committed the malicious 
acts without the intention of harassing the victims or without the knowledge that 
the victims have perceived the conduct as harassment. So, under the definition 
of cyberstalking, how can someone be accused of committing a malicious act 
when he is not aware of how the act is perceived by the recipient?  In my view 
a cyberstalker may be unaware of the impact that his conduct has on a victim 
because unlike face to face stalking, it is hard to judge the immediate reaction 
of the victim or to access the impact that a conduct might have on a victim in 
the virtual world”. 
 
PRO15 questioned how a person can be accused of committing a malicious act when 
“he lacks the requisite intent and is therefore, unaware of the impact that his conduct 
has on a victim”. The researcher however argues that a cyberstalker’s lack of 
awareness of the impact of his conduct on victims, should not constitute a defence for 
his criminal actions;  
 
Like PO12’s, PO19 said that a cyberstalker “may be unaware of the effect of his 
actions on victims because there is no face to face interaction”. Also, PO25 said that 
“cyberstalkers may lack knowledge that their acts are perceived as harassment by 
victims”.  
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Furthermore, PO8’s extract echoed the perceptions of the participants that there is a 
possibility that cyberstalkers commit malicious acts without the intention of harassing 
victims. 
    . 
PO8: “In the cases involving cyberstalking, the perpetrator may not have the 
intention to cause alarm or distress. Whereas in cases involving rudeness, 
abuse or unpleasant comments on the internet, the perpetrators may have the 
specific intention of offending the perpetrator.  Cyberstalking is unlike face to 
face stalking where the stalker can immediately tell from the body language of 
the victim that the victim has been offended. In cyberstalking cases, it is not 
easy for one to make that distinction because the cyberstalker is hiding his or 
her identity behind a computer gadget and cannot physically see how the victim 
is being affected by their actions”. 
 
 
The above extract suggests that the participants considered the issue of cyberstalking 
victimisation from the perspective of the cyberstalkers who were perceived as unable 
to assess the impact of their conduct on victims. 
 
The participants also revealed that the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse 
and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking, will depend on the 
effects of cyberstalking on victims.  Hence, PRO24 in his extract, said that the 
threshold depends on “if the comments cause alarm or distress”; 
 
PRO24: “Any abuse, rudeness and unpleasant comments on the 
internet will be equivalent to cyberstalking if the comments cause 
alarm or distress”. 
 
 
PRO21’s extract which echoed the views of the other participants, and further serves 
to illustrate this point;   
 
PRO21: “I think that there is a fine line between something deemed rude and a 
message that is perceived to be cyberstalking. In my view, if one is alarmed by 
198 
 
it and it causes alarm or distress, it is an abusive conduct. The threshold 
depends on the perception of the person on the receiving end”. 
 
While discussing the threshold, an important theme that emerged from the accounts 
of the participants is that an individual may be upset by a cyberstalking incident and 
another person may choose to ignore it. Hence, PO10 said “a person might find a 
conduct offensive and another person will not”.  Likewise, PRO20 remarked “an act 
that is construed as harassment by one victim may be considered as nuisance by 
another victim and trivialized”. Similarly, PRO27 expressed the view that the threshold 
depends on “how people choose to react”. Notably, PRO27 suggested that;  
 
PRO27: “The threshold for distinguishing between rudeness and cyberstalking 
depends on individuals and how they choose to react.  Some people choose to 
do nothing and wait. The level of harassment is crucial. Sometimes, the best 
way is not to react as cyberstalkers want to provoke a reaction. It all depends 
on the circumstances of the victim”.   
 
In contrast to the above views, many of the participants believed that the threshold for 
distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking is the ‘Objective Test’ or ‘Reasonable Person Test’. These tests ask if 
an ordinary person in the victim’s position would have reacted in the same manner as 
the victim. Consequently, PO6 in discussing the threshold, questioned whether “a 
reasonable person in the victim’s position will be offended”. Worryingly, PO6 
expressed the view that victims have the option of switching their computers off to 
avoid being bothered by cyberstalkers; 
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PO6: “The Reasonable Person Test. The question to be asked is would a 
reasonable person in the victim’s position be offended? If for example I am sent 
an abusive message online my personal individual reaction will be to turn off 
my computer or stop using the computer entirely if needed. Other people who 
receive the same abusive message may perhaps, be sensitive and seek help 
of the police to get to the bottom of it”. 
 
Like PO6, PO23 stated that the threshold has to “pass the Reasonable Person Test”.   
The Objective Test is the same as the Reasonable Person Test. PRO19 agreed with 
PO6 and PO23 that the threshold will depend on the Objective Test. However, PRO19 
highlighted that “there should be a respect of the right to freedom of expression as 
long as the criminal threshold is not passed”. 
 
             
PRO19: “I think you have to have an objective approach to it. There has to be 
an impartial analysis of the situation as some people may take it personally and 
others are not bothered. Because the internet is full of people with opinions, it 
sets the threshold of when we prosecute very high. There should be respect of 
the right to freedom of expression as long as the criminal threshold is not 
passed”. 
 
The criminal threshold for stalking is highlighted under S2A of the PHA (1997) and 
S4A of the PHA (1997). Section 2A of the PHA defines the offence of stalking as 
pursuing a course of conduct which amounts to harassment and stalking.511  Section 
4A of the PHA (1997) creates the offence of stalking involving fear of violence or 
serious alarm or distress. The offences were previously discussed in Chapter 2, 
sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 respectively.  The criminal threshold is defined by the relevant 
legislation and will therefore be met once either of the above highlighted offences are 
committed.   
                                                          
511 A course of conduct is the same as defined under section 7 of the PHA 1997 and referred to elsewhere in this guidance 
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Like PO6, P019 and PRO23, PRO25 shared the perception that the Reasonable 
Person Test will be used to distinguish between rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet and cyberstalking. However, PRO25 added that he would 
also, take on board the views of victims.  
 
PRO25: “I would consider the views of the victim together with some form of 
Objective Test. We need to take on board the views of the victims”.  
 
 
From a legal perspective, whilst discussing the threshold in relation to the culpability 
of mentally ill cyber stalkers, PRO28 cited the case of R v Colohan.512  The principle 
established in the case of R v Colohan suggests that it may be difficult for cyber stalker 
to evade liability on the grounds of a mental health condition. 
 
PRO28:  “In the case of Colohan, the defendant appealed against his conviction 
for harassment on the grounds that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. 
However, the court held that the mental health condition of the defendant was 
irrelevant and not a defence because an objective test had to be applied when 
determining whether the actions of a mentally ill individual constitutes 
harassment because the question that ought to be asked is whether a 
reasonable person would think that the actions of the individual amounted to 
harassment.” 
 
 
In contrast to the participants who shared the perception that the threshold will depend 
on either the subjective or the reasonable persons test, PRO29 said “I am not sure if 
the Objective Test or the Subjective Test should be applied”. 
Please note the Reasonable Person Test is discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.3.5.   
                                                          
512 [2001] All.ER 230 
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 Notably, while discussing the threshold and the culpability of cyberstalkers from a 
legal perspective, PRO29 said that cyberstalkers were legally required to take their 
victims as they found them. This perception implies that that cyberstalkers will be held 
responsible for the impact of their behaviour on victims regardless of whether any 
adverse effects were foreseen:  
 
PRO29: “In the case of R v Blaue, the principle of take your victim as you find
 him was established.  It does not matter that another person would have shaken 
the cyberstalking behaviour off. You see I am not sure if the Objective Test or 
the Subjective Test should be applied. I say take your victim as you find him”.  
 
Like PRO29, PO15 discussed the vulnerability of victims. Hence, PO15 remarked 
“you will have to ask whether the cyberstalker sought a vulnerable victim”. 
       
PO15: “The perception of the person on the receiving end is crucial. 
Others will argue in assault allegation take your victim as you find him. 
You will have to check whether the defendant sought out a vulnerable 
victim”    
 
From the outset of the study, it was evident that given their prosecutorial backgrounds, 
the prosecutors who took part in the study would identify the statutory provisions as 
the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the 
internet from cyberstalking. Consequently, PR014 said that the threshold will depend 
on “whether the behaviour is legally defined”. When asked why he held this view 
PRO14 explained that when a conduct is defined in law, it is perceived to be serious.  
In expressing this view in his extract, PRO14 made a distinction between a racial 
incident which is based on “what the victim perceived” and cyberstalking which is 
“based on the legal definition of the behaviour”; 
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PRO14:  “It has to be legally defined. It is not all about the subjective 
perspective. It has to be what about the law says that can count regardless of 
whether I think that it is rude or cyberstalking. When defined in law, the conduct 
prohibited in law will be viewed as serious. In some of the cases like racial 
harassment the conduct is defined on a subjective basis. A racial incident is 
subjective. An incident can be racial to me but not to you. It is based on what 
the victim thinks or perceives at that point in time but for harassment and 
cyberstalking cases the threshold should be defined by law.” 
 
In agreement with PRO14, PRO27 shared the perception that the threshold will 
depend on the wording of the statute. PRO4 however, identified when a 
cyberstalking case has an aggravating factor;  
           
PRO27: It is a matter of referring back to the wording of the statute. If the 
conduct is done on more than one occasion, it will amount to stalking and 
cyberstalking as the case may be. When the cyberstalker has been put on 
notice that his unwanted conduct is upsetting the victim and he still carries on, 
then the aggravating factor occurs where the cyberstalker ignores the personal 
feelings of the victim and still carries on with the conduct. 
 
Similarly, PRO16 shared the perception that the threshold “will depend on the 
definition of the terms of the Act; 
 
PRO16: “Multiple comment crosses the line of being harassment. It will depend 
on the definition of the terms of the Act. It will be the cause of conduct. The test 
is that it must have occurred on more than one occasion”.  
 
Likewise, PRO11 shared the perception that the threshold will depend on statutory 
provisions. Hence PRO11’s extract echoes the views of the other participants; 
 
 
 
PO11: “The intensity and duration of the activities is the dividing line. This is 
provided for in the legislation as stalking has to be a course of conduct which 
means that by law, it has to be done on more than one occasion. If it is a one 
off act, the Malicious Communications Act will be applicable but if it is an intense 
long term act, then the Protection from Harassment Act will apply”. 
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Similarly, PRO21 shared the perceptions that the threshold for distinguishing 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking is the 
“the legislation” in addition to the “reaction of victims”; 
 
PRO21: “I think it all depends the perception of each individual. The focus 
should be each individuals’ reaction. The criteria for cyberstalking will be met 
when aspects of the legislation has been satisfied”. 
 
While discussing the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking, many of the participants stressed that it 
will be determined by the frequency of events as opposed to the nature of the 
comments. Hence PRO3 remarked “we need to look at the frequency rather than the 
nature of comments”. PRO3’s extract echoes the views of many of the participants.  
 
             
PRO3:  “Stalking is a pattern of events and so we need to look at the 
frequency rather than the nature of comments to distinguish it from rudeness, 
abuse and unpleasant comments”.  
 
 
 
PRO7 shared the perception of PRO14 and PRO3 that the threshold depends on the 
duration of the behaviour; “the threshold depends on if there is a “repetition of the 
conduct” (PRO7). Similarly, PO13 stated that the threshold depends on whether the 
activity of a cyberstalker “goes over a couple of messages and is a continued action”. 
Likewise. PO16 said the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking depends on if the incident occurred on 
“more than one occasion”.  
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PO20 in his extract, echoed the views of PRO14, PRO3 and PRO7. Particularly, PO20 
made a distinction between “persistent incidents” and a “one off comment”;  
  
 
PO20: “I think for it to be cyberstalking, it has to involve persistent incidents as 
opposed to a one off comment. It has to be a repeated conduct over a period 
of time and not a one off rudeness”. 
 
Like PO20, PO25 made a distinction between “repetitive behaviours” and “isolated 
incidents”; 
 
             
PO25: “The offence will have to be one that was done on more than one 
occasion. Their cyberstalking behaviour has to be repetitive and not just an 
isolated incident. …It has to be done over a given period or length of time for 
it to amount to a cyberstalking incident”. 
 
 
Akin to PO25, PRO13 in his extract, expressed the view that the threshold will depend 
on whether the “conduct is repeated”. However, PRO13 added that it depends on 
whether there exists “a clear indication that the conduct is unwanted”. Similarly, 
PRO12 expressed the view that the threshold depends on if the victim asked the 
cyberstalker to stop. However, PRO12 also added that additional factors to be 
considered are the content of the messages and the frequency of the conduct; 
 
 
PRO12:  “It is how the victim and the other people perceive it. If the defendant 
is rude, persistent and offensive then it becomes cyberstalking. It also depends 
on if the victim asked the cyberstalker to stop. It will still be considered 
cyberstalking even if the messages are not rude especially if it is done in public. 
I know that people say that if a rude message is posted online, the recipient 
should look not look at it but my argument is that you have to look at the content 
of the message to know the threat level in case it escalates to more serious 
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actions like threat to life.  If you are a victim, it is not as simple as saying do not 
look at the messages. She might be able to gain a hint of future threats”. 
 
 
In agreement with PO12, other participants believed that the contents of the messages 
sent by cyberstalkers was the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and 
unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking. Hence, they said the 
threshold depends on “if the messages are sinister” (PO4) and “insulting” (PO7). 
 
 
While discussing the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking, PRO29 expressed the view that if there 
is “escalation in the abuse” such behaviours will constitute cyberstalking. 
Likewise, PRO22 stated that the threshold will depend on if the cyberstalking 
behaviour “crossed the line”. Notably, PRO22 in his extract, equated crossing the line 
to when comments “become menacing”; 
 
 
PRO22: “The law says that the line is crossed when it becomes menacing. In 
such instances, we need to balance the right to freedom of speech against 
causing alarm, distress or harassment. That is where the line is drawn. In one 
case that I reviewed, a female harassed the ex and sent emails, letters and stuff 
on Facebook. When the ignored her, she took it to another level calling him a 
paedophile and then sent text messages begging him to take her back. It was 
not a criminal activity when she was sending messages begging to get back 
with him until she realized that he was not interested. She enlisted the help of 
her friend to print out the letter and hand it out to everyone in the community 
that he was a paedophile. She was convicted and her friend was charged with 
joint enterprises and harassment by defamatory letters in the letter boxes of 
neighbours”.  
 
Like PRO22, PRO26 expressed a shared perception that the threshold will be 
dependent upon whether the conduct of a cyberstalker is “grossly offensive”.  
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However, both PRO22 and PRO26 raised the issue of the right to freedom of speech 
and expression when discussing the threshold; 
 
PRO26: “The test is that it has to be grossly offensive. We had a case where 
the defendant was alleged to have posted comments on Facebook saying that 
the victim was a slag. There was a huge debate surrounding this case because 
people said no as you have to protect the freedom of speech and expression. 
The standard is high for that reason”. 
 
Similarly, PO23 explained that “the problem is that there is a fine line between freedom 
of speech and the right to online privacy in an online medium that is designed to have 
worldwide publication”. 
 
Some of the participants shared the perception that the threshold for distinguishing 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking were 
linked to the “the facts of the case” (PO15) and the “size of the electronic platform that 
was used to disseminate messages” (PO20).  Similarly, PO17 asserts that the type of 
the electronic platform and the size of the audience were relevant.  PO17 however, 
made a distinction between messages that have been posted on a private forum and 
messages that have been posted on a public forum;  
 
PO17:  “If the malicious message was posted on a private forum there 
is no problem as such because only a limited number of people will view 
it but if the message is posted on a public forum then there would be a 
problem because there will be a much wider audience”. 
 
The researcher does not agree with PO17’s stance because a victim may still be 
subjected to abuse at the hands or a cyberstalker even if offensive messages are 
posted on a private forum.  Supporting this point, PO2 while discussing the threshold, 
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highlighted that the problem with online harassment is that “there is a level of 
permanence attached to the messages”. 
 
While discussing the threshold, there was consensus among the participants that 
cyberstalking is not taken seriously because it is carried out online. From a 
governmental perspective, MEP therefore said “there needs to be a change in the 
cultural attitudes of people to the offence. People do not recognize the seriousness of 
the offence”. 
 
Similarly, PO8 stressed that “law enforcement agencies should begin to take the 
offence seriously given the devastating effects it has on victim”. In the following 
interview sequence PO13 echoed the views of MEP and PO8 in explaining why 
cyberstalking is not perceived to be as serious as face to face stalking; 
 
 
Int: What in your opinion, are the issues with cyberstalking that need to be 
addressed? 
 
PO13: “I think it is not deemed to be as serious as face to face stalking or 
harassment”. 
 
Int: In your opinion, why do you think that is the case? 
 
PO13: “There is no contact with the victim. We tend to look at the potential 
damage to victims when investigating such cases”. 
 
Int: Would it be right to infer that such a balancing exercise tends to reveal 
that such cyberstalking cases complained of are not deemed to be serious in 
your opinion? 
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PO13: “That’s right. It all depends on if there is a potential risk to the victim. If 
not…….With face to face stalking the risks are obvious but with cyberstalking, 
we have to identify the risk……It is not that straightforward”. 
 
Like PO13, PRO20 expressed the view that cyberstalking is not considered a serious 
offence.  Notably, PR20’s extract echoes the frustration of the participants and 
additionally highlights why cyberstalking should be regarded as a serious offence: 
 
Int: What in your opinion are the issues with cyberstalking that need to be 
addressed? 
          
 
PRO20: “The way that it is regarded by people generally. Not serious enough. 
The perception needs to change in my view because the conduct can be 
distressing for victims”.   
 
It is important to note that whilst discussing the threshold, a minority of the participants 
referred to cyberstalking incidents which are committed as part of other offences. 
Hence, PO7 referred to “homophobic and racist cyberstalking offences”; 
 
             
PO7: “It all depends on what was said and the length of time that the conduct 
spanned over. Single comments can be ignored. Homophobic and racist puts 
it into a different bracket”. 
 
 
Comparably, a minority of the participants shared the perception that a threshold for 
distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking cannot be identified because cyberstalking is not a serious offence in 
comparison to other offences. Therefore, from a moral perspective, PO17 suggested 
that cyberstalking cannot be compared to offences such as selling drugs to children. 
PO17 however, acknowledged that the related offence of “cyberbullying leads to 
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suicide among victims and is widespread among children because children have easy 
access to social media”; 
 
Int: What criminal category will cyberstalking be prosecuted under? 
        
PO17:  “If you are talking of trolling, it is distasteful and causes lot of distress 
on the victim. Although the victim impact is severe you cannot compare it to 
someone selling drugs to kids. Morality issues and the impact of a conduct on 
the victims make the selling of drugs to kids more serious than cyberstalking or 
posting malicious messages online”.  
 
 
 
The participants expressed frustration that cyberstalking is considered to be less 
serious in comparison to other offences despite the fact that it results in the death of 
victims. Hence, PRO10’s extract echoed the frustrations of the participants; 
 
Int: What suggestions do you have to assist the cross jurisdictional 
investigation of cyberstalkers? 
                           
PRO10: “Most people think that theft, murder, and rape are inappropriate, 
serious, offences. However, cyberstalking does not evoke the same 
condemnation even tough offenders end up murdering victims in some cases.  
I suspect that over the years, the behaviour will receive universal 
condemnation”. 
 
 
PRO18 reiterated the views of the participants that cyberstalking is not perceived as 
a serious offence in comparison to face to face stalking. PRO18 highlighted that the 
there is a misconception that cyberstalking has a lesser impact on victims in 
comparison to face to face stalking; 
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PRO18: “I do not think that cyberstalking is given the same attention as face to 
face stalking on a one to one level. One to one physical level, face to face 
stalking is perceived to have a greater impact on the victim whereas, 
cyberstalking on a one to one level is perceived to have a less significant impact 
on victims. This is a totally wrong perception to hold. These are the issues with 
the definition of cyberstalking that need to be addressed. That is why a lot of 
societies distance themselves from the act which I think is wrong. I find it 
infuriating that there is an ignorance among certain aspects of society on the 
devastating psychological, emotional and mental effects that cyberstalking can 
have on victims. There is a dangerous misconception that because 
cyberstalking is not physical, it is less serious”.  
 
While discussing the difficulty of identifying a threshold, MEP cited the case of  
Paul Chambers to suggest that in the cyber world, it is difficult to tell if a person is 
joking. 
 
Int:  What in your opinion is the threshold for distinguishing   
 rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking? 
       
MEP 1:   How do you determine the threshold?  That is the problem. You recall 
the case of an airport passenger who threatened to blow up the airport if he 
was not let out of the airport.  In that case it was difficult to tell if the passenger 
was joking or if he really meant to carry out his actions. The passenger Paul 
Chambers was convicted of sending a menacing tweet threatening to blow up 
Doncaster airport.  He sent the Tweet as a joke on Twitter. On 27/7/12, he won 
a High Court appeal victory after his conviction was quashed by three High 
Court judges. This case indicates the difficult balancing test that needs to be 
applied by the courts which weighed up, threats to the safety of the airport 
passengers against the requirement for all staff to notify the police of any 
serious security threats that have been made by members of the public to the 
airport passengers and staff.  
 
The majority of participants shared the perception that there should be a threshold for 
acceptable online behaviour. Further, they expressed concern that vulnerable victims 
such as young girls, accept things online which they do not accept in person. Hence, 
PO1 remarked that “the threshold of acceptable online behaviour is shocking and 
should be looked at to tackle offending”.  
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In conclusion, the participants shared the perception that the threshold for 
distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from 
cyberstalking depends on different factors. Most of the participants, recognised that 
individuals may respond differently to cyberstalking victimisation. Some of the 
participants therefore, used the following analogies to describe the reaction of some 
unperturbed victims to cyberstalking victimisation “water off a duck’s back” (PO2), 
“thick skinned” (PO3) and “not bothered” (PO20).  These terms indicate that the 
participants shared the view that people react differently to cyberstalking victimisation 
and arguably suggests that some victims may not affected by victimisation while others 
may not be. There was no indication from the study that police officers and prosecutors 
were not taking the issue of cyberstalking seriously despite the fact victims react 
differently. On the contrary, there was an indication that the police officers felt that 
some victims perceive cyberstalking to be a minor offence and therefore, are reluctant 
to report incidents to the police because they believe that police officers which will not 
take cyberstalking incidents that are reported seriously.  
 
4.3.2 Theme 2: Legislation 
 
 
‘Legislation’ was the second theme identified through analysis of the data. Given the 
various background experiences of the participants, the perceptions of the participants 
on the criminalisation of cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime were varied. The 
findings of this study reveal that 92% of the police officers and 90% of the prosecutors 
shared the perception that certain legislative issues frustrate them in the investigation 
and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The legislative issues include perceived leniency in 
sentencing, the implementation of existing legislation, underreporting, breaching of 
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restraining orders, establishing a course of conduct under the PHA, establishing fear 
of violence under the PHA, and the statutory time limit for commencing proceedings 
under the Protection from Harassment Act (1997). 
 
Furthermore, the findings as contained in Table 4.6 reveal that the police officers and 
prosecutors identified 6 and 9 perceived legislative issues respectively which frustrate 
them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
    
            
 
 Table 4. 6: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on Legislation: 
 
Legislation Number 
of police 
officers 
Percentage 
sample of  
police 
officers 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
sample of 
prosecutors 
PHA lenient 
sentencing 
options  
6 24 4 13 
Ineffective 
legislative 
implementation 
2 8 3 10 
No  single 
cyberstalking 
legislation 
3 12 2 7 
Restraining  
orders are 
breached 
2 8 6 20 
Establishing  
course of 
conduct under 
the PHA 
6 24 9 30 
Statutory time 
limit for 
prosecuting 
0 0 3 10 
Definition of 
cyberstalking 
4 16 0 0 
Total 23 92 27 90 
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A majority of the participants shared the perception that several legislative issues 
hinder them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. From the outset of 
the study, it was evident that the participants were frustrated by lenient sentences 
which they perceived were given to convicted cyberstalkers. Hence, PO16 when 
asked how effective the laws in the country are said “there should be stronger 
sentencing laws to protect victims”. Furthermore, PO16 expressed frustration at the 
perceived problem of lenient sentencing which “results in victims getting a raw deal”.  
 
Int:   How effective do you think that the laws in this country are  
          against cyberstalking? 
 
 
PO16: “When cyberstalkers are charged and successfully prosecuted, 
sometimes judges impose restraining orders to prevent the cyberstalkers from 
contacting victims further. Generally we will love to have all the laws to be 
tougher as we believe that the criminal justice system is soft on the accused 
who often receive lenient sentences.  This results in victims getting raw deals”.  
 
Like PO16, PO23 expressed the view that cyberstalkers should be given stronger 
sentences to protect victims. However, PO23 attributed the issue of lenient sentences 
to lack of judicial knowledge on the seriousness of cyberstalking and the impact that 
the behaviour has on victims; 
PO23: “Harsher sentences should be passed when cyberstalkers are found 
guilty to pass on the message that the behaviour is abominable. The judges 
and jurors should be enlightened on the seriousness of the offence to enable 
them to pass adequate sentences. They should be trained on the devastating 
effects that it has on victims”.  
 
The participants expressed frustration that the existing legislation is not adequately 
implemented. Particularly, they raised concerns that victims delay in reporting 
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incidents. Consequently, PO1 stated that the reluctance of victims to report incidents 
will make it difficult to assess the effectiveness of existing laws;   
 
PO1: “I think we have one of the best pieces of legislation in the world. The         
difficulties lie in the implementation of the legislation. What we need to do, is 
improve the ability to investigate the crime. From the victim’s perspective, the 
victim will experience an average of 100 episodes of stalking activities including 
cyberstalking before reporting the offence. The reluctance of victims reporting 
the conduct makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the legislation”.  
 
Like PO1, PRO4 expressed the view that the laws were adequate and that the problem 
was in implementing the existing laws. Notably, while discussing the issue of existing 
legislation, PRO4 highlighted that police officers also make decisions to charge 
offenders in harassment cases;  
 
PRO4: “The legislation is effective. However, there are many cases that we 
won’t see as the police are making a lot of the decisions with our input. It is a 
two staged process. Sometimes, the police charge harassment cases where a 
conduct has only been committed once. There are some evidentially good 
harassment cases where the defendant hasn’t been charged. It is a matter of 
implementing it”.  
 
In contrast to PRO4, PROB stressed that “the current law and practice are 
ineffective”;   
   
PROBHF: “At the moment, it is completely ineffective. The current law and 
practice are ineffective”.  
 
Likewise,   PRO5, echoed the view of PROBHF and stated that “there were no effective 
laws”. Notably, PRO5 in his extract, linked effectiveness of laws to “adequate 
enforcement”.  
Int:  What difficulties do the police face in the investigation of cyberstalkers? 
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PRO5: “There are no effective laws. The effectiveness of law depends on 
adequate enforcement”. 
 
While discussing the existing laws. PO18 said that the laws are only effective in cases 
“when it involves a racial element or aggravating factors”. It is important to note that 
only PO18 held this view. 
 
Question:  How effective do you think that the laws in this country are against 
cyberstalking? 
 
 
PO18:  “I do not think they are very effective or being enforced properly. It is 
only important when it involves a racial element or aggravating factors. When 
balanced against other problems that the police have ineffective legislation is 
a problem”. 
 
The participants expressed frustration that there is no specific legislation for 
cyberstalking. 
Int:   What in your opinion are the issues with definition of cyberstalking that 
needs to be addressed? 
 
PO9:  “There is no specific legislation criminalizing cyberstalking. There is for 
stalking but not cyberstalking expressly. There needs to be a specific legislation 
defining the crime”. 
 
 
Like PO9, PO12 stated that “there needs to be a specific legislation defining 
cyberstalking”.  PO12 also indicated that a major issue is not being able to apply 
existing legislation to cases involving anonymous cyberstalkers. PO12’s extract 
echoes the views of the other participants;  
 
PO12: “There needs to be specific legislation defining the crime. I think you 
have cyberstalking cases where the defendant is not known that is what comes 
to mind. The major problem for police officers is investigating anonymous 
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cyberstalkers and applying the law to such offenders whose identities are 
unknown”. 
 
 
 
Like PO12, PO24 expressed the view that “there is insufficient legislation” to regulate 
cyberstalking. Similarly, PO24 acknowledged that despite the perceived issue of 
insufficient legislation, it is difficult to identify anonymous cyberstalkers.  Particularly, 
PO24 explained that victims may be unaware that they are being targeted; 
Int: What in your opinion are the issues with defining cyberstalking that need 
to be addressed?  
 
PO24: “There are I would say, insufficient legislation to tackle the conduct. The 
problem I would say is that the conduct by its nature, makes it difficult to identify 
the suspect as he is usually anonymous hiding behind the virtual cyber world. 
Sometimes, the victims may not even realize that they are victims”. 
 
Likewise, PRO25 emphasised that there is “no specific legislation for cyberstalking”.  
Additionally, PRO25 stressed that in some cases cyberstalkers are not prosecuted 
because they had not yet “made threats of violence”. PO25 however did not explain 
if this is because victims delay in reporting incidents until cyberstalkers make threats 
of violence.  PRO25 also, echoed the frustration of the participants regarding the 
perceived inadequate sentencing powers of the magistrate’s courts; 
 
PRO25:  “My general view is that there are too many legislations on 
harassment and no specific legislation on cyberstalking. In some cases, the 
cyberstalker commits several years of the offence but because he has not made 
threats to violence, he is not prosecuted. Also, the sentencing powers of the 
magistrates is limited to 6 months. People questioned why a cyberstalker in a 
case that I dealt with wasn’t in the crown court. The cyberstalker in this case 
had 60 years of no previous conviction, he got 1 week off for pleading guilty 
and was sentenced to only 6 months. Compared to other offences that go to 
the crown court, an extended cyberstalking over a lot of years has more effect 
on the victim. Greater sentencing power is required to cover it”.            
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In contrast to the above views, some of the participants expressed the view that the 
existing laws are effective.  Particularly, the participants who held this view, said “the 
laws are very good because restraining orders can be imposed under existing 
legislation to prevent convicted cyberstalkers from contacting victims further” (PO14).  
Int:  How effective do you think that the laws in this country are 
      against cyberstalking? 
 
 
PO14:  “I think that they are very good”. 
 
  
Sub Question: In your opinion why do you think that the laws are very good? 
 
 
PO14:  “When the cyberstalkers are charged and they go to court, when they 
are convicted, there is a restraining order that can be imposed under existing 
legislation to prevent cyberstalkers from contacting victims further”.  
 
Like PO14, PRO2 shared the perception that the laws are adequate: 
 
 
PRO2: “I think that the laws are adequate.  Particularly the restraining order 
aspect of them”.  
 
Like PO14 and PRO2, PRO9 also shared the perception that the current legislation 
offers victims the opportunity to apply for restraining orders;  
 
 
PRO9:  “The good thing about the act is that it gives the victim the opportunity 
to apply for a restraining order to protect her from future harassments”. 
 
Like PO14, PRO2 and PRO9, PO30 also shared the perception that existing laws are 
effective because they enable prosecutors to apply for restraining orders especially in 
cases involving repeat offenders. PO3O therefore, explained that a judge in a case 
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that he reviewed, “imposed a restraining order after a cyberstalker was successfully 
convicted because the cyberstalker had previous records”. 
 
However, from a critical perspective, PRO22 said that is some cases, offenders “lodge 
civil action claims to circumvent the restraining orders that have been imposed by 
judges”.  It is important to note that the participants did not share PRO22’s view which 
is highlighted in the extract below.  
 
Int: Briefly outline your experience to date with law enforcement to do with 
cyberstalking? 
 
PRO22: “I investigated a case in which a cyberstalker was convicted and the 
court granted a restraining order against him to prevent him contacting the 
victim. The defendant then lodged a civil claim action in order to circumvent the 
restraining order. The defendant claimed that his human rights had been 
breached. The question was how had his human rights been breached by the 
issue of the restraining order?” 
 
Sub Question: What was the outcome of the case? 
PRO22: “It was a significant case. Until this case, no one realized that a 
cyberstalker could use civil law to circumvent prohibitions or restraining orders 
not to communicate with or contact victims”.  
 
Similarly, PRO5 expressed frustration at the ability of convicted cyberstalkers to 
persist in harassing victim after breaching restraining orders;  
 
 
PRO5: “I have the experience of reviewing a case which involved an element 
of cyberstalking. In this case, the cyberstalker and the victim were in a 
relationship. The cyberstalker committed further offences after breaking a 
restraining order not to contact the victim.  The officer in this case was infuriated 
because it demonstrated how ineffective restraining orders can be at times in 
protecting victims”. 
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A minority of the participants expressed frustration at the high burden of proof. 
Although they did not elaborate on what they meant, PO18’s extract served to further 
affirm this view. 
 
 
Int:  What, in your opinion, are the issues with definition of cyberstalking that 
need to be addressed? 
 
 
PO18: “The definition of stalking and the burden of proof should be made 
easier so that the conduct can be proven in court because we have to look at 
it from the victim’s point of view. The burden of proof is too high and it may be 
challenge to proof a course of conduct or an offence under s4 of the PHA”. 
 
 
The participants emphasised that an issue which frustrates them is that it may be 
difficult to proof that a cyberstalker’s behaviour amounted to a course of conduct as 
defined under S7 of the PHA. Consequently PRO26 echoed the frustration of the 
participants and reiterated that the PHA requires a conduct to have occurred on 2 
consecutive occasions as opposed to isolated incidents.  
 
Int: What in your opinion are the issues with the definition of cyberstalking that 
need to be addressed? 
 
PRO26:  “For me it has to be clear looking at a cause of conduct over a number 
of occasions. The law states that you need a cause of conduct on two 
occasions. If you have a cause of conduct with five elements, you will have a 
strong case as opposed to isolated incidents. You need to have strong evidence 
and understand the legislation. For example, if someone sends an offensive 
text message on 1/1/13 and another after 6 months, it is the last incident that 
will be charged. If I put a wreath on a neighbour’s door on 1/1/14 every year, it 
is the last one within the last 6 months that will be considered. So it may be 
difficult to prove a cyberstalker’s behaviour amounts to a course of conduct 
under the PHA if the incidents are isolated and not consecutive”.  
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The participants also expressed their frustration at the statutory time limit for bringing 
offences under the PHA which they perceived to be short.  Hence, PRO17’s in his 
extract, echoed the views of many of the participants; 
 
PRO17: “The legislation should be amended to give lawyers more time to 
prosecute. For the S4 offences under the Protection from Harassment Act, 
there should be no time limit for establishing the offence of putting a person in 
fear of violence once it can be shown that an electronic communication has 
been made and that the communication contained elements of cyberstalking. 
The summary only offence under S2 of the act carries a sentence of 6 months 
imprisonment”.  
 
Like PRO17, PRO23 discussed perceived issues with the statutory time limit under 
the PHA. PRO23 was frustrated by the fact that some victims report cases after the 
six months statutory time limit for initiating legal proceedings. PRO23 explained the 
reasons for his frustration in his extract; 
 
 
PRO23:  “The laws are ok in my view. My issue is that we cannot investigate 
and prosecute cases which are reported out of time. This situation results in 
offenders not being prosecuted. This leaves them free to continue offending. 
The reason is because, in summary only offences, there is a legal requirement 
for complaints to be commenced within 6 months from the time when an offence 
was committed, or the matter of complaint arose.  It is exasperating for police 
officers when cyberstalkers cannot be prosecuted because victims have made 
formal complaints of harassment against cyberstalkers six months after the 
incident complained of”.  
 
While discussing the effectiveness of the existing legislation, many of the participants 
shared the perception that it was difficult to gauge the effectiveness of existing 
legislation because some victims do not report incidents. The participants stated that 
it was frustrating when cyberstalkers are not investigated and prosecuted because 
victims fail to report incidents formally. Therefore the participants attributed the issue 
of under reporting to various factors. The factors were; “fear of getting involved with 
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the police“, (PO7), “lack of confidence in the criminal justice system” (PO11), “victims 
thinking that cyberstalking is not a serious offence” (PO21) and “victims deciding to 
rekindle relationships with offenders in domestic violence cases” (PO14). PO7’s 
extract, illustrates the frustrations of the participants. Particularly, PO7 stressed that 
there will be “missed opportunities” to prosecute offenders if victims do not report 
incidents to the police;  
 
 
PO7: “At the moment, there is a fear of getting involved in the police or the 
criminal justice system.  It is difficult to say if the fear is justified. My only worry 
is that if victims do not report cyberstalking incidents to the police, it will lead to 
missed opportunities for prosecutors to charge offenders”.  
 
 
Some of the participants emphasised that the effectiveness of existing legislation 
cannot be assessed due to several reasons. Hence they remarked “stalking offences 
are recorded as harassment’” (PO7), “some victims are reluctant to report offences” 
(PRO11) “not every single incident is investigated” (PO14) and “cyberstalking is not 
deemed a serious offence” (PO20).  
 
Similarly, a minority of the participants discussed the perceived preferential treatment 
that celebrity victims will receive in cases involving the extradition of cyberstalkers. 
The participants shared the perception that cyberstalkers who stalk from abroad and 
target non-celebrities will not be extradited because, cyberstalking is not deemed to 
be a serious enough offence that warrants the extradition of an offender. The 
participants discussed the difficulties of extraditing cyberstalkers in other jurisdictions 
because they wanted to highlight there was also a jurisdictional difficulty to the 
investigation of cyberstalkers given that there is no geographical barrier to 
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cyberstalking. The jurisdictional difficulties are discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.1. 
PO6’s extract, reflects the views of the participants. 
 
Int:   What are the existing extradition arrangements specifically relating to 
cyberstalking? 
 
PO6: “There is no chance of a cyberstalker being extradited. No chance at all”. 
  
 
Sub Question:  In your opinion, why do you think that there is no chance of a 
cyberstalker being extradited? 
 
 
PO6: “The offence is not considered serious enough to warrant the extradition 
of a cyberstalker”. 
  
Sub Question:  In your opinion if the cyberstalker threatens to kill the victim will 
the offence be considered serious enough to justify the extradition if a 
cyberstalker? 
 
  
PO6: “We will have to convince the CPS and the law enforcement officials that 
the offence is serious. The problem is that it is not that simple or easy to warrant 
the extradition of a cyberstalker. If the case involves a celebrity it is media 
worthy and will be viewed to be in the public interest and vice versa”.  
  
Like PO2 and PO6, PRO17 expressed frustration at the perceived preferential 
treatment that is given to victims who are in the public eye. Notably, PRO17’s extract 
made specific reference to 2 politicians who were victimised by cyberstalkers.  
 
Int: What in your opinion are the issues with definition of cyberstalking that 
need to be addressed? 
 
PRO17: “Celebrity cases generate media publicity such as the cases of Stella 
Creasey and Caroline Criado Perez who are members of parliament who were 
recently cyberstalked. I wish cases involving ordinary members of the public 
especially in domestic violence cases, generated the same publicity to increase 
public awareness on the issue”.  
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Given that cyberstalking is committed in the virtual realm, a minority of the participants 
were doubtful that cyberstalkers will be deterred by existing legislation. Therefore, 
P025 remarked in his extract, “You can’t stop the offence with regulation”. 
 
 
 
PRO25: “You can’t stop the offence with regulation. The answer to the question 
is that you can regulate the offence but you cannot control the behaviour. So 
the legislation can never be sufficient”. 
 
 
In conclusion the participants shared the perception that several legislative issues 
frustrate them in in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  The frustration 
ranged from the perceived issue of lenient sentencing to the perceived proving 
offences under the PHA. 
 
4.3.3 Theme 3: Lack of training and knowledge  
 
Lack of knowledge and training’ was the third main theme that emerged from the 
interview data.  In total, 88% out of 100% of the police officers and 80% out of 100% 
of the prosecutors, highlighted the areas of knowledge that were lacking. Additionally 
the participants shared the perception that they require training in several areas. The 
areas include retrieving, assessing and preserving electronic evidence, risk 
assessment, legislation and connecting cyberstalkers to unregistered SIM cards.  
 
The data presented in Table 4.7 below indicate that the sample of police officers lack 
knowledge in 8 areas and that the sample of prosecutors lack knowledge in 5 areas. 
The data presented in Table 4.8 below indicates that the sample of police officers 
require training in 11 areas and that the sample of prosecutors require training in 5 
areas.  
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The participants discussed the measures they have adopted to acquire the gap in their 
professional knowledge. The wide ranging measures are highlighted in Tables 4.9 and 
4.10. The police officers identified 6 self-help measures that they have adopted to 
acquire the knowledge they lack in comparison to the prosecutors who identified 10 
self-help measures. 
Table 4.7:  Self-perceived areas in which police officers and 
prosecutors identify lack of knowledge when investigating and 
prosecuting cyberstalkers 
Lack of 
knowledge 
Number 
of police 
officers  
Percentage 
of sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of sample 
Risking 
assessing 
suspects on 
arrest who 
have no 
obvious signs 
of mental 
illness 
2 8 0 0 
Identifying  
cyberstalkers 
who may need 
to be risk 
assessed 
 
2 
 
8 
 
0 
 
0 
Unmasking the 
identities of 
cyberstalkers 
who use 
dongles to 
victimise 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
Connecting 
cyberstalkers 
to unregistered 
SIM cards 
1 4 0 0 
Connecting 
cyberstalkers 
to unregistered 
SIM cards 
3 12 3 10 
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Table 4.7 Self-perceived areas in which police officers and prosecutors 
identify lack of knowledge when investigating and prosecuting 
cyberstalkers 
 
 
Lack of 
knowledge  
Number 
of police 
officers  
Percentage 
of sample  
Number of 
prosecutors  
Percentage 
of sample 
Stalking laws  
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
10 
Tracking  
cyberstalkers  
 
5 
 
20 
 
4 
 
13 
ISP strategies 
for combating 
cyberstalking 
 
 
7 
 
 
       28 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
20 
Unmasking 
anonymous 
cyberstalkers 
3 12 2 7 
Lack of police 
knowledge on  
CPS evidential 
threshold 
requirements 
0 0 6 20 
Lack of police 
knowledge on  
the rationale 
for providing 
further 
evidence after 
charge 
0 0 4 13 
Total 24 96 28 93 
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Table 4. 8: Self-perceived areas in which police officers and prosecutors 
identify lack of training when investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers 
 
Lack of 
training  
Number of 
police 
officers  
Percentage 
of sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutor 
sample 
Tracing email 
and IP 
addresses 
 
4 
 
16 
 
3 
 
10 
Phone and 
computer 
evidence 
 
4 
 
16 
 
9 
 
 
30 
Computer 
forensics 
 
2 
 
8 
 
6 
 
20 
Obtaining 
digital 
evidence 
 
3 
 
12 
 
0 
 
0 
Accessing 
digital 
evidence 
 
1 
 
4 
 
3 
 
10 
Preserving 
digital 
evidence 
 
3 
 
12 
 
0 
 
0 
Judicial 
training 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
Identifying 
digital 
evidence 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
Psychological 
impact of 
Cyberstalking 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
13 
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   Table 4.8: Self-perceived areas in which police officers and prosecutors 
identify lack of training when investigating and prosecuting cyberstalkers 
 
Lack of 
training  
Number of 
police 
officers  
Percentage 
of police 
sample 
Number of 
prosecutors  
Percentage 
of 
prosecutor 
sample 
Most effective 
way of 
gathering 
evidence  
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
Risk 
assessment of 
offenders  
 
3 
 
12 
 
0 
 
0 
Risk 
assessment of 
victims 
 
2 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
Total 25 100 25 83 
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Table 4.9: Perceptions of the police officers on the self- help measures that they 
adopt to close the knowledge gap 
 
Perceptions of police 
officers on  
self-help measures that 
close the knowledge gap 
Number of police 
officers 
Percentage of 
sample 
Ask experienced colleagues 
within the department 
14 56 
Acquire knowledge during 
the investigation process 
5 20 
Personal research on how to  
trace anonymous internet 
portal and email addresses 
2 8 
Read the malicious 
communications guidance 
1 4 
Liaise with specialist police 
officers who are based in the 
Police Central e- Crime  Unit 
1 4 
Liaise with colleagues in 
other departments 
2 8 
Total 25 100 
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Table 10: Perceptions of prosecutors on the self - help measures that they 
adopt to close the knowledge gap 
Perceptions of 
prosecutors on  
self - help measures that 
close the knowledge gap 
Number of prosecutors Percentage of 
sample 
Legal sources such as 
Archbold, Blackstone, and 
Westlaw 
9 30 
Liaise with experienced 
colleagues 
6 20 
CPS Guidance 2 7 
CPS Info net 1 3 
Creation of spreadsheet of  
cases for personal 
knowledge 
1 3 
Law books 2 7 
Legislation 3 10 
Online library 1 3 
Personal research 3 10 
Reading case reviews 2 7 
Total 30 100 
 
 
 
The participants talked about missed opportunities to risk assess cyberstalkers who 
do not display any obvious signs of mental illness when arrested. Hence, PO12 in his 
extract, reflected the frustration of the participants; 
 
 
PO12: “Sometimes, we arrest suspects who have mental health issues. I feel 
that an issue is that police officers in some cases may be unaware that an 
offender is mentally ill. This can lead to missed opportunities. The reason is 
because due to lack of knowledge, it is difficult to risk assess cyberstalkers who 
have no obvious signs of mental illness”. 
 
Like PO12, PO15 while discussing the difficulties that police officers face in the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers, revealed that it is difficult to “spot the hidden  symptoms”  
230 
 
Hence PO15 said in his extract that police officers lack specialist knowledge on how 
to identify offenders who are mentally ill; 
 
 
PO25: “A problem is identifying cyberstalkers who have mental health issues. 
It is an issue because, it is not always apparent that they require medical 
assistance. We will benefit from training on how to spot the hidden symptoms 
on arrest”. 
 
The participants expressed frustration at not being able to trace anonymous 
cyberstalkers. While the participants shared the perception that there is the danger of 
anonymous cyberstalkers evading justice, PO14 indicated that he lacked knowledge 
on how to unveil the identity of customers who use dongles to victimise. PO14 in his 
extract explained why he was frustrated by the issue; 
 
 
PO14: “Although a cyberstalker can obtain 3 dongles for a laptop some ISPs, 
are still unable to link the users of dongles to the relevant internet subscriptions.  
ISPs use the knowledge gap as an excuse for not being able to disclose the 
internet details of suspects to police officers”.  
 
Like PO14, PRO1 discussed how lack of knowledge impedes the investigation 
process. Hence, PRO1 stated that he lacked knowledge on how to connect 
cyberstalkers to unregistered subscriber identification module (SIM) cards.  Notably, 
PRO1 indicated that lack of knowledge and evidential difficulties can lead to cases 
being dropped;  
 
 
PRO1: “I once investigated a case which involved a news reader who was being 
cyberstalked. During the course of the investigation, we faced some obstacles. 
First, the cyberstalker was using an unregistered telephone so it was impossible 
to trace the call or identify the culprit. Next the internet service providers were 
not willing to help. We stopped investigating the case because we could not 
prove it without the telephone evidence”. 
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When asked how effective they considered the laws in the UK against cyberstalking 
to be, some of the participants said “We do not know much about it” (PO8). Likewise, 
the participants talked about lack of experience and said “The problem is that the 
police need technical experience to investigate cases” (PO13). Hence, PO10 
suggested that police officers require training on the implementation of existing 
legislation. PO10’s extract, demonstrates this; 
 
 
PO10: “I think that the current legislation is effective - what we need is training 
on how to implement the amended PHA and existing legislation. The training 
will provide the knowledge required on how to apply legislation to cases”. 
 
While discussing the difficulties that police officers face in the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers, the participants expressed their frustration at the perceived “knowledge 
gap” among the ISPs, judiciary, CPS and the police. PO22’s extract reveals the 
frustration of the participants that the ISPs do not have the knowledge required to 
unmask the identity of anonymous cyberstalkers.  
 
 
PO22: “There is also a knowledge gap among the judiciary which has led to a 
problem with presenting the technical aspects of such a case. For example, 
when I approach judges for productions orders to access the IP addresses, 
email addresses, and so on of cyberstalkers, they turn around and ask for help 
on how to protect themselves online. This knowledge gap is a big problem - the 
judiciary, defence, and the prosecutors all need to be trained in my view”. 
 
 
The participants shared the common frustration that there is a lack of knowledge 
among members of the public on the psychological impact of cyberstalking on victims 
and also a lack of knowledge among the judiciary which may affect how judges direct 
jurors during trials. Echoing this view, PRO16 explained that there was a dangerous 
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misconception that because cyberstalking is not a physical offence, victims are 
affected less seriously; 
 
 
PRO10: “The final point that I will like to raise is that research has to be 
undertaken to increase the public and judicial awareness of the psychological 
harm that is done to victims. Research is required to assess the level of impact 
on the victim to assist the prosecutors in the building of cases. The courts in 
general have difficulties in explaining cyberstalking to the jurors because there 
is a perception that cyberstalking constitutes a virtual offence and not an 
immediate physical threat. This is a wrong and dangerous perception to have. 
A lot of people feel that if there is no physical harm, then no serious damage 
has been done. They don’t realize that they can cause devastating harm to the 
victim by damaging their reputation through libellous comments and 
psychologically through mental damage. There is therefore, a lack of 
knowledge on the impact of cyberstalking on victims”. 
 
The participants also expressed frustration at the lack of police knowledge on the CPS 
evidential threshold and the rationale for providing outstanding evidence after 
defendants have been charged.  The tone of PRO27’s extract, reflects the frustration 
of the participants; 
 
PRO27: “Another difficulty is that some police officers have to be repeatedly 
enlightened by prosecutors on the CPS evidential threshold and how we arrive 
at charging decisions. This results in us having to repeatedly request 
outstanding evidence while explaining again, we require the evidence. They do 
not seem to realize that we cannot progress cases until they provide sufficient 
evidence to prove that there is a realistic prospect of convicting an offender”. 
 
While discussing how lack of knowledge hinders police officers from investigating 
cyberstalkers, PRO13 expressed the view that an investigative issue which frustrates 
him is the lack of evidential clarity on the best way to gather evidence from the internet. 
PRO13 equally shared the perception that the participants faced challenges in trying 
to trace electronic evidence; 
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PRO13: “There is lack of evidential clarity on the best way to gather evidence 
from the internet. Another issue that I can think of is the difficulty in identifying 
the defendant. There is the difficulty of tracking where the communication is 
coming from”.   
 
When asked if they had received training on the investigation of cyberstalkers, the 
participants shared the perception that police officers lacked the requisite knowledge 
on how to trace the emails or internet portal addresses of suspects.   
 
PO19’s extract highlights the frustration of police officers in having to obtain knowledge 
from the internet on how to trace the email and IP addresses of suspects rather than 
being trained how to do this; 
 
Int:  Have you received any training on cyberstalking? 
 
PO19: “I have not received any training on how to investigate the conduct of 
cyberstalking”. 
 
Sub Question: Where have you obtained the knowledge that you so far have 
on the subject from? 
 
PO19: “I have obtained it from the internet. That is tips on how to investigate or 
trace the email addresses and IP addresses of suspects. I have obtained my 
knowledge from the internet”. 
 
While discussing how lack of knowledge and training can impact on how police officers 
investigate cyberstalkers, PO21 in common with PO19 revealed that police officers 
had not received the required training. PO9’s extract shows the frustration of the 
participants;  
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Int: Have you received any training on cyberstalking?  
PO21: “At the moment we have received no training. We have not been trained 
on phone and computer crimes. We have not received the computer forensic 
police training required to investigate such a digital crime”. 
 
 
However, PO21’ s extract below reveals that there is an assumption that police 
officers will acquire knowledge on how to investigate cyberstalking cases during the 
investigation process;  
  
 
Sub Question: Where do you obtain knowledge of the conduct from? 
 
PO21: “From the officers in my team who have investigated such cases or 
similar cases. This is one of those offences where you are required to learn 
about the offence as you are investigating it. You will probably get to learn 
more about the offence or have a decent idea about what it is about by the 
end of the investigation”. 
 
While discussing cyberstalkers who use encrypted messages and fake email 
addresses to target victims, the participants expressed frustration at the lack of 
knowledge on how to access encrypted messages.  Hence, PO24 makes it clear that 
all police require training in general on the investigation of cyberstalkers;   
 
 
PO24:  “Finally, the police officers have not been given the required training 
needed to effectively investigate the crime. This ranges from the lowly paid 
police officers to the most senior police officers.  There is an urgent need for 
such training given the rapid technological advancement”. 
 
When asked the difficulties that police officers face in the prosecution of cyberstalkers, 
the participants shared the perception that police officers lack specialist knowledge on 
how to access and preserve electronic evidence at the time of the study;  
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PO17: “The police should also be trained on how to access preserve digital 
evidence which is crucial to building strong cases against cyberstalkers. Not all 
police officers have received the training”.  
 
 
 
Similarly, the participants shared the perception that only specialist police officers have 
the requisite knowledge for investigating cyberstalking cases. PRO16’s extract 
reinforces this view. Notably, PRO16’s comments revealed that lack of specialist 
knowledge can result in cases being dropped if police officers cannot retrieve the 
evidence required to prosecute offenders;  
 
PRO16: “Firstly, the police do not understand it. They have a special crime 
department which is supposed to specialize in electronic, media and telephone. 
They state that deleted emails and texts can be retrieved. The specialist officers 
know this but ordinary police officers don’t as they can’t help you when the 
victim claims that the offensive messages have been deleted. Cases can get 
dropped if the police officer does not have the knowledge or if a victim for 
example drops her phone in the bath and losses relevant evidence”. 
 
 
The above observations highlight the shared perceptions of the police officers and 
prosecutors on the issue of lack of training and knowledge and are based on perceived 
difficulties in relation to various areas. The data in Table 4.7 indicates that the police 
officers identified 8 areas of knowledge that were lacking and that the prosecutors 
identified 6 areas of knowledge that were lacking therefore this adds weight to their 
assertions that all involved in investigating and prosecuting these crimes receive 
appropriate, sufficient and current training. 
 
Most of the participants highlighted lack of training as an issue which frustrates them 
in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. Therefore, the participants stated 
that they had not received “specific training” (PO3), “any training” (PO2, PO4 and 
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PO5), “special training outside the normal detective training” (PO15), “training on how 
to investigate the conduct” (POI6) and “training on the technological aspects of the 
case” (PO25). 
 
PO11 expressed the view that he had received “no training because cyberstalking is 
part of general policing”. Consequently, in justifying why participants had resorted to 
self-help measures to obtain the lacking knowledge, PO4 remarked “we have received 
no training and so we all grab help from where we can….in the beginning, 
cyberstalking was an unknown conduct and so, liaising with other relevant officials is 
crucial”. 
 
Worryingly, PO6 remarked “no training is required if you have the required evidence 
because “cyberstalking is another form of harassment and public disorder”.  It is also 
concerning that PO12 remarked “no training has been offered to me. I do not think that 
the MET realizes cyberstalking is becoming a growing concern”. Likewise, PRO4 
endorsed the views of many of the participants by stating a problem which will hinder 
the prosecution of cyberstalkers in that “there are not enough trained law enforcement 
officials”.  
 
From a governmental perspective, MEP remarked “there are not enough trained police 
officers to investigate the conduct”. In contrast, PO24 was optimistic that training will 
be provided in the future and remarked “I anticipate that training will be provided in the 
future”. 
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Notably, the tone of PO5’s extract highlighted his frustration that he had not been 
trained on how to investigate cyberstalkers. Hence, he suggested that “all police 
officers should be offered training”;  
 
Int: Have you received any training on cyberstalking? 
 
PO5: “No. I have not received any training. What I know, I learnt on the job. In 
my view all police officers should be offered training to equip them with the skills 
required to investigate the conduct”. 
 
It is important to note that some of the participants revealed that they had received 
training on harassment in general although they had not received specific training on 
cyberstalking. Of concern is the fact that POI8’s extract demonstrates that that it was 
not clear to some participants whether harassment and cyberstalking are offences 
investigated under the same category of offences; 
 
 
PO18: “I have not received any training for cyberstalking although I have 
received training for harassment. It falls under the same category doesn’t it?” 
 
Like PO5, PO9, PO12, and PO15 respectively, PO21 remarked “I have learnt about 
the offence on the job.” PO21’s extract reiterated that the majority of the participants 
have not received any training and have resorted to self-help measures to obtain the 
requisite knowledge: 
 
 
Int: Have you received any training on cyberstalking? 
 
PO21: “I have not received any training relating to cyberstalking. The little 
knowledge that I have is derived from materials that I have read online during 
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my own spare time. I have not received any formal training. I have learnt about 
the offence while investigating cases. I do not believe that there is any specialist 
police training that is being given for cyberstalking cases.  
 
From a positive perspective, some of the police officers indicated that they had 
received “normal 5 week training on harassment and a 1 day domestic violence 
course’’ when they were first recruited (PO13), training on the ‘”Computer Misuse Act” 
(PO7), “nothing outside the normal detective training” (PO9), “on obtaining mobile 
phone evidence as part of the detective course” (PO14) and “training on harassment 
as part of the detective course” (PO18). Notably, PO13 in her extract stated that she 
had received an additional 1 day in domestic violence training which implicitly, 
provided additional training on harassment arguably in relation to domestic violence 
cases.  
Int: Question:   Have you received training on cyberstalking? 
 
PO1: “No. I have not received any specific training. I had the normal 5 weeks 
training at Hendon. I did the one day domestic violence course which was 
because I was working on the domestic violence unit then. This enabled me to 
learn what harassment was and revisit the law”. 
 
Like PO13, PO19 indicated that he had received training “on how to do a lot with 
mobile phones”. PO19 highlighted that the training educated him on how to connect 
telephone cell cite maps to an address; 
     
PO19: “I have taken part on a detective training course as I was explaining how 
you can do a lot with a mobile phone. It was useful as it enlightened me on how 
mobile phones can be linked to a crime scene. We can then link the cell cite 
map to an address”. 
 
Additionally, some of the prosecutors confirmed that they had received “online training” 
at the time of the study (PRO7, PRO11, PRO18). Another participant highlighted that 
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she was given useful “hand-outs” on cyberstalking by her manager (PRO3). Further, 
participants indicated that they had received training from a “pupil master” (PRO12) 
and had “completed an e-learning cyberstalking module” (PRO13).  
 
Notably, PRO15’s extract reflected the view of the participants who were optimistic 
that more training will be provided in the future; 
 
  
PRO15: “I have received some training. Training will be more developed in 
the future I hope. We have the new prosecutor’s guidelines for prosecuting 
cases involving the sending of malicious tweets”. 
.  
Many of the participants expressed PO8’s view “that the investigation process is a 
“learning experience on how to investigate digital crimes”. The participants therefore, 
explained how they obtain knowledge given that the relevant training had not been 
provided at the time of the study. Hence, PO15 said “what we know we learnt on the 
job” and PO6 remarked that he gained knowledge “during the course of the 
investigation’. Also, the participants stated that they obtained knowledge “from the 
internet” (PO9), from experienced colleagues in my team" (PO10) and “learnt while 
investigating cases” (PO11).  Similarly, PO12 explained that he acquired knowledge 
by “referring to the standard operating guidance”. PO15 shared PO12’s view by stating 
that he gained knowledge by “asking experienced Colleagues questions”.  
 
Additionally, the tone of PO19’s extract, echoes the views of PO5, PO6,  PO12, PO15 
and PO21 who perceive investigation processes as learning processes; 
 
PO19: “I have not received any training on cyberstalking. I have obtained the 
limited knowledge that I have from doing the job. When I first investigated a 
cyberstalking case, I had to ask my colleague for help as I had received no 
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training whatsoever. In other words, I relied on colleagues who had a lot of 
experience”. 
 
In conclusion, the above observations highlight the shared perceptions of the 
participants on how lack of knowledge and training, hinder police officers and 
prosecutors from bringing cyberstalkers to justice. The data in Table 4.7 attests to this 
and furthermore, Table 4.8 indicates that the sample of police officers recognise that 
they require training in 11 areas and the sample of prosecutors require training in 5 
areas. 
 
4.3.4 Theme 4: Lack of resources 
 
‘Lack of resources’ was the fourth main theme identified from the interview data.  
Importantly, all of the police officers and 97% of the sample of prosecutors shared the 
perception that lack of resources was a factor that frustrates police officers in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The participants highlighted six 
perceived aspects which frustrate them namely, missed opportunities to risk assess 
victims and offenders, inability to risk manage victims, managing heavy caseloads, 
inability to meet CPS deadlines, shortage of staff and inability to fulfil the public 
expectation that police officers will investigate every cyberstalking incident.  
 
The prosecutors and police officers highlighted 8 and 6 perceived lack of resources 
respectively which they report frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of 
cyberstalkers. The perceived legislative issues are presented in Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on lack of resources: 
 
Perceptions of 
prosecutors on 
lack of 
resources 
Number of 
police officers 
Percentage of 
sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutors 
Missed 
opportunities to 
risk assess 
victims 
1 4 2 8 
Unable to 
manage risks to 
victims  
1 4 0 0 
Unable to risk 
assess 
cyberstalkers  
1 4 0 0 
Insufficient 
specialist and 
non-specialist 
staff 
4 16 3 10 
Retention of staff  1 4 0 0 
Excessive 
caseloads 
4 16 6 17 
Inability to meet 
CPS deadlines 
for providing 
evidence  
3 12 6 17 
Unrealistic public 
expectation to 
investigate all 
cyberstalking 
cases 
3 12 0 0 
Insufficient time 
to follow up on 
initial reports by 
victims 
2 8 3 10 
Lack of 
centralized 
database for 
sharing local 
intelligence 
3 12 2 7 
Lack of a single 
point of contact  
2 8 4 13 
Frequency 25 100 26 83 
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While discussing the risk assessment of victims, the participants shared the perception 
that shortage of manpower can lead police officers not being able to “manage the risks 
to victims”. PO1’s extract echoed the frustrations of the participants concerning this; 
 
 
PO1: “The laws are effective especially the amended PHA. The problem is 
trying to manage the risk to victims once a cyberstalker has been identified due 
to lack of resources”. 
 
The participants also expressed frustration at how the shortage of manpower can lead 
to police officers failing to realize that offenders may be suffering from mental illnesses. 
Consequently, PO3 expressed frustration at how lack of resources hinders police 
officers from carrying out risk assessment measures. However unlike PO1, PO3 
expressed his frustration regarding the inability of police officers to risk assess 
cyberstalkers as opposed to victims. Particularly, PO3 highlighted a case involving a 
mentally ill cyberstalker who was not risk assessed due to staff shortage. Hence, PO3 
remarked that staff shortage can result in a police officer “misjudging situations when 
a cyberstalker needs to be risk assessed”. Notably, PO3 highlighted that in some 
cases, cyberstalkers may require “counselling and support”; 
 
 
PO3: “I think that the laws are fine. The problem is insufficient resources.  I dealt 
with a bloke who rented a flat opposite a bar after developing an obsession with 
a bar maid. In the beginning, he went into the bar and frequently struck up 
conversation with the barmaid then it progresses to him buying presents and 
then turning up frequently at her work place. The stalker was arrested and put 
in custody. During investigation, it later came out that the defendant was 
suffering from a mental illness which obviously affected his judgement. The 
scary thing is that this case had previously been investigated by a colleague 
who just believed that the stalker had an unhealthy interest in the victim. The 
shortage of manpower led to my colleague misjudging a situation when a 
cyberstalker need to be risk assessed on arrest. The bigger picture is that a 
cyberstalker may need counselling and support”.  
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Likewise, PRO19 discussed how due to staff shortage, police officers may not 
recognize when mentally ill cyberstalkers require medical assistance. However, 
PRO19 queried why “people assume that all cyberstalkers are sane”. “PRO19’s 
extract supported PO3’s views. 
 
 
PRO19: “The existing legislation offers victims the opportunity to apply for a 
restraining order. My concern is that  if a mentally ill cyberstalker who targets 
victims  in the physical and cyber realms is arrested, an over-worked  arresting 
police officer may fail to risk assess the offender and recognize that the offender 
is suffering from a mental illness and therefore requires medical assistance. 
Why do people assume that are all cyberstalkers are sane?” 
 
Likewise, PRO30 explained that the due to the shortage of trained specialist and non-
specialist staff, police officers investigating cases may fail to recognize the “warning 
signs” that a domestic violence victim is also being cyberstalked by her former partner. 
PRO30 perceived the warning signs to include former partners sending victims 
obscene, intimidating and threatening emails. PO30 stated that the warning signs also 
include victims receiving persistent unwanted telephone calls from cyberstalkers  
 
Likewise, the tone of PO4’s extract, strongly echoed the frustration of the police 
officers at the shortage of manpower hindering police officers from risk assessing 
victims. Hence, PO4 indicated in his last sentence that he was unable to risk assess 
an anonymous cyberstalker; 
 
 
PO4:   “I think you have cyberstalking cases where the defendant is not known 
that is what comes to mind. I investigated a cyberstalking case where the 
identity of the cyberstalker was not known to the police due to the anonymous 
nature of the offence. As a result, it was impossible to monitor the cyberstalker 
or to carry out an effective risk assessment”. 
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The police officers were frustrated by the perceived public expectation that every 
single cyberstalking incident that has taken place will be investigated. Hence PO22 
remarked that that the perceived public expectation is unrealistic because police 
officers cannot investigate every single case”. PO22’s extract reiterated the view of 
PO14 that police officers “cannot investigate every single incident”;   
 
PO22: “If you speak to the victims they will say the laws are not effective 
because the conduct is not taken seriously. There is I suppose, a public 
expectation that police officers will investigate all cyberstalking cases. The 
public expectation in my view is unrealistic because we cannot investigate 
every single case. The victims I suspect feel let down because high profile 
celebrities are protected more by the legislation than ordinary members of the 
public. Then again should the police investigate every single complaint by a 
member of the public?” 
 
 
The participants linked the issue of lack of resources to the allocation of heavy 
caseloads. In doing so they expressed further frustration that the allocation of heavy 
caseloads “leads to police officers being overworked” (PRO5), “puts police officers 
under enormous pressure” (PO12) “creates the problem of staff retention” (PO18) and 
“delays the time that it takes for police officers to complete investigative actions” 
(PO24).  PRO5 echoed the views of the participants and said that it is challenging for 
police officers to provide outstanding evidence within strict deadlines because they 
are “juggling the investigation of several cases due to having heavy caseloads”. 
 
Int.: In your opinion do you think that police officers are allocated too many 
cases and if so why? 
 
PRO5: “Although I am not a police officer, I work with police officers daily and 
some of them have made it known in the past that they are overworked which 
is why they have been unable to provide the evidence within stipulated 
deadlines that the CPS requires to prosecute certain criminals.  Some of the 
police officers also complain that there is a staff shortage and a high 
expectation for them to complete investigations within strict deadlines. The 
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situation can become exasperating for prosecutors too when we are dealing 
with several cases including cyberstalking which might require us to risk assess 
victims. I would say that the exasperation felt by some police officers has an 
inevitable impact on their ability to provide the evidence required by prosecutors 
to build robust cases against criminals. They are overworked and are juggling 
with the investigation of several cases due to having heavy caseloads”.  
 
PO24 echoed the frustrations of PRO5 on the challenges faced by police officers to 
provide evidence due to lack of resources. However, PO24 highlighted that this issue 
leads to judges giving court directions for the CPS to provide outstanding evidence 
within strict court deadlines; 
 
PRO5: “What I do know is that lack of manpower is having a negative impact on 
the ability of police officers to provide outstanding evidence and the prospect of 
prosecutors to build robust cases. This evidential delay in proving evidence 
leads to judges orders. The orders require the CPS within strict deadlines”. 
 
Likewise, PRO6’s extracts support the views of PRO5 and PO24. The extract reveals 
that the participants were frustrated because, they are unable to meet CPS deadlines 
due to lack of delay;  
 
 
PRO6: “Staff shortage can prevent police officers from following up on initial 
reports by victims within stipulated CPS deadlines due to the fact that police 
officers are investigating serious and complex cases with the investigation of 
cyberstalking cases. 
 
 
Similarly, PRO11 expressed the view that due to staff shortages, police officers do not 
promptly provide outstanding evidence requested by the prosecution which can be 
frustrating for prosecutors: 
 
            
PO11: “A police officer who I work with regularly once told me that the reason 
why some police officers do not provide evidence that the CPS requires within 
specific deadlines is because they are investigating several cases 
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simultaneously. The police officer stated that the work overload delays them 
from proving outstanding evidence promptly because they are tasked with 
investigating several cases at the same time. This situation prevents 
prosecutors from building strong cases against cyberstalkers due to lack of 
evidence because we have to ensure that cases meet the evidential threshold”. 
 
While discussing the difficulties that police face in the prosecution of cyberstalkers 
PRO11 like PO24, shared the perception that staff shortage was an investigative 
issue. However, PO24 referred specifically to the lack of computer experts in addition 
to ordinary police officers. The tone of PO24’s extract, highlighted his frustration which 
is reflected in the last sentence of his extract in which he describes the issue as “an 
investigative predicament”; 
 
PO24: “We do not have enough computer experts to investigate the cases 
given the expansion of information technology. In addition, we also lack 
ordinary police officers. This is an investigative predicament”. 
 
Notably, while discussing the effectiveness of existing laws in this country against 
cyberstalking, the participants shared the perception that lack of resources can lead 
to police officers not taking initial allegations seriously and not adequately 
implementing the laws adequately. Hence, PO25 linked the perceived issue of 
inadequate implementation of existing legislation to heavy caseload. PO25’s extract 
was representative of the views of most of the participants; 
 
 
PO25: “The legislation is ok because I think that it is sufficient. The problem we 
face is that there is the danger of police officers not taking initial allegations 
seriously due to a heavy caseloads thereby not implementing the legislation as 
and when required”. 
 
It is important to note that the some of the participants revealed that due to lack of 
resources, sometimes police officers may not deem cyberstalking to be a serious 
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offence in comparison to other offences if they are required to prioritise cases. Hence 
PO18 in his extract, referred to cyberstalking as a “minor offence”; 
 
PO18: “The difficulty that springs to mind is shortage of manpower which makes 
us prioritise cases more. When cases are prioritised, the investigation of rape, 
murder or kidnap cases may take priority over the investigation of a 
cyberstalking case. Having said that, it all depends on the facts of a case”.  
 
 
Like PO18, PO23 expressed the view that cyberstalking is not deemed serious 
enough. However, PO23 highlighted that due to lack of resources, police officers will 
have to justify spending “limited resources” on a cyberstalking case instead of “other 
major crimes”.  PO23’s extract revealed the frustration of the participants; 
 
PO23: “The reality is that the police want to help in the investigation of  
cyberstalking but officers will have to justify the merit of investigating such a 
conduct. They will have to explain why the limited resources should be 
employed and why the case should be prioritised over other major crimes. In 
the UK, cybercrime is classified as a Tier 1 threat meaning that it is very serious 
given the implication with international terrorism. However, when you start 
comparing it to rape, murder and so on, it becomes an issue for the police 
officers who may have different views given the problem of limited resources”.    
 
While discussing the problems that police officers face in the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers, the participants also discussed the issue of lack of designated 
cyberstalking units.  Notably, the participants highlighted 3 types of units. The units 
are “specialist unit” (PRO11), “central unit” (PRO15) and “designated cyberstalking 
unit” (PO17). Hence, PRO2 expressed frustration that the lack of a clear point of 
contact leads to police officers going on “a wild goose chase”;  
 
   
PRO2: “There are no clear points of contact for international and domestic 
cases. This could result in police officers going on a wild goose chase while 
victims are still being harassed by cyberstalkers. This problem is tiresome for 
prosecutors who are keen to prosecute but cannot prosecute because of 
delays in the investigation process”. 
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Like PO2 and PRO11, PRO27 expressed frustration at the lack of a designated unit 
to make it easier for prosecutors to liaise with specialist police officers; 
 
 
PRO27: “A challenge that comes to mind is that there is no designated 
cyberstalking investigating unit in the UK to centralize the investigation process 
and to make it easier for prosecutors to liaise with specialist police officers. 
Such a specialist unit will make it much easier for prosecutors to liaise with 
specialist officers”. 
  
PRO23 in his extract below, echoed the frustrations of the participants and also, 
highlighted the additional problem of lack of finance;  
 
PRO23:  “There is the resources side of the problem. By that I mean a lack of 
resources both financially and manpower wise. Then there is also the issue of 
what units that are out there to use. Are there any specialist units that can help? 
If so where are they? Who do we contact?” 
 
Like PRO23, PRO28 expressed the view that a specialist unit was required.  Hence, 
he remarked from a financial perspective, “there is an option of setting up a specialist 
unit but it costs money to set up and run it”. 
 
 Moreover, PO20 shared the perception that there was no centralized database for 
gathering and accessing local intelligence on cyberstalkers at the time of the study. 
PO20 explained that at the time of the study, police officers were unable to access the 
database of another police force. PO2O’s extract reveals that police officers are 
frustrated when such an investigative issue prolongs the ordeal of victims;  
 
PO20: “To start with, the police face difficulties with accessing local intelligence 
because most foreign law enforcement agencies are not willing to share 
intelligence. This can hamper the investigation of such cases. Would you 
believe that in this country for example, police officers like myself cannot search 
the database of another police force without going through a lot of red tape? 
This can slow down the investigation process? For example, I am investigating 
a Cambridge job and cannot even access the local police database of the 
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Cambridge police force and this slowing my investigation of a particular offence. 
In the middle of this is a victim. Situations like these are so frustrating for the 
police officers especially when victims are involved. How do you then tell the 
victim that a different police force is holding up the investigation of a crime 
thereby prolonging the dilemma of the victim at the hands of the cyberstalker? 
It is ridiculous and this is an aspect of the investigation that needs to be 
addressed. Do you see what I mean? Because the offence is not taken 
seriously”. 
 
Like PO20, PRO1 expressed frustration at the lack of a centralized cyberstalking 
database in the UK;               
 
PRO11: “There are no specialist cyberstalking units in the UK. What this means 
is that if a cyberstalker is residing in a different part of the UK and the victim is 
in a different part of the UK, it might not be a straightforward process for the 
different police officers to work together and share intelligence promptly”. 
 
 
Although the participants referred to different types of units, they all shared the view 
that the purpose of the units would be to “equip the units with specialist officers who 
will “offer guidance to police officers” (PO9), “provide assistance to colleagues who 
need them” (PRO23), and “enable UK police officers to obtain assistance from the 
right officials from the start to the end of a cyberstalking case” (PO25).  
 
Similarly, PO21 emphasised how the units will be beneficial to police officers. Notably, 
PO21 said “the units will make it easier for me to make contact with the right people 
from the beginning of the investigation to the conclusion”. 
 
Int: What problems are you aware of that hinder the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers? 
 
           PO21: “A designated unit should be created”. 
Sub Question: “In your opinion, how would such a unit assist law enforcement 
officials? 
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PO21: “It will ensure that I get the right experiences when investigating the case 
because I will be liaising with the experienced and appropriate law enforcement 
officials. Also, it will make it easier for me to make contact with the right people 
from the beginning of the investigation to the conclusion”. 
 
It is important to note that in contrast to the above view on lack of resources, PO17 
was keen to point out in his extract below, the existence of the National Cybercrime 
Reporting Centre; 
 
PO17: “At the moment the crime is poorly reported. What we have done is 
create a National Cyber Crime reporting centre. Intelligence is disseminated 
from this centre to the City of London to the police”. 
 
In conclusion the participants shared the perception that issues pertaining to lack of 
resources frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  Given 
that cyberstalking is committed in the virtual realm, some of the participants attributed 
the issue of lack of resources to the cyberstalking not being perceived as a serious 
offence in comparison to other major offences which are committed in the physical 
realm.  Therefore, PO22 in explaining why lack of resources is an investigative 
problem, remarked that “the offence is not taken seriously”. 
4.3.5 Theme 5: Risk assessment challenges 
 
 
‘Risk assessment’ was the fifth main theme identified in the study. Importantly, all of 
the police officers and 94% of the prosecutors shared the perception that five 
perceived risk assessment challenges frustrate them during investigation and 
prosecution processes because the challenges jeopardize the safety of victims. The 
perceived risk assessment challenges are; i) police officers not being able to risk 
assess anonymous cyberstalkers, ii)cyberstalkers breaching restraining orders, iii) 
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lack of resources, iv) lack of knowledge, v) victims in domestic violence cases 
rekindling relationships with cyberstalkers and  vi) victims refusing to implement 
recommended risk assessment safety measures.  
 
The police officers and prosecutors identified 13 and 10 perceived risk assessment 
issues respectively which frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of 
cyberstalkers. The perceived risk assessment issues are presented in Table 4.12. 
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Table 4.12: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on risk assessment  
 
Perceptions of 
prosecutors on 
risk 
assessment  
Number of 
police officers 
Percentage of 
sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutors 
Risks posed by  
anonymous 
cyberstalkers 
cannot be 
assessed 
 
2 
 
8 
 
3 
 
10 
Anonymous 
cyberstalkers 
cannot be 
managed 
3 12 1 3 
Anonymous 
cyberstalkers 
cannot be 
identified 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
The actions of 
anonymous 
cyberstalkers are 
unpredictable 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
Unveiling the 
identities of 
anonymous 
cyberstalkers 
 
2 
 
8 
 
6 
 
20 
Impossible to 
eliminate risks to 
victims 
absolutely 
 
2 
 
8 
 
1 
 
3 
Some victims are 
unaware of risks 
 
1 
 
4 
 
3 
 
10 
Challenging to 
risk manage 
victims in 
general 
 
2 
 
8 
 
3 
 
10 
Managing risks 
in domestic 
violence cases 
specifically 
 
4 
 
16 
 
6 
 
20 
Victims  refusing 
to implement  
recommended 
risk assessment 
safety measures 
 
2 
 
8 
 
0 
 
0 
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Table 4.12: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on risk assessment  
 
Perceptions of 
prosecutors on 
risk 
assessment  
Number of 
police officers 
Percentage of 
sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutors 
Educating 
victims on risk 
assessment 
safety measures 
 
1 
 
4 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 
Breach of 
restraining 
Orders 
 
2 
 
8 
 
3 
 
1o 
Cyberstalking via 
proxy 
 
2 
 
8 
 
1 
 
3 
Victims refusing  
to be risk 
assessed 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
3 
Total 25 100 27 92 
 
 
The participants expressed their frustration at their inability to investigate and 
prosecute anonymous cyberstalkers whose identities are unknown. Particularly, the  
Participants stressed that they cannot assess the risks to victims that are posed by 
anonymous cyberstalkers. Hence, PO6 expressed frustration that victimisation cannot 
be stopped if the perpetrator is anonymous. Notably, PO6 in the last sentence of his 
extract, said that it is vital to establish the identity of an anonymous cyberstalker to 
enable police officers to risk assess victims; 
 
 
PRO6: “The main problem is the anonymity of cyberstalkers. Also, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean an alleged cyberstalker sent the messages as his computer 
could be hacked. The worrying thing is that most people won’t know how to 
tackle a cyberstalker if the identity of the cyberstalker is anonymous.  I feel that 
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it is crucial to verify the identity of a cyberstalker to enable us to risk assess 
victims”. 
 
 
 
Sub Question: In your opinion, why is the identity of cyberstalkers crucial for 
risk assessment purposes? 
 
PRO6: “It is crucial because the police cannot risk assess victims if the identities 
of cyberstalkers are not know. They are therefore tasked with unveiling the 
identifies of cyberstalkers which is difficult” 
 
Like PO6, PRO22 explained that it is difficult for police officers to assess the dangers 
posed by anonymous cyberstalkers to victims. 
 
Int: What difficulties in your opinion do the police face in the prosecution of  
           cyberstalkers? 
 
 
PRO22: “Police officers cannot access the risks posed by cyberstalkers who 
are anonymous. Risk assessments work when the identities of the offenders 
who pose threats or a danger to victims are known. It is difficult to establish the 
threat posed by anonymous cyberstalkers because the police officers do not 
know who they are”. 
 
Given that the internet affords users the opportunity to create fake online identities and 
to harass victims at random, the participants stressed that another issue which 
frustrates them is that anonymous cyberstalkers are unpredictable which makes it 
difficult for police officers to monitor their actions. Hence PRO12 discussed how the 
unpredictable activities of cyberstalkers who use multiple identities impede the risk 
assessment of victims.   
 
Int: What difficulties do the police face in the prosecution of cyberstalkers? 
 
PRO12: “I will say evidential difficulties in terms of not being able to prosecute 
anonymous cyberstalkers. It is also a difficulty for police officers if they cannot 
carry out risk assessments because a cyberstalker has used various fake online 
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identities. The challenge for police officers is to establish the correct identities 
of cyberstalkers in order to risk assess victims. The two main challenges that 
police officers will have to overcome are that some cyberstalkers victimise via 
third parties and also use publicly accessible computers to send obscene and 
threatening messages to victims from numerous fake internet accounts”. 
 
Similarly, PO13 expressed frustration that the unpredictable actions of anonymous 
cyberstalkers leaves victims on “tenterhooks”; 
 
PO13: “The difficulty that is a major investigative headache is anonymous 
cyberstalkers. Would you believe that in some cases, the risks posed by 
anonymous cyberstalkers cannot be subsequently monitored if initially 
identified? Because anonymous cyberstalkers are unpredictable, victims are 
left on tenterhooks”.  
 
Like PRO12 and PO13, PO21 shared the perception that it is challenging to risk 
assess anonymous cyberstalkers;  
 
PO21: “I would say unveiling the identities of anonymous cyberstalkers. This 
issue has arisen because cyberstalking occurs in the cyber realm and does not 
require perpetrators to have physical contact with victims. This is obviously a 
dilemma for police officers because they cannot conduct risk assessments if 
cyberstalkers cannot be identified”. 
 
 
Similarly, PO25 echoed the views of PRO12 and PO21. Notably, PO25 indicated that 
he could not conduct a risk assessment in a case because the cyberstalker was 
anonymous; 
 
PO25: “Anonymous cyberstalkers are a real stumbling block for us simply 
because it stops us from risk assessing both the cyberstalkers and victims. The 
worry is that we cannot risk assess the danger that victims are in if we do not 
know who the cyberstalkers are. I once investigated a case involving an 
anonymous cyberstalker but could not conduct a risk assessment because the 
cyberstalker was anonymous”. 
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While discussing the unpredictable actions of cyberstalkers as an impediment to the 
risk assessment of victims, the participants shared the frustration that victims in some 
cases, may be unaware of the risks that they face from cyberstalkers. PO14 explained 
that in such cases, victims become aware that they are being cyberstalked only after 
their dilemma has been brought to their attention by a third party; 
 
PO14: “A concern is that in some cases, victims may be totally unaware that 
they are in danger and are being cyberstalked until a third party brings it to their 
attention. This situation arises in cases involving cyberstalkers who create fake 
email and internet accounts in the names of unsuspecting victims and then 
disseminate offensive messages in the names of victims after hacking into their 
internet accounts. It is a concern because we cannot risk assess victims who 
are not aware that they are being victimised”.  
 
 
Similarly, PRO22 expressed frustration at cyberstalking victims for example who 
“refuse to make formal complaints to the police despite their ordeal”. PRO22 explained 
that the issue of underreporting prevents the risk assessment of victims. However, 
unlike PO14, PRO22 referred to victims who are aware that they are being 
cyberstalked and have nevertheless, chosen not to report such incidents to the police.  
 
Likewise, POI expressed frustration at some victims not being aware of the potential 
risks faced by victims is an issue. Therefore, PO1 reiterated in the last sentence of his 
extract that the real problem is trying to manage the risk that the victim faces at the 
hands of cyberstalkers”; 
 
 
PO1: “In summary, a combination of factors will affect the effective investigation 
of cyberstalkers such as barriers to understanding the seriousness of the 
offence, the lack of understanding of potential risks faced by victims, failure of 
victims to pursue a complaint, evidential problems and a poor cultural attitude 
by the law enforcement officers. In theory, it should be easy to track down the 
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cyberstalker once a complaint is made given that the crucial evidence are on 
the computer. The reality, is trying to manage the risk that the victim faces”. 
 
In common with, PO19, PRO3, PRO17 and PRO23, PO10 explained that the 
continued victimisation of individuals by persistent cyberstalkers, frustrates police 
officers because sometimes, convicted cyberstalkers breach restraining orders and 
then commit further offences against victims. PRO10 in his extract, powerfully 
illustrated that some cyberstalkers are not deterred by restraining orders;   
 
PO10: “Sometimes offenders continue to offend despite legal sanctions. For 
example, I reviewed a rape case which involved a cyberstalker who had been 
in a relationship with the victim. The cyberstalker raped the victim after 
breaching a restraining order and then hacked her email account and sent out 
obscene messages in the victim’s name. The police officer who investigated 
the case was frustrated by the case because the case demonstrates that 
restraining orders may not deter cyberstalkers in certain cases. The problem is 
that victims in such domestic violence cases will continue to be at risk from 
persistent offenders”.  
 
While discussing the difficulties the police face in the prosecution of cyberstalkers, the 
participants expressed frustration at victims who are aware of imminent risks at the 
hands of cyberstalkers but refuse to implement recommended safety measures after 
being risk assessed. PO7’s extract demonstrates the frustration felt by police officers 
when victims refuse to implement recommended risk assessment safety measures; 
 
PO7: “In addition to investigative difficulties, an issue which I feel needs to be 
highlighted is that sometimes, victims refuse to implement recommended risk 
assessment safety measures after being risk assessed. This is a nightmare for 
police officers because such decisions, jeopardize the efforts of police officers 
to manage the risk to victims. 
 
Like PO7, PO21 discussed the reluctance of some victims to implement recommended 
risk assessment safety measures. Although PO21 acknowledged the reasons given 
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by victims at the end of his extract, he stated that personal safety should take priority 
over pride; 
 
 
PO21: “It is frustrating for police officers when victims do not implement risk 
assessment safety measures. I say this because, some of the victims that I risk 
assessed refused to change or remove their personal details from the internet 
because of business implications and because, they did not want to give the 
cyberstalkers the satisfaction that they were controlling their lives. In the grand 
scheme of things, personal safety comes first before pride”. 
 
 
Given the risk assessment difficulties highlighted by the participants, many of the 
participants shared the perception that managing the risks to victims in domestic 
violence cases specifically is frustrating. Particularly, PRO20 highlighted the issue of 
victims having intermittent relationships with cyberstalkers which makes it difficult for 
police officers to guarantee the safety of victims. PRO20’s extract, powerfully 
illustrates the frustration felt by police officers, as demonstrated in the end of the 
extract, wherein PRO20 questioned how police officers are expected to risk assess 
victims who are refusing to cooperate;  
 
 
PRO20: “Police officers sometimes, encounter problems in risk assessing 
domestic violence victims if the victims still want to maintain relationships with 
the cyberstalkers especially if she has a child with the cyberstalker. This 
situation may result in the victim refusing to be risk assessed. This can be 
frustrating for us especially when we are aware of the risks and can foresee the 
danger that victims are in”. 
 
When discussing the factors which hinder police officers from risk assessing victims 
in domestic violence cases, the participants also expressed the view that sometimes, 
victims withhold information on the gravity of the cyberstalking incidents that they have 
been subjected to. The participants revealed that this lack of disclosure prevents police 
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officers from fully establishing the risks or potential risks that victims face. PRO14’s 
extract, powerfully illustrates the frustration felt by police officers; 
 
 
PRO14: “Victims withholding crucial evidence. When victims decide to rekindle 
relationships with former partners who are under investigation for cyberstalking 
and domestic violence offences, such decisions place victims at risk from the 
cyberstalkers because they can be unpredictable. It is equally infuriating for 
police officers because it wastes the time of police officers who are trying to 
keep victims safe from potentially dangerous cyberstalkers”.  
 
 
The participants discussed how evidential difficulties, can hinder the risk assessment 
of victims. Hence, PRO9 confirmed the views of the participants especially in relation 
to victims in domestic violence cases withholding evidence; 
 
 
PRO9: “There is also the issue of risk assessing victims in domestic violence 
cases who appear to still want a relationship with the cyberstalker. Obviously in 
domestic violence cases, risk assessments will be conducted to protect the 
victim and police officers will be required to manage the identified risks. But 
how can the risks be managed in domestic violence cases for example where 
the victim is still in contact with the cyberstalker and subsequently decides not 
to support a prosecution? In such cases, the cyberstalker’s activities could be 
a means of controlling a victim who has been in an abusive relationship for a 
while. Another issue is that if the victim in a domestic violence case does not 
reveal the true scale of a cyberstalker’s harassment, the police may be unable 
to accurately assess the severity of the situation”.  
 
The participants also, shared the view that it is challenging for police officers to conduct 
risk assessments when cyberstalkers victimise via proxy. Hence, PO22 stated that 
“cyberstalking via proxy is an impediment to the risk assessment of victims especially 
if it involves anonymous cyberstalkers using unsuspecting third parties to target 
victims”. 
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While discussing the evidential challenges in investigating domestic violence cases, 
the police officers expressed frustration at not being able to conduct investigations 
quickly to avoid fatalities. Consequently, PO5 described the situation as a “vicious 
cycle” and asserted in the last statement of his extract that “there are no absolute 
guarantees with the management of risks”; 
 
PO5: “If the cyberstalker is in the UK, we have to speed up the investigation 
and do things much quicker to avoid any fatality and vice versa. The difficulty 
is how can we as police officers be sure that an anonymous cyberstalker is not 
abroad? Which brings us back to having to rely on the evidence. Most of the 
time, there is no evidence because the cyberstalker is usually anonymous and 
as such, we rely on the victim and we advise them to keep records of any emails 
or computer messages from the cyberstalkers. Do you see the predicament we 
face? It is a vicious cycle to investigate. To investigate properly, we need the 
evidence and at the moment, we are struggling to get the evidence. There are 
no absolute guarantees with the management of risks to victims”.  
 
 
Remarkably, PO6 acknowledged that there is a possibility that a police officer may 
make an error in risk assessing victims because he will be required to establish the 
realistic risk to a victim based on his personal judgement. It is important to note that 
no other participant shared this view; 
           
PO6: “The initial difficulty is the risk management because an investigating 
police officer will need to establish the realistic risk to the victim.  Because it is 
subjective and based on an individual police officer’s judgement, there is a 
possibility that a police officer might get it wrong. If a victim has reported an 
incident after 6 months, it is less likely to be serious compared to if a victim has 
reported an incident immediately after it happened”.  
 
While discussing the difficulties that the police face in the risk assessment of victims, 
PO17 highlighted that if required, the police take special measures to protect victims. 
Hence PO17 in his extract, discussed the measures that were implemented to 
guarantee the safety of a victim in a domestic violence case. However, PO17 did not 
confirm if this was common practice;  
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PO17: “Risk assessing victims. This is not always possible if the cyberstalkers 
cannot be identified”. 
 
 
Int: Did you take any measures to protect victims?  
\. 
 
PO17 “Yes. In a case that I investigated, the victim’s address was put under a 
special scheme which meant that any phone call from her address was treated 
as urgent and received a quicker response. She was also given advice on what 
to do and the safety measures to take”.  
 
While discussing the risk assessment of cyberstalkers whose identities are known, 
some police officers shared the frustration that it was impossible to eliminate the risks 
to victims even if the identity of a cyberstalker is known. The participants expressed 
the view that the safety of victims cannot be absolutely guaranteed because 
sometimes, cyberstalkers breach restraining orders which prohibit offenders from 
contacting victims. Echoing this view PO19 discussed the risk assessment of 
cyberstalking victims in domestic violence cases; 
 
PO19: “The issue that we face in terms of protecting victims is that police 
officers cannot always predict if former partners will breach restraining orders 
or murder their partners because absolute guarantees cannot be given in the 
management of risks. It is very frustrating when cyberstalkers breach 
restraining orders because, they jeopardize all the risk assessment safety 
measures that have been put in place to protect victims”. 
 
It is of note that, PRO5 reiterated the view of PRO19 by highlighting the case of Claire 
Bernal who was murdered by her former boyfriend after being stalked face to face and 
cyberstalked via phone; 
 
PRO5: “The Protection from Harassment Act has been around since 19997 so 
more officers are aware of the legislation. Also, the case of Claire Bernal who 
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was cyberstalked by her ex-partner and then murdered in the Harvey Nichols 
shop, puts the case in the public agenda. The defendant later killed the victim 
while on bail even though a restraining order was in place The case did a lot for 
the government to make them take the offence seriously”. 
 
In conclusion, the majority of the participants expressed their frustration at several 
factors which hinder the police officers from risk assessing and managing the risk to 
victims. The factors include anonymous cyberstalkers, victims refusing to implement 
recommended risk assessment safety measures, breach of restraining orders, victims 
in domestic violence cases rekindling relationships with cyberstalkers and 
underreporting.  
 
4.3.6 Theme 6: Evidential challenges 
 
‘Evidential difficulties’ was the sixth main theme that emerged from the interview data. 
Crucially, all of the police officers and 91% of the prosecutors shared the perception 
that various perceived evidential difficulties frustrate them during the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. The perceived evidential difficulties are delays by police 
officers in providing outstanding evidence, inability of prosecutors to make charging 
decisions due to insufficient evidence, reluctance of domestic violence victims to 
support  the prosecution of cyberstalkers,  establishing offences under the PHA, the 
inability of police officers to trace anonymous cyber stalkers to unregistered cards and 
the inability of police officers to unveil the identities of anonymous cyberstalkers.  
The police officers and prosecutors identified 11 perceived evidential difficulties which 
frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The perceived 
issues are presented in Table 4.13. 
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Table 4.13: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on evidential 
challenges  
Perceptions of 
participants on 
evidential 
difficulties 
Number of 
police officers 
Percentage of 
sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutors 
Victims not 
keeping 
evidential 
records 
1 4 0 0 
Police officers 
not providing 
further evidence 
once  suspects 
have been 
charged 
0 0 4 13 
Prosecutors 
having to 
repeatedly chase 
police officers for 
evidence  
0 0 3 10 
Not obtaining 
CPS charging 
decisions due to 
lack of evidence   
3 12 5 17 
Establishing a 
course of 
conduct under 
section 7 of the 
PHA 
2 8 3 10 
Cases having to 
be discontinued 
due to a lack of 
evidence 
 
1 4 1 3 
Obtaining 
evidence from 
victims in 
domestic 
violence cases 
6 24 4 13 
Insufficient 
evidence to 
prosecute 
2 8 3 10 
 
 
 
264 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on evidential 
challenges  
 
Perceptions of 
participants on 
evidential 
difficulties 
Number of 
police officers 
Percentage of 
sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutors 
Domestic 
violence victims 
not reporting 
cases 
0 0 1 3 
Proving a case 
under s4A of the 
PHA 
0 0 1 3 
Anonymous 
cyberstalkers are 
one step ahead 
of police officers 
2 8 0 0 
Evidence in the 
cloud 
1 4 0 0 
Unregistered 
SIM cards 
2 8 0 0 
Registered SIM 
cards 
0 0 1 3 
Using lost or 
stolen phones 
2 8 0 0 
Impact of 
disclosure on 
victims 
0 0 1 3 
Prosecuting 
mentally ill 
Cyberstalkers 
3 12 0 0 
Police delays in 
providing 
evidence 
0 0 1 3 
Total 25 100 28 91 
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While discussing how lack of evidence can hinder prosecutors from making charging 
decisions, the prosecutors expressed frustration at not being able to obtain evidence 
from the cyberstalking victims in domestic violence cases. 
 
PO10’s extract illustrated the participant’s frustrations at victims withholding crucial 
evidence from the police.  The tone of PO10’s extract demonstrates this in relation to 
the perceived problem of victims withholding evidence from the police; 
 
 
PO10: “Obtaining evidence from the victim may be challenging in domestic 
violence cases which involve victims who no longer wish to support the 
prosecution of offenders. This can be infuriating if it results in charges being 
withdrawn”.  
 
Similarly, while discussing evidential difficulties which impede prosecutors from 
charging offenders, PO14 expressed frustration at the inability of some police officers 
to provide all the evidence that the prosecutors require to charge offenders within CPS 
deadlines. However, PO14 acknowledged that the delay in providing evidence after 
suspects have been charged was due to the fact that police officers have to prioritise 
their work and are under pressure which may lead to other cases that are perceived 
to be more serious, being investigated first; 
 
 
PO14: “The CPS always require more evidence after suspects have been 
charged. The problem is that we prioritise our work and may not provide the 
evidence required when the prosecutors want them. We are under a lot of 
pressure to provide additional evidence in several cases”. 
 
Likewise, PO19 echoed the views of PO10 and PO14. However, PO19 suggested that 
the delay by police officers in providing outstanding evidence is linked to the high CPS 
evidential threshold; 
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PO19: “A major problem is meeting the high CPS evidential threshold because, 
the prosecutors may request additional evidence which make take a while for 
us to obtain. I think that the evidential threshold is very high which is why we 
struggle to meet the threshold in some cases”. 
 
 
Similarly, the participants shared the perception that evidential difficulties can hinder 
them from proving cases due to this high evidential threshold PR020 highlights this in 
the following extract;  
 
 
 
PRO20: “Proving a case is dependent on whether prosecutors can satisfy the 
evidential and the public interest tests. The evidential threshold is very high. 
The threshold can only be met if police officers provide the necessary evidence. 
Obtaining the evidence however, can be challenging”. 
 
 
 
While discussing the difficulties police face in the prosecution of cyberstalkers, the 
participants shared the frustration that prosecutors find themselves having to 
repeatedly request outstanding evidence from police officers. Therefore, PRO7 
explained that it is frustrating for prosecutors when they have to repeatedly chase 
police officers for outstanding evidence because it prevents prosecutors in some 
cases from making charging decisions. However, at the end of their extract, PR07 
acknowledges that police officers are overworked; 
 
 
PRO7: “The length of time that it takes for police officers to provide the required 
evidence. This issue is frustrating for us because it results in prosecutors having 
to repeatedly chase police officers for outstanding evidence. The police always 
say that they are investigating several cases at the same time. Some do not 
realise that we as prosecutors cannot prepare robust cases against suspects 
without the required evidence. Most of the officers in my cases tell me that they 
are overworked” 
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Like PRO7, PRO22 stated that prosecutors are unable to progress cases due to lack 
of evidence from the police. Particularly, PRO22 said that CPS charging decisions 
may not be provided due to lack of evidence from the police. Hence, PRO22’s extract 
highlighted his frustration that the ordeal of victims at the hands of cyberstalkers, will 
be prolonged due to the delay by police officers in providing outstanding evidence. 
Importantly, at the end of the extract, PRO22 linked the problem of lack of evidence to 
the misguided perception that cyberstalking is not a serious offence;   
 
PRO22: “Due to lack of evidence, a charging decision may not be promptly 
obtained from the CPS.  Prosecutors can only make prompt charging decisions 
once all the required evidence is provided by the police. Prosecutors can only 
decide if there is sufficient evidence to charge a person when the police provide 
the evidence that they have against an accused. In my view, an evidential 
challenge is not obtaining prompt charging decisions due to lack of evidence. 
The problem has arisen because not everyone considers cyberstalking a grave 
offence”.  
 
 
Similarly, some of the of the participants linked the highlighted evidential difficulties to 
the perceived problem of police officers prioritising cases perceived to more serious 
over cyberstalking.  Hence PO16 explained that cyberstalking is an offence which is 
committed in the cyber realm and will be therefore be “at the bottom of the pile” 
because it is perceived to be a “self-inflicted” offence by some people;  
 
 
PO16: “Police officers dealing with more serious cases may be reluctant to 
prioritise a cyberstalking case because it merely involves harassment 
conducted in cyber space. I think that cases involving online harassment will be 
at the bottom of the pile because cyberstalking is a new offence which is 
perceived by some as self-inflicted because it is not mandatory for people to be 
part of the social media world given the dangers that are associated with being 
part of the online world. As a result, the offence may not be taken seriously. 
Also, if there is no obvious danger to the life of the victim, trying to establish 
whether a cyberstalker poses a real or current risk may delay the investigation 
of such cases”. 
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PRO30 echoed the frustrations of PRO7, PRO22 and PO16 that some police officers 
do not realise that they are still required to submit additional evidence after a 
cyberstalker has been charged. At the end of his extract, he stressed that prosecutors 
are tasked with contacting police officers repeatedly for outstanding evidence to 
ensure that cases are progressed;  
 
PO1: “Obtaining the required evidence from the police promptly. Police officers 
do not realize that they are still required to submit additional evidence after a 
cyberstalker has been charged. If the evidence is provided promptly, 
prosecutors are able to charge cyberstalkers with appropriate offences. The 
problem is that prosecutors like end up contacting the police repeatedly for 
previously requested evidence after charge”.  
 
 
 
While discussing the cyberstalking issues that need to be addressed, the participants 
shared the perception that it will be difficult to obtain advice from prosecutors to charge 
a cyberstalker under s4 of the PHA if the cyberstalker is anonymous. PRO22’s extract 
highlighted his frustration at anonymous cyberstalkers evading justice after committing 
offences under s4 of the PHA. However, at the end of the extract, PRO22 reveals that 
sometimes, cyberstalking is linked to other criminal conducts and consequently, it  may 
be difficult to promptly build a case against an accused because the other charges 
may take prosecutors a long time to review; 
 
PRO22: The issue is with the evidential gathering process to proof that  
anonymous cyberstalkers  have committed offence of causing fear of violence 
has been committed under s4 of the PHA. This in my opinion is an annoying 
issue which makes the jobs of police officers and prosecutors so much more 
difficult because we cannot prosecute without the relevant evidence. We cannot 
prove that there is sufficient evidence to realistically prosecute a cyberstalker if 
the cyberstalker is anonymous. This may lead to them evading justice. Another 
problem is that sometimes, cyberstalking is associated with other criminal 
conducts such as threats to kill, criminal damage and so on which are linked to 
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stalking and harassment but yet, it may be difficult to build a case against a 
suspect because of the other charges may take prosecutors ages to sift 
through”. 
 
Similarly, the participants expressed the view that because cyberstalking is not 
perceived to be as serious as face to face stalking, it is difficult to show that a fear of 
violence has been committed in certain cases under s4 of the PHA. PRO19 in his 
extract, powerfully illustrated that some cyberstalkers are not deterred by restraining 
orders;   
 
PRO10: “I once reviewed a cyberstalking case. Due to the fact that the 
harassment was not deemed to be an immediate threat to the victim’s life, the 
actions of the stalker fell short of creating the fear of violence. We could not 
prove that the cyberstalker created a fear of violence. Not being able to satisfy 
such legal requirements can unfortunately mean that cases cannot be proved. 
This obstacle can constitute a stumbling block for prosecutors”. 
 
Int: In your opinion what other legal requirements can determine if cases be 
prosecuted? 
 
PRO10: “There are several areas of legal difficulties that can be infuriating such 
as police officers not being able to obtain sufficient strong evidence to connect 
suspects to cases. This Evidential Test needs to be satisfied under the code for 
crown prosecutors. Without the evidence, we cannot build cases. Then there is 
the legal issues of having to prove that a cyberstalker’s actions towards a victim 
created fear of violence to make out the offence. The other legal issue that I 
can think of is the fact that a cyberstalker can claim that a third party hacked 
into his computer and disseminated offences messages to the victim in his 
name. This area of legal difficulty will require us to rely on expert digital forensic 
expert evidence to connect a cyberstalker to an offence. So specialist 
knowledge will be required”.  
 
Given that prosecutors cannot prove that there is a realistic prospect of convicting 
offenders without sufficient evidence from the police, some prosecutors expressed 
frustration that cases may be discontinued due to lack of evidence. The participants 
expressed the view that the inability of police officers to provide outstanding evidence 
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within stipulated court deadlines can become exasperating for prosecutors because it 
can lead to the prosecution missing various deadlines to comply with court directions. 
PRO22 in his extract, powerfully illustrated the frustration of the prosecutors who 
perceive lack of evidence as a factor which leads to cases being discontinued;  
 
PRO22: “Police officers not promptly provide outstanding evidence from victims 
or not providing the evidence required to build cases against cyberstalkers. This 
issue is never ending for prosecutors because they constantly have to chase 
police officers and their supervisors for outstanding evidence. This is more 
frustrating because the lack of evidence can lead to offenders not being 
charged and cases being discontinued”.  
 
Likewise, the prosecutors shared their frustration at not being able to build strong 
cases against offenders in some domestic violence cases due to insufficient evidence. 
Hence, PRO26 emphasised that an issue which frustrates them is that it may be 
difficult to meet the CPS evidential threshold. However, at the end of the extract, 
PRO26 expressed the concern that the evidential problem will stop victims especially 
in domestic violence cases from reporting incidents; 
 
PRO26: “We are constantly faced with the problem of police officers providing 
insufficient evidence which means that in some cases prosecutor cannot satisfy 
the Evidential Test that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic 
prospect of conviction against a suspect on each charge. The bigger worry for 
me is that victims will lose faith in the criminal justice system if they report cases 
of cyberstalking and are told by the police that there is insufficient evidence to 
take the cyberstalkers to court. This may stop victims from reporting cases. It is 
very concerning because in some domestic violence cases, cyberstalking can 
lead to fatalities”.  
 
 
Similarly, PRO25 expressed frustration at the inability of police officers to investigate 
and prosecute anonymous cyberstalkers; 
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PRO25:  “There is the problem of identifying the cyberstalker. How can we get 
him to trial if we cannot find him?  If we do not know his identity? Assuming that 
you eventually get a cyberstalker to court, how do you prove that the 
cyberstalker was the originator of the message? You will need to provide expert 
report to say that the message came from his computer and confirming that the 
computer was not hacked into. You will have to establish that the computer was 
secure. It will have to be shown that the cyberstalker had physical access to the 
computer. In relation to the contents of the messages, it has to be determined 
whether the contents of the messages pass the test of harassment or malicious 
communications. In relation to the internet service providers, the issue of 
proportionality will need to be addressed. We struggle to get them to cooperate 
with serious offences let alone cyberstalking offences”.  
 
Like PRO25, PO21 expressed frustration that it will be challenging for police officers 
to prosecute cyberstalkers due to evidential difficulties. Worryingly, in the last sentence 
of his extract, PO21 concluded that “we can overcome the technical difficulties but we 
cannot overcome the evidential difficulties”; 
 
PO21:  “Because we as police officers may track online malicious activities to 
a cyberstalker but will then face the difficulty of proving that the cyberstalker 
sent the offensive messages for example if he claims that he was living in a 
shared accommodation  and as such, anyone could have used the computer to 
send the messages. The problem we then face has to prove that such an 
alleged cyberstalker used the computer. How for instance do you establish that 
an alleged cyberstalker sent the offensive online messages when he claims that 
a third party hacked into his computer? How does a police officer prove the time 
that it was sent, the location, the identity of the sender and the identities of the 
various people who could have potentially accessed the computer or had 
access to the computer? Police officers therefore face technical difficulties in 
trying to investigate the conduct by the very nature of the definition of the 
conduct”.  
 
While discussing the issues which define cyberstalking, PRO24 talked about evidential 
challenges that prosecutors and police officers encounter when prosecuting offenders 
in domestic violence cases. Particularly, PRO9 highlighted the issue of victims 
subsequently wishing to maintain relationships with cyberstalkers after making formal 
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complaints. PRO9 explained that this issue is particularly frustrating in child custody 
cases especially because it results in victims withholding evidence from the police; 
 
 
PRO24: “An issue is how cyberstalkers in domestic violence cases define 
course of conduct under the PHA. I prosecuted a case involving a cyberstalker 
who argued that his actions were reasonable because still wanted to maintain 
a relationship with the victim”. 
 
Int: In your opinion why is it challenging to investigate cyberstalkers in domestic 
violence cases? 
 
PO24:  “The main reason is that the victim may still want a relationship with the 
cyberstalker especially if she a child with him and as such, may not reveal all 
the threatening messages that she has been receiving from him. The problem 
is that prosecutors require the electronic evidence to build strong cases against 
cyberstalkers and to show that there is a realistic prospect of convicting them. 
The legal issue which frustrates us is that we cannot prosecute cyberstalkers 
without sufficient evidence. We are led by the victims. If the victim says that she 
consented to the conduct, can we prove that an offence has been committed? 
The victim has to spell out the nature and effect of the conduct”. 
 
The participants also, expressed frustration at cyberstalkers who victimise via phones 
and then try to evade justice by claiming that they did not harass the victims because 
their phones were either lost or stolen. Notably, PO23 revealed that he had lost a lot 
of cases because the police could not prove that suspects who claimed that their 
phones were lost or stolen, sent telephone messages or internet messages to specific 
victims; 
  
                                                                     
PO23: “I used to work in the Domestic Violence Unit and investigated 
harassment cases some of which related to cyberstalking coming to think of 
it…… For example I had cases where the victim was receiving text messages, 
annoying telephone messages persistently from the suspects. Sometimes the 
suspects will call the victims at odd times of the night and then hang up the 
telephone. I lost a lot of the cases because we could not prove that the suspect 
sent the telephone messages or internet messages because although the 
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telephones were registered to them they often claimed that their telephone was 
stolen or lost and that they did not send the messages. So you had victims who 
were still suffering and receiving telephone calls at the middle of the night”. 
 
Similarly, the participants expressed their frustration at how difficult it is to gather 
evidence against cyberstalkers who use ‘pay as you go ‘phones with unregistered SIM 
cards to harass victims; 
 
                                                                     
PO14:  “I have investigated cases involving cyberstalkers who use  emails, 
letters, Twitter, Facebook to harass victims and most of the time the suspect do 
not use correctly registered phone or ISP details. I think they give false 
information to the ISPs. I am dealing with one which has been going on for 
years. This guy has been phoning and texting his victim using unregistered SIM 
cards and phones. I have been doing several checks. He has used at least 30 
different SIM cards and our records show that he has used different systems to 
harass the victim. Now the victim is on anti-depressants and her kids have a 
phobia of answering the telephone, this situation is frustrating not only for me, 
but for the poor victim”. 
 
 
 Int: In your opinion, why is the issue frustrating? 
 
PO14: “Because, most of the times as I explained, the cyberstalker uses false 
details to obtain to obtain his phones or to register with ISPs or sometimes buys 
phones with unregistered SIM cards.  It then requires a lot of police time 
resources and procedure to track down the cyberstalker.  In many of my cases, 
the cyberstalkers registered false details with Virgin Media, The current case 
that I am investigating has led me to Greenfield, Derby and all across the 
country” 
 
 
Like PO14, PO16 expressed frustration that some anonymous cyberstalkers who 
offend via the use of unregistered mobile phones evade justice because they cannot 
be traced by police officers. PO16 expressed additional frustration that the 
investigation of such futile cases, leads to the wastage of limited police resources; 
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PO16: “One of the major problems is that the cyberstalkers use unregistered 
phones it is difficult to track them down as a result, a lot of them cannot be 
traced.  In addition, it is very time consuming to investigate the case and leads 
to the wastage of limited police resources in terms of manpower, time and 
finance...” 
 
Sub Question: In your opinion, why is it difficult to trace such suspects? 
 
PO16: “At the moment there is no requirement or legislation compelling 
customers to register their correct details once a phone is purchased or an 
internet account is opened. The anomaly makes it easier for the cyberstalkers 
to commit the crimes without arguably being traced”. 
 
Like PO23, when discussing cyberstalkers who stalk victims using mobile phones to 
send obscene electronic text messages, P029 expressed frustration that in some 
cases, it was  difficult for police officers to connect cyberstalkers who have registered 
telephones to offences which could result in cases being lost; 
 
PO29: “There is a massive problem where you have a victim that shows you 
their mobile phone with a message that they received but we do not know where 
the message came from. The suspect might say that he did not send the 
message and that someone else stole his phone which was lost or that 
someone else used his phone without his knowledge.  How can we prove that 
an offence has been committed in such a case even though the phone is 
registered to the suspect?” 
 
The participants also expressed frustration that an anonymous cyberstalker cannot be 
prosecuted especially where he uses a phone that has been registered with fake 
personal details. Hence PRO7 said that “cyberstalkers are one step ahead of police 
officers; 
 
 
PRO7: “The major one is that because it will be difficult to arrest, interview, and 
charge a cyberstalker if he is anonymous. This is where the issue with the 
evidential difficult arises. The other problem is that it will be difficult to prosecute 
a cyberstalker who uses a registered SIM card and several pay as you go 
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phones to target victims. This problem is kind of linked to the fact that 
cyberstalker can use false details to create fake accounts for cyberstalking. The 
problem as it stands today unfortunately puts cyberstalkers one step ahead of 
the police officers because cyberstalkers cannot be prosecuted unless they are 
identified and evidentially connected to offences, They know this too which is 
why some of then cover their tracks online”.  
 
While discussing the difficulties that police officers face in the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers, many of the participants also expressed frustration at the ISPs who do 
not promptly provide the required evidence which prolongs the ordeal of victims. 
Hence PRO26 highlighted in the last sentence of his extract, the issue of victims not 
having faith in the criminal justice system if offenders are not prosecuted due to 
evidential difficulties; 
 
 
PRO26: “It is a pain to work with the network providers. In the midst of all this 
delay, there are victims who are still being harassed and whose harassment 
ordeal are ongoing. There is an issue with the evidence gathering process 
because it is difficult to obtain evidence from some of the ISPs. The danger is 
that it could result in victims losing faith in the criminal justice system”.  
 
 
It is important to note that PO11 linked the reluctance of some ISPs to provide 
outstanding evidence to the perception that cyberstalking is not deemed by some to 
be a serious offence; 
 
PO11:  “ISPs should be made to promptly provide the information required on 
the same day to prevent the court from giving judges orders. The ISPs do not 
believe that cyberstalking is a serious offence which is why this problem exists”.  
  
Like PO11, PO20 shared the perception that the ISPs are not very helpful in 
investigating cybercrime offences. In making this point, PO2O in his extract, referred 
to the online of 5 year old April Jones who was murdered by a paedophile after being 
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abducted. It is important to note that PO20 highlighted that cyberstalking can be linked 
to online grooming in certain cases;  
 
 
 
PO20:“Police officers can’t get help from Facebook when required. This 
problem is becoming more and more relevant now and was apparent in the 
case of April Jones who was kidnapped, raped and murdered by a paedophile 
who assessed 400 websites depicting child sexual abuse online and 
pornography. This is a dangerous situation which can enable cyberstalkers who 
are paedophiles to target children”. 
 
Likewise, PRO18 expressed frustration at the ISPs who were perceived to use data 
protection laws as an excuse for not releasing details of cyberstalkers. Hence, PO18 
in his extract, highlighted that police officers sometimes, resort to seizing the 
computers of suspects to obtain the required evidence; 
 
 
 
 
PO18: “The internet service provider should make it easier for the police to 
access information about cyberstalkers. Sometimes, they are not helpful and 
as a result, police officers are forced to seize the computers of victims in order 
to identify the cyberstalkers. This is unfair on victims. There should be a 
system similar to the medical consent forms to stop the internet service 
providers from using data protection laws as an excuse for not releasing the 
details of cyberstalkers”. 
 
 
Int: In your opinion, why is it difficult to trace suspects? 
 
PO18: “At the moment, there is no requirement for legislation compelling 
customers to register their correct details once a phone is purchased or an 
internet account is opened. The anomaly make it easier for cyberstalkers to 
commit the crimes with fake accounts without being traced”. 
 
 
While discussing the difficulties that police officers face in the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers, the participants shared the perception that it is evidentially challenging 
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to obtain the subscribers details of alleged cyberstalkers from ISPs. Hence PO2 in his 
extract, echoed the views of the other participants; 
 
 
 
PO2: “The ISPs, are usually hesitant to assist us which is an investigative 
obstacle. It is a challenge to obtain the IP addresses of subscribers suspected 
of alleged cyberstalking incidents. This issue creates an obstacle in the 
investigation process and thereby allows cyberstalkers to hide behind the veil 
of anonymity”.  
 
 
While discussing people who do not take care of their phones thereby allowing such 
phones to be used by criminals to commit cyberstalking offences out of sheer 
frustration, PO3 expressed the view that such individuals should be penalized. PO3’s 
expressed frustration that he had lost some cases as result of this issue;  
 
 
PO3: “Laws are required to penalise individuals who do not take adequate 
responsibility for their phones which are used to commit crimes. There should 
be legal sanctions because it makes it difficult for the police officers to 
investigate or prove such cyberstalking cases. I have lost a lot of cases on this 
point and it is frustrating”. 
 
Similarly, PRO5 expressed the view that it is difficult to obtain evidence from the 
cloud which makes it challenging to trace victims;  
 
PRO15:  “The issue of offences occurring in the cloud makes it difficult to trace 
victims”.  
 
While discussing alleged cyberstalkers who live in shared accommodations and 
share passwords with a third party, PO24 expressed the view that in such cases, it 
may be difficult to connect a suspect if the offenders claim that someone else sent 
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the messages to a victims. PO24 in line 2 of his extract, echoes the views of the 
participants; 
 
Int: In your opinion, why is it evidentially difficult to build a case against a 
cyberstalker? 
 
 
PO24: “Because we as police officers may track online malicious activities to a 
cyberstalker but will then face the difficulty of proving that the cyberstalker sent 
the offensive messages for example if he claims that he is living in shared 
accommodation and as such, anyone could have used the computer to send 
the messages because they all share the same password for the computer”. 
 
 
Like PO24, PRO21 expressed frustration at police officers who cannot link anonymous 
cyberstalkers to IP addresses.  PRO21’s extract echoes the views of the participants; 
 
PRO21: “It is very difficult evidentially to build a case against a defendant. 
There is big reliance on IT or computer experts. It is a very difficult offence to 
prove. Plus harassment can occur by proxy. Also, people can send messages 
using another person’s account. For example when couples share passwords. 
Even if you obtain the IP addresses, it does not mean anything as people break 
into the IT addresses if they know how to.  Also, there is an anonymous website 
which innocently implicates victims. The people who have set up the 
anonymous websites cannot be traced down as they may have 2,000 different 
sources. Paedophiles use these websites. Defendants are trying to be a step 
ahead. Evidentially, it is not easy to prove a case as you have to prove that the 
defendant used the IP addresses linked to offences”. 
 
 
The participants also shared the view that the various evidential difficulties can result 
in cyberstalkers evading justice. Consequently, PRO9’s extract below reiterated the 
views of the other participants using the phrase “toxic mix of problems” to refer to the 
various evidential difficulties;  
 
            
PR09: “Obtaining evidence is the primary issue. This can have an adverse 
impact on the investigation process and leading offenders not being 
prosecuted”. 
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Int: “In your opinion, how does the issue of evidential difficulty an adverse 
impact on the investigation process? 
 
PR09: “Generally speaking it makes police officers become disillusioned 
because they are unable to do their job of investigating and prosecuting 
cyberstalking and also protecting victims due to the toxic mix of problems. It 
might lead to the time and effort that has been put into investigating cases going 
down the drain if cases cannot be proved due to a lack of evidence”. 
 
Notably, PO23 explained that sometimes, “cases are lost on little things” because it is 
difficult to obtain all the evidence that the CPS requires to prosecute offenders. 
Remarkably, from a personal experience, PO23 also indicated that he felt that the 
existing law was not effective in protecting victims. PO23 in his extract, appeared to 
link his perception that the laws are “poor” to his believe that “cases are lost on little 
things”; 
 
PO3: “My sister was cyber stalked by her ex- partner for a while and we found 
the law poor. Not very effective in protecting victims. It is very hard on the 
borough to get all the evidence that is required  and to get what the CPS 
wants and then you end up losing the case on little things”.  
 
Notably, the participants expressed frustration at the solicitors of mentally ill 
cyberstalkers who take a long time to provide medical evidence on a cyberstalker’s 
mental illness.  Consequently, PRO15 said that it may be difficult to prosecute a 
cyberstalker who is mentally ill due to delays in trials caused by defence. In the last 
sentence of his extract, PO15 revealed that such delays leave victims feeling anxious; 
 
 
 
PRO15: “An issue that is often overlooked is that it may be difficult to prosecute 
a cyberstalker who is mentally ill and requires treatment. In such cases his 
solicitors will inform the court that they will have the suspect assessed by a 
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psychiatrist to establish if he is fit to enter a plea. For prosecutors, it is frustrating 
when defence take a long time to provide the outstanding medical evidence 
which ends up delaying trials and making victims feeling anxious and desperate 
for trials to take place so that they can obtain closure”. 
 
 
In conclusion, the above observations highlight the shared perceptions of the 
participants on how evidential difficulties hinder police officers and prosecutors form 
bringing cyberstalkers to justice. Table 4.13 indicates that the police officers and 
prosecutors, identified 11 areas of evidential difficulties. 
 
4.3.7 Theme 7: Victim behaviour  
 
 
‘Victim Behaviour’ was the seventh and final theme identified in the study. Crucially, 
all of the police officers and 95% of the prosecutors shared the perception that various, 
perceived, evidential difficulties frustrate them during the investigation and prosecution 
of cyberstalkers. The perceived issue of victim behaviour concerns victims not 
supporting prosecutions, refusing to testify, lack of full disclosure, cross 
communicating with cyberstalkers, withholding information and not reporting offences. 
 
The prosecutors and police officers highlighted 11 and 13 (respectively) aspects of 
victim behaviour which frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of 
cyberstalkers. These are presented in Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.14: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on victim 
behaviour 
Victim 
Behaviour  
Number of 
police 
officers  
Percentage 
of sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of 
prosecutor 
sample 
Not supporting 
prosecutions 
       4        16        6       20 
Refusing to 
testify 
        0           0         9       30 
Refusing to go 
through the 
stress of trials 
       2                 8         1       3 
Cross 
communicating 
with 
Cyberstalkers 
        0          0         3 
 
      10 
Lack of full 
disclosure 
        2          8         3        10 
Unwilling to 
spell out the 
effects and 
nature of 
incidents 
        1               4         0        0 
Lack of 
confidence in 
the police 
3 12 1 3 
Withdrawal of 
allegations 
        4        16        0       0 
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Table 4.14: Perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on victim 
behaviour 
Victim 
Behaviour  
Number of 
police 
officers  
Percentage 
of sample 
Number of 
prosecutors 
Percentage 
of prosecutor 
sample 
Fear of 
repercussions 
       0          0          1         3 
Perception that 
that cases will 
be dropped 
        1          4           0         0 
Breakdown of 
trust between 
the public and 
the police 
        1          4           0          0 
Not reporting 
offences 
3 12 1 3 
Delays  in 
reporting  
incidents 
        0           0           1           3 
Disclosing 
personal 
information on 
the internet 
1 4 0 0 
Continuing 
relationships 
with 
Cyberstalkers 
2 8 0 0 
Withholding 
information on 
the gravity 
offences 
        1         4             3       10 
Total 25 100 29 95 
283 
 
 
The participants expressed frustration at victims who do not report cyberstalking 
incidents to the police or delay before reporting such incidents.  PO1 in his extract, 
demonstrates this viewpoint; 
 
PO1: “From the victim’s perspective, the victim will experience an average of 
100 episodes of stalking activities including cyberstalking before reporting the 
offence. The reluctance of victims reporting the conduct leads to victims 
evading justice and makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
legislation”.  
 
 
Similarly, PRO14 expressed frustration at victims who refuse to support the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. Particularly, those victims who subsequently make 
withdrawal statements; 
 
PRO14: “Police officers face several difficulties in the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers. Unfortunately, the situation is not helped when victims refuse to 
support the prosecution of offenders. I have investigated cases involving victims 
who have subsequently withdrawn their statements prior to trials and after 
suspects have been charged.”   
 
 
PRO17 also expressed frustration at victims who refuse to support the prosecution of 
offenders. In this extract, RPO17 reveals that this arises commonly in domestic 
violence cases and stated that it can leave prosecutors feeling frustrated if cases are 
consequently not progressed; 
 
Int: Why do you feel that victims of cyberstalking are reluctant to support the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers? 
 
 
PRO17: “In domestic violence cases, the reason is because some of the victims 
have a change of heart after reporting incidents because they do not want to 
see the father of their children being prosecuted. This really puts a spanner in 
the works for police officers and prosecutors who have put in so much time and 
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effort into such cases to bring offenders to justice. It is more exasperating for 
police officers and prosecutors if the CPS has no choice but to discontinue 
cases against cyberstalkers because victims have subsequently, withdrawn 
their allegations against the cyberstalkers. In such cases, the CPS cannot 
prosecute if there is therefore insufficient evidence to build a strong case 
against the offenders”.  
 
Likewise, the participants expressed frustration at the lack of full disclosure by 
victims. The participants explained that this difficulty occurs when victims only show 
police officers some of the messages they have received from cyberstalkers. Hence 
PO3 in his extract was frustrated at victims who provide an incomplete evidential 
account because, it can lead to cases being dropped. Once again, PO3 observed 
that this issue was very frequent in domestic violence cases.  
 
 
PO3: “We face the problem of taking the victims words against the stalkers 
words in court. There must be an easier way of processing the Also, victims 
only show some of the messages they have received thereby giving an 
incomplete account for investigative purposes. How can you only show half of 
the message and not give the police officers the full picture? They then get 
surprised when the case is thrown out of court. In domestic violence cases it is 
common for the victims to be selective of the messages that they show to the 
police officers. Everyone is guilty in this sense of frustrating the investigative 
process. They should be more aware of the impact of their conduct which could 
result especially in domestic violence cases in cases being dropped”. 
 
While discussing how the behaviour of the victims can lead to lack of evidential 
disclosure, the participants shared the perception that sometimes, victims withhold 
evidential materials from police officers that link offenders to offences. Hence, Like 
PO3 and PO17, PRO29 expressed frustration at the lack of full evidential disclosure 
by some victims. 
 
PRO29 in his extract, powerfully illustrates the frustration of the participants; 
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PRO29: “An additional major issue that I can think of is lack of full evidential 
disclosure by victims who do not paint an accurate picture of cyberstalking 
incidents. It is disappointing because this problem makes it difficult for police 
officers to gather the evidence that is required by prosecutors to prove that 
there is a realistic prospect of convicting a cyberstalker. The problem of lack of 
full disclosure by victims or victims withholding evidence is equally annoying 
because it can lead to cases being lost and cyberstalkers not being charged 
with suitable offences”.   
 
Similarly, while discussing the behaviour of some victims in domestic violence cases, 
the participants shared the perception that sometimes, victims change their minds, 
withdraw their allegations and take the cyberstalkers back as partners thereby 
impeding investigation processes. PO9, therefore expressed the frustration that “some 
victims may become selective of the information that they provide to the police”; 
 
 
PO9: “In some cases victims turn around and inform police officers that they 
have changed their minds. They may become selective of the information that 
they provide to the police. This approach undermines the time that have been 
invested by police officers into prosecuting cyberstalkers. It is annoying if cases 
are lost due to the behaviours of victims because they put in a lot of time into 
the investigation and prosecution of offenders”.  
 
 
The participants also expressed frustration at victims who are reluctant to report 
incidents because of their perceived of lack confidence in the police. Hence, PO1 in 
his extract, asserts that there needs to be a change in cultural attitude to ensure that 
cyberstalking is taken seriously. The participants revealed that victims not making 
formal complaints can result in missed opportunities to bring cyberstalkers to justice.  
In this extract, PO1 discusses why victims may be reluctant to report cyberstalking 
incidents and the consequences of their decisions;  
 
Int: In your opinion, why do you think that the victims of cyberstalking feel 
reluctant to report the conduct to the police? 
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PO1: “Because they feel that they will not be believed by the authorities or the 
police officers. Let’s say a victim of cyberstalking attends a police station to 
make a complaint about malicious online messages that she has been receiving 
from a cyberstalker and then apologises for wasting police time because she 
feels that the conduct she is complaining of is not serious, a weak police officer 
will feed off the victim’s reluctance to pursue the complainant by failing to 
investigate it. Such behaviours of victims will lead to missed opportunities to 
charge offenders and bring them to justice”. 
 
Like PO1, and PO7, PO18 shared the perception that at the time of the study, there 
was a fear of getting involved with the police. The tone of PO18’s extract echoes this 
concern; 
 
PO18: “Victims not having confidence in the police. Some of them feel that 
cases will still be dropped even if they testify. The issue of lack of confidence in 
the police can hinder the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers if 
offences are not reported by victims. If victims do not make formal complaints 
against cyberstalkers, the cyberstalkers will continue to offend”.  
 
The participants expressed further frustration at victims refusing to attend court. 
Notably, PO13 explained that the reason for this issue is because some victims do not 
want to go through the perceived stress of appearing in court. Furthermore, PO13 
uses the phrase “kick in the teeth” to describe the effect on police officers, of cases 
being dropped because victims refuse to testify in court 
 
 
PO13: “Victims refusing to go through the stress of trials. Also, victims who have 
been romantically linked to cyberstalkers may refuse to testify against them in 
court”. 
 
Int: Why do you feel that victims of cyberstalking are reluctant to support the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers? 
 
PO13: “In some domestic violence cases, the refusal is usually because victims 
want to rekindle their relationships with suspects. Because there are currently 
insufficient trained staff to investigate such cases in some police forces, when 
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police officers like invest time in the investigation of cases, it is a kick in the 
teeth if cases cannot go ahead because victims are refusing to testify in court”.  
 
In common with  PO13, discusses how the behaviour of victims can lead to evidential 
difficulties,  the prosecutors shared the perception that in domestic violence cases, it 
is difficult to obtain evidence from victims if the victims still want to maintain a 
relationship with the cyberstalkers. PO21 in his extract, echoed the frustration of the 
participants;  
 
PO21: “We generally face several obstacles because offence is committed in 
the virtual world. When dealing with victims who have been in a prior 
relationship with the cyberstalkers it can be tasking for police officers because 
we find ourselves dealing with victims who are withholding evidence from the 
police because they want still want to have a relationship with the cyberstalkers. 
Dealing with such cases can be challenging for all those seeking to bring 
offenders to justice”. 
 
Another aspect of victim behaviour which was discussed by the participants is that 
sometimes, victims cross communicate with cyberstalkers thereby, giving them mixed 
messages.  PO17 in his extract, powerfully illustrated the frustration of the participants 
concerning this issue; 
 
PO17: “Sometimes, victims give mixed messages and respond lovingly to some 
of a cyberstalker’s message which might result in the solicitors of a cyberstalker 
arguing that the victim was encouraging the cyberstalker and is only bringing a 
subsequent prosecution out of spite. I must admit that it is frustrating when 
victims cross communicate with offenders because it enables the solicitors of a 
cyberstalker to argue that the victim was encouraging the cyberstalker’s 
actions”.  
 
Int: In your opinion, why is it a problem for victims to cross communicate with 
cyberstalkers? 
 
PO17: “It could waste the time of police officers and prosecutors when victims 
subsequently decide to withdraw allegations just after cross communicating 
with victims. 
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In summary, the above observations highlight the shared perceptions of the 
participants on how victim behaviour hinders police officers and prosecutors from 
bringing cyberstalkers to justice.  This is supported by the data in Table 4.14 which 
indicates that the police officers and prosecutors all identified – often in agreement the 
various aspects of victim behaviour that frustrate the process of bringing cyberstalkers 
to justice successfully. 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
This thesis reports on a qualitative study of London police officers and prosecutors 
perceptions of cyberstalking and the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. 
The aim of the study was to describe the perceptions of London police officers and 
prosecutors on the impediments that hinder them from investigating and prosecuting 
cyberstalkers in London. The findings identified seven main themes: 
 Threshold of acceptable online behaviour 
 Legislation 
 Lack of knowledge and training 
 Lack of resources 
 Risk assessment challenges 
 Evidential Challenges 
 Victim Behaviour 
These key themes will be discussed in the following chapter and recommendations 
will be made as to how police officers and prosecutors may circumvent the issues 
raised in the future. 
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Chapter 5   Discussion, Recommendations and Conclusions: 
 
 
 
This chapter will summarise and discuss the findings of this research for the purpose 
of informing recommendations. The summation highlights the objectives of the study, 
the primary findings and how these answered the research questions. Further, the 
summation identifies the general conclusions based on these findings. Additionally, 
this chapter highlights the limitations of the study, its theoretical implications and 
relationship to previous research and finally will provide suggestions for future 
research into the prosecution of cyberstalkers. This chapter concludes with 
recommendations for three groups of stakeholders in the law sector enforcement 
namely, the MET, the CPS and the government. 
 
5. 1 Introduction and overview of the results: 
 
The overarching aims of the current research were threefold; firstly, to investigate how 
lack of resources and lack of staff training as perceived by police officers and 
prosecutors in London can frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of 
cyberstalkers. Secondly, to discern what proactive measures are taken by police 
officers and prosecutors to acquire the knowledge which the participants themselves 
perceived to be lacking in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers and thirdly 
what investigative impediments exist to the risk assessment of victims of cyberstalking 
as perceived by participant police officers and prosecutors. This research is significant 
given the devastating impact of cyberstalking on victims.  
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The unique features of cyberstalking enable cyberstalkers to harass victims 
instantaneously and cheaply.513 Goodno acknowledges that law enforcement 
difficulties can hinder the prosecution of cyberstalkers. From a psychological 
perspective, Hazlewood and Koon-Magnin emphasise that cyberstalking can create 
feelings of fear, terror, stress and anxiety among victims.514 Further, Hazlewood and 
Koon-Magnin stress that cyberstalkers can contact victims from any jurisdiction 
leading to victims living in a state of fear, terror, stress, anxiety or intimidation.515   
 
Qualitative methods were used to elicit the data and explore the research aims. 
Interviews were carried out with serving police officers and members of the Crown 
Prosecution service. The police officers and prosecutors who took part in the study, 
shared various perceptions on cyberstalking and what might constitute the threshold 
of acceptable behaviour on the internet. Although the police officers and the 
prosecutors provided their opinions from investigative and prosecutorial perspectives 
respectively, they shared common views on the issues that hinder the successful 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. Interviews were analysed using 
Thematic Analysis.516  7 main themes emerged from the data; (threshold of acceptable 
online behaviour, legislative issues, lack of training and knowledge, lack of resources, 
risk assessment challenges, evidential challenges and victim behaviour) and the 
findings of these are discussed in the sub sections that follow. 
 
                                                          
513  Naomi  Goodno, ‘Cyberstalking A New Crime: ‘Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws’ (2007) 72  
     Missouri Law Review  1 
514Steven   Hazelwood and Sarah Koon-Magnin, ‘Cyberstalking and Cyber Harassment Legislation in the United States: A Qualitative  
    Analysis’ (2013) 7 International  Journal of Cyber Criminology 2  
515 ibid 
516 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 7  
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5.2 Threshold of acceptable online behaviour and how it is distinguished from 
cyberstalking: 
 
Given that the internet enables cyberstalkers to communicate anonymously, the 
threshold of acceptable behaviour online ought to be established to encourage internet 
users to conduct themselves in a law abiding manner when interacting with others on 
the internet.517  The responses of the participants on the threshold of acceptable online 
behaviour are therefore insightful because their responses identify various thresholds 
as determined by the participants through their own professional experience. The 
findings relating to this theme revealed that both prosecutors and police officers 
perceived that a level of objectivity is required in determining when the threshold has 
been crossed (PO6, PRO19 and PO23: Chapter 4, pages 196 and197).  For example, 
application of the objectivity test can be used in order to determine whether the actions 
of a mentally ill individual who is accused of cyberstalking do indeed constitute 
harassment. This principle has previously been explored by PRO 28 in the case of R 
v Colohan wherein the accused’s defence on the basis of mental ill health was ruled 
irrelevant based on the premise that the question that should be asked is whether any 
reasonable person would consider that the actions of the individual amount to 
harassment (PRO 28: Chapter 4, page 198).518  It is important to note that although 
the investigation of mentally ill cyberstalkers was raised in brief in the data, this thesis 
does not investigate the challenges faced by police officers in the investigation and 
prosecution of mentally ill cyberstalkers.  
 
                                                          
517 This is more so because, as previously highlighted, cyberstalking can result in either the murder or suicide of victims 
518 [2001] All.ER 230 
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The participants also, discussed where the impact of cyberstalking on victims falls in 
relation to the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments 
on the internet from cyberstalking (PROB: Chapter 4, pages 192 and 193). They 
maintained that the yardstick should be whether victims expressed distress and alarm 
as a result of the behaviours. It is important to note that in expressing the above view, 
the participants made a distinction between cyberstalking and face to face stalking as 
highlighted (PO8, PO12 and PO19: Chapter 4, pages 192 and 195.)519  
 
However, it was also argued that a cyberstalker may be unaware of the impact that 
his conduct has had on a victim because unlike face to face stalking, it is hard to judge 
the immediate reaction of a victim and in some instances offenders realize that they 
have committed an offence only after they have been questioned by police officers 
(PO12, PO19 and PO25: Chapter 4, pages 194 and 195).  
 
In contrast to the above, participants referred to the case of R v Blaue and stressed 
that the threshold will depend on whether the cyberstalker sought out a vulnerable 
victim (Chapter 4: page 199). Notably, from a legal perspective, the participants 
asserted that the principle established in this case weakens the argument that 
sometimes cyberstalkers lack the required intention to commit offences. The legal 
principle established in the case of R v Blaue, stipulates that offenders are legally 
required to take their victims as they find them.520 Therefore, applying this legal 
principle to cyberstalking cases, it follows that if certain victims are suffering from pre-
existing health conditions which worsen after they have been harassed by 
                                                          
519 The participants stated that cyberstalkers may be unaware of the impact if their behaviour on victims because they communicate with 
victims in the cyber realm as opposed to stalkers in the physical realm who are able to gauge the reaction of victims 
520 [1975] 1 W.L.R 1411 
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cyberstalkers, the cyberstalkers will be liable for the subsequent deterioration of their 
health even if the cyberstalkers are unaware of the health conditions and the impact 
of their actions on the health of such victims.521.  
 
While discussing the threshold and the right to freedom of expression, a participant 
prosecutor explained that because the internet is full of people with opinions, the right 
to freedom of expression should be respected provided a crime has not been 
committed  (Chapter 4: page 199).  However, it can be argued that there is a fine line 
between freedom of speech and the right to privacy in the cyber realm which by 
definition is designed to have worldwide publication. Hence, it can be inferred that the 
intention of the cyberstalker who posted the messages will determine the threshold. 
This thesis argues that a cyberstalker’s right to freedom of expression should be 
balanced against a victim’s right to privacy despite the inferred intention of the 
cyberstalker. 
 
Furthermore, participants suggested that the size of the electronic platform from which 
a cyberstalker disseminated messages might indicate the threshold for distinguishing 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking. They 
argued that if the platform is small, private and limited to a small audience then this 
could be deemed less harmful (Chapter 4: page 204). This thesis does not accept this 
view given that victims can be affected if they are targeted by cyberstalkers who have 
posted messages on private settings despite the fact that the audience may be smaller 
in comparison to the audience of a cyberstalker who posts offensive messages on a 
public setting as the level of harm is surely relative to the individual affected? 
                                                          
521 Therefore, a cyberstalker’s ignorance on the impact of his conduct on a victim will not be construed as a defence by the courts 
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In relation to this theme, around one third of participants revealed they would refer to 
legislation to assist their decision although this  might prove challenging to establish 
the threshold via reference to for example the Protection from Harassment Act (PHA) 
because the PHA does not expressly define cyberstalking as a specific offence.522 For 
a conduct to constitute cyberstalking, it has to satisfy the legislative requirement 
stipulated by section 7 of the PHA ‘that a conduct has to occur on more than one 
occasion'.523  
 
Likewise, the gravity of an offence might be useful in determining the threshold 
especially if the offence escalates to violence being used.  However, it is important to 
note that the threshold will only be crossed when a behaviour becomes menacing 
because mere rudeness is not actionable. Therefore the behaviour will need to be in 
the nature of racism, libel, homophobia or malicious intent. This view implies that 
certain acts will be considered by police and prosecutors as offences if they are linked 
to traditional defamatory offences.  The research’s stance on this issue is that an 
offensive or threatening behaviour will result in a victim experiencing alarm, distress 
or the fear of violence which constitute stalking offences as defined under section 2A 
and 4A of the PHA. The offences were previously discussed in Chapter 2, sections 
2.3. 3 and 2.3.4. 
 
In conclusion, previously discussed research findings reveal that victims are affected 
by the activities of cyberstalkers. Notably, in a recent study which was conducted in 
                                                          
522 Instead s2A (3) b, c, d f and g of the PHA list statutory examples of the activities of cyberstalkers. These aspects of the legislation govern 
the criminal activities of a cyberstalker ranging from the publishing of statements by any means in the name of another person to the monitoring 
of an individual’s internet usage. 
523  This feeling was echoed by another prosecutor who went further to state that if a conduct occurs on more than one occasion, it will 
constitute cyberstalking 
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the year 2019, Maran and Begotti found that victims suffered from depression and 
traits of anxiety in comparison to non-victims.524 Maran and Begotti therefore highlight 
the importance of preventing cyberstalking and offering support to victims of 
cyberstalking.525 Likewise, Worsley, Wheatcroft, Short, and others thematically 
analysed the experiences of one hundred victim narratives via an online survey in 
order to assess the mental health and well-being implications of the experience of 
cyberstalking.526  Worsley, Wheatcroft, Short, and others found that the emotional 
impact of cyberstalking primarily includes comorbid anxiety and depression. Notably, 
they found that cyberstalking can affect the psychological, social, interpersonal, and 
economic aspects of the lives of victims. Additionally, they found that victims adopted 
various coping measures which include making major changes to both their work and 
social life, stopping employment and changing usual daily activities. 
 
In light of the above, the majority of the participants in this study shared the perception 
that there are different thresholds for distinguishing between rudeness, abuse and 
unpleasant comments on the internet and cyberstalking some of these being victim 
specific. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
524 Daniela Maran and Tatiana Begotti ‘Prevalence of Cyberstalking and Previous Offline Victimization in a Sample of Italian University 
Students’ (2019)  8 Soc.Sci 1 
525 Maran and Begotti compared the effects of cyberstalking between victims of cyberstalking and victims of cyberstalking and previous 
offline victimization in their lifetimes based on a sample of 229 Italian students who completed a self-administered questionnaire 
526 Joanne Worsley, Jacqueline Wheatcroft, Emma Short and Rhiannon Corcoran ‘’Victims’ Voices: Understanding the Emotional Impact 
of Cyberstalking and Individual Coping Responses’ (Sage, April 2017) 
<www.journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2158244017710292>accessed 21 December 2019 
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5. 3 Legislation and law enforcement issues  
5. 3. 1.  Legislative difficulties  
 
The participants shared the perception that the there is no single legislation expressly 
criminalising cyberstalking in the UK. (PO9, P012, PO24 and PRO25: Chapter 4, 
pages 214 and 215). The need for an effective legal structure to address the criminal 
behaviour of cyberstalking was discussed by Basu who argues that the legal system 
is not structured to deal with criminal offences perpetrated in the virtual world.527 
Hence, Geach and Haralambous argue that in the information and technology sector, 
criminalising a conduct that is specific to online acts may be problematic if due to 
technological advancement, a particular technology becomes so outdated that it no 
longer matches the technology as specified in an offence.528 Geach and Haralambous 
therefore suggest that to fulfil the principle that the law is certain, the legislation should 
provide a clear and precise definition of cyberstalking.529  
 
Similarly, the fact that there is no acceptable definition of cyberstalking has been 
acknowledged.530 Vasiu and Vasiu stress that cyberstalking can have psychological, 
economic or physical effects on victims and can result in the perpetration of violent 
crimes.  They emphasise that it is a challenge to define cyberstalking.531  Likewise, 
Chick argues that cyberstalking differs from stalking in the physical realm.532 Chick 
                                                          
527  Subhajit Basu, ‘Stalking and Stranger In Web 2.0: A Contemporary Regulatory Analysis’ (2012) 3 (2) European Journal of Law and 
Technology’ <http://wwwwarwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/eu/jit/2007_2/basu-jones> accessed 21 September 2017 
528  It is contended that in such situation, the technology develops into something that no longer matches, what is defined in the offence.  
529 Neal Geach and Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating Online Harassment: Is the Law Fit for the Social Networking Age? (2009) 73 (3)  
    73 Journal of Criminal Law 3 
530 Ioana Vasiu and Lucian Vasiu, ‘Cyberstalking Nature and Response Recommendations’ (2013) 2 (9) Academic Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies <http://www.mcser.org/journal/index.php/ajis/article/download >accessed 17 September 2017 
531 Suzanne Van der Aa, ‘International (Cyber) Stalking, Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution’ (Pure, 2011) 
<www.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1310512/Aa_International_cyberstalking_110216_posprint_embargo_1_y.pdf  >  accessed 9 August 2018 
532 Warren Chick, ‘Harassment Through  the Digital Medium   A cross Jurisdictional Comparative Analysis on The Law of Cyberstalking’ 
(2008) 3 (1) Journal of International Commercial  Law and Technology <http://wwww.jclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/view/40/39> accessed 
20 September 2017 
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asserts that the difference can be attributed to communication, jurisdictional and 
evidential factors.   
 
The significance of legislative difficulty is two dimensional. From the first dimension, it 
highlights that UK police officers will have no legal standing and will be unable to 
establish that a cyberstalker has committed an offence in the UK which is similar to an 
offence in a foreign country if cyberstalking is not a proscribed conduct in the foreign 
country in which the cyberstalker resides. From the second dimension, it indicates that 
if cyberstalking has not been criminalised in the foreign country, the UK police officers 
will be unable to utilize extradition as a method of international cooperation. This is 
because, the international officials in the foreign country may use the fact that 
cyberstalking is not a proscribed conduct as a ground for refusing the extradition of a 
cyberstalker.  From a law enforcement perspective, the implication of the legislative 
difficulties is that law enforcement officials may find it challenging to initiate legal 
actions against cybercriminals if countries have not enacted laws criminalizing the 
conduct that perpetrators engage in.533  
 
From an extradition perspective, when investigating a case where a cyberstalker and 
the victim reside in different jurisdictions, UK police officers and prosecutors face the 
related difficulty of identifying which jurisdictional law will be applicable to a given case.  
This is because the law enforcement authorities in a cyberstalker’s country of 
residence could refuse to extradite a suspect on the grounds that they do not extradite 
nationals. Consequently, Shearer argues that some international extradition treaties 
may contain either mandatory or discretionary bars to the extradition of nationals 
                                                          
533 Marc Goodman and Susan Brenner, ‘The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyber space’ International  Journal of  Law and  
   Technology 10 (2) <http://www.sk.sagepub-com/navigator/crime-and-media> accessed 1 October 2017 
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exempting countries from extraditing citizens.534 Shearer suggests that there is no 
moral duty on countries to extradite a fugitive in the absence of an extradition treaty.    
 
The findings indicate that the despite the above criticisms, some of the participants 
acknowledged that the amended Protection from Harassment Act is an important tool 
for regulating cyberstalkers with a view to successfully bringing offenders to justice.  
 Figure 5.3.1 below illustrates the relationship of the various legislative difficulties 
identified by participants 
Figure 5.3.1 Legislative Difficulties perceived by participants. 
 
 
Given the various background experiences of the participants, the view of criminalising 
cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime were varied. Importantly consensus of 
agreement amongst prosecutors and police officers was high (>90%), concerning the 
                                                          
534 Ivan Shearer ‘Non-Extradition of  Nationals: A Review and a Proposal’ (1966) 2(3) Adelaide Law Review Association  
  <http://www.austlii.edu.au/journal/adellawrw/1966>  accessed 11 January 2016 
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legislative issues which frustrate them such as  the issues of restraining orders being 
breached by cyberstalkers and the need to establish a course of conduct under the 
PHA.  
 
The participants were not convinced of the efficacy of the existing legislation pertaining 
to cyberstalking particularly as some victims do not report incidents when they occur. 
Hence, Alghrim emphasises that cyberstalking is a relatively new phenomenon and 
argues that cyberstalking is likely to be underreported due to limited knowledge of 
what behaviours constitute cyberstalking. 535 Importantly, Alghrim stresses that there 
are many factors unique to cyberstalking which may affect the extent to which the 
offence is reported, and the extent to which the offender or victim is held accountable.  
 
Furthermore, in the current research, Police officers and Prosecutors shared the 
perception that lenient sentencing under the PHA was an issue. The participants were 
of the opinion that cyberstalkers should be given stronger sentences to deter future 
offenders (PO16 and PO23: Chapter 4, page 212). The participants indicated that 
tougher sentencing options should be provided because there is a commonly held 
perception that the criminal justice system is lenient on offenders and that victims 
instead, are given a tough time (See chapter 2 sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). It is important 
to note that this aspect of legislative concern was acknowledged by the government 
on 17 September 2019 when the Ministry of Justice announced that the government 
will allow victims of criminals convicted of stalking, harassment, child abuse and other 
sex offences to argue for offender sentences to be increased if victims or the public 
                                                          
535 Billea Alghrim and Cheryl Terrance  ’Perceptions of cyberstalking: Impact of Perpetrator Gender and Cyberstalker/Victim Relationship’ 
(2018)  Journal of Interpersonal Violence 
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think their original punishment was too lenient.536  This recent change justifies the 
frustration of the participants who at the time of the interviews expressed the view that 
the sentences that are given to some cyberstalkers are too lenient. The thesis revealed 
this issue prior to the government announcement and therefore it can be construed 
that this subsequent change in sentencing provides support for the findings in this 
thesis. 
  
Additionally, it was revealed that it may be difficult to prove that a cyberstalker’s 
behaviour amounted to a course of conduct as defined under s7 of the PHA as 
previously discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.11.537 This is further complicated 
because there is no specific legislation in the UK that criminalizes cyberstalking 
because there was no specific offence of cyberstalking that existed at the time the 
interviews took place. The police officers emphasised that instead, there are different 
pieces of legislation which criminalize different aspects of the conduct.    
 
From a legislative perspective, the participants stated that it may be difficult to prove 
a course of conduct under the PHA (PO18 and PRO26: Chapter 4, page 218). This is 
because, in comparison to the MCA, sections 2 and 2A of the PHA respectively, 
stipulate that the offences of harassment and stalking respectively will be committed 
if there is a conduct which amounts to harassment and that particular harassment 
constitutes a stalking behaviour. This demonstrates that if a cyberstalker disseminates 
a rude, abusive, offensive or threatening communication on one occasion then the 
offender will be prosecuted under the section 1 of the MCA. Whereas, if a cyberstalker 
                                                          
536 ‘More victims able to challenge unduly lenient prison sentences’ (Ministry of Justice, 17 September 2019) 
<www.gov.uk/government/news/more-victims-able-to-challenge-unduly-lenient-prison-sentences> accessed 17 September 2019 
537 Section 7 of the PHA defines a course of conduct as occurring on at least two occasions 
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embarks on a more intense campaign of harassment for a longer duration and on more 
than one occasion, the cyberstalker will be prosecuted under the PHA.   
 
From a prosecutorial perspective, the participants also highlighted the issue of victims 
reporting offences outside the statutory time limit.  This issue can be linked to delay in 
report by victims. Hence while discussing the related issue of underreporting, Oltman 
argues that victims underreport crimes for various reasons ranging from not wanting 
to bother the police to feeling embarrassed.538 Additionally, Oltman states that the 
consequences of victims not reporting crimes are lack of accurate data about crime in 
communities which results in more risk to citizens and resource allocation not being 
effectively deployed to tackle the criminals.  In light of these observation and given 
that the statutory time limit for bringing offences under the s 2 of the PHA is 6 months, 
the researcher argues that there is an onus on police officers to effectively explain to 
the victims, the statutory requirements for proving offences under the PHA to ensure 
that they promptly report offences and meet the legislative criteria for proving that an 
offence has been committed. 
 
From a statistical perspective, in 2017 the Office for National Statistics published a 
report ‘Reasons for Not Reporting Crime to the Police in England and Wales’.539  The 
statistical data provided 17 reasons why victims do not report offences. Notably, 3 of 
the reasons reflected the perception of the participants in this research these were; 
i) the perception that an offence is too trivial ii) the perception that police officers will 
not be bothered to investigate offences and most importantly iii) the fear of reprisal.  
                                                          
538 Rick Oltman ‘Underreporting of Crime’  (2011)  21 Social  Contract Journal Issue  4  
539 ‘Reasons for Not Reporting Crime to the Police in England and Wales 2016-201 Crime Survey for England and Wales’ (ONS, 17 
November 2017) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/adhocs/007750reasonsfornotreportingcrimetothepolice2016to20
17crimesur >accessed 23 November 2019  
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This report once again provides support for the findings of this thesis as this reason 
was highlighted by a participant when explaining why victims refuse to testify against 
cyberstalkers in court. Furthermore,  in respect of points i) and ii) above, a prosecutor 
expressed the view that if police officers do not take cyberstalking incidents seriously, 
they will miss opportunities to bring offenders to justice.  
 
The research also revealed the frustration of participants with persistent cyberstalkers 
who breach restraining orders thereby jeopardizing the safety of victims. Hence to 
ensure that victims of stalking and harassment are adequately protected, in their 2017 
report,  Her Majesty’s  Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate stated that there should be a proper examination of 
persistent offending, instead of an assumption that breaches of restraining orders will 
be prosecuted ahead of major crimes.540  
 
Despite the above legislative criticisms, the researcher is aware that in the UK, an 
additional attempt is being made to further criminalise stalking and cyberstalking 
implicitly via the Stalking Protection Order which is a civil order. Hence, on 23 
November 2018, it was reported that the Stalking Protection Bill, sponsored by Dr 
Sarah Wollaston MP,  had its third reading in parliament.541 The bill which was backed 
by the government received Royal Assent on 15 March 2019.542 It is anticipated that 
the bill will introduce Stalking Protection Orders to improve the safety of stalking 
                                                          
540 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate And Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in Fear-The Police and CPS 
Response to Harassment And Stalking’ (CPS, 2017)  < www.living–in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> 
accessed 10 July 2017 
540  ‘CPS Response to HMIC 
541 ‘What is Stalking Protection Orders’ (Suzylamplugh, 2016) < https://www.suzylamplugh.org/what-is-the-stalking-protection-bill>  
accessed 29 April 2019 
542  Victoria Atkins ‘Government Backed Stalking Protection Bill receives Royal Assent’ (Gov, 15 March 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-backed-stalking-protection-bill-receives-royal-assent> accessed 10 August 2019 
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victims giving police the authority to tackle the danger that perpetrators pose while 
they gather more evidence and deal with particular issues related to the 
crime.543  More importantly, the Stalking Protection Orders may require stalkers and 
cyberstalkers implicitly to be psychologically assessed or to attend rehabilitation 
programmes to help prevent reoffending.544  From a mental health perspective, this 
development is significant given that some of the participants expressed frustration at 
investigative challenges which hinder the prosecution of mentally ill cyberstalkers (see 
Chapter 4 Section 4.3.6)  
 
In light of the above, the majority of the participants in this study shared the perception 
that various legislative difficulties frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution 
of cyberstalkers. 
 
5.3.2. Lack of knowledge and training: 
 
 
Lack of knowledge and training was a principal theme identified in the study by the 
majority of the participants (> 93%). Given that the participants shared several 
frustrations regarding the sensitive issue of lack of training and knowledge, the 
researcher recognized that issues of research bias could prevent participants from 
providing detailed responses due to a fear of losing their jobs. Therefore, Pannucci 
and Wilkins acknowledge that research bias can occur in planning, data collection and 
the analysis phase of research.545 Likewise, Smith and Noble highlight that bias can 
                                                          
543 ibid 
544 ibid 
545 Christopher Pannucci and Edwin Wilkins ‘Identifying and Avoiding Bias in Research’ (NCBI, August 2010 
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occur at different stages of the research.546  The issue of bias was previously 
discussed in chapter 3, section 3.1.1.  
 
The researcher was aware that because of the sensitivity of the topic, the participants 
may not be forthcoming with information. Holt, Bossler and Fitzgerald in explaining low 
response rates among specific law enforcement research participants, highlighted that 
participants may have had some reservations over proffering information on behalf of 
their organizations on matters relating to training and caseloads.547 Further, Sleath 
and Bull emphasise that it may be difficult to recruit meaningful samples of police 
officers especially if the research topic is sensitive.548 Consequently, the researcher 
was rigorous in implementing strategies (See Chapter 3) at each interview to ensure 
that the participants felt confident in the research protocols in place whilst they 
disclosed information relating to lack of training and knowledge in respect of the 
following four aspects: police officers, ISPs, the judiciary and members of the public. 
The key sub-themes that emerged from the interview data are shown in Figures 5.2 
and 5.3: 
 
                                                          
546 Joanna Smith and Hele Noble ‘Bias in research’  (BMI, 2014) 
<www.pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c49e/2f596d13b868421034ef9636ca925bbfecfd.pdf> accessed 21 January 2019 
547  Thomas Holt, Adam Bossler and Sarah Fitzgerald ‘Examining State and Local Law Enforcement Perceptions of Computer Crime’ 
(Press, 2013) < www. cap-press.com/files/holt%203E%20bonus%20chapter/Holt%203E%20Bonus%20Chapter.pdf> accessed 15 February 
2019 
548 Emma Sleath and Ray Bull ‘Comparing Rape Victim And Perpetrator Blaming In A Police Officer Sample’ (2012) 39 Criminal Justice 
and Behaviour 5  
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Figure 5.3. 2 Lack of Knowledge issues identified by participants
 
Figure 5.3 Lack of Training issues identified by participants 
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Shan highlights that Scotland’s first national prosecutor for domestic abuse has 
emphasized that police officers require additional training in tackling stalking and 
cyberstalking implicitly to ensure successful prosecutions.549 The issue of lack of 
police knowledge on the investigation of stalkers and implicitly, cyberstalkers was 
discussed by Lynche and Logan who investigated two groups of police officers on 
perceived barriers to charging and attitudes relating to charging stalking offences.550 
Importantly, their results demonstrated that officers who had never investigated 
stalking, found the offence less dangerous, did not file relevant reports on reported 
incidents and perceived barriers related to charging stalking more challenging than 
police officers who had investigated stalking before.551 The study found that police 
officers who had previously investigated stalking, had a greater understanding and 
were able to identify specific statutory problems. The findings of their research is 
arguably relevant to cyberstalking which is an aspect of stalking.  
 
Lack of knowledge on the extent and nature of cyberstalking can lead to police officers 
under recording stalking and cyberstalking offences implicitly compared to other 
offences and perpetrators being arrested for them. Consequently, Brady and Nobles 
examined police officers response to stalking at a Houston police station to investigate 
the issue of underreporting and under recording of stalking incidents.552 Brady and 
Nobles examined 3,756  stalking incident calls and  stalking calls for service which 
                                                          
549 Ross Shan ‘Stalkers Freed due to lack of Police Training’  (The Scotsman, 10 February 2014)  
550 Kellie Lynch and TK Logan ‘Police Officers Attitudes and Challenges with Stalking’ (2015)  30 Violence and Victim 6 
551 ibd 
552 Patrick Brady and Matt Nobles’ The Dark Figure of Stalking: Examining Law Enforcement Response’  (2017) 32 Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 20  
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had occurred over 8 years and found that that there were only 66 stalking-related 
incident reports, and only 12 arrests for stalking. Worryingly, Brady and Nobles also 
found that not one of the stalking calls for service generated a stalking-related incident 
report nor led to an arrest for stalking. Additionally, Brady and Nobles found that the 
majority of the stalking calls for service which generated an incident report were 
classified as harassment or a protective order.  Importantly, Brady and Nobles 
revealed that incident reports and arrests for stalking generally arose regarding 
harassment or terrorist type threats.  
 
Likewise, a report which was conducted by HM Crown Prosecution Service 
Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary into how the police and 
CPS respond to stalking and harassment made crucial findings.553 The report found 
that lack of understanding of what constitutes stalking manifests in the under recording 
of stalking offences, and the wide variation of recorded stalking offences between 
police forces.554 The report additionally emphasised the issues of stalking being 
wrongly identified as harassment, police officers not properly understanding the nature 
of the offending and the risks to the victim and subsequently investigations not being 
allocated to specially trained officers. From a victimisation perspective, the report 
stressed that if stalking and cyberstalking implicitly are wrongly identified as 
harassment, it could result in victims not being referred to specialist stalking support 
services when available. 
 
                                                          
553 ‘HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, living in fear-the police and CPS 
response to harassment and stalking’, (CPS, July 2017) <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmcifrs/wp-content/uploads/living –in-fear-
the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> accessed 6 March 2018 
554 ‘HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, living in fear-the police and CPS 
response to harassment and stalking’, (CPS, July 2017) <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmcifrs/wp-content/uploads/living –in-fear-
the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> accessed 6 March 2018 
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The difficulty posed by lack of training was highlighted by the participants in the current 
research from the following three perspectives: insufficient trained officials, lack of 
public awareness on cyberstalking and the lack of trained computer experts to assist 
police officers in the investigation of cyberstalkers.  
 
On 5 July 2017, subsequent to the completion of the interviews carried out for the 
current research,  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate published critical findings of their joint inspection into 
how the MET and the CPS tackle the offences of harassment and stalking offences.555 
The findings highlight that the CPS and the MET are required to implement additional 
measures with a view to ensuring that all lawyers and prosecutors have received 
training in harassment and stalking. The inspectorates anticipated that ensuring that 
lawyers and prosecutors receive the training will lead to improvements in the 
prosecution of harassment and stalking offences.556 Particularly, the inspectorates 
recommended that the CPS provides training for prosecutors in terms of professional 
development and awareness-raising in an informal environment.  
 
The findings of the inspectorates reflect similar issues to those raised by the 
participants, that prosecutors lack implicit knowledge of stalking and cyberstalking 
offences and therefore require training.557  Furthermore, the findings of the current 
research revealed a shared frustration that police officers also lacked the requisite 
knowledge on how to trace the emails or internet portal addresses of suspects.   The 
participants were of the view that all police officers ranging from the lowest ranks to 
                                                          
555 CPS Response to HMIC/HMCPSI Joint Thematic Inspection of  Harassment and Stalking Offences’ (CPS, 2017) 
<www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cpsresponse to hmic hmcpsi harassment stalking report, pdf > accessed 2 December 2019 
556 ibid 
557 The inspection of  Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate into how the 
MET and the CPS tackle the offences of harassment and stalking offences 
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the most senior require training in the technological elements of computer forensics 
for investigating cyber- crimes.  The researcher acknowledges that at the time this 
study was concluding, the CPS had introduced the Stalking and Harassment package 
of training measures for prosecutors.  
 
A further implication of this lack of training is that police officers are prevented from 
accessing, obtaining and preserving the digital evidence that they need to successfully 
prosecute these perpetrators through lack of technological knowledge. This also has 
a negative impact on evidential clarity as without the requisite knowledge to gather 
evidence effectively from the internet the result can be police officers implementing 
inconsistent measures. Therefore this thesis asserts that basic training in these 
necessary skills should be mandatory for officers of all ranks. 
 
The interview data also revealed a further crucial shortfall in knowledge relating to the 
psychological impact of cyberstalking on victims. Confirming this, one participant 
prosecutor reiterated that there was a dangerous misconception that because 
cyberstalking is not physical, it is less serious.  On this basis it could be construed that 
such a misconception can prevent law enforcement officials from appreciating the 
severity of certain cyberstalking offences especially in domestic violence cases and 
cases involving the victimisation of vulnerable children.  
 
Additionally, the findings revealed a vital shortfall in knowledge relating to the 
misconception that cyberstalking is not as serious as face to face stalking because 
cyberstalking occurs in the cyber realm. Maran and Begotti recently compared the 
effects of cyberstalking between victims of cyberstalking and victims of cyberstalking 
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and previous offline victimization in their lifetimes.558 They hypothesised that 
cyberstalking had an impact on the wellbeing of victims and contributed to increases 
in physical and emotional symptoms, anxiety and depression, and that those 
symptoms increased in victims who had suffered previous offline victimisation.  Maran 
and Begotti’s study was based on a sample of 229 Italian students who completed a 
self-administered questionnaire. The study found that in general, the prevalence of 
cyberstalking in the study sample was higher than in previous investigations. With 
regard to consequences, victims indicated higher scores for depression and anxiety 
than non-victims.559  From a risk assessment perspective, the study was significant 
because it highlighted that victims can be subjected to both cyberstalking and face to 
face stalking. Additionally, the study highlighted the importance of preventing 
cyberstalking and recommended that victims of cyberstalking are offered support. 
 
Further shortfalls in police knowledge were also revealed in relation to risk 
assessment. The police participants identified that they lacked knowledge on how to 
risk assess anonymous cyberstalkers and that as a result of this issue police officers 
are hindered from protecting victims. However, it should be acknowledged that one 
participant who had previously worked in the Serious Organised Crime Agency, (which 
is now defunct), had been in receipt of specialist training due to the nature of his job.560  
The police officer confirmed that although he himself had received training on the core 
investigative skills that police officers require to investigate internet crimes, non-
specialist-police officers had not received the same training.561  
                                                          
558 Daniela Maran and Tatiana Begotti ‘Prevalence of Cyberstalking and Previous Offline Victimization in a Sample of Italian University 
Students’ (2019)  8 Soc.Sci 1<http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/1/30> accessed  25 December 2019 
559 Ibid  
560  In doing so, the police officer indicated that he had received specialist training which enabled him to investigate digital enabled crimes 
such as phishing and online blackmail 
561 The police officer, was of the view that the implication is that non-specialist police officers will not be able to retrieve the required evidence 
in situations for example when victims drop their mobile phones in the bath and lose relevant evidence 
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Shortfalls in knowledge in respect of the identification of cyberstalkers suffering from 
mental ill health were also revealed to have a detrimental impact on the risk 
assessment process, particularly if at the time of arrest they did not display overt signs 
of mental illness. Crucially, the findings reveal that this lack of knowledge prevents 
police officers from establishing when suspects who have been arrested require 
medical treatment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
In summary, it is clear from this theme that participants from both professions share 
the view that successful investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers  is hampered 
through lack of knowledge and training in the key staff involved. However, the findings 
also revealed that participants have relied upon a wide range of alternative measures 
including personal research, liaising with colleagues, learning on the job, reading up 
on materials to widen their professional knowledge and fill gaps in the skills they 
require It is also notable that subsequent to the conclusion of this research the relevant 
authorities have recognised the need for a package of training measures to 
supplement knowledge in this area. This thesis now argues that this package is made 
mandatory for all officers and legal professionals involved in this field. 
.3.3 Lack of resources 
 
‘Lack of resources’ was the fourth main theme identified in the study by the majority of 
participants as a factor that frustrates police officers in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
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Once again the researcher was aware that due to the working relationship between 
her and the participants, the participants may be reluctant to fully divulge certain 
aspects of the perceived issue of lack of resources that frustrates them in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  The researcher was also aware of the 
risk that research bias could prevent the participants from expressing their views in 
detail on the perceived issue of lack of resources due to a fear of disciplinary 
repercussions. The researcher was especially aware that bias could arise when the 
perceived issues of the allocation of heavy caseloads and staff shortages were being 
discussed by the participants. Therefore, as before the researcher was rigorous in 
ensuring that when conducting interviews she was not perceived as controlling and 
she actively sought to maintain a balance of power between herself and the 
participants. 
 
The findings indicate that the participants identified six perceived resource issues 
which frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The 
relationship of these issues is shown in Figure 5.3.3: 
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Figure 5.3.3.  Perceived lack of resources 
 
 
 
 
In summary, the legislative difficulties shown in Figure 5.3.3., represent the issues 
perceived by participants which impede the investigation of cyberstalkers.  It is 
important to note that the study found that in some cases, there is a relationship 
between the issue of lack of resources and the inability of police officers to risk assess 
victims and perpetrators.  
 
The findings reveal that police officers and prosecutors shared frustration at the lack 
of a single point of contact to enable the participants to liaise with the correct officials 
from the beginning to the end of cases. The researcher is aware that in reality, the 
national stalking protocol requires each police force and CPS Area to appoint a single 
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between the police and the CPS.562 The researcher further acknowledges that on 5th 
July 2017, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate in their critical joint findings, highlighted that the 
SPOC should include close liaison with third-sector organisations that provide support 
to victims of stalking and cyberstalking implicitly.563  
 
Importantly, the findings of the current research suggest that lack of manpower results 
in missed opportunities to risk assess both victims and cyberstalkers due to the 
allocation of heavy caseloads.  This also might prevent officers recognising that an 
offence is actually taking place.564 Consequently, from a domestic violence 
perspective, the dangers associated with missed opportunities to risk assess 
cyberstalking victims in such cases was also highlighted to present a very serious 
issue. This finding is worrying given that academics have stressed that victims of 
stalkers particularly and cyberstalkers implicitly, face various physical and mental risks 
from stalkers.565  Notably, McEwan, Pathe, James and Ogloff emphasise that 
clinicians ought to consider various risks ranging from the risk of physical violence 
towards the victim or a third party to the risk of psychological damage to the victim.566 
 
The findings suggest that due to lack of resources, cyberstalking may not be perceived 
as a grave offence when cases are being prioritized by over worked police officers. 
                                                          
562 Protocol on the appropriate handling of stalking offences between the Crown Prosecution Service & ACPO’ (CPS, 2014) 
<www.cps.gov/publications/agencies> accessed  2 December  2019 
563 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate And Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in Fear-The Police and CPS 
Response to Harassment And Stalking’ (CPS, 2017)  <www.living–in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> 
accessed 10 July 2017 
564 The police officer further explained that an over worked police officer may fail to risk assess offenders thereby, wrongly assuming that 
offenders are merely showing unhealthy interests in the victims 
565 Troy McEwan, Michele Pathe  and James Ogloff  ‘Troy Advances in Stalking Risk Assessment’  Behavioural  Sciences and the Law    
(wileyonlinelibrary, 15 February 2011)  <http://www.fixatedthreat.com/perch/resources/mcewan-pathe-ogloff-2011-risk-assessment.pdf>  
accessed 20 January 2020 
566 ibid1  
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Consequently, the participants expressed the view that the issue of heavy caseloads 
is compounded by the fact that there is a high unrealistic public expectation for police 
officers to investigate all incidents of cyberstalking incidents.  
 
The issue of lack of resources can arguably affect the ability of police officers to detect 
and solve offences. Coupe examined the effects of police officer resources and 
the ease with which crimes may be solved, on burglary detection.567 Coupe 
found that the application of resources to the investigation of solvable incidents 
helps explain detection levels and based the study on data obtained from 
computerised police incident logs and self-completed surveys of officers.568  
 
The participants shared the misgiving that there was no centralized database for 
gathering and accessing local intelligence on cyberstalkers and indicated that it will be 
a challenge for police officers in different forces to share local intelligence concerning 
unknown cyberstalkers due to bureaucratic processes.  
                                                                
Given the above observations regarding the lack of a centralized unit, the researcher 
acknowledges that in 2017, the CPS and the MPS introduced a Stalking Single Point 
of Contact in response to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her 
Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate’s report on the current approach to 
tackling crimes of harassment and stalking.569 The inspectors recommended that the 
National Police Chief Counsel and the CPS stalking leads review the single point of 
                                                          
567 Richard Coupe ‘Evaluating the Effects of Resources and Solvability in Burglary Detection’  (2016) 26 An International Journal of 
Research and Policy 5 
568 ibid 
569  ‘CPS Response to HMIC/HMCPSI Joint Thematic Inspection of Harassment and Stalking Offence’ (CPS publications, 5 July 2017) 
<www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps response to hmic hmcpsi harassment stalking report> accessed 8 August 2017 
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contact system and ensure that it is completely effective and operating uniformly for 
victims in all areas.570 As previously discussed (Chapter 1, section 1.5), the researcher 
acknowledges that since the conclusion of this study, that the CPS and the National 
Police Chiefs’ Council have strengthened the Single Point of Contact for the 
investigation and prosecution of stalking offences to ensure that the Police and CPS 
leads on stalking fully understand the requirements and expectations of the role.571 
Additionally, the researcher acknowledges that there are several charitable 
organizations in the UK which work with police officers when required on cyberstalking 
such as the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, the Protection against Stalking, the National 
Stalking Helpline and the Cybersmile charity among others. 
 
In summary it is clear from this theme that participants from both professions share 
the view that the successful investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers is 
hampered by lack of resources. More concerningly, this issue can prevent police 
officers from risk assessing victims. It is also notable that subsequent to the conclusion 
of this research, the relevant authorities have recognized that lack of resources can 
impede the investigation and prosecution of stalkers,  lead to the allocation of heavy 
caseloads  and result in missed opportunities to risk assess both victims and 
cyberstalkers.  
 
 
 
                                                          
570  ‘HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, living in fear-the police and CPS 
response to harassment and stalking’, (CPS, July 2017) <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmcifrs/wp-content/uploads/living –in-fear-
the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> accessed 6 March 2018 
571 As previously discussed, the measures were introduced following Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate inspection and report 
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5.3.4 Risk assessment challenges  
 
Given that cyberstalking can affect victims psychologically, emotionally and physically, 
there is an onus on police officers and prosecutors to ensure that victims are risked 
assessed and that identified risks are managed during the investigation and 
processes. The relationship between the issues raised and risk assessment of victims 
is illustrated in Figure 5.3.4 below: 
 
Figure 5.3.4 Issues that impact on Risk Assessment. 
 
 
 
 
The participants highlighted the additional importance of risk assessing the 
cyberstalkers given that some cyberstalkers may be mentally unwell (PRO12 and 
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illnesses.572 Groenen and Vervaeke also acknowledge that academics have argued 
that when assessing risk to victims, the following 3 factors should be considered by 
police officers; i) risk of physical violence, ii) risk of the victim suffering psychological 
or social damage and iii) risk of the offence continuing to occur or reoccurring.573  
 
From a mental health perspective, McEwan, Pullen and Purcell stress that the stalking 
behaviour can lead to substantial damage in victims, whether the perpetrator is violent 
or not.574 Therefore, from a mental health perspective, they emphasise that the 
responsibility for assessing and managing risks lies with mental health 
professionals.575 From a law enforcement perspective, the researcher asserts that 
police officers also have a crucial role to play in identifying, monitoring and managing 
risks to victims when offenders are questioned, arrested and charged and during the 
investigation process. The researcher also argues that prosecutors by liaising with 
police officers in the progression of cases, have a role to play in ensuring that victims 
of cyberstalking cases are risk assessed. Hence as previously discussed (Chapter 1, 
section 1.3 and Chapter 2, section 2.7 respectively), the CPS and the MPS have 
introduced risk assessment measures to protect victims ranging from the introduction 
of relevant legal guidelines to the introduction of a Risk Identification and Assessment 
Model. 
 
From a domestic violence perspective, the participants expressed frustration at 
cyberstalking victims in domestic violence cases refusing to implement recommended 
                                                          
572 Anne Groene and Geert Vervaeke ‘Violent Stalkers: Detecting Risk Factors by the Police’ (2009)  15 European Journal of Criminal 
Policy and Research 3 
573 Anne Groene and Geert Vervaeke ‘Violent Stalkers: Detecting Risk Factors by the Police’ (2009)  15 European Journal of Criminal 
Policy and Research 3 
574 Troy McEwan, Paull Mullen and Rosemary Purcell ‘Identifying Risk Factors in Stalking: A review of Current Research’ 2007  30 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1 
575 The identified the following damage: assault, persistent stalking, recurring stalking, psychological damage and social damage 
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risk assessment safety measures. The responses of the participants revealed that it 
can be challenging for police officer to risk manage victims who have intermittent 
relationship with cyberstalkers.  This finding is concerning, given that a study in 2019 
found that stalking and cyberstalking victims (implicitly) in domestic violence cases are 
more likely to be targeted by offenders. The study was conducted by Bendlin and 
Sheridan based on a sample of 369 police incident reports into domestic violence  
which identified  correlates of nonviolent, moderate, and severe physical violence  
where stalking behaviour was indicated.576 The incident reports that featured in the 
study occurred between 2013 and 2017 between intimate or ex-intimate partners.    
 
Similarly, the CPS acknowledged, in the current annual Violence against Women and 
Girls report, hat a majority of stalking and cyberstalking incidents implicitly in 2018-19 
related to domestic abuse.577 Importantly, the CPS highlighted that the joint police and 
CPS protocol on stalking has equipped police officers and prosecutors with tools to 
better identify offending.578  The researcher argues that the challenge for the CPS and 
the MPS is to work collaboratively with a view to tackling the issue of cyberstalking 
victims in domestic violence cases refusing to support the prosecution of offenders 
given that as previously discussed (Chapter 1, section 2.2), cyberstalking can lead to 
the death of victims either via murder or suicide.  
 
From a domestic violence risk assessment perspective, the CPS has published 
Domestic Abuse Guidelines for prosecutors which contain risk assessment checklists 
                                                          
576 Martyna Bendlin and Lorraine Sheridan ‘Risk Factors for Severe Violence in Intimate Partner Stalking Situations: An Analysis of Police 
Records’ (2019)  Journal of Interpersonal Science’  
577 Annual Violence against Women and Girls report published’ (CPS, 12 September 2019) < www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/annual-violence-
against-women-and-girls-report-published-0> accessed 12 September 2019 
578 ibid 
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and risk assessment indicators.579 The risk assessment checklists and indicators will 
equip prosecutors with the skills that they require to identify victims of domestic 
violence and related cyberstalking who need to be risk assessed and risk managed. 
The CPS has given 3 assurances in relation to the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and 
Honour Based Violence risk assessment (DASH) and the stalking risk screening tool. 
The first assurance is that prosecutors will ensure that the DASH and the stalking risk 
screening tool have been applied by the police.580 The second assurance is that the 
DASH and the stalking risk screening tool will be used to inform decisions regarding 
bail or remand. The third assurance given by the CPS is that the DASH and the 
stalking risk screening tool will be used to inform safeguarding plans in relation to the 
victim. Notably, the CPS confirmed that in cases of domestic violence this will be in 
addition to the Joint CPS ACPO Domestic Violence Evidence Checklist.581 
 
Section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 empowers criminal courts to 
make a restraining order after a conviction under either section 2 or section 4 of the 
Act.  Additionally, section 12 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 
extended the power of criminal courts to impose orders for any criminal offence, and 
on acquittal as well as conviction.582  However despite these statutory provisions from 
a risk assessment perspective, the participants expressed frustration at cyberstalkers 
who breach restraining orders and continue to cyberstalk victims. The frustration is 
understandable given that in the ‘Protocol between the National Police Chief’s Council 
and the Crown Prosecution Service, the stakeholder acknowledged that breach of 
                                                          
579 ‘Domestic Abuse Guidelines for Prosecutors (CPS) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/domestic-abuse-guidelines-prosecutors>  
accessed 22 December 2019 
580 580 Protocol on the appropriate handling of stalking offences between the Crown Prosecution Service & ACPO’ (CPS, 2014) 
<www.cps.gov/publications/agencies> accessed  2 December  2019 
581  ibid 
582 It was anticipated that these statutory provisions will reduce the risk to and potential victims of stalking, domestic violence, harassment 
and other offences. However the effectiveness of the orders  have been questioned given that some offenders persist in offending 
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restraining orders is evidence of further stalking and harassment offences.583  The 
protocol was previously discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.4. Therefore, 
Benitez, McNiel and Binder highlight that there is a controversy over the effectiveness 
of protection orders and restraining orders implicitly despite acknowledging that 
restraining orders can be an effective tool for threat management.584 
 
From a critical perspective, while addressing the issue of the breach of restraining 
orders by offenders in stalking harassment and cyberstalking cases implicitly, Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service 
Inspectorate highlighted the need for a proper deliberation of the persistent offending 
instead of an assumption that the breach will be prosecuted ahead of substantive 
offences.585  Hence the CPS confirmed in the recently published annual Violence 
against Women and Girls report that one of its future priorities is to refresh the CPS 
guidance on breaches of restraining orders and the new Stalking Protection Orders.586 
 
 
Notably, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate joint inspection of Harassment and Stalking 
Offences found that victims of stalking offences in non - domestic violence cases were 
less likely to have had a risk assessment.587 Crucially the inspectorates made three 
                                                          
583 Protocol On the Appropriate Handling of Stalking Cases Between the Crown Prosecution Service and ACPO’ (CPS, 2014) 
<www.cps.gov/publications/agencies> accessed 14 August 2014 
584 Christopher Benitez, Dale McNiel and Renée Binder ‘Do Protection Orders Protect?’ (2010)  
38 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online September 2010 3 
585 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate And Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in Fear-The Police and CPS 
Response to Harassment And Stalking’ (CPS, 2017)  < www.living–in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> 
accessed 10 July 2017 
586 Annual Violence against Women and Girls report published’ (CPS, 12 September 2019) < www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/annual-violence-
against-women-and-girls-report-published-0> accessed 12 September 2019 
587 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate And Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in Fear-The Police and CPS 
Response to Harassment And Stalking’ (CPS, 2017)  < www.living–in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> 
accessed  3 December 2019 
322 
 
significant observations; i) firstly, that when risk assessing domestic abuse victims, the 
specific questions relating to harassment and stalking were sometimes overlooked. 
  ii) Some victims of harassment and stalking are left unprotected because the risks to 
them are not assessed routinely. iii) Lack of risk assessment adds to the problems of 
victims who believe that they are not taken seriously.588 It is important to note that the 
third observation echoes the findings of this thesis that cyberstalking is not routinely 
regarded as a serious offence. 
 
Following publication of the findings, the CPS introduced a new joint protocol which 
replaced the previous agreement that was introduced in 2014 by the CPS and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers.589  The new joint protocol highlights that the police 
are required to ensure that the Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Honour Based 
Violence risk assessment (DASH) or other appropriate risk identification or screening 
tool (including SASH)  are used  for two purposes. The first purpose is to assess the 
risk to the victim. The second purpose is to identify safety measures and manage 
the risk to victims of harassment and stalking.590  
 
The participants also expressed frustration at the inability to assess and manage the 
risk posed by anonymous cyberstalkers who use fake internet accounts to harass 
victims because their identities are unknown (PRO12 and PO13 and PO21: Chapter 
4, page 255) The participants stated that this situation has enabled anonymous 
cyberstalkers to be one step ahead of law enforcement officers who cannot risk assess 
and manage the threat they pose to victims (PRO7: Chapter 4, pages 274 and 275).  
                                                          
588 ibid 
589 ‘Protocol on the appropriate Handling of Stalking or Harassment Offences Between the National Chief Police Chief’s Council and the 
Crown Prosecution Service’  (CPS, 2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/action-stalking-and-harassment> accessed 3 December 2019 
590 Randall  Kropp ,Stephen Hart and David Lyon ‘Risk Assessment of Stalker Some Problems and Possible Solutions  (2002) 29 Criminal 
Justice and  Behaviour 5  
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Kropp, Hart and Lyon emphasise that violence risk assessment entails two aspects. 
The first aspect is the evaluation of individuals to identify the risk as to whether they 
will perpetrate acts of violence.  The second aspect of risk assessment is to develop 
interventions to manage or reduce that risk. Therefore, Kropp, Hart and Lyon argue 
that professionals should ascertain the factors that are present in a case that might 
enhance or increase risks and also assert that the risk assessment of stalkers is simple 
because victims of any future violence are obvious. From a critical perspective, given 
that cyberstalking is an aspect of stalking which enables offenders to escalate their 
harassment of victims from the cyber realm to the physical realm, the researcher 
argues that legal professionals will be unable to risk assess anonymous cyberstalkers 
whose risk to victims cannot be assessed, monitored and managed.  
 
The current research findings identified that officers and prosecutors acknowledge that 
some cyberstalkers are mentally ill and require treatment.  Therefore, from a 
rehabilitative perspective, Mackenzie and James stress that the treatment of stalkers 
is crucial to resolving the problems motivating stalkers to offend and acknowledge that 
civil law remedies such as restraining orders may be ineffective.591  Mackenzie and 
James also emphasize that implementing a framework for establishing the factors and 
determining the delivery of service is important. The researcher argues that Mackenzie 
and James’ observations are only applicable to cases involving offenders whose 
identities are known given that some cyberstalkers are anonymous.592  The difficulty 
in such cases is that criminal and mental health professionals will be unable to develop 
                                                          
591 Rachael  Mackenzie and David James ‘Management and Treatment of Stalkers: Problems, Options and Solutions’  (2011) 29 Behavioural 
Sciences and The Law 2 
592 Ibid  
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a framework that is created to treat the anonymous offender, identifying risk factors 
and shape the delivery of treatment.  
 
The above observations reveal that the anonymity of cyberstalkers, cyberstalking 
victims in domestic violence cases having intermittent relationships with offenders, 
cyberstalkers breaching restraining orders and the inability to risk asses mentally ill 
cyberstalkers are issues which hinder police officers and prosecutors in the risk 
assessment of victims and offenders. The findings also reveal that in some cases, 
restraining orders do not deter offenders from committing further offences against 
victims after risk assessments have been completed by police officers. From a risk 
assessment perspective, the implications are that this may result in offenders 
persisting in the victimization of individuals and jeopardizing the safety of victims by 
engaging in criminal behaviours which could lead to the materialization of identified 
risks. From a victimization perspective, another complication of cyberstalkers 
breaching restraining orders is that it will result in victims fearing for their safety due to 
the unpredictable nature of cyberstalkers who sometimes, escalate stalking in the 
cyber realm to stalking in the physical realm.  
 
5.3.5   Evidential difficulties  
 
 
‘Evidential difficulties’ was the sixth main theme identified in the study. Once again the 
researcher was aware that the issue of bias could lead to the participants fearing 
repercussions from their employers. Consequently, to avoid bias the researcher 
implemented the strategy of seeking clarifications in a sensitive manner and not being 
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judgmental. These measures put the participants at ease and enabled them to feel 
free to express their views. 
 
A majority of the prosecutors shared the perception that various perceived evidential 
difficulties hinder them during the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.  
Given that prosecutors require digital evidence to build robust cases against 
cyberstalkers, the participants shared the frustration that anonymous cyberstalkers 
cannot be successfully prosecuted due to lack of evidence to satisfy the evidential 
burden of proof as previously discussed earlier in the thesis (Chapter 2, section 2.3.8).  
The participants stressed that an inability to obtain charging decisions from the CPS 
is challenging for police officers because they cannot provide the evidence required to 
prosecute suspects (PO10, PO14 and PO19: Chapter 4, pages 265 and 266). The 
participants also acknowledged that there is a high evidential threshold to be met given 
that the CPS will not prosecute a case unless there is a realistic prospect of 
conviction.593 From a technological perspective, Reyns highlights that cyberstalkers 
have various tools at their disposal to enable them to engage in their deviant behaviour 
which includes desktop computers, laptops, mobile phones, and portable Wi-Fi 
devices.594  Hence, Vallcampa and Salat emphasise that prosecution of cyberstalking 
offences is dependent on forensic analysis of devices capable of communication with 
a victim.595  
 
                                                          
593 The significance of meeting the evidential threshold as previously discussed in paragraphs 2.3.7 and 2.3.8 respectively, is that the CPS 
will not prosecute suspects if the police do not provide credible, reliable, supporting and strong evidence that is required to build strong cases 
against the cyberstalkers. 
594 594 Bradford Reyns, ‘A Situational Crime Prevention Approach to Cyberstalking Victimization: Preventative Tactics for Internet Users 
and Online Place Managers’ Crime Prevention And Community Safety (2010) 2(9) 101 
595 Graeme Horsman and Lynne Conniss ‘An Investigation of Anonymous and Spoof SMS resources used for the purpose of cyberstalking’ 
(2015) 13 Digital Investigation  
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The participants discussed the challenges that they face in identifying anonymous 
cyberstalkers which hinder the investigation process. The issue of anonymous 
electronic communication by cyberstalkers poses investigative difficulties for police 
officers as are prevent them from obtaining the digital evidence that is required to 
prosecute cyberstalkers.596 Hence, Amichai-Hamburger notes that anonymity on the 
internet enables an internet user to communicate online without disclosing 
information.597  From the perspective of preserving evidence, Sammon indicates that 
a preservation order will prevent an ISP from deleting existing data pertaining to an 
internet subscriber that arguably includes a cyberstalker.598  However, a participant 
expressed the view that it might be a challenge for UK police officers to obtain the 
required preservation order if a cyberstalker is anonymous.   
 
From a legal perspective, the perceived evidential difficulties highlighted above, hinder 
prosecutors from building strong cases and meeting the evidential and public interest 
tests as defined by the CPS code for crown prosecutors. Crucially as previously 
discussed, (Chapter 1, section 1.2.4), based on the evidential test, UK prosecutors will 
have to decide whether the evidence presented is sufficient and credible to charge a 
cyberstalker and whether there is a realistic prospect of convicting him. Additionally, if 
there is sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution or settlement out of court, 
prosecutors will also be required to apply the public interest test to decide whether it 
is indeed in the public interest to prosecute a cyberstalker?599   
The relationship of these various issues to evidential difficulty are illustrated in figure 
5.3.5. 
                                                          
596  The issue of anonymous cyberstalkers may impede the efforts of police officers to  gather the evidence required to tackle  cyberstalking 
as an aspect of cybercrime and prosecute cyberstalkers  
597 Yair Amichai-Hamburger ‘The Social Net understanding Our Online Behaviour’  (2nd edn, OUP 2013)  
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Figure 5.3.5. Issues that lead to evidential difficulties identified by participants. 
 
 
 
 
From an evidential perspective, Geach and Haralambous suggests that further 
investigative difficulties for police officers are establishing the computer that was used 
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or internet cafe.600  A minority of the participants highlighted this issue in relation to 
cyberstalkers  who live in a shared accommodation property and who may argue that 
a third party used their computer without their consent to harass victims 
(PO21:Chapter 4, page 271).  
 
From a privacy perspective, Koops and his colleagues argue that the right to privacy 
as guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 1953, 
governs the processing of data relating to the private life of individuals which implicitly 
includes the likes of cyberstalkers and other criminals.601 Given that cyberstalkers can 
argue that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the information 
stored on their electronic devices which should not be subject to police investigations, 
there is a further onus on UK police officers to ensure that there is a legal basis for 
obtaining publicly accessible data on the internet which pertain to cyberstalkers.602  
 
While discussing the legal requirements for establishing offences under the PHA, the 
participants explained that the prosecutors may not be in a position to meet the legal 
requirement under s4A of the PHA if it cannot be proven that the actions of an 
anonymous cyberstalker caused a fear of violence because the identity of the offender 
is unknown.603  The participants therefore emphasised that the legal issue is proving 
that the actions of an anonymous cyberstalker created a fear of violence given that a 
high evidential threshold has to be met by prosecutors seeking to charge an offender 
under a section 4A of the PHA. 
                                                          
600 Neal Geach and Nicola Haralambous, ‘Regulating Online Harassment: Is the Law Fit for the Social Networking Age? (2009) 73 (3)  
    73 Journal of Criminal Law 3 
600 Ioana Vasiu and Lucian Vasiu, ‘Cyberstalking 
601 Bert-Jaaps .Koops, ‘Police Investigations in Open Internet Sources: Procedural Law Issues’ (2013) 29 (6)  
     Computer Law and Security Review <http://www.file:///c:users/user/downloads/ssrn-id2574951.pdf> accessed 3 March 2017 
602 ibid 
603 This legislative provision criminalizes the offence of stalking involving the fear of violence as previously discussed in paragraph 2.3.5. 
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While discussing the evidential threshold for proving the offence of fear of violence,   
the participants explained that if police officers cannot provide strong, reliable and 
credible evidence to prove that the actions of an anonymous cyberstalker created a 
fear of violence under s4A of the PHA, it can result in prosecutors charging offenders 
with lesser offences under sections s2 and 4 of the PHA instead. Hence, Leggett 
examined the concept of fear of violence under s4A of the PHA based on a judicial 
reasoning in a fairly recent case.604  The case is R v Qosa (Robert) which involved a 
stalker who was charged under s4A of the PHA with the offence of creating fear of 
violence.605 In this case, the judge in the court of appeal held that under s4A of the 
PHA, it was for the jury to consider not only whether the complainant feared imminent 
violence, but also whether she feared that violence would take place in the future. 
 
Likewise, Gowland argues that several grave stalking cases that fall barely short of 
s.4 of the PHA are charged instead under s.2 of the PHA due to the difficult 
requirement that the victim fears violence will be used.606 Importantly, Golwand 
highlights that there is a huge sentencing gap between the two offences (see Chapter 
2, sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). Therefore, Gowland suggests that the sentencing powers 
on s. 2 conviction should either be increased or the offence made a triable offence 
either way as proposed by the parliamentary inquiry, to ensure that serious s. 2 cases 
are adequately sentenced.607 Gowland’s view echoes the frustration of the participants 
in this research who explained that a legal challenge for prosecutors is proving that a 
victim was in fear of violence under s4A of the PHA because there is a higher evidential 
                                                          
604 Zach Leggett ‘Now or Never? How Intimate Must a Fear of Violence Be for the Purposes of s.4A of the Protection of Harassment Act 
1997? R v Qosja (Robert) [2016]  Crim 1543  (2017) 81 Journal of Criminal Law 1 
605 [2016]  EWCA Crim 1543 
606 Judith Gowland ‘Protection from Harassment 1997. The ‘New’ Stalking Offences (2013) 77 Journal of Criminal  Law 5 
607 ibid 
330 
 
burden on the prosecution to prove that the actions of a cyberstalker had a substantial 
adverse effect on the day to day activities of a victim.  
 
While discussing cases which are discontinued by the CPS due to lack of evidence, 
the participants stressed that in domestic violence cases, it is difficult to obtain 
evidence from victims especially if certain victims still want to maintain a relationship 
with their cyberstalkers. Importantly, the participants revealed that the bigger concern 
for them was that victims will lose faith in the criminal justice system if they report 
cases to the police and are subsequently told by police officers that their cases have 
been discontinued due to insufficient evidence. Therefore, the participants stated that 
the legal issue of cases not meeting the evidential threshold, could stop some victims 
from reporting case. The participants explained that this issue is concerning because 
in some domestic violence cases, cyberstalking can lead to fatalities. Thus, 
Mackintosh and Swann highlight that the number of individuals killed due to domestic 
violence in the UK is at its highest level in five years608  
 
Additionally, the participants also shared the perception that other difficulties include 
the reluctance of domestic violence victims to support the prosecution of cyberstalkers 
(PRO14 and PRO17, Chapter 4, page 283). Consequently, Vilhaeur highlights that 
domestic violence cases are often characterized by the evidentiary issue of victims 
refusing to support prosecutions.609 Notably, Vilhaeur emphasises that the nature of 
domestic violence creates an entangled relationship between victim and perpetrator 
that is not encountered in most other crimes. 
                                                          
608 Thomas Mackintosh and Stephen Swann ‘Domestic Violence Killings Reach a Five Year -High’  (BBC, 13 September 2019) < 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49459674> accessed 26 December 2019 
609 Jennice Vihaeur ‘Understanding the victim. A guide to understanding the prosecution of domestic violence’ (2000) 27 Fordham Law 
Journal 3 < http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol27/iss3/8> 
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The abuse of technology in domestic violence and stalking cases was investigated by 
Westbrook based on a survey with 152 domestic violence advocates and 46 victims. 
The study made three crucial findings.610 The first finding is that stalkers and 
cyberstalkers implicitly, used technological tools such as phones, tablets, computers, 
and social networking websites to victimize in intimate partner stalking. The second 
finding is that perpetrators utilised technology to create a feeling of the omnipresence, 
and to isolate, punish, and humiliate domestic violence victims. The third finding that 
was made by Westbrook is that perpetrators also threatened to share sexualized 
content online to humiliate victims.611  
 
The above findings support the findings of this thesis because it echoes the views of 
the participants who indicated that some cyberstalkers harass domestic violence 
victims by hacking into their computers and humiliating them by disseminating 
obscene sexualized messages in the names of victim. The above findings also 
confirmed the views of participants who revealed that some victims become isolated 
and ostracized by their family members after being targeted by cyberstakers.  
Additionally, the notion of cyberstalkers punishing victims was echoed by a participant 
of the researcher’s study who revealed that a victim who was constantly punished by 
an anonymous cyberstalker via numerous silent calls at all hours of the day was 
mentally and psychologically traumatised which left suicidal and dependant on anti-
depressants after seeking medical help. 
 
                                                          
610 Delanie Woodlock ‘The Abuse of Technology in Domestic Violence and Stalking’ (2016) 23 Violence Against Women 5  
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From a statistical perspective, the Crime Survey for England and Wales revealed that 
in the year ending March 2019, an estimated 2.4 million adults aged 16 to 74 years 
experienced domestic abuse. This report further revealed that of these,1.6 million were 
women and 786,000 were men and  that the police recorded 746,219 domestic abuse-
related crimes in the year ending March 2019 which is an increase of 24% from the 
previous year. Although the report did not specify the number of cases that were linked 
to cyberstalking incidents the findings of the current research reveal that cyberstalking 
stalking incidents are often linked to domestic violence.612 
 
It is important to note that the issue of the lack of victim disclosure of evidence in 
criminal cases was recently addressed by the CPS in relation to the handling of mobile 
phone data in rape cases.613 The CPS recently emphasized that mobile phone data, 
or social media activity, will only be considered by the police when crucial to a specific 
case.  Importantly, the CPS indicated that this requirement is necessary to ensure that 
investigations are fair for both complainant and suspect, all reasonable lines of enquiry 
must be pursued. The researcher is of the view that this process is currently being 
applied by police officers in the investigation of cyberstalkers because they are 
required to obtain, retrieve and analyse offensive electronic messages that have been 
disseminated by cyberstalkers which constitute electronic evidence and are crucial to 
cases. The researcher anticipates that this process will enable the CPS to build robust 
cases against  given that only credible evidence that are crucial to the prosecution of 
                                                          
612 Domestic Abuse in England and Wales Overview: November 2019 (Office for National Statistics, ) < 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesoverview/november2
019 > accessed 26 December 2019 
613 ‘Handing Over Mobile Phone Data in Rape Prosecutions’ (CPS, 29 April 2019) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/handing-over-mobile-
phone-data-rape-prosecutions> accessed 4 May 2019 
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offenders will be considered by police officers and prosecutors during the investigation 
prosecution processes respectively.  
  
From a legal perspective, the perceived evidential difficulties highlighted above, hinder 
prosecutors from building strong cases and meeting the evidential and public interest 
tests as defined by the CPS code for crown prosecutors. Crucially, based on the 
evidential test, UK prosecutors will have to decide whether the evidence presented is 
sufficient and credible to charge a cyberstalker and whether there is a realistic 
prospect of convicting them (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.4). Additionally, if there is 
sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution or settlement out of court, prosecutors will 
also be required to apply the public interest test to decide whether it is in the public 
interest to prosecute a cyberstalker.614   
 
In summary, the research findings discussed in relation to existing literature 
demonstrate that there are various aspects of evidential difficulties that hinder UK 
police officers in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. The findings reveal that participants 
were exasperated by the perceived evidential problems because they felt that the 
problems enabled anonymous cyberstalkers to be a step ahead of police officers given 
that cyberstalkers cannot be prosecuted unless they are identified, arrested, 
questioned and charged after being evidentially connected to offences.  
 
5.3.6. Victim Behaviour  
 
                                                          
614 ibid 
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‘Victim Behaviour’ was the seventh theme identified in the study. While discussing 
victim behaviour, participants stated that cases are sometimes not prosecuted due to 
underreporting of incidents by victims. The participants shared the perception that 
victims do not report incidents for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons are; the 
perception that cyberstalking incidents are trivial, victims will be wasting the time of 
police officers by reporting incidents, cyberstalkers will not be successfully prosecuted 
even if victims testify, victims lack faith in the criminal justice system and fear of 
repercussions from the cyberstalker and his family. This finding resonates with that of 
Vallacampa and Salat’s research as to the reasons why stalking and cyberstalking 
victims implicitly, do not report incidents and the use of protection systems by stalking 
victims.615 Vallacampa and Salat found that victims rarely report stalking and 
cyberstalking cases implicitly, due to a lack of confidence in the criminal justice 
system. Their research revealed that victims gave six reasons why they did not report 
incidents; lack of evidence, fear of repercussion, unwillingness to punish the criminal, 
the belief that it was a private matter or that it was not serious enough to justify 
reporting, and a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the criminal justice system 
and fear of secondary victimisation616. 
 
Likewise, Al-khateeb, Epiphaniou, Alhaboby and others, investigated the role of 
Police, Mobile Operators, Internet Service Providers, and owners/administrators of 
online platforms regarding intervention in response to offences.617 The study was 
based on a sample of 305 participants who identified themselves as victims of online 
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616 ibid 
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Formal-Intervention-and-the-Role-of-Corporate-Social-Responsibility.pdf > accessed 23 December 2019 
335 
 
harassment.  Notably, in relation to the reporting of incidents, the study made three 
important findings. The first finding is that some of the victims did not notify the police 
of incidents due to various reasons which include fear of escalation, feelings of guilt, 
sympathy and self-blaming. The second finding is that an outstanding number of 
victims did not report incidents to their service provider because they were not aware 
that they could. The third reason is that the victims who had reported incidents to the 
ISPs revealed that either no or very little support was offered. The first findings of Al-
khateeb, Epiphaniou, Alhaboby and others echo the views of the participants in the 
researcher’s study who explained that sometimes, victims of cyberstalking do not 
report offences to the police for various reasons. The reasons are that they feel that 
the offence is trivial, they will be wasting the time of police officers by reporting 
incidents and that cyberstalkers will not be successfully prosecuted even if victims 
testify against them in court. 
 
The researcher’s findings and the findings of Al-khateeb, Epiphaniou, Alhaboby and 
others, attribute the issue of victims not reporting cyberstalking incidents to the police 
to a variety of reasons. Al-khateeb, Epiphaniou, Alhaboby and others found that 
victims had various personal reasons for not reporting incidents to the police. Likewise, 
the researcher’s study found that victims do not report cyberstalking incidents to the 
police for various reasons which are linked to a lack of confidence in the criminal justice 
system.  
 
Participants in the current research also expressed  frustration at victims who refuse 
to testify in court and thereby hindering prosecutors from building strong cases against 
offenders (PO13: Chapter 4, page 286). While discussing the reason why some 
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victims of cyberstalkers refuse to attend court, the participants explained that the 
reason for this issue is because some victims fear repercussion from the cyberstalker 
and his family. This issue was once again was highlighted by Vallacampa and Salat.618 
 
Figure 5.3.6. Illustrates the types of victim behaviour that participants perceive hinder 
the successful investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
Figure 5.3.6 Victim Behaviour difficulties perceived by participants to hinder the 
investigation and prosecution process. 
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Participants stated that lack of full disclosure by victims can lead to cases being lost 
and cyberstalkers not being charged with suitable offences due to victims withholding 
evidence from the police (PO3, PO17 and PRO29: Chapter 4, pages 284 and 285). 
The participants emphasised that this aspect of victim behaviour was frustrating 
because, it provides incomplete pictures of cyberstalking incidents and can lead to the 
death of victims in some domestic violence cases. Hence Bent-Goodley therefore 
asserts, from a global perspective, that domestic violence fatality presents obstacles 
to countries and communities globally.619 From a law enforcement perspective, Hill 
therefore encourages police officers not to ignore reluctant victims in domestic abuse 
cases but to instead endeavour to build a strong criminal cases against offenders 
without relying on the victim’s evidence.620 Importantly, Hill argues that the actions of 
a police officer in handling a domestic violence case may prevent an escalation of 
future acts of violence in the home. From a cybercrime perspective the researcher 
argues that given that some anonymous cyberstalkers target domestic violence 
victims, police officers may only be able to prevent an escalation of victimisation 
emanating from the cyber realm to the physical realm if the identity and location of the 
is  cyberstalker are known.  
 
Likewise, Matos, Grangeia, Ferreira, and others conducted a study on stalking 
victimization in Portugal and found that nature of the relationship between the victim 
and the stalker was a primary predictor of stalking ranges and perpetuation.621 The 
study found that the closer the relationship, the greater the diversity and duration and 
that the stalking impact was higher in victims that experienced more diverse stalking 
                                                          
619 Tricia Bent-Goodley ‘ Domestic Violence Fatality Reviews and the African Community’ (2013)  17 Criminology and Criminal Justice 4  
620 Rodney Hill, ‘Domestic Violence and the Reluctant Victim’ (2009)  4 AELE Monthly Law Journal  501 
621 ‘Marlene Matos, Helena Grangeia, Celia Ferreira, Vanessa Azevedo, Mariana Goncalves and Lorraine Sherridan Stalking Victimization 
in Portugal: Prevalence Characteristics and Impact;’(2019)  57 International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice   
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behaviours and fear.622 Matos, Grangeia, Ferreira, and others concluded that fear and 
impact mediate the relationship between stalking diversity and help-seeking. From a 
domestic violence perspective, given that the study found that the stalking impact was 
higher in victims that experienced more diverse stalking behaviours and fear, there is 
an expectation that victims will promptly report stalking and cyberstalking incidents to 
the police with a view to stopping victimisation and bringing offenders to justice.  
 
It is important to note that the participants indicated that they offer support to victims 
who are reluctant to testify against cyberstalkers in court (PO17: Chapter 4, page 260). 
The researcher therefore, acknowledges that  under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, the CPS can offer vulnerable and intimidated witnesses various  
measures that can assist them in giving evidence in court and to alleviate some of the 
stress associated with giving evidence.623           
 
Although a majority of the participants alluded to the fact that victims of cyberstalkers 
tend to be females and that offenders tend to be males, the researcher recognises 
that victims could also, include males and perpetrators females because victimisation 
and offending are not restricted to a specific gender.  The fact that males can be 
victimised by cyberstalkers is evident in the highly publicized case of Lord McAlpine 
of West Green v Bercow.624 In this case, the judges considered the dissemination of 
electronic communication via Twitter from defamatory and libellous perspectives. In 
doing so, the judges held that the words will be deemed defamatory if they referred to 
the claimants and if they had a significant adverse effect on the way people 
                                                          
622 ibid 
623 ‘Special Measures’ (CPS, 2017) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/special-measures>  accessed 29 June 2019 
624 [2013] EWHC 1342 (QBD) 
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approached them.625 This case is significant because, it arguably established that the 
victims of cyberstalking can seek to bring cyberstalkers to justice via civil litigation as 
opposed to criminal litigation. 
 
In summary, the research findings demonstrate that underreporting, lack of disclosure 
and reluctant cyberstalking victims in domestic violence cases are perceived aspects 
of victim behaviour which hinder UK police officers in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
The findings reveal that the participants were hindered by the perceived difficulties 
associated with victim behaviour because the difficulties lead to cases being 
discontinued and in some cases to cyberstalkers not being prosecuted.  Worryingly, 
the highlighted aspects of victim behaviour may lead to victims being put at risk 
particularly in domestic violence cases because the escalation of offending can and 
has resulted in fatalities.  
 
The thesis findings in respect of the research questions: 
 
This thesis reports on a qualitative study of the perceptions of police officers and 
prosecutors in London and the factors which frustrate them in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers. Participants shared the perception that several factors 
impede the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers and from the interview data 
six main themes emerged namely; legislative difficulties, lack of training and 
knowledge, lack of resources, issues with risk assessment, evidential challenges and 
victim behaviour. Additionally, the findings have explored and addressed the issue of 
what might be considered the thresholds of acceptable behaviour on the internet and 
                                                          
625 ibid 
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these thresholds were determined in some part through the participants’ own 
professional experience. A further objective of the research was to explore the 
challenges that police officers perceive impede the risk assessment of cyberstalking 
victims. The findings reveal that participants acknowledge certain factors which hinder 
the risk assessment of both cyberstalking victims and cyberstalkers particularly where 
the mental health status of the cyberstalker is in question.  
 
The findings in respect of Research Question 1: 
 
 
What are the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on cyberstalking and the 
threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the 
internet from cyberstalking? 
 
To identify the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors in London on 
cyberstalking and the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking the results of this research provide a 
breakdown of several perceptions. The analysis of the qualitative interviews, enabled 
the researcher to identify the following fifteen perceptions that UK police officers and 
prosecutors on cyberstalking and the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and 
unpleasant comments on the internet from cyberstalking; (1) Subjective view of victims 
(2) Objective view  (3) Facts of the case and motive of the offender  (4) Impact on 
victims (5) Gravity of the offence (6) Statutory definition of cyberstalking (7) Intention 
of the cyberstalker (8) Duration of the conduct (9) prior relationship with the victim (10) 
Content of the  messages (11) Reaction of the victim, (12) Vulnerability of the victim 
(13) Request of the victim for the cyberstalker to stop victimization (14) Cyberstalker’s 
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awareness of the impact of his conduct on the victim Intention of the cyberstalker and 
(15) Size of the electronic platform that was used to disseminate messages  
 
In relation to this, Edward discusses behaviours that occur within the parameters of 
acceptable deviance in relation to deviant acts which are informed by norms and 
anchored by law.626  Importantly, Edwards makes a distinction between the regulators 
and the regulated who can trigger enforcement and social sanctions when behaviours 
cross the parameters of an acceptable behaviour threshold.627  The findings of this 
study reflect the views of Edward given that that the participants shared the perception 
that cyberstalking is a behaviour that does not comply with the law which occurs when   
various perceived thresholds of the parameters of acceptable behaviour are crossed 
and therefore, not acceptable to police officers, prosecutors and victims within the law 
enforcement framework of the regulators and the regulated. 
Moreover, Hooper and Kalidas emphasize that various differences between 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour online and offline have emerged628. Hooper 
and Kalidas found that stalking or cyberstalking implicitly was identified by the 
participants as one of nine unacceptable behaviours629.  Despite the fact, that the 
research participants are different in age and background, there is a correlation 
between this study and the study of Hooper and Kalidas because both studies 
establish that cyberstalking is deemed an unacceptable online behaviour by 
individuals more especially, from the perspective of the invasion of privacy.630 Further, 
both studies highlight that personal beliefs and values guide individuals in determining 
                                                          
626 Mark Edwards ‘Law and the Parameters of Acceptable Behaviour’ (2006)  97 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1  
627 ibid 
628 Val Hooper and Tarika Kalidas ‘Acceptable and Unacceptable Behaviour on Social Networking Sites: A Study of the Behavioural Norms 
of Youths on Facebook’ (2012)  15 Electronic Journal Information System Technology 3 
629 ibid 
630 Hooper and Kalias  conducted qualitative interviews were conducted with 16 youth, aged 18-20 years, and 
who had a Facebook account 
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the behaviours that are unacceptable online and on Social Networking Sites such as 
Facebook.  
 
The findings in respect of Research Question 2: 
 
 
What factors do police officers and prosecutors perceive could frustrate them in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers? 
 
Despite the fact, that the research jurisdictions are different, there is a correlation 
between this study and the study of D’Ovidio and Doyle.631  This is because the current 
research findings confirm that there are evidential and legislative difficulties in the 
investigation of cyberstalkers. D’Ovidio and Doyle highlighted two out of the seven 
perceived investigative difficulties identified by the participants in the current research. 
A further comparison can be made between both studies because they suggest that 
law enforcement officials encounter several difficulties in the investigation of 
cyberstalkers.  Further, both studies highlight the issue of anonymous cyberstalkers 
as an investigative hurdle and suggest that staff should be trained on how to 
investigate cyberstalking offences with a view to equipping them with the requisite 
knowledge and the computer forensic skills required to investigate cyberstalking 
offences.  
 
From an educational perspective, a crucial comparison can be made between the 
findings of this thesis and the findings of the independent parliamentary inquiry into 
                                                          
631 Robert D’Ovidio and James Doyle, ‘A Study of CyberStalking Understanding Investigative Hurdles’ (FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,  
    March 2003)  
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stalking law reform which recommends that the relevant Secretaries of State ensure 
that criminal justice professionals receive training in anti-stalking legislation as well as 
on how to identify it.632   
 
The findings in respect of Research Question 3: 
 
What challenges do police officers perceive impede the risk assessment of 
cyberstalking victims? 
 
To identify the challenges that police officers perceive impede the risk assessment of 
cyberstalking victims the analysis of the qualitative interviews, enabled the researcher 
to identify the following 6 challenges which hinder police officers from risk assessing 
victims; 
(1) Anonymous cyberstalkers cannot be risk assessed, monitored or managed 
(2) Domestic violence victims who rekindle relationships with cyberstalkers 
(3) Lack of knowledge  
(4) Shortage of manpower  
(5) Cyberstalkers breaching Restraining orders 
(6)   Victims refusing to implement recommend risk assessment safety measures  
In support of this finding, Kropp, Hart and Lyon stress that the risk assessment of 
stalkers and cyberstalkers implicitly is difficult due to the range of stalking behaviours 
and lack of research.633  The findings of this thesis therefore, contribute knowledge to 
this area of research by identifying the above six specific challenges which hinder 
                                                          
632 ‘Independent Parliamentary Enquiry Into Stalking Law Reform’, (Dashrisk, February 2012)  
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police officers in the risk assessment of victims given the fact that cyberstalking 
consists of a variety of behaviours which have negative impacts on victims.  
From a mental health perspective, although Mullen, Mackenzie and James, identify 
that the risk assessment of stalkers and cyberstalkers implicitly often falls to mental 
health professionals, this study found that police officers are also tasked with risk 
assessing victims and managing the risk to victims with a view to countering identified 
and envisaged threats. Importantly, the findings in relation to this research question 
identify that the anonymity of cyberstalkers whilst representing a major hindrance to 
the risk assessment of cyberstalkers by police officers is not the only one.  
 
5.6.4. The Findings in respect of Research Question 4: 
 
Do police officers and prosecutors perceive evidential challenges, victim behaviour, 
lack of resources, and lack of training as presenting law enforcement difficulties?  
In response to this fourth research question, the analysis of the qualitative interviews, 
enabled the researcher to identify the following significant aspects of evidential 
challenges, victim behaviour, lack of resources and lack of training which present law 
enforcement difficulties; 
 
Evidential Challenges: 
(1)  Victims not keeping evidential records  (2) Cases being discontinued due to lack 
of evidence (3) Police officers not providing further evidence once suspects have been 
charged (4)  Prosecutors having to repeatedly chase police officers for outstanding 
evidence  (5) Proving an offence under section 4A of the PHA (6) Establishing a course 
of conduct under section 7 of the PHA (8) Obtaining evidence from victims in domestic 
violence cases  (9) Insufficient evidence to prosecute  (9) Prosecuting cyberstalkers 
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who victimize via proxy (10) Domestic violence victims not reporting cases because 
the evidential threshold  cannot be met  (11) Anonymous cyberstalkers being one step 
ahead of police officers (12)  Police delays in providing evidence due to heavy 
caseloads (13) Prosecuting mentally ill cyberstalkers 
Victim Behaviour: 
(1)Victims not supporting prosecutions (2) Victims refusing to testify against 
cyberstalkers (3) Victims refusing to go through the stress of trials 
(4)Victims cross communicating with cyberstalkers and giving mixed messages 
(5)Victims withholding evidence (6) Victims lack of confidence in the police and the 
criminal justice system (7) Victims fear of repercussions (8) Victims assumption that 
their cases will be dropped even if they testify (9) Victims not reporting offences 
(11) Victims delaying in reporting incidents (12) Victims disclosing personal 
information on the internet (13) Victims continuing relationships with cyberstalkers 
(14) Victims withholding information on the gravity of offences 
 
Lack of resources: 
(1) Missed opportunities to risk assess victims and cyberstalkers (2) Shortage of 
specialist and non-specialist police officers (3) Excessive caseloads 
(4)An inability to meet CPS deadlines for providing evidence (5) Insufficient time to 
follow up on initial reports by victims (6) Lack of a centralized database for sharing 
local intelligence 
 
Lack of training: 
(1)Tracing IP and email addresses (2) Phone and computer forensic training 
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 (3) Obtaining digital evidence (4) Accessing digital evidence (5) Preserving digital 
evidence (6) Judicial knowledge on cyberstalking (7) Identifying evidence (8) 
Psychological impact of cyberstalking (9) Most effective way of gathering evidence 
(10) Risk assessment of cyberstalkers 
These findings are supported by Horsman and Conniss who emphasize that the  
proliferation of anonymous services make it difficult for digital forensic experts to  
analyse and detect the origin of stalking and cyberstalking messages implicitly. 634 
Furthermore, the findings concur with the view of Horsman and Corniss that the 
prosecution of cyberstalkers is dependent on the availability of the required digital 
forensic evidence for presentation at court.  More importantly, from the subjective  
perspective of law enforcement officials, the current research goes a step further in 
establishing that in addition to evidential challenges, police officers perceive victim 
behaviour, lack of resources and lack of training  as constituting investigative and 
prosecutorial challenges for both police officers and prosecutors.  
 
Contribution to knowledge: 
 
In summary, the findings of this thesis therefore, contribute knowledge by highlighting 
the six specific challenges which hinder police officers in the risk assessment of victims 
given the fact that cyberstalking consists of a variety of behaviours which have 
negative impacts on victims. This research also identifies that the risk assessment of 
mentally ill cyberstalkers is an issue that needs to be addressed by the relevant 
stakeholders to arguably avoid missed opportunities to both risk assess and develop 
strategies for countering identified risks to victims and their families. Finally, a major 
                                                          
634 Graeme Horsman and Lynne Conniss ‘An Investigation of Anonymous and Spoof SMS resources used for the purpose of cyberstalking’ 
(2015) 13 Digital Investigation 
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finding in respect of the risk assessment of cyberstalkers by the police is, that the 
process is being inhibited by the anonymity cyberstalkers are afforded by the internet. 
This then implies that police are ultimately impeded from managing the risk 
cyberstalkers present to their victims which places those victims at constant risk.  
5.4   Relation to previous research 
 
 
Although some of the findings of the research are broadly in line with the views of Van 
der Aa in terms of establishing that law enforcement officials will  encounter evidential, 
jurisdictional, extradition and legislative difficulties in the investigation and prosecution 
of cyberstalkers, the research runs counter to Van der Aa’s view regarding the failure 
of police officers to act. 635 To this effect, the findings are to some extent, at odds with 
the findings of Van der Aa because the research demonstrates that the police officers 
interviewed were willing to investigate cyberstalkers but they acknowledged that the 
investigation of cyberstalkers will be fraught with various perceived investigative 
difficulties. This appears to indicate that police officers are keen to take an active part 
in the investigation process by arresting, interviewing and charging cyberstalkers 
subject to the difficulties revealed in the study being overcome.  
 
Despite the research methods used being different, this research can be compared to 
the work undertaken by D’Ovidio and Doyle.636 D’Ovidio and Doyle conducted a study 
on cyberstalking with a view to understanding the investigative hurdles based on the 
analysis of 201 cases of cyberstalking. D’Ovidio and Doyle examined the outcome of 
                                                          
635 Suzanne Van Der Aa, International (cyber) stalking: Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution (Pure, 2011) 
<www.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1310512/Aa_International_cyberstalking_110216_posprint_embargo_1_y.pdf  >  accessed 9 August 2018 
636 Robert D’Ovidio and James Doyle, ‘A Study of CyberStalking Understanding Investigative Hurdles’ (FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
March 2003) < http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/Information%20Clearinghouse/a-study-on-cyberstalking-understanding-investigative-
hurdles.pdf?sfvrsn=4> accessed 17 August 2018 
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the 201 closed cases with a view to establishing investigative hurdles. Conversely, the 
current research, utilised interview techniques to obtain research data from 63 law 
enforcement officials with a view to identifying the difficulties that they encounter in the 
investigation of cyberstalkers. Both studies share the common factor of researching 
cyberstalking from a law enforcement perspective and from two important 
perspectives, the findings are consistent with the previous research of D’Ovidio and 
Doyle.637  Specifically, the current findings confirm that there are evidential and 
legislative difficulties that hinder the investigation of cyberstalkers. 
 
Although previously conducted research has found that police officers may be 
reluctant to investigate aggravated harassment cases which is arguably synonymous 
to cyberstalking if the perpetrators and the victims reside in different locations, this 
study found evidence to the contrary.638 In effect, this study found that although the 
police officers who were interviewed for the study were willing to investigate 
cyberstalkers, they were nevertheless frustrated by the fact that the six perceived law 
enforcement difficulties which have been highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively 
will hinder police officers in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
In addition, the findings of this research are to some extent, opposed to those of 
DreBing and his colleagues who conducted an online survey of 6,379 participants on 
the prevalence of cyberstalking.639 The research findings of DreBing and his 
colleagues revealed that most cases involved former partners and concluded that legal 
authorities should take cyberstalking seriously given that the negative impact of 
                                                          
637 ibid 
638 Ibid 
639 Harald DreBing, Bailer, Anders, Wagner and Gallas , ‘Cyberstalking in a Large Sample of Social Network Users: Prevalence, 
Characteristics, and Impact Upon Victims Cyberspsychology, Behaviour and Social Networking (2014) 17 (2) 
<http://www.cs.vu.nl/~eliens/sg/local/cyber/social-stalking.pdf > accessed 30 January 2018 
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cyberstalking is similar to online stalking. The findings of the current research run 
slightly counter to the view of DreBing and his colleagues given that it found that 
domestic violence cases were not the highest category of cyberstalking cases that 
London police officers investigated but was the second highest category of cases that 
had been prosecuted. In contrast, the research found that the cyberstalking of 
strangers was the highest category of cases investigated by UK police officers.  It 
should be noted that the research of DreBing and his colleagues were confined to the 
German jurisdiction and comprised of a large population sample that consisted of 
members of the public. Whereas in comparison this study was confined to the UK 
jurisdiction and consisted of a much smaller population sample comprising of law 
enforcement officials.  
 
From a legislative perspective, the findings of this study concur with the views of 
Hazlewood and Koon-Magnin, who examined the legislation on cyberstalking and 
cyber harassment within the 50 states of the US with a view to establishing a clear 
definition for cyberstalking and cyber harassment. Their findings too suggest that the 
investigation of cyberstalking and cyber harassment is synonymous with a lot of 
challenges ranging from the anonymity of cyberstalkers to jurisdictional issues.640  
 
Furthermore, the findings of this research, reflect the recent views of the Crown 
Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
following publication of their report findings on 5 July 2017 concerning how the police 
and the CPS tackle stalking and harassment. The report found that there is no single, 
                                                          
640 Steven. Hazelwood and Sarah Koon-Magnin,, ‘Cyberstalking and Cyber Harassment Legislation In the United States: A Qualitative  
 Analysis’  (2013)  7 IJCC 2    
 <http://www.cybercrimejournal.com/hazelwoodkoonmagninijcc2013vol7issue2.pdf>  accessed 29 September 2017 
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consistent definition for stalking.641 However, the findings of this thesis are to some 
extent, at odds with the conclusion of the inspectorate because it reveals that the 
police officers and prosecutors interviewed for the study are keen to prosecute  
cyberstalkers but acknowledged that they will encounter several difficulties during the 
investigation of cyberstalkers. The Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary inspected 112 cases of stalking and 
harassment and established that the cases had not been dealt with effectively. It is 
important to note that the findings of this research were identified prior to the 
publication of the inspectorates’ report.  
 
5.5   Theoretical implications 
 
The qualitative research method was applied to the study. This method afforded the 
researcher the opportunity to conduct the research and to gain an insight of the 
 cyberstalking phenomenon from the subjective perspective of the participants.642  In 
doing so, the researcher applied the epistemological assumption which postulates that 
the most effective way to understand a phenomenon is to recognize that there is no 
single unitary reality apart from our perceptions given that each individual has a point 
of view and experiences a different reality.643 This approach enabled the researcher 
to analyse the various subjective views of the 63 law enforcement officials.  
 
                                                          
641 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in fear-the police and CPS  
    Response to Harassment And Stalking’, (CPS, 2017 ) <http://www.living –in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-
stalking,> accessed 10 July 2017. 
642Evelyn Jacobs, ‘Clarifying Qualitative Research: A Focus on Tradition’ (1988) 17 (1) Educational Researcher, 16 
643 Steven Krauss, ‘Research Paradigms and Meaning, Making a Primer’ (2005) 4 (10) Qualitative Research Report    
   <http://www.nsuworks.nova.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi> accessed 16 June 2016 
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The qualitative research method was effective because it allowed for the exploration 
of the participant’s views on the phenomenon of cyberstalking from a law enforcement 
perspective. A dual approach was adopted towards the analysis of data. The first 
phase entailed the researcher transcribing the interview transcripts and analysing the 
data segment by segment with a view to highlighting the key words in text. The first 
phase was the basis for the preliminary analysis of data and also entailed the breaking 
down and coding of data to confirm the key words in the textual data. This phase 
highlighted seventeen themes as the data was voluminous. The second phase of the 
research entailed categorizing the seventeen themes into seven main themes. This 
dual approach to data analysis was significant because it ensured that the data was 
analysed in detail.  
 
In addition to an analytical lens, the findings were considered from a theoretical lens. 
Hence, the deterrent theory was applied to the findings. From a historical perspective, 
the deterrence theory can be attributed to Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria.644  
Notably, Jeremy Bentham postulated that offences occurred from the conscious, 
rational considerations of the individual. According to Jeremy Bentham, a person 
contemplating the commission of a crime would undertake a cost-benefit analysis and 
would engage in a criminal activity only if potential benefits sufficiently outweighed 
expected costs. From a law enforcement perspective applying this line of reasoning to 
cyberstalkers who breach restraining orders in particular, it is arguable that such 
cyberstalkers continue to offend because after applying a cost-benefit analysis, they 
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believe that the gain of committing cyberstalking offences outweighs the risks or costs 
of committing such activities.645 
 
From a mental health perspective applying Bentham’s theory in this era of mental 
health awareness, it is arguable that there is a growing recognition that not all 
offenders have decided to commit offences after weighing up the benefits and costs 
of committing criminal acts given that some of them are mentally unwell. Worryingly, 
O’ Keefe asserts that the police and the public still have negative attitudes towards 
offenders with mental health problems.646 Furthermore, O’ Keefe argues that the 
awareness campaigns and additional training, which have previously been successful 
at reducing negative attitudes are probably not as effective as previously assumed. 
Angermeyer and Dietrich investigated public attitudes and beliefs towards people with 
mentally illness.647  From a positive perspective, Angermeyer and Dietrich argue that 
due to an increase in knowledge and awareness, the negative attitude towards mental 
health issues is decreasing.648 Likewise, Savrun, Arika, Usyal and others emphasize 
that factors such as personal experience, education, occupation or being female can 
result in a reduction in the negative stigmatisation towards the mentally ill.649 To this 
effect, the current campaign to increase awareness on mental health albeit in respect 
of the treatment of mentally ill stalkers and cyberstalkers implicitly is evidenced by the 
creation of the National Stalking Clinic in 2011 for the treatment and rehabilitation of 
offenders as previously discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.7. 
                                                          
645 It could be argued that the convicted cyberstalkers who breach restraining orders are not deterred by the imposition of restraining orders 
as a punishment 
646 Ciaran O’Keeffe  ’Attitudes Towards Offenders With Mental Health Problem’ (2015)   Journal of Mental Health Training 
<file:///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/JMHTEP-08-2014-
0023%20(1).pdf > accessed 20 January 2020 
647 Matthaias  Angermeyer, and S Dietrich ‘Public Beliefs About and Attitudes Towards People with Mental Illness: A Review of 
Population Studies’  (2006) 113 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 3 
648  Angermeyer and Dietrich  emphasise that the there is a perception that mentally ill individuals are unpredictable and dangerous which is 
attributable to the reasons why people fear the mentally ill 
649 Bayram Savru,  Mert Arikan , Kemal Usyal,  Omer Cetin, Borc Poyraz,  and others ‘Gender Effects on Attitudes Towards the Mentally 
ill: A Survey of Turkish University Students (2007) 44  Israel Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences 1 
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From a general perspective, applying the deterrence theory to explain cyberstalking, 
it might be argued that cyberstalkers are rational economic actors who engage in 
criminal activities after applying a cost-benefit analysis prior to offending. From a legal 
perspective, the challenge therefore for law makers is to enact laws which will make 
criminals decide that the risks, or costs, of engaging in cyberstalking activities is so 
great that it outweighs the gain from committing such a crime. 
 
Kennedy stresses that that the deterrence theory promotes communicating the 
deliberate threat of harm to the public in a bid to discourage socially proscribed 
conduct across societies.650 The researcher argues that some cyberstalkers as 
members of the public may not be deterred especially if they are anonymous. From a 
punitive perspective, Kennedy further highlights that punishment, as a means for 
conveying the deterrence message, creates inhibitions against committing crimes 
which are conscious and unconscious and results in continued societal compliance.651 
It is questionable whether this line of reasoning can be applied to cyberstalking as a 
cyberenabled crime given that the internet enables offenders to communicate 
anonymously and via the use of pseudonyms or fake details in a bid to avoid detection. 
Additionally, cyberstalkers can buy mobile phones for targeting victims which not 
require a registered name as a means of avoiding detection, investigation and 
prosecution.  This is issue was  highlighted by a participant who explained that he had 
been unable to prosecute some cases anonymous cyberstakers who victimized 
individuals via the use of unregistered SIM cards and pay as you go mobile phones 
                                                          
650 Kevin Kennedy ‘A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory’  (1983-1984)  88 Dick L. Review 
<http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&=&context=facpubs&=&sei-
redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.bing.com%252Fsearch%253Fq%253Ddeterrence%252Btheory%252Bof%252Bpunishme
nt%252Band%252Bcybercrime%2526FORM%253DA>accessed 24 November 2019 
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because their identities could not be unmasked.  Therefore, Hazelwood and Koon-
Magnin highlight that it makes additionally difficult to identify and track offenders, and 
can further worsen the fear and apprehension felt by the victim, who may not know 
who is harassing, stalking or cyberstalking him or her implicitly.652   
 
From a different punitive perspective, Smith and Bailey emphasise that severity and 
certainty of punishment are two additive factors which are suggested by the deterrence 
theory.653  Crucially, Smith and Bailey assert that when punishments are severe and 
administered with certainty, maximum deterrence results.  The findings of this study 
demonstrate that a minority of the participants were frustrated at the perceived 
leniency of sentencing which some cyberstalkers received. Hence applying Smith and 
Baileys’s reasoning, it can be argued that some cyberstalkers may continue to offend 
if the punishment that they receive is not severe enough to deter them from future 
continuous offending.  
 
Draper emphasizes that Jeremy Bentham’s theory of punishment postulates that 
sentences should be proportionate to the crime committed.654 Similarly, Tomlinson 
notes that the classical deterrence theory posits that punishments should be swift, 
certain, and proportionate to the crime in order to effectively deter individuals from 
committing crimes.655 Given that the findings of the study reveal that the participants 
shared frustration at the lenient sentencing dealt to cyberstalkers it could be argued 
that such participants were frustrated because, they were of the view that the 
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sentences given to some cyberstalkers were not proportionate to the offences 
committed. However, in the current research the participants did not highlight delays 
and uncertainty of punishments as issues which frustrate them in the investigation of 
cyberstalkers.  
 
Further Tomlinson in highlighting the basic principles of classical theory, 
acknowledged that Cesare Beccaria advocated for laws that were clearly written and 
for enlightening the public on the law and its applicable punishments  to educate 
people about the consequences of their behaviour.656  The findings of this thesis reveal 
that the participants shared the perception that cyberstalkers still offended especially 
in domestic violence cases despite the criminalization of stalking and cyberstalking 
implicitly by the amended PHA. 
 
In light of the above observations, there are two theoretical assumptions based on the 
deterrent tenet on how punishment may deter cyberstalkers. The first assumption is 
that the certainty of punishments and increasing the likelihood of punishment may 
deter people from engaging in criminal conducts. The second theoretical assumption 
is that the severity of punishment for a particular crime may influence a behaviors if a 
potential offender concludes that the punishment is so severe, that it is not worth the 
risk of getting caught. Hence, Mungan, explores whether the certainty of punishment 
is a more severe deterrent than the severity of punishment.657   
 
The findings further revealed that the participants expressed frustration at anonymous 
cyberstalkers who cannot be  prosecuted or issued harassment warning notices 
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because their identities are unknown The finding additionally  revealed that some 
police officers lack the knowledge required to unveil the identities of anonymous 
cyberstalkers. From a punitive perspective, it can therefore be argued that  even if the 
punishment in the UK for committing cyberstalking are swift and severe, the measures 
would not deter anonymous cyberstalkers who continue to offend because some of 
the law enforcement officials lack the specialist knowledge that is required to unveil 
the identities of the offenders.   
 
The findings further highlighted that the participants expressed frustration at 
cyberstalkers who continue to offend after they have been convicted by breaching 
restraining orders.658 This finding therefore demonstrates that cyberstalkers who 
breach restraining orders are not deterred by the threat of punishment hence their 
decision to continue to victimise individuals. Given that the participants expressed 
frustration  that some victims do not report offences because they lack confidence in 
the criminal justice system, it is arguable that the threat of certain and swift 
punishments for engaging in cyberstalking offences may not deter certain  
cyberstalkers if they know that victims will not report the offences especially if the 
cyberstalkers are anonymous.  This is more so because, a participant highlighted a 
case which involved a cyberstalker who breached the terms of a restraining order by 
contacting a victim and subsequently murdering her. The case therefore demonstrated 
that the punishments imposed on certain criminals such as cyberstalkers, may not 
deter them from committing further offences if the offenders are determined to 
persistently victimise individuals regardless of the threat of punitive sanctions.   
 
                                                          
658  The participants were frustrated because they were of the view that cyberstalkers who persistently offend, waste the time of criminal 
justice officials who have and prolongs the ordeal of victims 
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From a technological perspective, the internet enables cyberstalkers to communicate 
instantaneously, anonymously, cheaply and globally. Therefore, in light of the above 
research findings with regards to cyberstalkers breaching restraining orders, 
victimisation by anonymous cyberstalkers and underreporting by victims, it is 
questionable from a theoretical perspective whether the deterrence theory can be 
applied to cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime. Hence, Taddeo acknowledges 
that the success of cyber deterrence is greatly reduced by factors such as anonymity, 
global reach and the inter-connectedness of information networks.659 Notably, Taddeo 
argues that these factors can render the success of cyber deterrence entirely 
ineffective.  
 
From a law enforcement perspective, it may be difficult to police cyberstalking as a 
cyber-enabled crime because it is a transnational crime. Hence, Brenner and 
Scherwta emphasise that the fact that cybercrime transcends national boundaries 
causes investigative issues because the procedural laws that govern the conduct of 
criminal investigations only apply to the countries which enacted the laws.660 
Therefore, Brenner and Scherwta examine the legal issues emanating from the use of 
computers ranging from legislative to evidential issues.661  
 
From an international perspective, Jingiong highlights that the current system of 
cooperation between countries is inefficient for dealing with international issues arising 
from cybercrime given that the electronic evidence of cybercrime can be easily 
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damaged and therefore, requires countries to promptly obtain evidence.662 Applying 
Jingiong’s reasoning to the cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime, it is arguable 
that UK police officers will encounter the international issues highlighted by Jingiong 
in the investigation of cybercrime more especially, given its transnational nature. 
Therefore, Grabosky emphasizes that transnational cybercrime will always be a 
challenge partly due to the borderless nature of cyberspace particularly in relation to 
organized criminal groupings.663  
 
Given the above, Strancu and Andrei stress that cybercrime is a grave issue which 
requires a strong technical and legal response.664  Strancu and Andrei therefore 
highlight that cyber criminals are permanently developing new and ingenious methods 
to hack into systems. Given that cyberstalking is a cyber-enabled aspect of cyber-
crime Strancu and Andrei’s line of reasoning can be applied to cyberstalkers who 
sometimes, hack into the computers of victims.  
 
5.6   Summary of the research 
 
The ability of UK police officers and prosecutors to bring cyberstalkers to justice is 
contingent on whether they can successfully prosecute the perpetrators given that 
cyberstalking is an anonymous behaviour which is perpetrated in the virtual world. 
 
The researcher has provided the findings from the two perspectives of i) identifying 
the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors in London of the factors which 
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frustrate them in the investigation prosecution of cyberstalkers and ii) establishing 
what could be considered the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. The 
findings reveal that participants shared the perception that six factors impede the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The findings further reveal that the 
participants identified various thresholds of acceptable behaviour viewed through the 
lens of their own professional experience. 
 
Therefore, the four pronged, objectives of the thesis are important because; 
1 The objectives identify the perceptions of police officers and prosecutors on 
cyberstalking and the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking. 
2 The objectives examine the factors which police officers and prosecutors perceive 
could frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
3 The objectives explore the challenges that police officers perceive impede the risk 
assessment of cyberstalking victims  
4 The objectives investigate whether police officers and prosecutors perceive 
evidential challenges, lack of resources and lack of training as presenting law 
enforcement difficulties. 
 
 
 
5.7. Strengths and limitations of the research 
 
5.7.1 Strengths 
 
Extensive information reinforcing credibility of the data  
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The seven themes of investigative difficulties were established via a breakdown of the 
primary data obtained from the interview transcripts (n=55) of the police officers and 
prosecutors. Additional data was obtained from the four transcripts of UK law 
enforcement officials. The large amount of data collected ensured that the data was 
credible and this was reinforced when theoretical saturation was reached during the 
interview process.  
 
Recruitment of prominent law enforcement officials 
 
The research involved participants who were top ranking law enforcement officials. 
Two of the four additional senior UK participant law enforcement officials were involved 
in the criminalisation of cyberstalking at the time of the study. The first senior law 
enforcement official was a prominent member of parliament who was appointed by the 
coalition government to chair the independent parliamentary inquiry on stalking. The 
participant was able to provide views based on first-hand experience from legislative, 
investigatory and governmental perspectives. 
 
The second senior law enforcement official is an Assistant Chief Constable and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers Lead on stalking and harassment in the UK. Due 
to the prominent nature of his job, the participant was able to provide detailed data 
based on his experience in investigating cyberstalkers. 
 
The third prominent law enforcement official who was interviewed is the former chief 
executive of the national probation service who was a part of the independent 
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parliamentary inquiry on stalking. The participant provided data from the perspective 
of a probation official.  
 
The fourth UK law enforcement official recruited is a senior policy advisor for the 
Northern Ireland government who assists the Northern Ireland government in drafting 
laws. The participant contributed to the study from the perspective of a government 
official who assists in the drafting of government policies. The participant was 
responsible for assisting the ministry of justice legislatively by conducting researches 
and reporting back to governmental officials on proposed legislative changes. The 
participant confirmed that in Northern Ireland, at the time of the study the current 
legislation on harassment was still being used to prosecute stalkers and cyberstalkers 
because there was no specific legislation on either stalking or cyberstalking in 
Northern Ireland. The participant further indicated that although some London 
representatives of stalking charities had lobbied the Northern Ireland government for 
legislative changes, at the time of the study, the public prosecution service in Northern 
Ireland was content with the current law on harassment as a tool for the prosecution 
of cyberstalkers.  
 
In addition to the above, the researcher interviewed three senior borough crown 
prosecutors who provided significant data from a prosecutorial perspective. The 
findings of the study highlight that the police officers and the prosecutors share 
common views regarding the difficulties that law enforcement officials face in the 
investigation of cyberstalkers and the law enforcement methods of international 
cooperation. 
 
362 
 
Diverse sample based at different work locations 
 
As previously mentioned, the participants consisted of 25 police officers, 30 
prosecutors and 4 UK law enforcement officials. The participants were based in 
different London office locations and had varied law enforcement backgrounds. 
Consequently, they were able to answer the research questions from various 
professional viewpoints which reflected their different experiences, and this enriched 
the data gathered.  
 
 
 
 
5.7.2 Limitations  
 
The study is significant because it investigates the perceptions of police officers and 
prosecutors in London of the factors which frustrate them in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers and the threshold of acceptable behaviour on the internet. 
Nevertheless, it has four limitations; 
 
Research Bias  
 
Given that the researcher has been employed by the CPS for over fifteen years, the 
researcher was aware that her professional background could lead to bias and prevent 
the participants from fully discussing the factors which frustrate them in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. Therefore, bias was a limitation of the 
study.  As previously discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.1 bias is present in all research 
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and is difficult to eliminate.665 Hence, Barusch, Gringeri and George emphasise that 
some researchers have conducted their studies to minimize bias given the pervasive 
effects of human limitations and subjectivity which may impede the potential objectivity 
of social work research.666 Consequently, to address the limitations of the study 
regarding bias with a view to conducting a rigorous study, the researcher implemented 
several measures. This more so because, Mark and Poon stress that existing 
sampling methods can produce biased outputs and stress that existing sampling 
methods require modifications to alleviate the bias.667 Additionally, Mackieson, 
Shionsky and Connolly acknowledge that there are criticisms of bias regarding the 
lack of rigour in qualitative research that is conducted by social researchers.668 
Therefore, they highlight that academics have indicated that in reality, bias may occur 
because of varied value assumptions in the conduct of any method of research.669  
 
The research bias issues that were discussed in paragraph 3.1.1 did not arise 
because the researcher developed a professional rapport with the participants who 
felt comfortable in her presence and were therefore willing to discuss the perceived 
difficulties that they encounter.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
As previously discussed in detail in Chapter 3, (section 3.2), the researcher adopted 
several measures in a bid to eliminate bias. The measures ranged from recruiting 
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participants from different CPS and MPS offices who had never worked with the 
researcher to writing and asking neutral questions. The researcher implemented the 
above measures to avoid deviation from the truth and to ensure that the study was 
credible given that some of the participants were her colleagues.  
 
In conclusion, Connell, Lynch and Warring highlight that the limitations of qualitative 
research partially depends on the researcher’s standpoint given that the constraints 
could be easily regarded as the inherent strengths of the methodology.670 As 
previously discussed in Chapter 3, (section 3.2), given that the researcher’s 
epistemological assumption recognizes that multiple realities exist, her standpoint 
enabled her to conduct the study from a phenomenological perspective after 
implementing several measures to minimize the research limitation of bias which 
resulted in the study generating rich data.  
 
 
 
 
Potential Unequal Power Balance 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, (section 3.2), the researcher was aware that her 
role as an interviewer might result in an unequal power balance. Therefore, Haworth 
suggests that in police interviews, the roles of participants are unequal in relation to 
the distribution of power.671  Further, Karnieli-Miller and Strier stress that during the 
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personal collection of data, the aim of the interviewer is to create an environment that 
is welcoming and nonthreatening environment in which the interviewees are willing to 
share personal experiences and beliefs.672 Additionally, Karnieli-Miller and Strier 
emphasise that an unstructured, informal, anti-authoritative, and non-hierarchical 
atmosphere can fuel the feeling of intimacy via which the qualitative researcher and 
participants establish their relations in an atmosphere of power equality.673 
 
Given the above observations, in conducting the interviews, the researcher was aware 
that as an experienced employee of the CPS who has been employed for fifteen years 
given her institutional status, her role as an interviewer may be perceived as 
controlling. Consequently, to maintain the balance of power and control between 
herself as the interviewer and the participants, the researcher implemented five 
strategies to ensure that the participants disclosed information without challenging the 
interviewer. 
 
The strategies,  (discussed in detail in Chapter 3, section 3.2), are establishing a 
rapport with the participants, listening attentively to their responses, being empathetic, 
seeking clarifications in a sensitive manner and not being judgmental. The strategies 
were significant because, given that the participants had institutional status too as 
investigative and prosecutorial law enforcement officials, there was a risk that the 
dynamics of the discourse could have been affected by their institutional roles and 
relative knowledge on the research topic. Consequently, Haworth argues that factors 
such as the institutional roles of participants, the discursive roles assigned to them 
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and their relative knowledge are factors which can affect the dynamics of power and 
resistance in a discourse.674  
 
The population sample is confined to the London region of the UK jurisdiction 
 
The third limitation is that the population sample is confined to the London region of 
the UK jurisdiction. The researcher has therefore addressed the research issue as it 
affects London police officers and prosecutors.  The researcher makes it clear that 
she has confined her findings to the London region of the UK jurisdiction because 58 
out of the 63 law enforcement officials resided in London. The prosecutors and the 
police officers who took part in this study are based in different MPS and CPS London 
offices. Consequently, the viewpoints of the participants are reflective of the police 
officers and the prosecutors who work in different regional London offices of the MPS 
and the CPS.  
 
Given that the population sample primarily consists of police officers and prosecutors, 
the views of the participants are not a national representation but rather, a 
representation of a selected sample of UK law enforcement officials. Consequently, it 
must be kept in mind that the conclusions drawn from the thesis reflects the views of 
only a cross section of London police officers and prosecutors and their results must 
be viewed as such. Nevertheless, the sample consisted of police officers and 
prosecutors from London departments of the MPS and the CPS and the data provided 
new insight to issues faced by both police officers and officers of the CPS in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
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The participants were recruited on a voluntary basis. Although some of the participants 
had different work backgrounds such as extradition, domestic violence, serious 
organised crime, cybercrime and sexual offences, they shared common views on the 
factors that hinder the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers.   
 
The researcher stopped interviewing when theoretical saturation was reached. This 
indicated that the participants had certain commonly held views and at this point that 
no new insights were coming through the interview data.   
 
Representatives of the ISPs did not take part in the study  
 
A fourth limitation is that the researcher could not contact Google, Facebook or Twitter 
officials as there was no apparent means of contacting representatives of the ISPs 
directly for research purposes. Consequently, the subjective views of the Facebook 
and Twitter officials were not obtained.  
 
Gul and Ali highlight that it might be a challenge to recruit and retain research 
participants.675 Therefore, they argue that an understanding of challenges and the 
issue that hinder the recruitment and retention of participants will enable researchers 
to devise strategies to overcome the barriers.676  
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Given the above observations, the researcher acknowledges that it was unrealistic in 
anticipating that representatives of the ISPs would participate in the study.  
 
5.8   Future Research 
 
It has been highlighted that in the last decade, researchers, law makers, policy 
officials, and law enforcement agencies have focused on cyberstalking.677 Vasiu and 
Vasiu however suggest that although there is an extensive body of literature on the 
topic which identifies cyberstalking as a very serious problem, cyberstalking is 
nevertheless, not examined adequately in light of the rapidly evolving technologies 
which give perpetrators unprecedented capabilities.   
 
There is currently no universal definition of cyberstalking.678  From a law enforcement 
perspective it is arguable that the lack of a universal definition of cyberstalking 
indicates that cyberstalking is not perceived to be a grave criminal behaviour justifying 
the regulation of the conduct via legislation. Griffiths therefore highlights that 
cyberstalking will only be considered a serious deviant behaviour when the conduct 
crosses over to physical stalking.679   
 
Against the above background, further research is required because there has not 
been much research focus on cyberstalking in comparison to stalking.680 To this effect, 
Vasiu and Vasiu argue that although some research has been conducted on 
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cyberstalking in the last decade, more research is required to examine the 
cyberstalking phenomenon in light of technological advancements.681  
 
From a risk assessment perspective, the findings of the current research indicate that 
there is a requirement for further research in this area based on a population sample 
comprising of law enforcement officials to investigate why cyberstalkers breach 
restraining orders and if anonymous cyberstalkers may be risk assessed based on 
their digital footprints. The findings of this research demonstrate that the police officers 
and prosecutors encounter several problems in the investigation of cyberstalkers that 
are magnified if the cyberstalkers cannot be risk assessed.  
 
From a domestic violence perspective, the current study provides evidence that 
insinuates that lack of disclosure by domestic violence cyberstalking victims especially 
under reporting, can frustrate police officers and prosecutors in the investigation and 
prosecution of cyberstalkers.  Hence, Maran and Varetto’s investigation of the motives 
of victims to report stalking and cyberstalking incidents implicitly to the police revealed 
that under reporting was a law enforcement issue.682 From a geographical perspective, 
Maran and Varetto’s report found that victims in larger cities were less likely to report 
offences than victims in smaller cities. 
 
From a cultural perspective, the findings of this research reflect the views of DeMatteo 
and his colleagues that there is a varied perception of cyberstalking.683 However, 
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the research findings unlike the findings of DeMatteo and his colleagues, do not 
identify areas of disagreement between public perception and statutory case law 
or the number of participants who were of the view that cyberstalking should be 
treated as a distinct offence from stalking. This is because this study was based 
on a smaller sample size which consisted of police officers and prosecutors 
whereas DeMatteo’s study comprised of a national sample of 303 participants who 
completed an online survey and demographic questionnaire which covered the 
participants perceptions about the scope of cyberstalking as a crime in addition to 
other matters.684  A significant law enforcement aspect of DeMatteo’s study is that 
it illustrates that the US public preferred other means of penalizing cyberstalkers 
to the imprisonment of cyberstalkers whereas the findings of this study provided 
data on the prosecution of cyberstalkers and revealed the perceived factors which 
hinder police officers and prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of 
cyberstalkers.  
 
In summary given that cyberstalking is an aspect of cybercrime, it is evident from the 
study as  previously discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.3.5 that the inability of police 
officers to risk assess anonymous cyberstalkers is a factor which hinders them from 
identifying, monitoring and managing the risks posed by certain cyberstalkers. 
 
 It is also evident from the study that lack of evidential disclosure by domestic violence 
cyberstalking victims can hinder police officers and prosecutors from bring offending 
cyberstalkers to justice. This is more so if the behaviour of victims prevents them from 
realising that they are in danger from anonymous cyberstalkers especially because 
                                                          
684 ibid 
371 
 
due to lack of knowledge on cyberstalking victimisation, they are oblivious to the  
potential risks that they face which could lead to fatalities. More research is therefore 
required in this area to assist policy makers in implementing the correct measures with 
a view to ensuring that strategies are developed to unmask the identities of 
anonymous cyberstalkers with a view to bringing them to justice. Additionally, research 
is required on how the evidential issue of lack of disclosure by domestic violence 
cyberstalking victims can be tackled with a view to risk assessing and managing the 
risks to victims.  
 
5.9 Reform  
 
The issue of cyberstalking is an aspect of cybercrime that is currently reported by the 
UK media albeit in relation to hate crime and the online victimization of politicians or 
celebrities especially. Hence Mason highlights that the former Prime Minister Theresa 
May ordered an inquiry into the intimidation of Members of Parliament during the last 
general election.685 From a celebrity perspective, on 12 September 2019, BBC One 
broadcast a moving documentary by Jesy Nelson a member of the UK girl band 
Littlemix who has been a victim of cyberbullying for many years. In the documentary, 
Ms Nelson narrated the nature of the victimisation she suffers, the impact on her health 
and the coping strategy that she has implemented to survive the victimisation. In the 
documentary, Ms Nelson revealed that she attempted suicide to escape her ordeal 
and was speaking out to help other victims. The documentary generated a lot of public 
debate on cyber bullying and cyberstalking. Hence, Pandey highlights how the 
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documentary enlightens victims on how to cope with cyber bullying and cyberstalking 
implicitly.686 
 
Given that the findings of this study indicate that UK police officers and prosecutors 
share the perception that they will encounter several perceived problems in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers, the researcher makes several 
recommendations for the government, MET, CPS and the EU to implement best 
practices and quintessential policies with a view to tackling the identified perceived 
difficulties.  
  
The researcher has a strong law enforcement ground for proposing the 
recommendations listed below given that the study was based on the subjective and 
varied views of experienced law enforcement officials who identified the several 
problems that they will encounter in the prosecution of cyberstalkers.    
 
Against this background, the researcher makes the recommendations listed below for 
the implementation of best practices and model policies.  
 
5.10 Recommendations for the Government 
 
5.10.1 Creation of a centralised cyberstalking unit within the existing cybercrime 
units 
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The findings of the study highlight that a separate cyberstalking unit staffed with 
computer experts is required to facilitate international cooperation. The researcher 
therefore recommends that a centralized body be established within existing 
specialised cyberstalking units with a view to ensuring that law enforcement officials 
obtain the information, assistance and guidance that they require in the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers. It is anticipated that the creation of a centralized cyberstalking unit 
staffed with officials who have specialist knowledge on cyberstalking will afford UK 
police officers the opportunity to liaise directly with computer experts on cyberstalking 
via telephone or email correspondence during the investigation process. 
 
The National Cyber Crime Unit is the primary body tasked with providing a response 
to cybercrime in the UK.687 It has been highlighted that the unit works with the Regional 
Organised Crime Units, the Metropolitan Police cyber Crime Unit, government and 
international law enforcement.688 It would appear that the National Cyber Crime Unit 
was established to collaborate with partners with a view to investigating the most 
serious incidents of cybercrime and coordinating a national response to the previously 
identified common cyber threats. It is therefore debatable whether cyberstalking will 
be recognized as a common cyber threat. 
 
In the UK, the National Crime Agency set up in the year 2013 as a non-governmental 
law enforcement organization currently deals with cybercrime as an aspect of serious 
organized crime689. The organization tackles cybercrime from a consumer perspective 
and highlights seven common cyber threats ranging from phishing to key logging 
                                                          
687 ibid 
688  ibid 
689 ‘National Crime Agency’ (NCA, 2017) <www.nationalcrimeagency.co.uk >accessed 21 January 2018 
374 
 
which the agency specifically investigates. Given that cyberstalking is not listed as one 
of the common cyber threats, the researcher recommends that a centralised 
cyberstalking unit should either be created within the National Crime Agency or 
independent of any existing governmental institution. The researcher further 
recommends that the units are equipped with experienced cybercrime officials who 
will offer UK police officers assistance in obtaining, preserving and analysing the digital 
evidence that they require in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
5.10.2. Increasing public awareness on cyberstalking via government 
participation in   the annual UK National Stalking Awareness Week   
 
The researcher recommends increasing public awareness on cyberstalking via 
government participation in the annual UK National Stalking Awareness Week. From 
a comparative perspective, a measure which was adopted in the US to combat stalking 
and arguably cyberstalking is the annual broadcast of the presidential proclamation of 
the National Stalking Awareness month to commence the yearly event. To this effect 
in January 2015, the eleventh observance of the National Stalking Awareness Month 
was marked on a national and local level. This event resulted in several agencies, 
individuals and groups across the US engaging in various innovative activities to 
commemorate the day.690 The most recent proclamation was signed on January 2016 
by Barak Obama as the previous president of the United States.691  
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In the UK, an equivalent National Stalking Awareness Week was started in the year 
2011 with a view to raising awareness on the behaviour of stalking and the protection 
of victims and to assist in the training of professionals on the new legislation.692 The 
researcher recommends that the UK government adopts a similar approach to the US 
government when opening the UK National Stalking awareness week that commences 
annually in April. This recommendation will ensure that there is a governmental input 
in the annual UK National Stalking week thereby, boosting the confidence of victims 
and members of the public in the government efforts to tackle stalking and 
cyberstalking implicitly.  
 
3 The creation of a single definition for cyberstalking 
 
The creation of a single definition for cyberstalking is required as there is currently no 
single specific definition for cyberstalking in the UK. Despite the two new offences 
which were created under the amended PHA, the limitation of the new legislation is 
that s2 (3) of the PHA does not expressly define cyberstalking but rather highlights 
examples of stalking activities which implicitly encompasses activities that constitute 
cyberstalking. Hence, her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and her Majesty’s 
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate highlighted that there is no single accepted 
definition of stalking which implicitly includes cyberstalking.693 The inspectors made 
their observation from a perspective which demonstrates that there is a connection 
between the lack of a clear definition for stalking and the low number of reported 
crimes and prosecutions in the UK. 
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Given that the research participants gave different definitions for cyberstalking, the 
researcher further recommends that the PHA should be expanded to include a specific 
offence of cyberstalking which will make it easier for police officers and prosecutors to 
establish that an offence has been committed. In effect, if the PHA is expanded to 
specifically include cyberstalking, it will enable UK police officers and prosecutors to 
arrest and charge perpetrators for the specific offence of cyberstalking as opposed to 
the similar but different offences of harassment and stalking.  
 
3 The provision of resources   
 
The researcher recommends that resources in terms of finance, tools and manpower 
should be provided to equip police officers in the investigation of cyberstalkers. This 
is more so because it has been highlighted that the UK government is to invest £1.9 
billion in new automated cyber security defences and further highlighted that this was 
an indication that the UK government intended to enhance cyber security and protect 
public institutions and ministries.694 Consequently, Patel and Elgot emphasise that due 
to the fact that the growing online threat was putting national and personal security at 
risk, the former chancellor Philip Hammond had announced that the financial 
resources will be utilised for three purposes. The purposes are to protect citizens and 
businesses by enhancing automated defences, to assist the cyber security industry 
and to prevent attacks from offenders.695 Given the observations, it is debatable 
whether cyberstalking as an aspect of cybercrime will be prioritized as a serious 
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offence hence the recommendation for resources to be provided to equip the police 
officers in the investigation of cyberstalkers specifically. It is anticipated that such a 
measure will enable police officers to effectively investigate the perpetrators.  
 
In light of the above, it is arguable that cyber security is the primary focus of the 
government as opposed to cyberstalking due to the fact that in the current political 
climate, cyber security is geared towards protecting national security and public safety 
as opposed to cyberstalking which could be perceived as an aspect of cybercrime 
which merely leads to the invasion of an individual’s privacy. This observation is 
buttressed by the fact that it was recently reported that Ciaran Martin the UK head of 
the National Cybersecurity Centre has warned that a major cyber-attack in the UK 
which could disrupt British elections and infrastructure is inevitable.696 The observation 
was made from a perspective which highlights that such a national attack is anticipated 
in the next two years. 
 
 
 
5.11 Recommendation for the Police  
 
5.11.1 Provision of training 
 
The research findings indicate that a lack of trained police officers can constitute an 
impediment to the investigation of cyberstalkers. The researcher therefore suggests 
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that police officers and staff at the front line should be given in depth, mandatory 
training on how to investigate cyberstalkers.   
 
The training should highlight the impact of cyberstalking on victims to ensure that 
police officers when investigating cases and the judiciary when sentencing 
cyberstalkers fully, appreciate the adverse impact that cyberstalking has on the lives 
of victims. In effect, the training should also address the legislative and evidential and 
extradition requirements that need to be satisfied in the prosecution of cyberstalkers. 
 
From the perspective of liaising with other organizations, the researcher recommends 
that the Metropolitan Police Service addresses the issue of lack of police training by 
relying on the support of relevant private organisations and charities to train police 
officers.697 Against this backdrop, Miller suggests that training, education and a 
willingness to collaborate are measures which can address the problem of a limitation 
in police response to the issue of cyberstalking.698 
 
5.11.2. Enhance police awareness on the risk assessment of victims and  
   cyberstalkers 
 
The researcher recommends that the head of the National Police Chief’ Council lead 
on stalking and harassment should introduce measures which will enable police 
officers to identify, monitor and manage the risks posed by anonymous cyberstalkers 
especially to victims. The researcher recommends that such measures should include 
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the provision of specialist risk assessment training for all police officers which will be 
linked to their professional development. The researcher also recommends that an 
aspect of the specialist training should focus on the risk assessment of mentally ill 
cyberstalkers who require medical assistance to enable police officers to promptly 
identify such offenders on arrest.  
 
5.11.3. Recruitment of more staff   
 
Given that the research found that shortage of manpower and the allocation of 
unmanageable caseloads were investigative issues, the researcher recommends that 
the Metropolitan Police Service takes prompt steps to ensure that more police officers 
are recruited. The significance of the recommendation is that it will ensure that there 
are enough police officers to investigate cyberstalkers effectively, follow up on initial 
complaints and complete the risk assessments of victims with a view to protecting 
them.  
 
5.11.4. Continued Strengthening of the Single Point of Contact System to 
promote risk the risk assessment of victims 
 
To ensure that cases are effectively progressed, the researcher recommends that the 
single points of contact regularly liaise with one another with a view to bringing 
offenders to justice. From a performance monitoring perspective, the researcher 
recommends that the existing Single Points of Contact (SPOC) should introduce a 
system for monitoring performance levels across all areas in order to identify cases 
that were not successfully prosecuted after consultation with the SPOCs and to 
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establish solutions to identified problems. This recommendation will ensure that future 
cases are successfully prosecuted if highlighted investigative issues are addressed.  
 
In making the above recommendation, the researcher acknowledges that in 2017, the 
CPS and the MPS introduced a Stalking Single Point of Contact in response to Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service 
Inspectorate  report on the police service’s and Crown Prosecution Service’s approach 
to tackling crimes of harassment and stalking.699 The researcher further acknowledges 
that since this research took place, the CPS and the National Police Chiefs’ Council 
have strengthened the Single Point of Contact for the investigation and prosecution of 
stalking offences to ensure that the police and CPS leads on stalking fully understand 
the requirements and expectations of the role.700 The researcher is further aware that 
the national stalking protocol requires each police force and CPS Area to appoint a 
single point of contact (SPOC) for stalking to enhance effective and early consultation 
between the police and the CPS.701  
 
The researcher additionally acknowledges that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate in their 
critical findings of their joint report, highlighted that the SPOC should include close 
liaison with third-sector organisations that provide support to victims of stalking and 
cyberstalking implicitly.702  From a risk assessment perspective, the researcher further 
                                                          
699  ‘CPS Response to HMIC/HMCPSI Joint Thematic Inspection of Harassment and Stalking Offence’ (CPS publications, 5 July 2017) 
<www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps response to hmic hmcpsi harassment stalking report> accessed 8 August 2017 
700 As previously discussed, the measures were introduced following Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her 
Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate inspection and report 
701 Protocol on the appropriate handling of stalking offences between the Crown Prosecution Service & ACPO’ (CPS, 2014) 
<www.cps.gov/publications/agencies> accessed  2 December  2019 
702 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate And Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in Fear-The Police and CPS 
Response to Harassment And Stalking’ (CPS, 2017)  < www.living–in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking> 
accessed 10 July 2017 
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recommends that while liaising with third-sector organisations that provide support to 
victims of stalking and cyberstalking implicitly, the SPOC in all areas should make the 
risk assessment of victims a primary priority  to ensure that appropriate measures are 
implemented to protect  victims. 
 
5.11.5 Introduce of a standardized cyberstalking incident form  
 
To ensure that cyberstalking cases are investigated effectively, the researcher  
recommends that a centralised cyberstalking police incident form should be introduced 
for all the police forces to ensure that local intelligence on convicted cyberstalkers are 
collated on a database. The introduction of such a measure will enable police officers 
to have a centralised access to data on known offenders and will make it easier to an 
extent for police officers to access the relevant intelligence data on UK cyberstalkers. 
At the time of the study, there was no evidence of the existence of such a form.  
 
The researcher recommends that the cyberstalking police incident form should 
complement the existing checklist for stalking cases which was introduced in the year 
2009 as a risk identification tool.703 
 
5.11.6 Establish a local a specialized telephone investigation unit in all police 
forces 
 
To tackle the issue of investigative delays, the researcher recommends that a 
dedicated telephone investigation unit is created in the various police stations and that 
                                                          
703 ‘Checklist For Stalking Cases (2009)’ (Paladin, 2014) <www.paladin.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2012-2013-stalking-checklist-
pdf > accessed 23 January 2018 
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a timetable is drawn up for actions to be completed with a view to speeding up the 
investigation process. From a domestic perspective, the researcher proposes that a 
specific official based at a single telephone investigative unit should be employed to 
analyse the phone and email data of cyberstalkers in a bid to reduce the red tape 
involved in this aspect of the investigation process. The researcher recommends that 
such a unit is introduced within the existing specialised cybercrime units with a view 
to introducing a consistent approach to conducting telephone investigations relating to 
cyberstalking.  
5.12   Recommendation for the CPS 
 
5.12.1. Provision of mandatory and refresher training  
 
The researcher acknowledges that the CPS on 5 July 2017, announced that it will 
update the Stalking and Harassment e-learning and make it mandatory for all 
lawyers.704 To ensure that there is a consistent approach to the prosecution of 
cyberstalkers, the researcher recommends that the CPS continues to provide 
mandatory courses on the prosecution of cyberstalkers.   
 
Additionally, the researcher recommends that the CPS provides refresher training 
courses at regular intervals. Currently, the CPS has online training courses which 
enlighten prosecutors and other employees on the legislative and evidential aspects 
to the prosecution of cyberstalkers since the creation of two stalking offences under 
the amended PHA. However, the findings of the study indicate that prosecutors will 
                                                          
704 ‘CPS Response to HMIC/HMCPSI Joint Thematic Inspection of Harassment and Stalking Offences’ (CPS, 5 July 2017) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps_response_to_hmic_hmcpsi_harassment_stalking_report.pdf> 
accessed 1 January 2020 
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benefit from refresher training courses on the prosecution of cyberstalkers given that 
the online training was not mandatory at the time of the study. This is more so given 
that the publication of her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and her Majesty’s 
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate revealed that there is a danger of stalking 
offences being prosecuted as harassment cases.705 
 
 
5.12.2. Creating the role of specialist cyberstalking Prosecutors  
 
The findings of the study revealed that there were no specialist cyberstalking 
prosecutors at the time of the study and that prosecutors routinely reviewed cases on 
cyberstalking when required. The researcher therefore recommends that the distinct 
role of specialist cyberstalking prosecutors should be introduced to ensure that a 
consistent approach to the prosecution of cyberstalkers is promoted given the 
Adverse effects of cyberstalking on victims. 
 
5.12.3. Raising staff awareness on prosecution of cross jurisdictional 
cyberstalking  
 
Given that most of the cyberstalking cases which were reviewed by the participants, 
were domestic cases as opposed to cross-jurisdictional cases, the researcher 
recommends that the CPS embarks on an increased staff awareness campaign on the 
                                                          
705  HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Living in fear-the police and CPS 
Response to Harassment and Stalking’, (CPS, 2017) <www.living–in-fear-the-police-and-cps-response-to-harassment-and-stalking > 
accessed 10 July 2017 
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prosecution of cross-jurisdictional cyberstalking to ensure that all prosecutors are 
equipped to review such cases from an international perspective when required.  
 
The researcher further recommends that there should be an increased public 
awareness campaign on how specialist prosecutors can liaise with the ISPs and global 
law enforcement agencies in the prosecution of cross-jurisdictional cyberstalkers.  
 
From an EU perspective, despite the fact that the UK is in the process of leaving the 
European Union, there is still a legal requirement for UK law enforcement officials to 
apply the relevant EU directives or regulations on the deviant behaviour of 
cyberstalking when required.706 This is more so, given that cyberstalking is a cross-
jurisdictional criminal behaviour and that some countries are yet to enact legislation 
on the regulation of cyberstalking. The significance of the above recommendation is 
that if implemented, it will ensure to some extent that prosecutors adopt a consistent 
approach in the application of relevant EU legal measures when reviewing cross-
jurisdictional cyberstalking cases amidst the Brexit negotiations.  
 
It is important to note that the CPS recently took some measures to raise staff 
awareness on harassment and stalking which implicitly includes cyberstalking. To this 
effect on 24 January 2018, the CPS notified the London staff via email of the updated 
legal guidance on harassment and stalking. The guidance is significant because it 
statutorily defined the offences of harassment and stalking, highlighted the relevant 
cases laws and set out the relevant legal principles. Additionally, the guidance 
highlighted the police and CPS response to the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
                                                          
706 ‘Rights and Obligations of European Union Membership’ (Government, 2016) 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/files/516501>  accessed 31 July 2017 
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Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate report on 
the response of the police and the CPS to stalking and harassment.707  
 
Further, on 23 February 2018, the CPS additionally notified staff via email of the new 
guideline that has been published by the sentencing council in relation to the offence 
of domestic violence.708 From a cybercrime perspective, the notification was made 
from a standpoint which indicates that the updated domestic violence guideline is 
significant because it acknowledges that perpetrators can utilise information and 
communication technology such as the email, text, social networking sites and GPS 
trackers to target victims.  
 
5.13 Recommendation for the EU  
 
5.13.1. Enactment of an EU directive on cyberstalking 
 
Given the cross-jurisdictional feature of cyberstalking and that the UK is still in the 
process of leaving the EU, the researcher recommends the introduction of an EU 
directive requiring member states to assist in the investigation of cross-jurisdictional 
cyberstalkers. The researcher anticipates that the introduction and implementation of 
such a specific legislative measure will ensure that the member states play a more 
significant role in the investigation of cross-jurisdictional cyberstalkers resident within 
and outside the EU respectively. As discussed below from a legislative perspective, 
                                                          
707  ‘Harassment and Stalking London Legal Guidance’ (CPS, 2018) 
<www.infonet.cps.gov.uk/infonet_live/announcements/pages/sentnecing >accessed 23 February 2018 
708 ‘New Sentencing Council Guidelines on Domestic Abuse’ <www.inonet.cps.gov.uk/infonet_live/ 
announcements/pages/sentencing > accessed 23 February 2018 
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the researcher acknowledges that the EU have taken certain measures to criminalise 
cybercrime and stalking which implicitly includes cyberstalking offences.  
 
From a regulatory perspective, the European Union directive on the European 
Protection Order is the only European legislative measure which specifically 
addresses stalking.709  It is arguable that the directive encompasses the related 
criminal behaviour of cyberstalking. The directive stipulates that domestic criminal 
protection orders are applicable in other member states across the European Union. 
Although the European Protection Order constitutes a legal basis in the European 
Union which enables a member state to recognize a criminal protection order granted 
in another member state, its effectiveness has been criticized on two grounds. The 
first ground is that it has very restricted applicability given that only stalking victims 
who move to another member state and who are still in danger can benefit from the 
European Protection Order.710 The second ground is that it does not alter the fact that 
there are significant variations in the types of protection that are available for stalking 
in the different states within the European Union.711  
 
From the perspective of preventing violence against women on 21 May 2011, the 
Council of Europe introduced the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence. The convention is 
significant because it categorically highlights stalking as a criminal behaviour.  
Specifically, Article 34 of the convention requires states to regulate stalking via 
                                                          
709 Suzanne Van der Aa and Renee Romkens , ‘The State of The Art In Stalking Legislation: Reflection On European Developments’ 
    (Pure, 2013) <ww.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1573109/The_state_of_the_art_in_stalking_legislation_final.pdf> accessed 10 August 2018 
710 ibid 
711 ibid 
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legislative measures and implicitly, cyberstalking which is a hybrid of stalking.712 Van 
der Aa and Romkens highlight that in defining stalking, the explanatory report to the 
convention explains that spreading untruthful information online can constitute 
stalking.713  
 
From a historical perspective, the researcher acknowledges that in 2001, the Council 
of Europe adopted the Convention on Cybercrime.714 It was anticipated that the 
decision of the Council of Europe to draft an international Convention on Cybercrime 
would promote the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime on a global scale. The 
Convention on Cybercrime is a significant law enforcement strategy because it 
addresses the criminalization of cybercrime, the application of local steps to enhance 
the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime and the grounds for the investigation 
and prosecution of cybercrime.715  
 
From a critical perspective, the convention makes no reference to cyberstalking as an 
aspect of computer crime. However, Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the convention regulate 
some stalking behaviours that can incorporate global cyberstalking.716 The Articles 
deal with instances when a stalker illegally accesses the computer of a victim, illegally 
intercepts the electronic communication of victims, intentionally destroys the data 
stored on the computer of a victim and vandalises the computer of a victim. From an 
international law enforcement perspective, this four-fold approach to expressly 
                                                          
712 ‘Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence’ (COE, 12 April 2011)  
<www.rm.coe.int/168046031c> accessed 15 January 2018   
713  Suzanne Van der Aa and Renee Romkens ‘The State of the Art in Stalking Legislation Reflection on European Developments’ (Pure, 
2013) <www.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1573109/The_state_of_the_art_in_stalking_legislation_final.pdf >accessed 10 August 2018 
714 ‘Convention on Cybercrime’ (Europa, 23 November 2001) <www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/ documents > accessed 15  
     January 2018 
715 Suzanne Van der Aa, ‘International (Cyber) Stalking, Impediments to Investigation and Prosecution’ (Pure, 1 January 2011)  
    <www.pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1310512/Aa_International_cyberstalking_110216_posprint_embargo_1_y.pdf >  accessed 10 August 2018 
716 Convention on Cybercrime’ (Europa, 23 November 2001) <www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/ documents > accessed 15  
     January 2018 
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criminalizing stalking behaviours which implicitly constitute cyberstalking offences is a 
step in the right direction. 
 
From an academic perspective, Maple and Lang emphasise that there is a need to 
protect the rights of vulnerable cyberstalking victims in particular at an EU level given 
the effects of cyberstalking on victims, the anonymous nature of the offence and the 
fact that that cyberstalkers can victimise from behind closed doors.717  Consequently, 
Maple and Lang question why cyberstalking was not included in the list of crimes that 
were highlighted by the European Commission after it implemented on 18 May 2011, 
its proposal for directive 2012/29/EU which will define minimum standards on the 
rights, support and protection of victims of vulnerable crimes.718  Notably, Maple and 
Lang argue that the EU has a special responsibility to victims of cyberstalking given 
the cross-border feature of the crime and the fact that the ISPs and website owners 
especially may be situated in different member states.  Hence, it has been highlighted 
that Brexit might afford the government an opportunity to act given that at present, 
social-media companies are not currently liable primarily as a result of an EU directive 
that classifies them as merely hosts of online contents.719  
 
 
5.13.2. The creation of a universal definition for cyberstalking  
 
                                                          
717 Carsten Maple and Richard Lang (20102) ‘Vulnerability, Victims and Free Movement: The Case of Cyberstalking 3 New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 2 
718 On  12 September 2012 and 4 October 2012 respectively, the directed was adopted by the European Parliament and by the Council of 
ministers 
719 ‘Chuka Umunna Fears Being Pushed Off a Tube Platform’ (BBC, 13 December 2017) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics> accessed 14 
December 2017 
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There is currently no universal definition for cyberstalking despite the fact that in the 
year 2010, the European Commission analysed the laws on stalking in the European 
member states.720  The fact that the European Commission did not specifically address 
the related issue of cyberstalking in its analysis, arguably indicates that cyberstalking 
is yet to be deemed a distinct serious deviant behaviour warranting criminalization on 
an EU scale.  
 
The researcher acknowledges that Article 34 of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence obliges 
signatory states to criminalize stalking and cyberstalking implicitly.721  The convention 
came into force in was implemented in 2013 and is the only convention that refers to 
stalking.  Given that the convention does not specifically refer to cyberstalking and that 
members states have found to hold different perceptions of what constitutes stalking, 
the researcher recommends that there should be a universal definition of cyberstalking 
by the EU. It is arguable that the EU can introduce an EU directive on cyberstalking 
especially which will require member states to enact domestic legislation to give effect 
to the terms of the cyberstalking directive. At the time of the study, Article 34 of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women 
and Domestic Violence appeared to be the only directive which has so far been 
introduced by the EU with a view to harmonising the law on stalking and cyberstalking 
implicitly.  
 
                                                          
720 ‘Feasibility Study to Assess The Possibilities, Opportunities and Needs to Standardise National Legislation on Violence Against  
     Women, Violence Against Children And Sexual Orientation Violence’ (Europa, 2010) 
     <www.ec.europa/justice/funding/daphne3/daphne-feasibility-study-2010-en-pdf (accessed: 13 January 2018)    
721 Convention on Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (12 April 2011, COE) 
<http://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168046031c> accessed 2 January 
2020 
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In light of the above, from a critical perspective, Van Der Aa asserts that the wordings 
of article 34 of the Convention are poor particularly concerning their stress on the 
consequences of the stalking for the victim.722  Van Der Aa argues that the requirement 
that the stalking should have caused the victim to fear for his or her safety is an 
especially high threshold that leaves victims unprotected. Further, Van Der Aa 
emphasises that although the members do not appear to be in violation of article 34, 
their perception of what constitutes stalking sometimes digresses from the intentions 
of the Convention. 
 
The researcher anticipates that the creation of a universal legislation will promote 
legislative uniformity across the various global jurisdictions. Such a global legislative 
measure is required in light of the fact that physical proximity is not a barrier to 
cyberstalking.723  
 
5.14 Conclusion 
 
The research in this thesis described the qualitative investigation of the perceptions of 
London Based police officers, prosecutors and UK law enforcement officials regarding 
the factors that frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. In 
doing so, the research further sought to establish what these legal professionals 
understand to be the threshold for distinguishing rudeness, abuse and unpleasant 
comments on the internet from cyberstalking. Additionally, the research sought to 
                                                          
722 Susan Van Der As ‘New Trends in the Criminalisation of Stalking in the EU Member States’  (2018)  European Journal of Policy Res 
723   ibid 
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identify the perceived challenges that participants believe impede the risk assessment 
of cyberstalking victims. 
 
The findings from this research demonstrate that police officers and prosecutors 
identify six law enforcement difficulties factors which will potentially hinder them in the 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The findings also reveal that police 
officers and prosecutors identified several perceived thresholds of acceptable 
behaviour online and these were dependent on the area of their own professional 
practice. Finally, the results of the study reveal that the anonymity afforded to 
cyberstalkers by the internet is an impediment to the risk assessment of victims and 
cyberstalkers.  
 
The research is unique because the findings are based on the subjective viewpoints 
of experienced police officers and prosecutors practicing in the UK. The results 
reported in this thesis matter because from the perspective of victims, they highlight 
that if the identified investigative problems are not addressed by the relevant 
stakeholders, the problems could result in cyberstalkers evading justice and also, both 
victims and cyberstalkers not being properly risk assessed.  
 
The research contributes five important findings which add knowledge to the field of 
cyberstalking as an aspect of cyber enabled crime. The findings are linked to the 
anonymity of cyberstalkers as a hindrance to the risk assessment of victims, under 
reporting as an impediment to the risk assessment of victims and victim behaviour as 
an obstacle to the prosecution of cyberstakers in domestic violence cases.   
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The first finding asserts that police officers cannot risk assess victims with a view to 
protecting them if they are being harassed by anonymous cyberstalkers whose 
identities cannot be revealed due to a lack of specialist knowledge on how to unmask 
their identities. The participants additionally revealed that police officers cannot risk 
assess anonymous cyberstalkers with a view to establishing the risks that they pose 
to victims if their identities cannot be unmasked. Importantly, the research found that 
the issue of anonymity has been exacerbated by the fact that some anonymous 
cyberstalkers use unregistered pay as you go mobile phones and SIM cards to avoid 
detection thereby, evading prosecution.  
 
The second finding that was made by the research is that the issue of under reporting 
hinders police officers investigating and risk assessing victims because police officers 
can only investigate offenders if they are notified of cyberstalking incidents via formal 
complaints. The finding is relevant because it draws attention to the fact that under 
reporting results in police officers not being able to risk assess victims and 
cyberstalkers if they have not been made aware that offences have been committed 
by offenders.  
 
The third relates to the behaviour of victims in cyberstalking cases involving domestic 
violence which can lead to various issues which ultimately hinder the successful 
investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. The behaviours include; disclosure 
issues, the refusal of victims to attend court, the decision of victims to cross 
communicate with offenders and the decision of victims to have intermittent 
relationships with offenders. 
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In addition to the above, the research found that police officers and prosecutors shared 
the perception that legislative difficulties, lack of knowledge and training, lack of 
resources, risk assessment challenges, evidential challenges and victim behaviour are 
factors which frustrate them in the investigation and prosecution of cyberstalkers. This 
finding adds to knowledge because it confirms from a dual investigative and 
prosecutive perspective that police and prosecutors in London hold the view that the 
identified difficulties need to be resolved to enable them bring offenders to justice, 
protect victims and deter offenders. 
 
The fifth finding that was made by the research is that there are various thresholds of 
acceptable behaviour online and how it is distinguished from cyberstalking. The finding 
is relevant because it reveals that police officers and prosecutors consider 
cyberstalking as criminal behaviour which can be associated to a single threshold of 
acceptable online behaviour. The finding adds to this field of knowledge because at 
the time of the research, no study had been carried out on the joint perception of police 
officers and prosecutors on the threshold of acceptable online behaviour which 
distinguishes and cyberstalking as a cyber-enabled aspect of cybercrime.  
 
In sum, this thesis has, through the research context highlighted key perceived, 
investigative, problems namely anonymity, under reporting and victim behaviour which 
prevent police officers and prosecutors from risk assessing victims and cyberstalkers 
with a view to protecting victims and gauging the risks posed by cyberstalkers. 
Consequently, this thesis argues that it is vitally important for the relevant stakeholders 
to implement measures, such as those suggested in this thesis that will address the 
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highlighted difficulties and smooth the way to successful investigation and prosecution 
of this cyber-enabled crime.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix One      
(a) Email text of the CPS granting access to the CPS sample of prosecutors 
      Gateway Research Message 
Ms Ori Igwe is a CPS employee who is currently studying for a PhD on the international 
prosecution of cyber stalkers at the Ealing Law School of University of West London 
under the supervision of Professor Malcolm Davies and Dr Phillip Elliot-Wright.  The 
research has been approved by Jean Ashton who is the Area Business Manager of 
CPS London. The CPS has authorized Ms Igwe to interview 50 London Crown 
prosecutors during the course of her research. The doctoral study has also been 
approved by the research department of the London Metropolitan Police Force.   
The research is seeking to build on the experience of Crown Prosecutors who have 
dealt with such cases. As part of her research, Ms Igwe is seeking to interview 50 
London Crown prosecutors on an anonymous basis with a view to identifying the 
challenges faced by Crown prosecutors in the cross- jurisdictional prosecution of cyber 
stalkers. The interviews will last for approximately 20 minutes and Ms Igwe is prepared 
to meet with the interviewees at a time and place that is convenient for them. She has 
so far interviewed 35 police officers, senior members of parliament, probation officials, 
American law enforcement officials and Eurojust officials. The findings will be 
published on completion of the research and will contribute towards policy debate in 
this area. If you are able to help please contact Ms Igwe on 07971670497 or her CPS 
mentor Mr Kris Venkansarmy, district crown prosecutor. 
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(b) Email text of the Metropolitan Police Force granting the researcher access 
to the police officers  
 
From: Jessica.Brander@met.pnn.police.uk 
[mailto:Jessica.Brander@met.pnn.police.uk]  
On Behalf of Research@met.pnn.police.uk 
Sent: 14 May 2012 11:10 
To: Igwe Ori 
Subject: Research into cyberstalking 
  
Hi Ori, 
Just to keep you updated, we have looked at your protocol, and your work seems very 
interesting and certainly of use to the MPS. As you are fully vetted, there should be no 
issues in getting you access to MPS sites, employees or data, however we may need 
to verify that you are indeed vetted (would you have any proof of this to send to us?) 
just to be sure. Both Stewart and I are currently waiting for a reply from Sam Faulkner 
and someone in SCD6 so that we can help you get access to the right people. If we 
do not receive a reply by the end of the week, I will start chasing people up. I hope 
that is alright. 
Thanks, 
  
Jess 
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(c)  Email from Professor Stanko- Metropolitan Police Service College of 
policing requesting that the researcher shares her research work 
From: "Research@met.police.uk“ 
To: Ori Igwe 
Sent: Thursday, 6 December 2012, 15:55 
Subject: MPS Work with the College of Policing: Sharing Research Knowledge 
Dear Colleague, 
As someone who has grounded your research within the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS), I am writing to ask if you would agree to share this work with the wider police 
family. I am aware that some of the fruits of your work may already be in the public 
domain through the peer review academic route, such as publications in books or 
articles, but we would like to extend this. 
As you may know, this December saw the launch of the national College of Policing 
(formerly the National Policing Improvement Agency - NPIA). The College will retain 
many of the original responsibilities held by the NPIA, and may lose others, but there 
is a strong commitment from the Home Office to improve the way policing uses 
research evidence: 
"The [College] will strengthen the links between the police service and other 
organisations. It will work with universities to share and develop the underlying 
evidence base for policing practice. It will work with other organisations, including with 
the private sector to ensure that, where appropriate, the police service is able to 
access the very best training from outside the police service. It will work closely with 
international partners, to ensure the police service is able to share and access the very 
best thinking from across the world." 
College of Policing: an Introduction (16.7.12) 
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: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police/college-of-policing introduction?-           
view=Binary 
In support of this mission, the MPS is changing the way it gathers, uses and shares 
research evidence. The MPS is working closely with the College of Policing to ensure 
that research knowledge is harnessed within the policing community and embedded 
into the way we work here in the Met. We aim to promote new research, but also 
encourage dialogue between policing, academia and the wider public about what 
works in policing. 
In order to achieve this, we are working with the College to create an easily accessible 
repository for research papers. You may remember completing the MPS research 
protocol when registering your research with Corporate Development (formerly 
Strategy and Performance and SRAU). This document permits us to share the details 
of your research within the MPS, through our intranet site and internal seminars. 
However, we would like to take this one step further and share the research more 
widely.  You have a few options of where the details may be shared and what is 
included. One, the information can be publicly available and accessed by anyone via 
the web. It is proposed that a table will be published in the public domain and within 
the policing community, with a list of research outlines, key findings, author details and 
PDF links to each report.   Two, the information can be available only within the 
national policing community via POLKA; and three, your information can be made 
available only within the MPS, as initially agreed.  In the future we will be explicit that 
any research completed in the MPS will be available to all those within the police 
community. 
I have noted below a series of options for you to consider with respect to the research 
that you registered with us. Please could you indicate whether you would be happy for 
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your details and that of your research to be published, including any other conditions? 
Also, if publication rights make it impossible to share your findings externally, please 
could you provide us with an abstract and link?  Leave the appropriate line displayed, 
deleting the others: 
 I consent to my research outline, author/supervisor details and 
findings to be published on the public College of Policing website 
  
 I consent to my research outline and author/supervisor details 
being published on the public College of Policing website, but do 
not consent to my findings being published. Please elaborate 
(e.g. awaiting clearance, time restrictions etc) The link to the 
findings as follows: ______________________________ 
  
 I consent to my research outline, author/supervisor details and 
findings to be published on a website accessible only to the 
national police service and associated organisations (e.g. Police 
Online Knowledge Area -POLKA). 
  
 I consent to my research outline and author/supervisor details 
being published on a website accessible only to the national 
police service and associated organisations, but do not consent 
to my findings being published. Please elaborate (e.g. awaiting 
clearance, time restrictions etc). The link to the findings is as 
follows: ______________________________ 
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 I do not consent to my research outline, author/supervisor 
details or findings to be published on a website accessible 
outside the MPS 
  
If we do not hear from you by 15 January 2013 we will exclude your research from 
the POLKA website.  
Please send all responses to: research@met.police.uk 
Kind Regards, 
  
Professor Betsy Stanko  
Corporate Development  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Empress State Building, Lillie Road,  
London, SW6 1TR 
Total Policing is the Met's commitment to be on the streets and in your communities 
to catch offenders, prevent crime and support victims. We are here for London, 
working with you to make our capital safer. 
  
Consider our environment - please do not print this email unless absolutely 
necessary. 
NOTICE - This email and any attachments may be confidential, subject to copyright 
and/or legal privilege and are intended solely for the use of the intended recipient. If 
you have received this email in error, please notify the sender and delete it from your 
system.  To avoid incurring legal liabilities, you must not distribute or copy the 
information in this email without the permission of the sender. MPS communication 
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systems are monitored to the extent permitted by law.  Consequently, any email and/or 
attachments may be read by monitoring staff. Only specified personnel are authorised 
to conclude any binding agreement on behalf of the MPS by email. The MPS accepts 
no responsibility for unauthorised agreements reached with other employees or 
agents.  The security of this email and any attachments cannot be guaranteed. Email 
messages are routinely scanned but malicious software infection and corruption of 
content can still occur during transmission over the Internet. Any views or opinions 
expressed in this communication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). 
  
Find us at: 
Facebook: Facebook.com/metpoliceuk 
Twitter: @metpoliceuk 
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Appendix   Two 
 
Consent Form 
Consent for Participation in Interview Research  
 I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Ms Ori Igwe from 
University of West London who is currently employed by the Crown Prosecution.  I 
understand that the project is designed to gather academic information about 
international law enforcement cooperation and the prosecution of cyber stalkers.  I 
will be one of approximately 30 people being interviewed for this research.  
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for 
my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without 
penalty. If I decline to participate or withdraw from the study, will be told.  
 2. I understand that most interviewees in will find the discussion interesting and 
thought-provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview 
session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview.  
3. Participation involves being interviewed by academic   researcher Ori Igwe.  The 
interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes. Notes will be written during the 
interview. An audio tape of the interview and subsequent dialogue will be made. If I 
don't want to be taped, I will notify the researcher.  
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using 
information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant 
in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject 
to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and 
institutions.  
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5. Colleagues will not be present at the interview or have access to raw notes or 
transcripts. This precaution will prevent my individual comments from having any 
negative repercussions.  
6. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by the 
research department of the London Metropolitan Force and the Crown Prosecution 
Service.  
 7. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me and I voluntarily 
agree to participate in this study.  
8. I have been given a copy of this consent form.   
  ____________________________ ________________________  
 My Signature                                                                 Date My Printed/Name 
Signature of the Investigator   Ms Ori Igwe 
For further information, please contact   Ori Igwe on 07971670497 
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Appendix Three 
Interview Questions  
Interviews with police officers 
 
Question 1: Briefly outline your experience to date with law enforcement to do with 
cyber stalking? 
Question 2: Have you received any training on cyber stalking? 
 Question 3: What is your definition of cyber stalking? 
Question 4: What in your opinion are the issues with the definition of cyber stalking 
that needs to be addressed? 
Question 5: What criminal category will cyber stalking be prosecuted under? 
Question 6: What in your opinion is the threshold for distinguishing between 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet and cyber stalking? 
Question 7: What difficulties do the police face in the cross- jurisdictional 
investigation of cyber stalkers? 
Question 8: As far as you are aware, what legislation do the police rely on to 
investigate cyber stalkers when it comes to cross jurisdictional cases? 
Question 9: How effective do you think that the laws against cyber stalking are in the 
country? 
Question 10: What are the existing extradition arrangements specifically relating to 
cyber stalking with: 
(a) The US? 
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(b) The Republic of Ireland? 
 Question 11: To what extent from your experience do you think that the extradition 
arrangements are effective in the cross- jurisdictional investigation of cyber stalkers? 
Question 12: What problems are you aware of that hinder the cross-jurisdictional 
investigation of cyber stalkers? 
Question 13: What strategies are in place to combat cyber stalking and the illegal 
activities on the internet? 
Question 14:  Can you give examples of inter-jurisdictional co-operation with this kind 
of crime? 
Question 15: What are the real practical difficulties with dealing with this type of 
crime?                    
 
Interviews with prosecutors  
 
Question 1: Briefly outline your experience to date with law enforcement to do with 
cyber stalking? 
Question 2: Have you received any training on cyber stalking? 
Question 3: What is your definition of cyber stalking? 
Question 4: What in your opinion are the issues with the definition of cyber stalking 
that needs to be addressed? 
Question 5: What criminal category will cyber stalking be prosecuted under? 
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Question 6: What in your opinion is the threshold for distinguishing between 
rudeness, abuse and unpleasant comments on the internet and cyber stalking? 
Question 7: What difficulties do the prosecutors face in the cross- jurisdictional 
investigation of cyber stalkers? 
Question 8: As far as you are aware, what legislation do the police rely on to 
investigate cyber stalkers when it comes to cross- jurisdictional cases? 
Question 9: How effective do you think that the laws against cyber stalking are in the 
country? 
Question 10: What are the existing extradition arrangements specifically relating to 
cyber stalking with: 
(a) The US 
(b) The Republic of Ireland 
Question 11: To what extent from your experience do you think that the extradition 
arrangements are effective in the cross- investigation of cyber stalkers? 
Question 12: What problems are you aware of that hinder the cross-jurisdictional 
investigation of cyber stalkers? 
Question 13: What strategies are in place to combat cyber stalking and the illegal 
activities on the internet? 
Question 14:  Can you give examples of inter-jurisdictional co-operation with this kind 
of crime? 
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Question 15: What are the real practical difficulties with dealing with this type of 
crime? 
The interviews were conducted from four perspectives. 
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Appendix 4 
Total number of interviews  
Participants  Total number of 
Interviews  
Police officers 25 
Prosecutors 30 
Total  55 
                   
Participants  Total number of 
Interviews  
Member of 
parliament  
1 
Parliamentary 
research 
assistant  
1 
Probation 
official  
1 
Northern Ireland 
government 
adviser  
1 
Total  4 
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Participants  Total number of 
Interviews  
Assistant 
attorney general  
1 
Federal Secret 
Service Agent  
1 
Criminal Analyst  1 
Executive and 
founder of a 
cyberstalking 
charity  
1 
Total  4 
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Interview Protocol 
 
A The prosecutors’ perspective 
 
The interviews provided an opportunity for prosecutors to give detailed accounts of the 
difficulties that they face in the prosecution of cross jurisdictional cyber stalkers. It also 
enabled the Prosecutors to identify the measures which in their opinions, need to be 
put in place to address the challenges that they face. 
 
B   The police officers’ perspective 
 
The interviews provided an opportunity for police officers to highlight the investigative 
hurdles that they face in trying to investigate cross-jurisdictional cyber stalkers. In 
doing so, the police officers identified measures which might facilitate international  
co-operation in the prosecution of cyber stalkers. 
 
C   The government official’s perspective 
 
The interviews afforded a member of parliament and a Northern Ireland government 
adviser the opportunity to confirm from the perspective of a government official, the 
steps that ought to be taken by the government to ensure that cyber stalking is 
criminalized in the UK. 
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D The probation officer’s perspective 
 
The interview enabled the former chair of the national probation office to identify from 
the perspective of victims, the problems that hinder the UK law enforcement officials 
from prosecuting cyber stalkers after the crime has been criminalized in the UK.  
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Appendix 5 
STALKING ADVICE 
Following the successful All Party Parliamentary Stalking Law Reform Inquiry, 
stalking became a criminal offence in 2012. 
Stalking-Law-Reform-Findings-Report-2012 
Stalking is about fixation and obsession. It is a high risk factor for serious harm and 
homicide, as well as serious psychological harm if left unchecked. For this reason 
there are specific questions in the DASH about stalking and a subset of 12 Risk 
Screening Questions, S-DASH. 
(1) Stalking and harassment screening question (S-Dash)  
What if you are victim being stalking? 
If you have reported to the police and do not feel satisfied with their response, do not 
despair. If you answer positively to these questions, please take this checklist with 
you when you speak with the police and/or other agencies. 
1. Are you very frightened? 
2. Is there previous domestic abuse or stalking/harassment history? 
3. Have they vandalised or destroyed your property? 
4. Have they turned up unannounced more than three times a week? 
5. Have they followed or loitered near your home or workplace? 
6. Have they made threats of a physical or sexual violence nature? 
7. Have they harassed or stalked any third party since the harassment began? 
8. Have they acted violently towards anyone else during the stalking incident? 
9. Have they engaged other people to help with their activities? 
10. Has the stalker had problems in the past year with drugs, alcohol or mental 
health? 
11. Is the stalker suicidal? Is there last resort thinking/finality? 
12. Have they ever been in trouble with the police or do they have a criminal 
history? 
 
For further specialist advice and support please call: Paladin, the National Stalking 
Advocacy Service 020 3866 4107 
Link: https://www.dashriskchecklist.co.uk/stalking-advice/ 
        http://www.paladinservice.co.uk 
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(2) Stalking and Harassment Screening Questions (S-DASH) 
 
S-Dash (2009) Risk identification checklist for use in stalking and harassment cases  
 
Link 
:  
https://www.reducingtherisk.org.uk/cms/sites/default/files/resources/risk/StalkingAnd
HarassmentS-DASH.pdf 
 
(3) Joint NPCC and CPS Checklist – For Use by Police Forces and CPS in 
Cases of Harassment or Stalking  
 
Date:                                                        Officer in case:                       
Staff number:                                           Case reference:  
 
The Police are to complete each box on the Checklist and send to the CPS in every 
case where charging advice or a charging decision is sought.  The form is an 
important part of the evidential file - it should be fully and accurately completed. If the 
case also involves Domestic Abuse (DA) then the DA checklist should also be 
completed. This form does not replace the DA check list, but complements it. 
 
Ensure that: timely decisions are made; a charging checklist is completed for each 
complainant (where more than one is involved); and the overall allegation is 
considered through the assessment of all available evidence, including the role and 
behaviour of the suspect.   
 
The checklist does not replace the MG3, but should supplement it.  The CPS should 
comprehensively endorse the MG3 including addressing any evidential weaknesses. 
 
The safety of complainants, their friends, children and dependents is paramount. The 
risks to them must be carefully considered in these cases. Where possible, referrals 
to Independent Stalking Advocacy Caseworkers (ISACs), Independent Domestic 
Violence Advisors (IDVAs), or equivalent specialist service support should be made 
at the earliest possible opportunity. 
 
The Police must refer to the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice 
here.  
Further information about charging cases of stalking or harassment is available here. 
Further information charging cases of domestic abuse cases is available here... 
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POLICE OFFICER - Before starting this checklist have you collected all available 
evidence, and have you given consideration to the wider pattern of behaviour, its 
cumulative impact and the context of the behaviour? Please ensure that all 
documentation referred to in the checklist is included with the file i.e. risk assessments, 
statements etc. 
 YES NO COMMENT*  
In cases of stalking, there is a pattern of unwanted, 
fixated and / or obsessive behaviour which is intrusive. 
It could be harassment that amounts to stalking or 
stalking that causes fear of violence or serious alarm 
or distress. Have you considered why this case does 
not meet the description of stalking?   
  
       
Risk screening / risk assessment tool  
  
       
101 / 999 Call  
  
       
101 / 999 Call supplied to CPS Direct 
  
       
 Body Worn Video 
  
       
Complainant’s statement - refer to all previous 
incidents if relevant and the impact the behaviour has 
had on the complainant) 
  
      
Photographs; of tangible evidence such as damage 
and any injuries (taken over time as injuries develop). 
Photographs of perishable items i.e. flowers. Consider 
screenshots of text messages electronic 
communications etc. Consider CSI advice. 
  
      
Admissions – especially were admissions are made 
about contact via social media.    
      
Medical evidence / DNA (if available at the time); 
signed consent form; medical exhibits i.e. hair, 
presents  
  
      
Other statements – children, attending officer, 
disposition of complainant/suspect, IDs of other 
persons present, and if relevant neighbours, family 
members, doctors, employers and work colleagues as 
well as specialist support services  
  
      
Passive data/Comms data/Financial data e.g. data 
mining foot prints, social media/other electronic 
evidence, messages, diaries, spyware technology, 
apps, bank-records CCTV.  Check all devices for 
incoming and outgoing data, WIFI and cell site data, 
including spyware (NB:  communications data can be 
collected retrospectively from the service provide). 
  
      
 
Relevant information to include from Police Records. 
 YES NO COMMENT*  
Risk of reoffending. Any previous risk screening / 
identification checklist with outcome    
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Any civil orders/proceedings and whether there has 
been previous breaches in any previous case 
(including DVPOs / DVPNs/PINs/court bail). 
  
      
Any previous allegations (with URNs and including 
other complainants) and how these allegations were 
concluded (if case did not proceed why not?) DVDs. 
  
      
Police to inform CPS of any breach or further offences, 
submit files to CPS and supply interview record in a 
timely way. 
  
      
Were any firearms used?  Does the suspect or 
members of the household have a firearms licence or 
are there any intelligence reports linking the suspect 
and/or household members to weapons? 
  
      
Information regarding the complainant and/or incidents.   
 YES NO COMMENT*  
Victim Personal Statement; if the complainant wishes 
to provide one (which should be updated throughout 
case proceedings and include the impact). 
  
      
Safety of complainant (complainant’s views and 
specialist support service views if applicable).   
      
Whether complainant has been contacted by 
suspect/friends/family whether contact is supportive or 
intimidating – detail within comments section.   
      
Counter allegations/defence. 
  
      
Information to support an application for bad character 
  
      
Restraining Order – does the complainant want one 
and if so with what terms?   
      
Bail conditions that do not restrict the complainant and 
any children. Include locations to avoid.    
      
Withdrawing support/retraction. There may be a 
number of reasons why the police might be asked not 
to proceed further including fear of further harm or 
repercussions.  See CPS Legal Guidance for further 
information and steps to follow including the need for 
an officer’s statement on the appropriateness of a 
summons.  
  
      
Ability/willingness of complainant to attend court, give 
evidence and any special considerations.   
      
Special measures needed? And type (views of 
complainant and specialist support service) need to 
complete an MG2. 
  
      
* The comment box must be completed if no evidence available or if the section is 
not applicable  
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CPS Prompts for Prosecutors 
Prosecutors must refer to the CPS Legal Guidance on Stalking and Harassment 
  The table below provides some helpful prompts for prosecutors to consider and 
record in the MG3 and any case review 
 
Provision and gathering of wider information in addition to this evidence 
gathering checklist. 
If further evidence is required from the police ensure this is articulated in a clear 
and concise action plan, and discussed with the Officer as appropriate. 
Find out whether there are any concurrent or imminent public law or private law 
family proceedings or civil proceedings and remedies involving the complainant or 
suspect. 
 
Assessing the suspect/defendant.  
Consider in every case of harassment that is referred through if this is a case of 
stalking?  
Ensure timely applications for; admissions, hearsay evidence and/or bad 
character. 
Has the credibility of the defendant been fully considered?  E.g. Are there any 
previous instances of misconduct/convictions. Check CPS systems including 
CMS? 
Do any of the statutory defences apply? 
- Was the behaviour pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
crime;   
- Was it pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any 
condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment; or 
- In the particular circumstances of the case was the pursuit of the course of 
conduct reasonable? 
Are there any other possible defences? 
A plea to harassment  in place of one of stalking should only occur on the 
rarest of occasions. When considering the acceptability of pleas has proper 
consideration been given to CPS Legal Guidance and the Attorney General’s 
Guidelines?  
 
Victim and witness support following a decision to charge. 
Victim Personal Statement obtained and updated throughout the case progression. 
Timely consideration of; special measures, Pre-Trial Witness Interviews, expert 
evidence and other support measures. 
Identification and consideration of vulnerabilities (BME, physical or mental 
impairment, LGBT, age). 
On-going communication through Witness Care Units/other specialist services on 
case progression and any other useful information. 
Where there is a withdrawal or retraction; see CPS Legal Guidance for further 
information on the possible reasons including fear or coercion, which should be 
fully explored with complainant/WCU/Specialist support.  
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Appendix 6 
Codes 
Codes  Meaning 
ANON Anonymous 
CAOI Cyberstalker’s awareness of impact 
COM Content of message 
CP Cultural  Perception 
CU Central Unit  
CSAMI Cyberstalking and mental illness 
CAW Cannot access websites 
CELVIC Celebrity victims 
CO Claim ownership  
CROSCOM Cross Communicating 
CUP Cultural perception  
CNAP Cyberstalking not a priority 
CVP Cyberstalking via proxy 
DEDLI Deadline issues 
DVI Domestic violence issues 
DL  Different laws 
DEL Delays 
DISC Discontinued cases 
DOB Duration of behaviour  
DOC Definition of cyberstalking 
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ECC Establishing course of conduct  
EVID Evidential difficulties 
ELII Existing laws ineffectively implemented 
ECOD Establishing a course of conduct 
EXC Excessive caseloads 
FOC Facts of case  
FOR Fear of repercussions  
GOO Gravity of offence  
IOC Intent of cyberstalker* 
IOV Impact on victims  
INSE Insufficient evidence 
INS Insufficient specialist 
ISPI Internet Service Providers issues  
INSTFO Insufficient time to follow up on initial 
reports 
INTERM Intermittent Relationships* 
JURDI Jurisdictional difficulties  
LOA Lack of awareness  
LEG Legislative difficulties  
LENOT Length of time  
LD Legislative difficulties 
LOCD Lack of centralized database 
LOCU Lack of centralized units  
LOE Lack of experts  
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LOFD Lack of full disclosure  
LOK Lack of knowledge 
LOR Lack of resources  
LOT  Lack of training  
LOSU Lack of separate units  
LSL Lenient sentencing laws 
MOP Missed opportunities 
NAO Not regulated 
NOCD Not obtaining charging  decisions  
NLRISP No laws requiring Internet Service 
Providers to assist  
NOT No training  
NOSL No single cyberstalking law 
OEFDV Obtaining evidence from domestic 
violence victims 
OBT Objective test 
PCUP Proving cases under S4A of the  PHA  
PGU Poor global understanding  
PNPOE Police officers not providing outstanding 
evidence 
PCPFE Prosecutors chasing police officers for 
outstanding evidence  
PMIC Prosecuting mentally ill cyber stalkers 
RAC Risk assessment challenges  
ROC  Risk assessment of cyberstalkers 
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ROV Risk assessment of victims  
RSC Registered sim cards 
ROV  Reaction of victims  
ROB Restraining orders breached 
RET Red tape  
STD Statutory definition  
SUBT Subjective test  
SOM Shortage of manpower 
SPOC Single point of contact  
STL Statutory time limit for bringing offences 
TOAB Thresholds of acceptable online 
behaviour   
USC Unregistered sim cards  
UNDR Under reporting 
UNPUB Unrealistic public expectations  
VIB Victim behaviour* 
VNSP Victims not supporting prosecutions  
VRTT Victims refusing to testify 
VWA Victims withdrawing allegations  
UNDR Under reporting 
VLOC Victims lack of confidence in the police 
VNRI Victims not reporting incidents*  
VOV Vulnerability of victims* 
VCC Victims cross communicating* 
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VCRWC Victims continuing relationships cyber 
stalkers* 
VWI  Victims withholding information * 
*Coding that emerged from the application of the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and 
Felson, 1979) to the data 
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